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Chapter 12: operations against Richmond.
- Movements of the Army of the James, 317.
-- seizure of City Point and its vicinity, 318.
-- operations in Southeastern Virginia, 319.
-- Confederate troops called from Charleston to the defense of Petersburg and Richmond, 320.
-- events between Petersburg and Richmond, 321, 322.
-- Union cavalry raid under General Kautz, 323.
-- advance of the Army of the Potomac from Spottsylvania Court
-- House, 324.
-- the armies on the North Anna in a race for Richmond, 325.
-- battle of the North Anna, 326.
-- the armies across the Pamunkey, 327.
-- the National troops at Cool Arbor, 328.
-- battle of Cool Arbor, 329, 330.
-- Grant resolves to cross the James River, 331.
-- preparation for the crossing, 332.
-- the passage of the James, 333.
-- the defenses of Bermuda hundred, 334.
-- attempts to capture Petersburg, 335.
-- attack on the Petersburg lines, 336.
-- operations against Petersburg, 337.
-- seizure of the Weldon railway, 338.
-- condition of the Army of the Potomac, 339.
-- Butler secures a lodgment at Deep Bottom, 340.
While
Meade and
Lee were struggling in the vicinity of the
Rapid Anna,
General Butler, then in command of the Army of the James, was co-operating with the Army of the Potomac in accordance with a plan which he had proposed to the
General-in-Chief, and which that officer had approved.
That plan contemplated a vigorous movement against
Richmond on the south side of the
James River, the first objective being
City Point, at the mouth of the
Appomattox River.
Grant issued
orders accordingly, and directed
General Butler to move simultaneously with
Meade.
Butler was well prepared for the execution of his part of the plan, when, at the beginning of May, he received orders to advance.
His effective force was about forty thousand men, and was composed chiefly of the Eighteenth Army Corps, commanded by
General W. F. Smith, and the Tenth Army Corps, which had lately been ordered from
South Carolina, led by
General Gillmore, who arrived at
Fortress Monroe on the 3d of May.
Butler's first care was to mislead the
Confederates concerning his intentions.
For that purpose he first sent
Henry's brigade of New York troops to
West Point, at the head of
York River, to begin the construction of wharves,
while cavalry made a demonstration in the direction of
Richmond.
He also sent the bulk of his army in that direction as far as the old lines of
McClellan1 at
Yorktown and
Gloucester Point; and so successful was the
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stratagem, that the
Confederates were satisfied that
Butler was about to move on
Richmond in the pathway trodden by
McClellan two years before,
2 and they made preparations accordingly.
They were quickly undeceived, but not until it was too late to prevent the mischief wrought by the deception.
On the night of the 4th,
transports, sent up from
Hampton Roads, conveyed
Butler's army around to the
James River, and by dawn the next morning, artillery and infantry, to the number of thirty-five thousand men, accompanied by a squadron of war vessels, under
Admiral Lee, were rapidly ascending that stream for the purpose of seizing
City Point.
3 At the same time
General A. V. Kautz, with three thousand cavalry, moved out from
Suffolk, forced a passage over the
Blackwater River, and, pushing rapidly westward, struck the Weldon railway at
Stony Creek, some distance south of
Petersburg, and burned the bridge there; while
Colonel Robert M. West, with about eighteen hundred cavalry (mostly colored men), advanced from
Williamsburg up the north bank of the
James River, keeping parallel with the great flotilla of war vessels and transports on its bosom.
This expedition, and the advance of the Army of the Potomac from the north, were grand movements preliminary to another dreadful struggle for the possession of
Richmond in the vicinity of the
Chickahominy River — a region made forever memorable by the seven days battles there, in the summer of 1862.
The expedition moved so unexpectedly and rapidly up the river, that the
Confederates could make no effective dispositions for opposing it. Portions of
Wilde's brigade of negro troops were landed at
Wilson's wharf, on the north side of the river, and at Fort Powhatan, on the south side, thus securing and holding, for the protection of its navigation, important points at bends in the stream.
On the afternoon of the same day,
Hink's division landed at
City Point, and took possession without any opposition.
That night
General Graham captured the
Confederate signal-station near, and the war vessels moved up to a position above the mouth of the
Appomattox.
At the same time a heavy force landed upon an irregular triangle of land at the mouth of the
Appomattox, lying between it and the
James River, called
Bermuda Hundred, and proceeded to cast up a line of intrenchments across the western side of the camp from river to river, while gun-boats in both streams completely covered each flank of the position.
Thus, in the space of twenty-four hours,
Butler gained a commanding and important foothold within fifteen miles of
Richmond, in a straight line, and only about eight from
Petersburg.
4 The movement was a complete surprise to the
Confederates,
[
319]
[
320]
and produced great consternation at
Richmond.
In the mean time the armed vessels had been busy in keeping the river open, and they now engaged in the perilous work of fishing up torpedoes, with which, in places, its channel had been sown.
Notwithstanding the great precautions observed, one of the smaller gun-boats, named
Commodore Jones, was totally destroyed by the explosion of one of these mines under it,
5 by which twenty of its officers and crew were killed, and forty-eight were wounded.
In the mean time
Colonel West, with his cavalry, had made his way across the
Chickahominy to the shore of the
James at
Harrison's Landing, and been taken thence, on transports, to
Bermuda Hundred.
A quick and vigorous movement upon
Petersburg and
Richmond at that time might have resulted in the capture of both cities, for very few Confederate troops appear to have then been in either place.
That fact was unknown by the Nationals, and a wise caution, rightfully exercised, caused a delay fatal to the speedy achievement of such victories, for strength was quickly imparted to both posts.
When the movement of
Butler and the arrival of
Gillmore with troops from
Charleston harbor was first known to the
Confederates at
Richmond,
Beauregard was ordered to hasten from
Charleston to the latter place, with all possible dispatch, with the troops under his command there, others drawn from
Georgia and
Florida, and such as he might gather in his passage through
North Carolina.
He instantly obeyed, and when
General Kautz struck the
Weldon road, as we have seen, he found these re-enforcements for
Lee passing over it. A large portion of them were left south of that cutting,
6 but as
Kautz could not hold the road nor advance toward
Petersburg, he returned to
City Point,
leaving the
Confederates to make their way without further molestation.
