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Chapter 5: the Chattanooga campaign.--movements of Sherman's and Burnside's forces.
- Bragg and his subordinates
-- suggestions of the Confederate “War Department,” 143.
-- troops sent to Rosecrans
-- Chattanooga to be held, 144.
-- Sherman moves on Jackson, Mississippi. 145.
-- Johnston attacked at and driven from Jackson, 146.
-- destruction of property at Jackson, 147.
-- expedition to the Yazoo River
-- expedition against Helena, 148.
-- battle at Helena, 149.
-- Confederate cavalry raids, 150.
-- General Grant at Chattanooga
-- Hooker's Corps at Bridgeport, 151.
-- Hooker marches toward Lookout Mountain, 152.
-- battle at Wauhatchie, 153.
-- the soldiers' steamboat, 154.
-- battle of Blue Springs
-- operations in East Tennessee, 155.
-- Longstreet invades the East Tennessee Valley, 156.
-- he invests Knoxville, 157.
-- Sherman's troops move eastward from the Mississippi River, 158.
-- they approach Chattanooga, 159.
-- Grant and Bragg prepare for battle
-- Thomas moves to attack, 160.
-- seizure of Orchard Knob, 161.
-- the Nationals scale Lookout Mountain, 162.
-- battle on Lookout Mountain, 163.
-- Sherman crosses the Tennessee, 164.
-- preparations for another battle, 165.
-- battle on the Missionaries' Ridge, 166, 167.
-- capture of the Missionaries' Ridge, 168.
-- retreat of the Confederates
-- pursuit by the Nationals, 169.
-- battle of Ringgold
-- end of the campaign against Bragg, 170.
In returning to
Chattanooga,
Rosecrans commenced the formidable line of fortifications around that town, under the skillful directions of
General James St. Clair Morton, of the engineers, which excited the admiration of all; and within twenty-four hours after the army moved from
Rossville, it was strongly intrenched — so strongly that
Bragg could not, with safety, make a direct attack upon it. He did not attempt it, but took measures for starving it into a surrender, by cutting off its avenues of supplies.
Bragg found himself in a most unpleasant predicament.
Regarding the failure of
Polk and
Hindman to bring on the battle at an earlier hour on the morning of the 20th
1 as the chief cause of his inability to secure a substantial victory, he had them placed under arrest, and thereby caused widespread murmuring, and a mutinous spirit in his army.
He was severely censured for not securing that victory himself, by pursuing the fugitives when they moved from the
Missionaries' Ridge, and striking them in the open, broken plain, in front of
Chattanooga.
More aggravating still was a requirement by the authorities at
Richmond that he should attempt the impossible feat of moving by his left across the
Tennessee River, and advancing on
Nashville.
So preposterous was this requirement, that he could scarcely conceal his contempt when saying to his superiors, “The suggestion requires notice only because it will find a place in the files of the War Department.”
He told them that such a movement was utterly impossible, for want of transportation; that half his army consisted of re-enforcements that had joined him just before the recent battle, without transportation or artillery horses; that a third of his own artillery horses were lost; that he had no means of crossing a wide river liable to be flooded any hour by a rain-storm in the mountains; and that by such movement he would have to abandon all the fruits of his victory on the
Chickamauga, and leave exposed vast supplies for the use of the Confederate army.
Bragg did not entertain the proposition from the War Department for a moment, but proceeded at once to the more practicable business of starving the Army of the Cumberland.
For this purpose he had now great advantages.
By his advance to
Lookout Mountain, and its vicinity, when
Rosecrans retired to
Chattanooga, he gained possession of the left bank of the
Tennessee to
Bridgeport, by which he commanded the navigation of that stream, and the road along its margin opposite, at the foot of the precipitous mountain ranges that skirt it. He thus cut off
Rosecrans from direct communication
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with his bases of supply at
Bridgeport and
Stevenson, and compelled him to transport these in wagons from the former place, over the rugged mountains by way of the
Saquatchie Valley, fifty or sixty miles, and then across the
Tennessee, at
Chattanooga, on pontoon bridges.
This service was most severe, and its operations were perilous and precarious, for the autumn storms were beginning to howl among the mountains, and small streams were often converted into torrents in the space of an hour.
The consequence was that for a time the Army of the Cumberland was on short allowance, and thousands of its horses and mules — not less than ten thousand, it is said — were starved or worked to death in the business of transportation.
While the Army of the Cumberland was thus imprisoned at
Chattanooga, a salutary change was wrought in its organization.
We have observed that when
Halleck was satisfied that
Longstreet had gone to
Tennessee, he telegraphed to
Grant and
Sherman, and other commanders in the
West, to give all possible aid to
Rosecrans.
2 Grant was then in New Orleans, disabled by a fall from his horse,
3 and
Sherman, who represented him at
Vicksburg, did not receive the dispatch till several days after it was issued.
Hearing nothing from either, and startled by the saddening news from the
Chickamauga, Halleck at once, as we have observed,
4 detached the Eleventh (
Howard's) and Twelfth (
Slocum's) corps from the Army of the Potomac, and sent them, under the general command of
Hooker, to
Middle Tennessee, with orders, until further directed, to guard
Rosecrans's communications between
Nashville and
Bridgeport.
These troops were moved with marvelous celerity under the wise direction of
General Meigs, the
Quartermaster-General, and the skillful management of
Colonel D. E. McCallum, the
Government Superintendent of railways, and
W. Prescott Smith,
Master of Transportation on the
Baltimore and
Ohio road.
