July 11, 1862. |
July 25. |
August 1. |
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[444]
was called
from the West1 to Washington to serve in that capacity, and entered upon the duties of that office on the 23d of July.
Let us turn back a moment, and observe events at Richmond and on the Peninsula, remembering that spies in the employment of the conspirators, and aided by persons out of the Confederacy who were in sympathy with them, were almost hourly giving information to Davis and Lee of the aspect of affairs in the National camps and in the National councils.
Immediately after his arrival at Washington, General Halleck visited General McClellan
at Harrison's Landing, to obtain exact information of the state and prospects of the army there.
McClellan at first demanded of Halleck fifty thousand new troops to enable him to take Richmond, but finally agreed to make the attempt with an addition of twenty thousand.
After consulting with a council of general officers, a majority of whom, upon learning the actual state of affairs, recommended the withdrawal of the army from the Peninsula, Halleck hastened back to Washington, and there received a dispatch from McClellan, saying that a re-enforcement of at least thirty-five thousand men must be sent.
It was now evident at the seat of Government that the Confederates were preparing to move in force northward, and that it was not safe to send .any troops to the Peninsula.
The only alternative was to withdraw those that were there, and unite them with Pope's in covering Washington City.
Accordingly, on the 30th of July, Halleck telegraphed to McClellan to send away his sick (twelve thousand five hundred in number) as quickly as possible, preparatory to such movement; and on the third of August, when it was evident that Lee was preparing for a movement toward Washington in full force, Halleck ordered him to withdraw his army from the Peninsula immediately, and transfer it to Aquia Creek, on the Potomac.
That this might be done with the expedition demanded by the exigency of the case, McClellan was authorized to assume control of all the vast fleets of war-vessels and transports on the James River and Chesapeake Bay.
Already Burnside's army, which had been ordered from North Carolina, as we have observed,2 and was at Newport-Newce, had been ordered
to Aquia Creek.3
Informed of these orders, the conspirators determined to attempt the capture of Washington before the junction of the two armies could be accomplished; and this would have been done but for the valor of the little force left for its defense, directed by energetic officers whose hearts were deeply
1 See page 296.
2 See page 315.
3 We have observed that when it was first proposed to withdraw the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula, General McClellan placed himself in decided opposition to the measure. With every disposition compatible with the highest public good to give him an opportunity to recover what he had lost by disastrous slowness and indecision, the Government, when on the 17th he asked for Burnside's entire army in North Carolina to be sent to him, complied with his request. He “dreaded,” he said, “the effect of any retreat on the morale of his men ;” but it was evident that their courage was not easily broken, for he had just assured the Government that his army was “in fine spirits,” after one of the most distressing series of retreats on record. So late as the 28th of July, he urged that he should be “at once re-enforced by all available troops ;” and so earnest was he in insisting upon the wisdom of his own opinion, that he paid no attention to Halleck's order of the 30th, to remove the sick. When that order was repeated, on the 2d of August, he replied that, until he was informed what was to be done with his army, he could not decide what course to pursue with his sick, and added: “If I am kept longer in ignorance of what is to be effected, I cannot be expected to accomplish the object in view.” To this extraordinary dispatch Halleck simply answered, that it was expected that McClellan would have sent off his sick according to orders, “without waiting to know what were and would be the instructions of the Government respecting future movements ;” and that the President expected him to carry out instructions given him with all possible dispatch and caution.--McClellan's Report, page 155.
Halleck's orders for the transfer of the army to Aquia Creek were met by a protest on the part of McClellan on the 4th. He informed the General-in-Chief, at the time when Stonewall Jackson, with a force greater than Pope's, was massing at Gordonsville, preparatory to a movement in heavy force on Washington, that Pope's army was “not necessary to maintain a strict defensive in front of Washington and Harper's Ferry,” and that “the true defense of Washington” was “on the banks of the James, where the fate of the Union was to be decided.” He asked his superior to rescind the order, and assured him that if he did not, he should obey it “with a sad heart.” --McClellan's Report, page 154. Under the restraining influence of the kind-hearted President, Halleck wrote a long reply, rebutting McClellan's propositions and assertions, and adhering to his order to remove his troops as quickly as possible.
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