Before
Petersburg was seriously threatened by
Butler,
Beauregard's troops were there in strong force.
It was expected that
General Butler's movements, after he should gain a position on the south side of the
James River, and intrench it, should be governed much by those of the Army of the Potomac, with which he was acting as an auxiliary.
It was believed that the latter would march quickly from the
Rapid Anna to the lines before
Richmond, defeating
Lee, or driving him within the intrenchments at the
Confederate capital.
So soon as
Butler should hear the sounds of battle on the north side of the
James, in front of the beleaguered city, he was to move against it on the south side, and in perfect co-operation, and even junction, the two armies were thus to work together.
But the unexpected detention of the Army of the Potomac at The Wilderness, and at Spottsylvania Court-House, compelled
Butler to stand much on the defensive; and in the absence of orders to march on either
Richmond or
Petersburg immediately after seizing
City Point and
Bermuda Hundred, he was forced to be governed by circumstances, and assume grave responsibilities.
He therefore resolved to do what he might
|
The Union Generals. |
[
321]
to keep re-enforcements from reaching
Lee from the south; and his first effort for that purpose was to destroy the railway between
Richmond and
Petersburg, lying at an average of about three miles from his line of intrenchments.
So early as the 6th,
he sent out
General Heckman to reconnoiter that road, and on the 7th five brigades, under
General Brooks, advanced upon the
Port Walthall branch of the railway, not far from the junction,
7 and began its destruction.
They soon found a strong Confederate force, under
D. H. Hill, on their front, for, on the previous night, nearly all of
Beauregard's troops had reached
Petersburg.
Heavy skirmishing ensued, and the Nationals, after gaining some advantages, were.
compelled to withdraw, with a loss of about two hundred and fifty men.
Another advance upon the railway was made early on the morning of the 9th, by a force composed of the divisions of
Generals Terry,
Ames, and
Turner, of the Tenth Corps, and of
Weitzel and
Wistar, of the Eighteenth.
General Gillmore commanded the right of the column, and
General Smith the left.
They struck the railway at different points, and destroyed it without molestation, and then, with
Weitzel in the advance, they moved on
Petersburg.
They were confronted by a heavy Confederate force at
Swift Creek, within three miles of that city, where a sharp action ensued.
The Confederates were driven across the stream; and that evening
Butler sent a dispatch to the
Secretary of War, saying, “
Lieutenant-General Grant will not be troubled with any further re-enforcements to
Lee from
Beauregard's forces.”
And, encouraged by the success that day,
Butler determined to improve the advantages gained by driving the
Confederates across the
Appomattox into
Petersburg, and, if possible, capture that place.
But that evening news came from
Washington that
Lee, vanquished by
Meade, was in full retreat on
Richmond.
If so, he might quickly and heavily fall, with crushing force, on the Army of the James, so
Butler recalled his troops from.
Swift Creek, strengthened his lines, and prepared for active co-operation in an attack on
Richmond.
The story was not true.
On the 12th,
Butler pushed a heavy column northward, the right, under
General Smith, moving up the turnpike in the direction of
Fort Darling, on
Drewry's Bluff,
8 and the left, under
General Gillmore (who left
General Ames to watch the
Confederates at
Petersburg), following the line of the railway further westward.
The Confederates fell back to, and across
Proctor's Creek, and took position upon a fortified line (outworks of
Fort Darling) behind it on the following morning.
Gillmore turned the right of that line and held it. The other column had pressed a well up toward the
Confederate left, and
Generals Butler and
Smith made their quarters at the fine mansion of
Dr. Friend, less than nine miles from
Richmond.
9 Orders were given for a general attack the next morning
but the
National line was then so thin that the movement was thought too hazardous, and it was postponed until the morning of the 16th.
The Confederates, meanwhile, had prepared for a similar
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movement at the same time.
Beauregard was in command of them in per. son.
The evening of the 15th was still and clear, but after midnight, a heavy fog arose from the bosom of the
James River, and enveloped both armies.
Under cover of this and the darkness, before the dawn,
Beauregard advanced and aroused the slumbering
Nationals by a sudden and heavy fire of musketry and artillery.
The assailed were illy prepared for the unexpected attack, and presented on their right a weak point, which
Beauregard had discovered the evening before,
and now quickly took advantage of. Between that right and the river was a space of open country, for a mile, picketed by only about one hundred and fifty negro cavalry.
To turn that flank was
Beauregard's first care.
At the same time a division under
General Whiting was to move from the
Richmond road, strike
Gillmore heavily, and cut off the
Union line of retreat.
The plan, if fully carried out, would, it seemed, insure the capture or dispersion of
Butler's army.
General Heckman's brigade, of
Weitzel's division, held
Smith's right.
After a gallant fight it was overwhelmed by the sudden and heavy blow, and the general was captured.
The Confederates gained the rear of that flank, and were pressing on to seize the road leading to
Bermuda Hundred, when the One Hundred and Twelfth New York, of
Ames's division, of
Gillmore's corps, which had been sent to
Smith, came up. Being at that instant joined by the Ninth Maine, the two regiments checked the assailants by such stubborn resistance, that the astonished Confederates, ignorant of the numbers on their front (for the fog was yet dense), first halted and then withdrew.
Meanwhile the front of
Smith's column and the right of
Gillmore's (the former held by the divisions of
Brooks and
Weitzel) were fiercely attacked, but a repetition of the performance in front of
Fort Sanders, at
Knoxville,
10 made their repulse an easy task.
General Smith had caused the stretching of telegraph wire from stump to stump, a short distance above the ground, ill front of his line, which tripped the assailants when they charged, in the dense fog, and they were shot or bayoneted before they could rise.
They recoiled; and
Whiting, failing to obey
Beauregard's orders to seize the
Union way of retreat on the left, the plans of the
Confederate general entirely miscarried.
Seeing this,
Beauregard renewed his effort to turn
Smith's right, and so far succeeded, with a heavier force, as to cause that commander to fall back and form a new line, extending from the
Half-Way House,
11 on the turnpike, nine miles from
Richmond, almost to the river.
Gillmore was compelled by this movement to fall back, and
Beauregard pressed the whole National line closely and heavily, with increasing numbers.
Perceiving the danger to his communications,
Butler withdrew his whole force within his lines at
Bermuda Hundred, when his antagonist
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proceeded to cast up a line of intrenchments in front of and parallel to those of the Army of the James, at that place.