In the space of eight days, the two corps, twenty thousand strong, marched from the
Rapid Anna to
Washington, and were thence conveyed through
West Virginia,
Ohio,
Kentucky, and
Tennessee, to the
Tennessee River.
Halleck determined to hold
Chattanooga and
East Tennessee at all hazards.
For that purpose he ordered the concentration of three armies there, under one commander, and on the 16th of October,
an order went out from the War Department, saying: “By order of the
President of the
United States, the Departments of the
Ohio [Burnside's], of the
Cumberland [Rosecrans's], and of the
Tennessee [Grant's], will constitute the Military Division of the Mississippi.
Major-General U. S. Grant, United States Army, is placed in command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, with his Headquarters in the field.”
By the same order
General Rosecrans was relieved of the command of the Army of the Cumberland, and
General Thomas was assigned to it.
General Sherman was promoted to the command of the Army of the Tennessee.
On the 18th,
Grant, then at
Louisville, whither he had gone from
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New Orleans, and was yet suffering from the effects of his accident, assumed the command, and issued his first order.
His field of authority comprised three departments and nine States and parts of States, from the
Mississippi, between the
Gulf and the great Lakes eastward, into the heart of the Appalachian range of mountains.
Rosecrans left for
Cincinnati on the 19th, after issuing a touching farewell address to his army.
Let us here pause for a moment in the consideration of events in
Southeastern Tennessee, to take a glance at military movements in the department commanded by
Grant, from the
fall of Vicksburg to his promotion just mentioned.
We left him at
Vicksburg, the winner of the then greatest and most important victory yet achieved by the
National troops,
5 and the recipient of the highest encomiums from his superiors
6 and fellow-citizens, while his paroled prisoners were making their way back to
Jackson, then reoccupied by
Johnston, and thence into the ranks of the Confederate army, in violation, on the part of the Conspirators at
Richmond, of all honor.
7
Johnston, as we have observed,
8 was still hovering in
Grant's rear when
Vicksburg was surrendered.
Sherman had been pushed out in that direction with a considerable force to keep him back, and had constructed a line of works from the
Yazoo, at Haines's Bluff, to the
Big Black River.
This movement was effectual, and
Johnston, as we have seen, was endeavoring to aid
Pemberton by co-operative movements farther down the stream,
9 when
Vicksburg was surrendered.
Grant at once sent out to
Sherman all that, remained of that officer's and
McPherson's corps, to drive
Johnston from
Jackson and the railway.
In the afternoon of the 4th of July
the re-enforcements were in motion, and when, the next day, they joined
Sherman, that leader had about fifty thousand effective men under his command.
With these he crossed the Big Black,
his right, under
Ord, passing at the site of the railway bridge;
10 his center, under
Steele, at Messenger's Ford, above; and his left, under
Parks, still farther up the river.
In sweltering heat and blinding dust — men and horses almost maddened by thirst, where little water might be found on account of a parching drought — the army pressed forward over a country which, by
Grant's orders,
had been desolated by
General Baird for scores of miles around
Vicksburg, and pushed
Johnston back to
Jackson, where he took shelter
behind his breastworks and rifle-pits, and from which, with a ludicrous show of faith at such a moment and under such circumstances (which he evidently did not feel), he issued a florid order
to his troops, telling them that “an insolent foe, flushed with hope by his recent success at
Vicksburg, then confronted them, threatening the homes of the people they were there to protect, with plunder and conquest.”
“The enemy,” he said, “it is at once the duty and the mission of you, brave men, to chastise and expel from the soil
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of
Mississippi.
The commanding general confidingly relies on you to sustain his pledge, which he makes in advance, and he will be with you in the good work, even unto the end.”
A week later these defenders of threatened homes, and the chastisers of “an insolent foe,” twenty-four thousand strong, were flying over the “soil of
Mississippi,” toward the heart of the
State, in search of safety from the wrath of the “invaders.”
Sherman had invested
Jackson on the 10th,
each flank of his army resting on the
Pearl River, that runs hard by, with his cannon planted on the hills around.
With a hundred of these he opened upon the doomed city on the 12th, but his scanty supply of ammunition, on account of the tardiness of his trains, would not allow him to continue the attack.
In that assault
General Lauman, by misapprehension of orders, pressed his troops too near the
Confederate works, and in the course of a few minutes he lost five hundred men, by a galling fire from sharp-shooters and twelve cannon charged with grape and canister shot.
Two hundred of his men were made prisoners, and with them went the colors of the Twenty-eighth, Forty-first, and Fifty-third Illinois.
Johnston was aware that
Sherman's ammunition train was behind, and he hoped to remove a greater portion of his stores before it should come up, satisfied that he could not hold the place against the host then hemming it in. Under cover of a fog, on the morning of the 13th,
he made a sortie, but with no other result than the production of some confusion, and a considerable loss of life on his part.
Finally, on the 16th, when he knew that
Sherman's ammunition had arrived, he prepared for a speedy departure, and that night
he hurried across the
Pearl River, burning the bridges behind him, and pushed on through
Brandon to
Morton.
11 Sherman did not pursue in force beyond the former place, his chief object being to drive off the Confederate army and make
Vicksburg secure.
For this purpose he broke up the railway at intervals for many miles in every direction, and destroyed every thing in
Jackson that could be useful to the foe, and more.
The place was shamefully sacked by the soldiers;
12 and the capital of
Mississippi, one of the most beautiful towns, in its public buildings and elegant suburban residences, in all that region, was totally ruined.
The business part of the city was laid in ashes, and many of the fine dwellings in the neighborhood, owned by known secessionists, shared the same fate.
Among these was the residence of
Bishop Green, of the Protestant Episcopal Church, that stood on a beautiful shaded eminence.
House, furniture, and fine library of three thousand volumes, were committed to the flames.
When the writer visited the spot, in the spring of 1866, nothing remained of it but broken walls, as delineated in the picture on the next page.
It was a sad sight.
Only the day before he had traveled
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with the venerable prelate from
Vicksburg to
Jackson.
A hotel near the railway station, kept by a violent rebel known as
Dick Edwards, called the “Confederate House,” was a special object of the wrath of the
Union soldiers, because, when
General Prentiss and his fellow-prisoners were taken to
Jackson by railway, after the
battle of Shiloh,
13 the proprietor refused the famished soldiers food or drink, and the women, who crowded the galleries in front of his house, sent boys to the captives with insulting,
and, in some cases indecent messages.
The building was reduced to ashes, and when the writer was there, three years afterward, only a few scattered bricks lying among rank grass marked its site.
Another object of their hatred was soon demolished.
It was a portion of an old covered bridge over the
Pearl River, which had been inclosed and converted into a prison for Union captives.
There, over the often turbulent waters, in cold and storm, they had been crowded b and most cruelly treated.
Two or three were in it when
Sherman's troops took possession of the town.
It seems to have been selected by the
Confederates as a place to torture and permanently disable their captives in, as was their practice elsewhere, for they had many other places in the city in which to confine prisoners.
When
Sherman had completed his work of destruction, he fell back by way of
Clinton, across the Big Black, toward
Vicksburg, followed by a great multitude of negroes, of both sexes and all ages.
Most of these were the infirm and children, the able-bodied having been sent farther south by their masters.
On
Sherman's departure, some Confederate troops in the vicinity re-entered
Jackson, and burned
Bowman's large hotel, because he had given shelter to wounded National soldiers.
By
Sherman's operations,
Vicksburg was secured from all danger of an immediate attack.
Grant proceeded to cast up a line of strong works for its defense,
14 and sent out expeditions to other places.
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We have observed, that, on the
fall of Vicksburg,
Grant was about to send
General Herron to the aid of
Banks, then besieging
Port Hudson,
15 when he heard of the surrender of that post.
Herron had already embarked with his troops, when the order was countermanded, and he was sent
in lighter draft vessels up the
Yazoo, for the purpose of capturing a large fleet of steamboats, which had escaped
Porter's fleet, and were then lying at
Yazoo City.
The transports were convoyed by the armored gun-boat,
De Kalb, and two of lighter armor, called “tin-clad” vessels, under
Captain Walker.
When they approached
Yazoo City, a small garrison there, of North Carolinians, fled, and the steamboats, twenty-two in number, moved rapidly up the river.
The
De Kalb pushed on, and, just as she was abreast the town, the explosion of a torpedo under her sunk her.
Herron's cavalry were landed, and, pursuing the steamers up the shore, captured and destroyed a greater portion of them.
The remainder were sunk or burned, when?
soon afterward,
Captain Walker went back after the guns of the
De Kalb.
Herron captured three hundred prisoners, six heavy guns, two hundred and fifty small-arms, eight hundred horses, and two thousand bales of Confederate cotton.
After finishing his work at
Yazoo City, he started
to cross the country to
Benton and
Canton, in aid of
Sherman, when information reached him of
Johnston's flight from
Jackson.
Then he returned to
Vicksburg.
On the day when
Vicksburg was surrendered, there were stirring events at
Helena, Arkansas, farther up the
Mississippi, which the
Confederates hoped would have a salutary bearing upon the fortunes of the garrison of the doomed city below.
Helena had been held by National troops as a depot of recruits and supplies for about a year, since
Washburne's cavalry of
Curtis's army took possession of it;
16 and in the summer of 1863 the post was in command of
General B. M. Prentiss, whose troops were so sorely smitten at
Shiloh.
17 The Confederates in
Arkansas, under such leaders as
Sterling Price,
Marmaduke,
Parsons,
Fagan,
McRae, and
Walker,. were then under the control of
General Holmes, who, at the middle of June, asked and received permission of
General Kirby Smith, commander of the Trans-Mississippi Department, to attack
Prentiss.
He designated
Clarendon, on the
White River, as the rendezvous of all the available troops under his command, and left
Little Rock for that point on the 26th of June.
Some of his troops were promptly at the rendezvous, while others, under
Price, owing to heavy rains and floods, did not reach there until the 30th.
This delay baffled his plans for surprise, for
Prentiss had been apprised of his movement and was prepared for his reception.
The post of
Helena was strongly fortified, and behind the earth-works and heavy guns and the
abatis in front of them, was a garrison of three thousand eight hundred men. The gun-boat
Tyler,
Lieutenant-commanding
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Pritchett, was lying there, ready to give support.
The main work, near the town, was called Fort Curtis.
The exterior defenses, on bluffs a mile in rear of the town, were under the immediate command of
General F. Salomons, at whose suggestion they had been constructed.
18
Holmes's entire force — the remnants of armies decimated by the war — was less than eight thousand effective men. He was ignorant of
Prentiss's real strength, and when, on the 3d of July,
he and his army were within four miles of
Helena, they were marching to certain defeat and humiliation.
They advanced at midnight, and took position within a mile of the outer works;
and at daylight moved to the assault in three columns:
Price, with the brigades of
Parsons and
McRae, over three thousand strong, to attack a battery on
Graveyard Hill;
Fagan, with four regiments of infantry, to assail another on Hindman's Hill; and
Marmaduke, with seventeen hundred and fifty men, to storm a work on Righton's Hill.