In the operations of the 16th, the Nationals lost about four thousand men, and the
Confederates a little over three thousand.
Butler was now in an almost impregnable position, with the rivers on each flank at his command, and was about to strike a determined blow for the capture of
Petersburg, when he received orders to send nearly two-thirds of his effective men to the north side of the
James, to assist the army contending with
Lee in the vicinity of the
Chickahominy.
Butler complied
with the requisition which deprived him of all power to make further offensive movements, saying “the necessities of the Army of the Potomac have bottled me up at
Bermuda Hundred.”
13
While
Butler's main army was making movements toward
Richmond,
Kautz was out upon another raid on the railways leading to that city from the South and Southwest.
He left
Bermuda Hundred on the 12th of May, with two brigades,
14 and passing near
Fort Darling, swept on the are of a circle by Chesterfield Court-House and struck the Richmond and Danville railway, at Coalfield Station, eleven miles west of the
Confederate capital.
He struck it again at
Powhatan; menaced the railway bridge over the
Appomattox, which was strongly guarded; swept around eastward, and struck the road again at Chula Station; and then, with a part of his command he crossed to the Southside railway at
White and Black Station, while the remainder went on to the junction of the
Danville and Southside roads. All now turned eastward, moving down far toward the
North Carolina line, crossing the
Weldon road and destroying it at Jarratt's Station, south of the scene of their devastations a few days before, and passing by Prince George's Court-House, returned to
City Point on the 17th.
Kautz had seriously damaged the railways that lay in his track, skirmished sharply at many places, and took to
City Point one hundred and fifty prisoners, of whom thirteen were officers.
When
Beauregard had perfected his batteries in front of
Butler's lines at
Bermuda Hundred, he opened their fire upon the Nationals,
and pressed their picket line heavily.
This was repeated the next morning, and under cover of these guns the
Confederates assailed the advance of the divisions of
Generals Ames and
Terry.
The pickets of the former were driven from their rifle-pits, and the line of the latter was
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forced back; but the rifle-pits were soon recovered by a brigade under
Colonel Howell, after heavy fighting and much loss on both sides.
The attack was renewed on the following day, with no better success, when
Beauregard ceased all attempts to dislodge
Butler.
Two or three days later,
Fitzhugh Lee, with a considerable body of Confederate cavalry,
attacked the post at Wilson's Wharf, then held by two regiments of negro troops, under
General Wilde.
After being three times repulsed,
Lee withdrew.
15
Operations of greater magnitude and importance nearer
Richmond, now
|
Rifle-pits.16 |
absorbed attention.
Let us consider them.
We left the Army of the Potomac at Spottsylvania Court-House, about to resume its march toward
Richmond.
17 It was then disencumbered of its twenty thousand sick and wounded men, who were taken to the hospitals at
Washington and elsewhere, and-of about eight thousand prisoners who had been sent to the rear.
At the same time twenty-five thousand veteran recruits, with ample supplies, were on their way to join the army, and full thirty thousand volunteers, recruited for one hundred days service, had been mustered in. It was under these favorable auspices that the Army of the Potomac began another flank and forward movement on the night of the 20th and 21st of May.
It was begun by
Hancock's corps, which, at midnight, moved eastward to Mattaponax Church, and then turned southward, with
Torbert's cavalry in advance.
Lee, anticipating the movement, was very vigilant, and
Longstreet's corps was put in motion southward immediately after
Hancock's started.
Warren followed the latter on the morning of the 2 1st, when
Ewell marched in the track of
Longstreet.
Then began another exciting race of the two great carnies, the immediate goal being the
North Anna River.
The Confederates had the more direct
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and better way, for the Nationals, in order to flank the former, were compelled to make a more circuitous march over indifferent roads.
The departure of the corps of
Hancock and
Warren (Second and Fifth), left those of
Wright and
Burnside (Sixth and Ninth) at Spottsylvania Court-House, where they were confronted by
A. P. Hill's.
Burnside's left on the afternoon of the 21st, after a sortie, as a covering movement, by
General Ledlie's brigade of
Crittenden's division, and
Wright's was preparing to follow, when it was attacked by
Hill's. The assailants were easily repulsed, and that night the works at Spottsylvania Court-House were abandoned by both parties, and the entire army of each was moving as rapidly as possible toward the
North Anna.
Torbert had captured Guiney's Station, on the Richmond and Fredericksburg railway, on the night of the 20th and 21st, without very serious opposition, and opened the way for the army, which reached the
North Anna on the morning of the 23d, at three fords, known respectively as Island,
Jericho, and
Chesterfield, or
Taylor's Bridge — the latter near where the Richmond and Fredericksburg railway crosses that river.
Lee, marching by the shorter route, had outstripped his antagonist in the race, and was found strongly posted and intrenched on the opposite side of the
North Anna, in close communication with the Virginia Central railway, over which
Breckinridge, who had beaten
Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley,
18 was hastening with re-enforcements.
There
Lee had evidently determined to make a stand.
Grant took immediate measures to dislodge him. His left, under
Hancock, was at the
Chesterfield bridge, a mile above the railway crossing.
Warren was at Jericho Ford, four miles above, where no formidable opposition appeared, for
Lee was engaged in holding the more important passage in front of
Hancock.
So
Warren prepared to cross and take the
Confederates in reverse.
Bartlett's brigade waded the stream, armpit deep, and formed a battle-line to cover the construction of a pontoon bridge.
This was quickly done, and early that afternoon the whole of
Warren's corps passed over to the south side of the river, and formed a line of battle.
Cutler's division was on the right,
Griffin's in the center, and
Crawford's on the left.
They took position at a piece of woods, where, at five o'clock, the divisions of
Heth and
Wilcox, of
Hill's corps, fell upon
Griffin's division.
They were repulsed, when three Confederate brigades, under
General Brown, struck
Cutler's division a sudden blow, which threw it into confusion and uncovered
Griffin's right.
The Confederates pushed quickly forward to attack it, but the danger was avoided by a refusal of that flank.
Bartlett was hurried to its support, and in that movement a volley of musketry, given at close quarters by the Eighty-third Pennsylvania,
19 Lieutenant-Colonel McCoy, on the flank and rear of the
Confederates, threw them into utter disorder, and caused.
their rout, with a loss of their leader and almost a thousand men made prisoners.
In this encounter
Warren lost three hundred and fifty men. He then proceeded to establish a line and intrench it, without further resistance.
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Hancock, in the mean time, had been preparing to force, a passage of the stream at Chesterfield bridge, where he was confronted by
McLaws's division of
Longstreet's corps.
These troops were mostly on the south side of the river, but held a
tete-du-pont, or bridge-head battery of redan form, on a tongue of land on the north side.
This, after a brief cannonade by three sections of field-pieces, planted by
Colonel Tidball, the
chief of artillery, was stormed and carried at six o'clock in the evening by the brigades of
Pierce and
Eagan, of
Birney's division.
They lost one hundred and fifty men, and captured thirty of the garrison.
That night the
Confederates tried in vain to: burn the bridge; and before morning they abandoned their advanced works on the south side of the stream, and withdrew to a stronger position a little in the rear.
Hancock passed over the bridge in the morning
which his troops had preserved, without feeling the enemy, and at the same time
Wright's corps crossed the river at Jericho Ford, and joined
Warren's.
The Army of the Potomac was now in peril.
Its two powerful wings were on one side of a stream, difficult at all times to cross, and liable to a sudden increase of volume, by rains, while the weaker center was on the other side.
Its antagonist was disposed in a blunt wedge-form, with its chief strength at the point, for the purpose of severing the
National force.
Lee had thrown back the two wings of his
|
Position on the North Anna. |
army, the left resting on
Little River; and the right, covering
Sexton's junction of the two railways running into
Richmond, rested on the marshes of
Hanover.
The powerful center, at the point of the wedge, was near the river, and menaced
Grant's center.
And so it was, that when
Burnside's, (Ninth) corps, of that center, attempted to cross between the two wings of the Army of the Potomac, his advance division (
Crittenden's) was quickly met, and repulsed with heavy loss.
And when
Warren, on the right, attempted to connect with
Burnside, by sending
Crawford's division in that direction,, an overwhelming force fell upon him with almost fatal weight.
Grant paused, and for more than two days he studied the position of his adversary, and came to the conclusion that
Lee could be dislodged only by a flanking movement, which he proceeded to make.
He secretly recrossed the river on the night of the 26th,
and going well east-ward, so as to avoid a blow on his flank, resumed his march toward
Richmond, his objective being the passage of the
Pamunkey, one of the affluents of the
York, formed by the junction of the North and South
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327]
Anna rivers, which would force
Lee to abandon the line of those streams, and give to the Army of the Potomac an admirable water base of supplies, at
White House.
20
Sheridan, who, as we have seen,
21 had just returned
to the army after his great raid toward
Richmond and across the head of the
Peninsula, now led the flanking column with two divisions of cavalry, immediately followed by
Wright's corps, leading
Warren's and
Burnside's.
Hancock's remained on the
North Anna until morning,
to cover the rear, at which time the head of the column, after y a march of more than twenty miles, was approaching the
Pamunkey at
Hanovertown, about fifteen miles from
Richmond.
Wright's corps crossed that stream at once, and early on Saturday, the 28th,
the whole army was south of the
Pamunkey, and in communication with its new base at
White House.
Grant's movement summoned
Lee to another compulsory abandonment of a strong position, and he again fell back toward
Richmond.
Having, as usual, the shorter and better way, he was already in a good position to confront the Army of the Potomac before it had reached the
Pamunkey.
He had taken a stand to cover both railways and the chief highways leading into
Richmond, and to dispute the passage of the
Chickahominy.
The only direct pathway to the
Confederate capital, for the Army of the Potomac, was across the
Chickahominy.
Before its passage could be effected,
Lee must be dislodged, and to that task
Grant and
Meade now addressed themselves.
Reconnoissances to ascertain the strength and exact position of the Confederate army, were put in motion.
Sheridan was sent out southward on the afternoon of the 28th, with the brigades of
Davis,
Gregg, and
Custer.
At
Hawes's store, not far from the
Tolopatomoy Creek, they encountered and vanquished cavalry under
Hampton and
Fitzhugh Lee. Both parties were dismounted and fought desperately.
The Confederates lost nearly eight hundred men, and the Nationals about one half that number.
This success inspirited the army, and it was followed by a reconnoissance in force,
in which
Wright moved on Hanover Court-House;
Hancock marched from
Hawes's store in the same direction;
Warren pushed out toward Bethesda Church, and
Burnside held a position to assist either
Hancock or
Warren.
The right and rear were covered by
Wilson's cavalry.
This movement quickly developed
Lee's position, which was in front of the
Chickahominy, and covering the railway from well up toward Hanover Court-House, southward to
Shady Grove and the
Mechanicsville pike, with pickets toward Bethesda Church.
Wright reached Hanover Court-House without much opposition, but the march of both
Hancock and
Warren was arrested
by strong forces in advance of
Lee's line.
The former was checked at Tolopatomoy Creek, after a sharp encounter, by intrenched troops; and the latter encountered
Rodes's division of
Ewell's corps, with cavalry, reconnoitering near Bethesda Church.
These struck the flank of
Colonel
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Hardin's brigade, of the Pennsylvania Reserves, and compelled it to fall back to the
Shady Grove road, when
General Crawford brought up the remainder of the Reserves, and Kitching's brigade, and effectively repulsed an impetuous assault by
Rodes, who attempted to turn
Warren's left.
This repulse enabled the Nationals to establish the left of their line on the
Mechanicsville pike, not much more than seven miles from
Richmond.
To relieve
General Warren, when first assailed by
Rodes,
Meade had ordered an attack along the whole line.
Only
Hancock received the order in time to act before dark.
He moved forward, drove the
Confederate pickets, and captured and held their rifle-pits.
Meanwhile,
Wright had formed on the left of
Hancock and
Burnside on his right; while
Lee strengthened his own right, now menaced by
Warren.
Grant was now satisfied that he would be compelled to force the passage of the
Chickahominy River, and he was equally satisfied that it would be folly to make a direct attack upon
Lee's front.
So he planned a flank movement, and prepared to cross the
Chickahominy on
Lee's right, not far from Cool Arbor,
22 where roads leading to
Richmond,
White House, and other points diverged.