Price was accompanied by
Harris Flanagan, the
Confederate Governor of
Arkansas, as volunteer aid-de-camp.
His troops, under cover of artillery firing, moved up gallantly to the attack, in the face of a heavy storm of bullets, and grape and canister shot, captured some of the guns, and turned them upon the Nationals.
But these were useless, owing to a lack of matches, or friction tubes.
Then, with a wild shout, they charged down the hill upon Fort Curtis, six hundred yards distant, exposed to a terribly galling fire from the other batteries, and especially from the
Tyler. So fearfully were they smitten, that one-third of them were lost.
19
Fagan, meanwhile, under the immediate direction of
Holmes, had attacked the battery on Hindman's Hill with his little force.
He left his artillery at the first obstructions, and with his infantry rushed up ravines and steep acclivities and over
abatis, driving the
National sharp-shooters from their rifle-pits, and pushing on to carry the battery by assault.
The assailants fought desperately but uselessly, and suffered fearful loss.
Toward noon
Holmes ordered a retreat, to save this little force from utter destruction.
Marmaduke, at the same time, was attempting to take the battery on Righton's Hill, but failed on account of a heavy fire from artillery and musketry from behind the levee, and a lack of co-operation on the part of some cavalry.
At three o'clock in the afternoon the assailants were repulsed at all points and withdrew, with a loss, reported by
Holmes, of twenty per cent. of his entire force.
20 Holmes hastily retreated with his shattered army, and thence-forth Confederate soldiers never molested
Helena.
There was quiet for some time along the eastern borders of the
Mississippi, likewise, for the attention and the material forces of both parties were drawn toward
Chattanooga,
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where a decisive conflict was impending.
Let us return to a consideration of events there.
It was evident that the Army of the Cumberland could not long exist a prisoner in
Chattanooga, its supplies depending on such precarious avenues of reception as the mountain roads, and the transportation animals so rapidly diminishing.
General Thomas had nobly responded to
Grant's electrograph from
Louisville,
“Hold
Chattanooga at all hazards,” saying, “I will hold the town until we starve;” yet it was not prudent to risk such disaster by inaction, for already
Bragg's cavalry had been raiding over the region north of the
Tennessee River, destroying supplies, and threatening a total obstruction of all communications between
Chattanooga and
Middle Tennessee.
On the 30th of September, a greater portion of
Bragg's horsemen (the brigades of
Wharton,
Martin,
Davidson, and
Anderson), about four thousand strong, under
Wheeler, his chief of cavalry, crossed the
Tennessee, between
Chattanooga and
Bridgeport, pushed up the
Sequatchie Valley, fell upon a National supply-train
of nearly one thousand wagons on its way to
Chattanooga, near
Anderson's cross-roads, and burned it before two regiments of cavalry, under
Colonel Edward M. McCook, which had been sent from
Bridgeport in pursuit, could overtake them.
Wheeler's destructive work was just finished when
McCook came up and attacked him. The struggle lasted until night, when
Wheeler, who had been worsted in the fight, moved off in the darkness over the mountains, and fell upon another supply-train of wagons and railway cars at
McMinnville.
These were captured, together with six hundred men; and then a large quantity of supplies were destroyed.
There, after the mischief was done, he was overtaken by
General George Crook,
with two thousand cavalry, and his rear-guard, as he fled toward Murfreesboroa, was charged with great spirit by the Second Kentucky Regiment of
Crook's cavalry, under
Colonel Long.
Wheeler's force greatly outnumbered Long.
They dismounted, and fought till dark, when they sprang upon their horses and pushed for Murfreesboroa, hoping to seize and hold that important point in
Rosecrans's communications.
It was too strongly guarded to be quickly taken, and as
Wheeler had a relentless pursuer, he pushed on southward to
Warren and
Shelbyville, burning bridges behind him, damaging the railway, capturing trains and destroying stores, and crossing
Duck River pressed on to
Farmington.
There
Crook struck him again, cut his force in two, captured four of his guns and a thousand small-arms, took two hundred of his men, beside his wounded, prisoners, and drove him in confusion in the direction of
Pulaski, on the railway running north from
Decatur.
Wheeler's shattered columns reached
Pulaski that night, and made their way as speedily as possible into
Northern Alabama.
He crossed the
Tennessee near the mouth of
Elk River, losing two guns and seventy men in the passage, and made his way back to
Bragg's lines, after a loss of about two thousand men. He had captured nearly as many as that, and destroyed National property to the amount of, probably, three million dollars in value.
When
Roddy, who had crossed the
Tennessee at the mouth of
Gunter's Creek, and moved menacingly toward
Decherd, heard of
Wheeler's troubles, and his flight back to the army, he retreated, also, without doing much mischief.
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When
Grant arrived at
Chattanooga,
he found
General Thomas alive to the importance of immediately securing a safe and speedy way to that post for supplies for the Army of the Cumberland.
It could not exist there ten days longer, unless food and forage could be more speedily and bountifully furnished.
In concert with
General W. F. Smith, who had been appointed
Chief Engineer of the army, he had been making preparations for the immediate concentration of
Hooker's corps at
Bridgeport, with the view of opening the river and main wagon road from that point
to Brown's Ferry on the
Tennessee, by which supplies might be taken to
Chattanooga across the peninsula known as
Moccasin Point,
22 and thus avoid the Confederate batteries and sharp-shooters at
Lookout Mountain altogether.