That important point was seized by
Sheridan on the afternoon of the 31st, after a sharp contest with
Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry and
Clingman's infantry; and toward it
Wright's corps, moving from the right of the army, in its rear, marched that night, unobserved by the enemy, and reached it the next day.
At the same time, and toward the same place, a large body of troops under
General W. F. Smith, which had been called from the Army of the James at
Bermuda Hundred, were moving, and arrived at Cool Arbor just after
Wright's corps reached that place, and took position on the right of the latter.
General Smith had left
Bermuda Hundred on the 29th, with four divisions of the Tenth and Eighteenth Corps, sixteen thousand in number, which had been taken in transports around to
White House.
The two armies were now upon the old battle-field of
Lee and
McClellan two years before.
The Confederate line, which had just been re-enforced by troops under
Breckinridge, extended, with its cavalry on its flanks, a short distance from Hanover Court-House, down nearly to Bottom's Bridge.
A. P. Hill's corps occupied its right,
Longstreet's its center, and
Ewell's its left.
On the morning of the first of June, an attempt was made by
Hoke's division to retake Cool Arbor.
Sheridan had been ordered to hold it at all hazards, and he did so. His men dismounted, and fought desperately with their carbines.
The assailants were repulsed, but were quickly re-enforced by
McLaws's division.
Wright's corps arrived in time to meet this new danger; and when, at three o'clock in the afternoon,
General Smith came up, after a march of twenty-five miles,
23 he was met by an order to form on the right of. the Sixth Corps,
24 then in front of Cool Arbor, on the road leading to
Gaines's Mill, and co-operate in an immediate attack upon the
Confederates.
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These were now in heavy force and in. battle order, in that vicinity, for when
Lee discovered the withdrawal of the Sixth Corps from
Grant's right, he suspected its destination, and had sent the whole of
Longstreet's corps to strengthen his own right, which was then partially concealed by thick woods.
Between the two armies was a broad, open, gently undulating field, and a thin line of woods, beyond which, and in front of the thicker forest, the
Confederates had lines of rifle trenches.
Over this open field the Nationals advanced
at four o'clock, with great spirit, the veterans of
Smith seemingly unmindful of their fatigue, and in the face of a murderous fire, quickly captured nearly the whole of the first line of rifle trenches and about six hundred men. They pushed on and assailed the second and much stronger line, but the
Confederates gallantly held it until night fell and the struggle ceased.
In these desperate encounters, the Nationals lost full two thousand men, but they held the ground they had gained, and bivouacked upon it that night, partly in the shelter of the thin wood, where some of the troops constructed rude bullet-proofs, that they might repose in safety.
But they found little opportunity even for rest, for during the night the
Confederates made desperate efforts to retake the lost rifle trenches, and greatly annoyed the troops by an enfilading fire.
The assailants were repulsed; and the result of the day's work on
|
A bullet-proof in the woods. |
the part of the Nationals was the firm occupation of Cool Arbor, which commanded the road to
White House, and was the chosen place from which to force a passage of the
Chickahominy.
That night
Grant ordered important but dangerous movements.
Hancock was directed to move from the right, and take position on the left of the Sixth Corps, at Cool Arbor.
Warren was ordered to extend his line to the left, from Bethesda Church, so as to connect with
Smith; and
Burnside was withdrawn entirely from the front to the right and rear of
Warren.
These movements were nearly all accomplished, but not without some trouble and loss.
The Confederates observed that of
Burnside, which took place on the afternoon of the 2d, and following up his covering skirmishers, captured some of them.
Then striking
Warren's flank they took four hundred of his men prisoners.
But so satisfactory were all arrangements that night,
that
Grant and
Meade, then at Cool Arbor, determined to attempt to force the passage of the
Chickahominy the next day, and compel
Lee to seek shelter within the fortifications around
Richmond.
Grant was now holding almost the position of
Lee in the
battle of Gaines's Mill,
25 two years before, and
Lee had the place of
McClellan on that occasion.
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At dawn on the morning of the 3d, the
National army was in battle order,
Hancock's corps on the Dispatch Station road on the left, the Sixth next,
Smith's command adjoining these, and
Warren and
Burnside on the right, extending to the
Tolopatomoy Creek.
Wilson's cavalry were on the right flank, and
Sheridan's were holding the lower crossings of the
Chickahominy, and covering the roads to
White House.
Orders had been given for a general assault along the whole lines, at half-past 4.
A few minutes later the signal for advance was given, and then opened one of the most sanguinary battles of the war. The Confederates were equally ready, equally brave, and equally determined to gain a victory.
Swiftly the Nationals advanced to the attack.
On the right it was made by the divisions of
Barlow and
Gibbon, of
Hancock's corps, that of
Birney supporting.
Barlow drove the
Confederates from a strong position in a sunken road, in front of their works, captured several hundred prisoners, a battle-flag, and three guns, and turning the latter upon his foes, sent them back in confusion.
|
Battle of Cool Arbor. |
But, before
Barlow's second line reached the front, the
Confederates rallied in stronger force, and retook the position from which they had been pushed.
Barlow was driven back about fifty yards, when he so speedily covered his front, that he could not be dislodged.
Gibbon, who charged at the same time, at the right of
Barlow, was checked by a marsh of the
Chickahominy, which partly separated and weakened his command.
A part of them gained the
Confederate works.
Colonel McKeen planted the
National flag on their intrenchments; but a moment afterward he fell, mortally wounded.
Gibbon's troops did not hold any part of the
Confederate works; yet some of them intrenched themselves so close to them, that they could not well be reached, nor could they get away, excepting under the cover of fog or thick darkness.
In these assaults
Hancock lost about three thousand men.
Smith's command and the Sixth Corps were heavily engaged at the same time; and on the extreme right,
Wilson's cavalry had a sharp fight with
Hampton's, without any decisive results.
But
Warren's corps was too extended to allow him to do more than to hold his line intact, while
Burnside brought two divisions of the Ninth to bear upon the left of
Lee's line.
These were hotly engaged, and would doubtless have vanquished their adversaries on that part of the field, had not the assault quickly ceased along the front.
The battle had been “quick, sharp, and decisive.”
The
Nationals had been repulsed, at nearly every point, with great slaughter.
It was estimated that within twenty minutes after the struggle began, ten
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thousand Union men lay dead or wounded on the field, while the
Confederates, sheltered by their works, had not lost more than one thousand.