Grant approved
Thomas's plan, and ordered its execution.
It was that
Hooker should cross the river at
Bridgeport with all the force at his command, and, pushing on to Wauhatchie, in
Lookout Valley, threaten
Bragg with a flank attack.
General Palmer was to march his division down the north side of the
Tennessee to a point opposite
Whitesides, where he was to cross the river and hold the road passed o ver by
Hooker.
General Smith was to go down the river from
Chattanooga, under cover of darkness, with about four thousand troops, some in batteaux, and some on foot along the north side and make a lodgment on the south bank of the stream at Brown's Ferry, and seize the range of hills at the mouth of
Lookout Valley, which command ed the Kelly's Ferry road.
The movements of
Hooker and
Palmer might be made openly, but
Smith's could only be performed in secret.
Hooker crossed at
Bridgeport on pontoon bridges on the morning of the 26th
without opposition,
23 and pushed on to Wauhatchie, which he reached on the 28th; and on the nights of the 26th and 27th,
Smith successfully performed his part of the plan.
Eighteen hundred of his troops, under
General Hazen, were embarked at
Chattanooga on batteaux, intended to be used in the construction of a pontoon bridge, and at two o'clock in the morning they floated noiselessly, without oars, close under the banks past the
point of Lookout Mountain, along a line of Confederate pickets seven miles in length, without being discovered, and arrived at Brown's Ferry just at
[
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dawn.
24 They landed quickly on the south side, captured the pickets there, and seized a low range of hills, about half a mile in length, which commanded
Lookout Valley.
The remainder of
Smith's force, twelve hundred strong, under
General Turchin, had, meanwhile, moved down the north bank of the stream, across
Moccasin Point, and reached the ferry before daylight.
They were ferried across, and by ten o'clock in the morning a pontoon bridge was laid there.
Before the bewildered Confederates could fairly comprehend what had happened, a hundred axes had laid an
abatis in front of
Hazen's troops; and the foe, after an ineffectual attempt to dislodge the intruders, withdrew up the valley toward
Chattanooga.
Before night the left of
Hooker's line rested on
Smith's at the pontoon bridge, and
Palmer had crossed to
Whitesides, in his rear.
By these operations the railway from
Bridgeport, well up toward
Chattanooga, was put in possession of the Nationals, and the route for supplies for the troops at
Chattanooga was reduced by land from sixty to twenty-eight miles, along a safe road, or by using the river to Kelly's Ferry, to eight miles. “This daring surprise in the
Lookout Valley on the nights of the 26th and 27th,” said a Confederate newspaper in
Richmond, “has deprived us of the fruits of
Chickamauga.”
We have observed that
Hooker reached Wauhatchie on the 28th.
He left a regiment at the bridge-head where he crossed, and to hold the passes leading to it through
Raccoon Mountain, along the base of which his route lay to Running Waters.
He met no opposition the first day, excepting from retiring pickets.
Leaving guards for the protection of the road over which he was passing, he followed the course of Running Waters, and on the morning of the 27th his main army descended through a gorge into
Lookout Valley, between the
Raccoon and
Lookout mountains, which has an average width of about two miles, and is divided in its center by a series of five or six steep, wooded hills, from two hundred to three hundred feet in height.
Between these and
Lookout Mountain flows
Lookout Creek.
The Confederates had possession of these hills, and also of the lofty crest of
Lookout Mountain, on which they had planted batteries.
From these and the heights of
Raccoon Mountain,
Bragg could look down upon his foes and almost accurately number them.
In that valley, and occupying three ridges near its mouth, toward Brown's Ferry, was a part of
Longstreet's troops, and these were the ones we have just mentioned as having been encountered by
Hazen.
As
Hooker pushed on toward Brown's Ferry,
Howard in advance, the latter was sharply assailed by musketeers on the wooded hills where the railway passes through them, near Wauhatchie.
These were quickly dislodged.
They fled across
Lookout Creek, burning the railway bridge behind them.
In this encounter
Howard lost a few men, and others were killed by shells hurled upon
Hooker's column from the batteries on
Lookout Mountain.
At six o'clock the advance halted for the night within a mile or so of Brown's Ferry, and, as we have observed, touched
Smith's troops.
Being
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anxious to hold the road leading from the
Lookout Valley to Kelly's Ferry, through a gorge of the
Raccoon Mountain,
General Geary, with his small force, was ordered to encamp at Wauhatchie, the junction of the
Memphis and
Charleston, and
Trenton railways, three miles from
Howard's position, with a very thin line of pickets connecting them.
From the hour when he entered the valley,
Hooker's movements had been keenly watched by
McLaws's division of
Longstreet's corps, then holding
Lookout Mountain, with a determination to fall upon and crush the Nationals at some favorable moment.
McLaws did not feel strong enough to fight
Hooker's full force in open daylight, so he descended stealthily and swiftly at
midnight
upon
Geary's weak force, lying at Wauhatchie, not doubting his ability to capture and destroy it, and then to burn
Hooker's train of supplies and seize the remainder of his army in that rough, wooded country, from which escape would be difficult.
With wild screams his troops swept down from the hills, drove in
Geary's pickets, and charged furiously upon his camp on three sides, while the batteries upon
Lookout Mountain sent down their shells in fearful lines upon the aroused camp.
But
McLaws had not surprised
Geary.
That vigilant officer, like all the others of
Hooker's little army, knew that a strong and wary foe was hovering over their heads and lurking among the hills on every side, with a determination to prevent, at all hazards, the establishment by the Nationals of a short and safe route for supplies between
Bridgeport and
Chattanooga, for that result once accomplished, that post and its advantages would be lost to the
Confederates.