A consciousness now pervaded the mind of every soldier that further attempts to force the
Confederate lines would be useless; and upon this impression they acted with marvelous unanimity, when, some hours later,
General Meade sent orders to each corps commander to again attack, without regard to the doings of other corps.
The whole army, as if controlled by a single will,
refused to stir! And so, at one o'clock in the afternoon, the
battle of Cool Arbor was ended in a dreadful loss of life to the Nationals, but of nothing else, for they held their position firmly, with all their munitions of war.
26
Grant now resolved to transfer his army to the south side of the
James River, and by this grand flank movement, to cut off the chief sources of supplies of men
|
View on Cool Arbor battle-ground.27 |
and provisions for
Lee's army from the south and southwest, and compel its surrender.
His prime object, as we have observed, had been the destruction of that army, by capture or dispersion.
He had hoped to accomplish that
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object north of
Richmond, but had failed to do so. He was disappointed, but not disheartened, by his failure and his enormous losses, which were to
Lee's as three to one;
28 and he proceeded to carry out, as far as possible, the remainder of his original design.
29 He had seriously crippled his adversary, who lacked means for recuperation, and he now determined to starve him into submission.
Having considered all the contingencies incident to the bold movement of throwing his army to the south side of the
James, he feared no mischief from it, but anticipated much benefit.
On the day after the battle,
Grant caused slight intrenchments to be thrown up in front of his line, and that night the
Confederates made a furious assault on; that front, but were quickly repulsed at every point.
On the following day an assault was made on the
National left (
Smyth's brigade, of
Hancock's corps), with the same result.
Meanwhile the army, preparatory to its march to the
James, was gradually moved toward the left by the withdrawal of corps in that direction; and on the night of the 6th,
a sharp but unsuccessful assault was made upon the right, then held by
Burnside.
On the following morning there was a brief armistice, for the purpose of gathering up the dead between the two lines, which had lain there four days; and before night
Grant's line was extended to the
Chickahominy, and
Sheridan was dispatched, with two divisions of cavalry, to more effectually destroy the railways in
Lee's rear, and render
Washington more secure.
30 He struck and broke the
Richmond and
Fredericksburg road at Chesterfield Station, and then, pushing across the upper branches of the
North Anna, smote the Virginia Central railway at Trevilian's Station, where he expected the co-operation of
General Hunter.
That leader, as we have seen,
31 was at
Staunton, and
Sheridan was left to deal, alone, with the gathering Confederates on the railway.
At
Trevilian's he encountered and routed some horsemen under
Hampton, and then destroyed the road almost to Louisa Court-House, where he was attacked by a much larger force.
After a contest, he was compelled to retrace his steps to
Trevilian's, where he fought a sanguinary battle, and then withdrew.
He swept around, by Spottsylvania Court-House and Guiney's Station, to
White House, and rejoined
Grant's army, having lost during his raid over seven hundred men, and captured nearly four
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hundred.
He inflicted a loss of men upon the
Confederates quite equal to his own. Among their killed was the active
General Rosser.
Grant continued moving slowly to the left, and keeping up the appearance of an intention to cross the
Chickahominy and march on
Richmond, until the evening of the 12th,
when every thing was in readiness for the army to move to the
James.
White House was abandoned as a base of supplies; the rails and ties of the York River railway leading from it to
Richmond were taken up and sent in barges to
City Point, and the command of
General Smith was re-embarked at the head of the
York, and sent back by water to
Bermuda Hundred.
Then the Army of the Potomac moved.
Warren's corps, preceded by
Wilson's cavalry,. forced the passage of the
Chickahominy at
Long Bridge with very little trouble, and made demonstrations in the direction of
Richmond, to mask the real movements of the army.
Hancock followed
Warren across the stream, and marched directly to Wilcox's Wharf, on the
James, below
Harrison's Landing, between Charles City Court-House and
Westover,
32 where he was ferried across.
Wright and
Burnside crossed the
Chickahominy at
Jones's. bridge, lower down; while the trains, for greater safety, took a route still further east, and crossed at Coles's Ferry.
Lee discovered the withdrawal of his antagonist from his front on the morning of the 13th; but finding
Warren across the
Chickahominy, and on the road leading through
White Oak Swamp to
Richmond, he concluded that
Grant was about to march by that route upon the
Confederate capital.
With this impression, he retired to the fortifications of that city, while
Grant's army was making a rapid journey in another direction.
Warren quickly followed the Nationals, and on the night of the 14th,
a pontoon bridge, more than two thousand feet in length, was thrown across the
James River, at Douthard's,
33 a little below
Wilcox's, over which the entire remainder of the army had passed before noon of the 16th, with very little molestation by the enemy, and was moving sin the direction of
Petersburg.
Grand meanwhile, had gone up to
City Point, and there, upon the beautiful
elevated grounds of
Dr. Eppes, near the junction of the
Appomatox and the
James, he established his Headquarters.
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334]
When
Grant determined to throw
Meade's army to the south side of the
James, he hastened to
Butler's Headquarters for the purpose of arranging a plan of co-operation from
Bermuda Hundred, against
Petersburg,
35 the possession of which would be of vast importance as a point d'appui, or fixed place for the forming of troops for chief operations against
Richmond.
Butler's line of works, erected under the direction of
General Weitzel, were then perfected, and were not surpassed, in completeness
for defensive operations by any made during the war. His position was almost impregnable; yet, while
Smith was absent with a greater portion of the Army of the James, he was too weak to attempt formidable offensive movements.
It was for this reason that
Smith was so quickly sent back to
Bermuda hundred, as we have observed.
37
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335]
in the mean.
Time,
Butler endeavored to do what he might in furtherance of
Grant's plans, and on the 10th of June he sent three thousand five hundred infantry, under
Gillmore, and fifteen hundred cavalry, under
Kautz, against
Petersburg.
At the same time two gun-boats were sent up the
Appomattox, to co-operate with a battery in bombarding an earthwork a little below
Petersburg, called
Fort Clinton.
These combinations were well arranged.
The troops crossed the
Appomattox at
Point of Rocks, four miles above
City Point.
Gillmore marched up the turnpike, while
Kautz made a little circuit, so as to strike the
City from the south.
The former found no resistance until he was within two or three miles of
Petersburg.
He had easily driven in the
Confederate skirmish line; but at the outer works of the defenses of
Petersburg, already thrown up, he first halted, and then fell back to his camp, with the impression that his force was inadequate for the task assigned him.
Kautz, meanwhile, had performed his part of the drama.
While a greater portion of the defenders of
Petersburg were watching
Gillmore, he dashed into the
City at about the time when the latter fell back, when the
Confederates, relieved of danger from the column, fell upon
Kautz in force, and drove him from the town and its defenses.
five days later, the attempt to capture
Petersburg was renewed.
When the Army of the Potomac began its passage of the
James,
Grant went to
Bermuda hundred, and finding the van of
Lee's Army, under
A. P. Hill, already on the south side of the
River, near
Fort Darling, and ready to act in co-operation with
Beauregard, he directed
Butler to send
General Smith and his command immediately across the
Appomattox, and in conjunction with
Gillmore and
Kautz, make another attempt upon
Petersburg.
He was so well satisfied that such attempt, if vigorously made, would be successful, that he looked for the possession of that City by the Army of the Potomac, within the space of three days, as a certainty.
Smith arrived at
Bermuda hundred on the night of the 14th.
His troops, having rested on the transports, were fresh; and early the next morning,
they crossed the
Appomattox on a pontoon bridge, and before noon were in front of the defenses of
Petersburg, northeastward of the
City.
The troops had marched in three columns.
Kautz had kept well to the left, and threatened the defenses of the
Petersburg and Norfolk railway.
Brooks led the center, and
Martindale the right.
On the way
General Hinks, with his negro brigade, had carried advanced rifle-pits and captured two. Guns; and the whole column was inspirited with the expectation of a quick and easy victory.
But this exultation was diminished when a reconnoissance revealed the fact that there was a strong line of works on their front, the guns of which swept the ditches and ravines, which cut a broad valley in various directions, over which the Nationals must pass to the assault.
General Smith paused. He did not then know how few and inferior were the soldiers behind the works he was facing, and it was nearly sunset before his cautious preparations for assault were completed.
Then a part of his troops, under
Martindale,
Brooks, and
Hinks, forming a heavy skirmish line, pressed forward, and at seven o'clock in the evening drove the
Confederates from their formidable line of rifle-pits.
Pushing on, they soon captured a powerful salient, four redoubts, and a connecting line of intrenchments along
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distance of two and a half miles. With these they took fifteen guns, and made three hundred men prisoners.
Meanwhile, two divisions of
Hancock's Corps had come up and joined
Smith's command,
38 when the united forces were ordered to rest upon their arms within the works just captured.
Smith thought it more prudent to hold what he had obtained, than to risk all by attempting to gain more.
39 so, during the calm hours that succeeded, the nearly full moon shining brightly until past midnight, the assailants reposed, while nearly the whole of
Lee's Army was crossing the
James to the south front of
Richmond, and troops were streaming down toward
Petersburg and into the lines around it. There, in a few hours, these worked wonders, and on the following morning
there was a startling apparition of a new line of works around the
City, with a cloud of veterans deployed in battle order behind them.
The prize so much coveted by
Grant was lost.
Twenty-four hours before,
Petersburg might have been easily taken;
40 now it defied its foes, and continued to do so during a most distressing siege of about ten months from that time.
That delay of twelve hours--whether wise or unwise let the reader judge — was the turning-point in the campaign.
and now, at the middle of June, a large portion of the Army of Northern Virginia were in
Petersburg, and within the lines in front of it, or were on their way and near by; and that evening
the greater part of the Army of the Potomac, with the command of
Smith on its right, resting on the
Appomattox, confronted the
Confederates.
Grant had gone to the front at an early hour that day, and ascertaining the state of affairs, was returning to
City Point, when he met
General Meade on the road, and directed him to post his Army as quickly as possible, and at six o'clock that evening open fire on the
Confederate lines.
It was expected that
Burnside would join
Smith and
Hancock by that time.
He did so. The bombardment was opened at the appointed hour, and was kept up, with varying intensity, until six o'clock in the morning.
The result of the fearful combat on that warm June night was a General advance of the
National lines, but at a serious cost to the
Corps of
Hancock and
Burnside.
Birney, of the former, stormed and carried the ridge on its front.
Burnside could make no impression during the night, and was kept at bay by a murderous fire; but at dawn
General Potter's division made a desperate charge upon the works in front of the Ninth Corps, carried them, and captured four guns and four hundred prisoners. His division was at once relieved by
General Ledlie's,
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which advanced to within a mile and a half of the
City, and held a position from which shells could be thrown into the town.
This menacing projection of
Burnside's line was furiously attacked that night, and the
National troops were driven back with great loss.
At other points they were repulsed.
Their loss much exceeded that of the
Confederates.
the danger threatening the
Petersburg lines having drawn a large portion of the troops from
Butler's front, that officer sent out
General Terry on the same day,
to force
Beauregard's lines, and destroy and hold, if possible, the railway in that vicinity.
Terry easily passed through those lines, and reached the road without much opposition, and was proceeding to destroy the track, when he was attacked by
Pickett's division of
Longstreet's Corps, then on its way from the
Virginia capital to the beleaguered City.
41 Smith's Corps (Eighteenth) having been relieved by the Sixth, was sent by
Grant to aid
Butler, in the event of an exigency such as had now occurred; but it arrived too late to assist
Terry, and the latter, after a sharp engagement, was driven back to the defenses of
Bermuda hundred, when the
Confederate works in front of them were at once heavily garrisoned.
on the morning of the 17th, the Second and Ninth Corps renewed the attack upon the works before
Petersburg, when the
Hill upon which Fort Steadman was afterward built, was carried and held by the former Corps.
Another attack was made by the Ninth in the afternoon, when the battle that ensued continued until night, with great slaughter, in which
Barlow's division suffered most severely.
Crawford was sent to
Burnside's support.
He became entangled in the ravines, and could do but little.
He penetrated the
Confederate lines, however, and brought away a number of prisoners.
Several times during the day, desperate but unsuccessful attempts were made to recapture what the Nationals had seized, and that night a heavy force drove back the Ninth Corps.
impressed with the belief that much of
Lee's Army yet remained near
Richmond, and hoping to capture
Petersburg before that Army should all be upon his front,
Grant ordered a General assault along the entire chain of works before him, on the morning of the 18th.