Geary's vigilance was therefore sleepless, and he was prepared for the assault, which came at about one o'clock in the morning.
He met the assailants with a steady, deadly fire, and made them recoil.
The rattle of musketry and the booming of cannon, borne on the midnight air, aroused
Hooker, who sent
General Schurz's division of
Howard's corps to
Geary's aid.
General Tyndale's brigade first reached the battle-field, where
Geary was fighting gallantly and keeping his assailants at bay.
25 He drove the
Confederates from a hill to the left of
Geary's camp, while a thin brigade of
General Steinwehr's division, led by
Colonel Orlan Smith, of the Seventy-third Ohio, charged up a steep and rugged acclivity behind
Schurz's division, drove a force three times the number of the Nationals from its crest, took some of them prisoners, and scattered the remainder in every direction.
26 “No
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troops,” said
Hooker, in his report of the battle, “ever rendered more brilliant service.”
27 For three hours the struggle continued, when the assailants.
fled, leaving one hundred and fifty of their number dead on
Geary's front, also over one hundred prisoners and several hundred small-arms.
Thus, at a little past four o'clock in the morning, ended the
battle of Wauhatchie.
28 Its most practical result was the security of a safe communication for the Nationals between
Bridgeport and
Chattanooga, already obtained by
Smith forty-eight hours before, and the defeat of
Bragg's plans for starving the Army of the Cumberland into surrender.
A little steamboat, named the
Chattanooga, which had been built at
Bridgeport by the soldiers,
29 was immediately loaded with two hundred thousand rations, and started up. the river.
It ran the blockade of
Lookout Mountain to Brown's Ferry, and thus the army at
Chattanooga was saved from actual famine.
Bragg was then in no condition for aggressive movements against the Nationals, for he had weakened his army by sending
Longstreet, with a greater portion of his command, against
Burnside, in
East Tennessee, and was compelled to content himself with
 |
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The Chattanooga. |
simply holding his very strong position on the northern acclivities of
Lookout Mountain and across the narrow
Chattanooga Valley, near the mouth of
Chattanooga Creek, and so along the crests of the Missionaries'
[
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Ridge to the tunnel of the Knoxville and Chattanooga railway, not far from the Chickamauga River.
While the two armies are thus confronting each other, with a space of only three or four miles between them at furthest, let us see what was going on between
Burnside and
Longstreet in the great Valley of
East Tennessee.
We have observed how little difficulty
Burnside encountered in throwing his army into the
Valley of
East Tennessee, and taking position at
Knoxville.
It was because the
Confederates were then moving to re-enforce
Bragg at
Chattanooga.
Halleck ordered
Burnside to concentrate his forces in that direction, but circumstances prevented his strict obedience, so he set about the task of keeping the valley clear of armed and organized Confederates, who were threatening it at different points.
In this business his forces were, for awhile, considerably diffused, and had many lively experiences.
Colonel Foster encountered
a considerable force near
Bristol, on the eastern border of the
State; and a little later there was a smart but desultory engagement during two days at
Blue Springs, not far from
Bull's Gap.
To that point the
Confederates had pressed down.
Burnside then had a cavalry brigade at
Bull's Gap, supported by a small force of infantry at
Morristown.
He dispatched
a body of horsemen, by way of
Rogersville, to intercept the retreat of the
Confederates, and advanced with infantry and artillery to
Bull's Gap.
Cavalry were then thrown forward to
Blue Springs,
where the
Confederates, under
General Sam. Jones, were in considerable force.
After a desultory fight for about twenty-four hours,
the
Confederates broke and fled, leaving their dead on the field.
They were pursued and struck from time to time by
General Shackleford and his cavalry, and driven out of the
State.
The latter captured a fort at
Zollicoffer, burned the long bridge at that place and five other bridges, destroyed a, large amount of rolling stock on the railway, and did not halt until he had penetrated
Virginia ten miles beyond
Bristol.
In the battle of Bluer Springs, and the pursuit, the Nationals lost about one hundred men in killed and wounded.
The loss of the
Confederates was a little greater.
When
Shackleford returned from the chase, he took post at
Jonesboroa with a part of his command, while another portion, under
Wilcox, encamped at
Greenville, and two regiments and a battery under
Colonel Garrard of the Seventh Ohio Cavalry, were posted at
Rogersville.
There, at daybreak on the 6th of November,
Garrard was attacked by a portion of
Sam. Jones's, troops, under
General W. E. Jones, almost two thousand strong.
It was a surprise.
The
Nationals were routed, with a loss of seven hundred and fifty men, four guns, and thirty-six wagons.
This disaster created great alarm at,
Jonesboroa and
Greenville, and
Shackleford's troops at those places fled back in great haste to
Bull's Gap.
At the same time,
Jones's troops, not doubting
Shackleford's horsemen would be after them in heavy force, were flying as swiftly toward the
Virginia line, in the opposite direction.
In a short space of time there was a wide space of country between the belligerents.
While
Burnside was thus engaged in spreading his army so as to cover many points southward of the
Holston and
Tennessee rivers,
Longstreet was ordered to make his way up the line of the
East Tennessee and Georgia railway, to seize
Knoxville, and drive the Nationals out of
East Tennessee.
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He advanced swiftly and secretly, and on the 20th of October he struck a startling blow at the outpost of
Philadelphia, on the railway southwest from
Loudon, then in command of
Colonel Wolford with about two thousand horsemen, consisting of the First, Eleventh, and Twelfth Kentucky Cavalry, and Forty-fifth Ohio Mounted Infantry.