42 at dawn it was discovered that the
Confederates had abandoned their broken and imperiled line at their front, and had taken a new and stronger position on an inner line, which had been constructed with the best engineering skill (and none was better) that
Lee could command.
This change compelled
Grant to readjust his own lines for attack, which delayed an advance until afternoon.
The attack which followed resulted in disaster to the Nationals, who were repulsed at every Point.
Only
Martindale's division gained any success.
That carried the
Confederate skirmish line on its front, and made a few prisoners.
[
338]
and now, after a loss of nearly ten thousand men, further attempts to take the
Confederate lines by storm were abandoned for awhile.
It was evident to the
Lieutenant-General that the bulk of
Lee's Army was behind them, and he prepared for a regular siege of them.
He at once began intrenching, and to extend his left in the direction of the Petersburg and Weldon railway, which he desired to seize, and thus envelop
Petersburg with his Army.
The Corps of
Hancock43 and
Wright were moved
stealthily to the left, for the purpose of turning the
Confederate right; but when the former, moving in the advance, reached the Jerusalem plank road, between the
Norfolk and
Weldon railways, it was met by a Confederate force, and pushed back to a position where it connected with the Fifth Corps.
On the following morning
both Corps (Second and Sixth) advanced together, and were maneuvering to turn the works, when a division of the command of
A. P. Hill, who had been keenly watching the movements of the Nationals, suddenly projected itself between
Wright and
Birney's commands, and in rapid succession struck the flanks of the divisions of
Barlow,
Mott, and
Gibbon, rolling them up and driving them back with heavy loss.
Wright's Corps was considerably shocked by a blow, at the same time, by another of
Hill's divisions.
Both Corps soon recovered and re-formed, and a fierce attack on the brigade of the ever-gallant General miles, of the Second, was repulsed.
Meade came up at about that time, and just at sunset he ordered both Corps to advance and retake what they had lost.
Hill, unsupported, suddenly withdrew, carrying with him Twenty-five hundred prisoners. Nearly all the lost ground was recovered.
on the following morning the Second and Sixth Corps again advanced, and reached the
Weldon road without much opposition; but three regiments in the van had scarcely begun the destruction of the track, when they were suddenly attacked by a part of
Hill's Corps, and were driven back upon the main line with the loss of many of their number made prisoners.
The
Weldon road had now been reached; but the result of the movements thus far was little more than an extension of the
Union line to the left, at a cost of about four thousand men, chiefly made captives.
meanwhile, a cavalry expedition, eight thousand strong, under
Generals Kautz and
Wilson, had been sent out to operate upon the railways leading southward from
Petersburg.
The latter was in chief command.
They destroyed the railway buildings at Reams's Station, ten miles south of
Petersburg, and the track for a long distance, and then pushed on to the Southside railway at Ford's Station, fifteen miles from
Petersburg, and destroyed it to Nottaway Station, over a space of Twenty-two miles. There they fought and defeated a brigade of
Virginia and North Carolina cavalry, under
Fitzhugh Lee.
Kautz then pushed on to Burke's Station, at the junction of the
Southside and
Danville railways, tore up both roads, and, pushing southward along the latter, was joined by
Wilson at Meherrin Station.
the united forces then destroyed the road to the
Staunton River, when the rapid gathering of the armed and mounted men in that region caused them to turn back.
They were compelled
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339]
to fight their way to Reams's Station, on the
Weldon road, which they expected to find in the possession of the Nationals.
On the contrary, the cavalry of
Hampton, and infantry under
Mahone and
Finnegan were there in great strength.
In attempting to force their lines,
Wilson and
Kautz were defeated with heavy loss, and with difficulty they made their way back to the Army before
Petersburg, with the men and horses of their terribly shattered columns nearly exhausted.
44 no other raid in the rear of the
Confederates was undertaken for several months after the return of this one.
It was too dangerous and expensive a service, under the circumstances, to be made profitable.
and now, after a sanguinary struggle for two months, both armies were willing to have a little repose, and there was a lull in the active operations of the campaign, excepting what pertained to intrenching.
The Union Army thus investing
Petersburg, at which
Point Richmond, Twenty miles distant, was best defended, had lost, within eight or nine weeks, nearly seventy thousand men. Re-enforcements had kept up its numbers, but not the
quality of its materials.
Many veterans remained; but a vast portion of the Army was composed, if not of entirely raw troops, of those who had been little disciplined, and in a great degree lacked the buoyant spirit of the early
[
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Army of the Potomac, when led by
McClellan and
Hooker.
It was now in front of a formidable line of redans, redoubts, and infantry parapets, with the outer defenses of abatis, stakes, and chevaux-de-frise, constructed by skillfully-directed labor.
This line was nearly forty miles in length, extending from the left bank of the
Appomattox, around the western side of
Petersburg, and so on to and across the
James, to the northeastern side of
Richmond.
To menace that line, and to keep the defenders within it, required an equally extended and strong line, and this was speedily provided.
Re-enforcements swelled the weakened ranks of the Nationals, and strong works were cast up along the front of the whole Confederate line, from the
Weldon road to the region of the
Chickahominy.
on the night of the 20th of June,
Butler, by one of his prompt movements, had thrown the brigade of
General Foster across the
James River at
Deep Bottom, where he formed an intrenched Camp; and this post, within ten miles of
Richmond, was immediately connected with the Army at
Bermuda hundred by a pontoon bridge, represented in the engraving on the preceding page.
There
Smith's (Eighteenth) corps was transferred to
Bermuda hundred, and thenceforth served with the Army of the James a greater part of the time during the siege.
The lodgment of
Foster, and the laying of the pontoon bridge at
Deep Bottom, provided a way for
Grant to move heavy masses quickly to the north side of the
James, if desired.
This advantage was perceived by
Lee, who met it by laying a similar bridge across the
River at
Drewry's Bluff, by which he could make countervailing movements.
By the close of July, a greater portion of that wonderful network of fortifications in front of
Petersburg, which commanded the admiration of visitors, was nearly completed, and the
Lieutenant-General was in a position to choose his method of warfare, whether by a direct assault, the slower process of a regular siege, or by heavy operations on the flanks of the
Confederates.
|
tail-pieces — Camp Stool. |