Wolford had just weakened his force at that point, by sending two regiments to protect his trains moving to his right, which, it was reported, were in danger; and, while in that condition, he was assailed on front and flank by about seven thousand Confederates.
He fought this overwhelming force gallantly for several hours, hoping the sound of cannon would bring him aid from
Loudon.
But none came, and he cut his way out with a desperate struggle, losing his battery and over thirty wagons.
He lost very few men, and took with him over fifty of the
Confederates as prisoners.
The detachment he had sent out (First and Eleventh Kentucky), under
Major Graham, to protect his trains four miles distant, found them in possession of
Longstreet's vanguard.
Graham instantly recaptured them, drove the
Confederates some distance, and made a number of them prisoners.
He was, in turn, attacked by a greatly superior force, and, in a running fight toward
Loudon, to which
Wolford fled, lost heavily.
30
When
Burnside heard of the disaster southward of
Loudon, he hastened to Lenoir Station, on the railway, where the Ninth Army Corps was encamped, and took command of the troops in person, having received from
General Grant a notice of
Longstreet's approach, and an order for him to fall back, lure the
Confederates toward
Knoxville, intrench there, and hold the place to the last extremity.
Grant saw with satisfaction the blunder of
Bragg, in detaching
Longstreet to fight
Burnside, and he resolved to assail the
Confederates on the
Missionaries' Ridge immediately, and in the event of success, to send a sufficient force to assist the troops at
Knoxville, and possibly to capture
Longstreet and his command.
With this view he had bidden
Burnside to hold on to
Knoxville with a firm grasp, as long as possible, until he should receive succor in some form.
Longstreet, meanwhile, was pressing rapidly forward.
By a forced march he struck the
Tennessee River at Hough's Ferry, a few miles below
Loudon, crossed it on a pontoon bridge there, and pressed on toward the right flank of
Burnside, at Lenoir Station.
At the same time
Wheeler and
Forrest were dispatched, with cavalry, by way of
Marysville, across
Little River, to seize the heights on the south side of the
Holston, which commanded
Knoxville, the grand objective of
Longstreet — the key to
East Tennessee.
Perceiving the danger threatened by this flank movement, and in obedience to his instructions,
Burnside sent out a force on the
Loudon road, under
General Ferrero, to watch and check the foe, and secure the
National trains, and, at the same time, ordered the whole force to fall back as rapidly as possible to
Knoxville.
A portion of the Ninth Corps, under
General Hartranft, was advanced to Campbellville Station, at the junction of the
Lenoir and Kingston roads, about sixteen miles from
Knoxville, and there the whole force was rapidly concentrated.
And there it was so closely pressed, that
Burnside
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found it necessary to abandon his trains or fight.
He chose the latter alternative, and taking a good position, with his batteries well posted, he turned upon his pursuer,
and gave him a stunning blow.
A conflict ensued, which lasted several hours, during which
Burnside's trains moved rapidly forward.
The battle ceased at twilight, ending in a repulse of
Longstreet, and a loss to the Nationals of about three hundred men.
31 The Confederate loss was about three hundred and seventy.
Taking advantage of this check,
Burnside moved on to the shelter of his. intrenchments at
Knoxville, the chief of which was an unfinished work on a. hill commanding the southwestern approaches to the town, and afterward called
Fort Sanders.
Longstreet followed as rapidly as possible.
Wheeler and
Forrest had failed to seize the height on which works had been thrown up on the south side of the
Holston, owing to the gallant bearing of some.
of the troops of
General W. P. Sanders, of
Kentucky, who was in immediate command at
Knoxville.
32 Equally gallant was the reception of the same force, which dashed up in advance of
Longstreet, and attacked the outposts there, on the 16th of November.
The main body of the
Confederates were then near, and, on the morning of the 18th,
Longstreet opened some guns on the
National works, sharply attacked
Sanders's advanced right, composed of four regiments,
33 who offered determined resistance, drove them from the ridge they occupied, and making his Headquarters at the fine mansion of
R. H. Armstrong, near the bank of the
Holston, less than a
mile from
Fort Sanders, planted batteries a little in advance of it. In the attack on
Sanders's right, that leader was killed,
34 and the
National loss,
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beside, was about one hundred.
35 Longstreet now nearly invested
Knoxville, and began a close siege.
Wheeler,
Forrest, and
Pegram were sent to cut off
Burnside's supplies and line of retreat.
While
Longstreet was pressing the siege of
Knoxville, stirring events occurred in the vicinity of
Chattanooga, which had an important bearing upon the
Confederate cause in
East Tennessee.
Grant, as we have observed, intended to attack
Bragg immediately after
Longstreet left him, so as to relieve
Burnside, but such was the condition of his army — not yet supplied with food and munitions of war, his artillery horses mostly broken down, and few others remaining fit for active cavalry service — that he was constrained to wait for the arrival of
Sherman with the most of the Fifteenth Army Corps, then on the-line of the Memphis and Charleston railway, eastward of
Corinth, repairing the road as' they moved toward
Stevenson.
They were there in obedience to an order of
General Grant, on the 22d of September, then at
Vicksburg, to proceed immediately to the help of
Rosecrans at
Chattanooga.
Sherman's corps was then lying in camp along the line of the
Big Black River.
36 He was first directed to send only one division; and on the same afternoon
Osterhaus was moving to
Vicksburg, there to embark for
Memphis.
On the following day
Sherman was ordered by
Grant to the same destination, with the remainder of his corps.
Tuttle's division was left behind, with orders to report to
General McPherson; and a division of the corps of the latter, under
General J. E. Smith, already on the way to
Memphis, was placed under
Sherman's command.
The water was low in the
Mississippi, and the vessels bearing the last of
Sherman's troops did not reach
Memphis until the 3d of October.
There he received instructions from
Halleck to conduct his troops eastward, substantially along the line of the Memphis and Charleston railway, to
Athens, in Alabama, and then report by letter to
General Rosecrans, at
Chattanooga.
The troops were moved forward, and on Sunday, the 11th,
Sherman left
Memphis for
Corinth, in the cars, with a battalion of the Thirteenth Regulars as an escort.
When, at noon, he reached the
Colliersville Station, he found a lively time there.
About three thousand Confederate cavalry, with eight guns, under
General Chalmers, had just attacked the Sixty-sixth Indiana (
Colonel D. C. Anthony), stationed there.
Osterhaus had already pushed on to the front of
Corinth, and had aroused to activity the
Confederates in that region.
This attack was one of the first fruits.
With his escort
Sherman helped beat off the assailants, and then, moving on, reached
Corinth that night.
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Sherman's troops engaged in repairing the road were continually annoyed by Confederate cavalry under
General S. D. Lee, whose force, about five thousand strong, was composed of the brigades of
Roddy and
Ferguson.
With these,
Osterhaus's division, supported by
M. L. Smith's (
J. E. Smith's covering the working parties), was constantly skirmishing.
Finally,
Lee attempted, near
Tuscumbia, to dispute the further advance of the Nationals, when
General Frank Blair took the advance divisions and soon swept away the opposing force.
On that day
Sherman received a dispatch from
Grant, then at
Chattanooga, who, fearing the
Confederates, reported to be gathering in force at
Cleveland on his left, might break through his lines and make a dash on
Nashville, ordered
Sherman to drop all work on the railway and move with his entire force to
Stevenson.
He assured
Sherman that in the event of the
Confederates moving on
Nashville, his forces were “the only ones at command that could beat them there.”
37
Fortunately,
Sherman's forethought had caused a supply of means, at this critical moment, for his army to cross the
Tennessee River, a movement which the general had expected to be very difficult, with the
Confederates in strong force hovering around him. He had requested
Admiral Porter to send up gun-boats from
Cairo, to assist him in that perilous task.
He did so, and on the day when, in obedience to
Grant's call,
Sherman marched to
Eastport, on the river, he found two gun-boats there.
Three other vessels soon arrived, and on the 1st of November he crossed and pushed on eastward,
Blair covering his rear.
He went by way of
Fayetteville,
Winchester, and
Decherd, in Tennessee, and then down to
Stevenson and
Bridgeport, arriving at the latter place on the 14th.
On the following day he reported to
Grant at
Chattanooga, in person.
Grant had been somewhat anxious about
Burnside's situation, for he could not send him aid when
Longstreet advanced, though strongly importuned to do so, especially by
Halleck, who deplored the danger of losing
Knoxville, and with it
East Tennessee.
But
Grant had plans for relief, which he could not communicate to the
General-in-Chief, but which were perfectly satisfactory to
Mr. Dana, the
Assistant Secretary of War, then at Headquarters in
Chattanooga.
If, as
Grant believed he could,
Burnside should hold out at
Knoxville until
Sherman's approaching re-enforcements should arrive, he felt certain that a double victory might be obtained, for he could then scatter the forces of
Bragg on the
Missionaries' Ridge, and by such blow possibly so demoralize and weaken
Longstreet's force as to compel him to raise the siege of
Knoxville.
He sent
Colonel Wilson, of his staff, accompanied by
Mr. Dana, to
Knoxville, to communicate his plans to
Burnside, and immediately after
Sherman's arrival he proceeded to put them into execution.
The two leaders proceeded, together with
General Smith, in a personal reconnoissance of
Bragg's position, and a plan of attack was speedily perfected.
Grant's first movement was to deceive
Bragg into the belief that he was to be attacked in heavy force on his left.
For this purpose
Sherman's troops were put in motion at
Bridgeport.
Ewing's division moved to
Shellmound,
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and thence over the mountains toward
Trenton, some distance up the
Lookout Valley, to menace
Bragg's left front, while the remainder of
Sherman's force, excepting
Osterhaus's division, moved up quickly and secretly to Brown's Ferry, crossed the river there on
Smith's pontoon bridge, and marched round behind
Chattanooga toward
Grant's left, thereby giving
Bragg the impression that they were more likely to be moving to the relief of
Burnside than to attack his extreme right.
The latter was the real movement intended.
These troops, as we shall observe presently, crossed the
Tennessee to
Chattanooga, and at a proper time took position on
Thomas's left.
Ewing's troops were stealthily withdrawn from near
Trenton, and ordered to follow the others of the corps to the extreme left of the
Union Army, leaving only
Hooker, with the addition of
Osterhaus's division, on
Bragg's left.
The latter had been prevented from crossing the river at Brown's Ferry, on account of the breaking of the pontoon bridge by drift-wood, and was ordered to join
Hooker.
On account of bad roads, caused by heavy rains,
Ewing's march was more tardy than was contemplated, and he did not reach his assigned position until the 23d, instead of on the 21st, when
Grant expected to make his attack.
The latter was impatient, for he knew that
Burnside was in peril; and by a note from
Bragg on the 20th,
38 and the report of a Confederate deserter on the 22d, he was impressed with a belief that his adversary was preparing to fly southward.
Bragg was simply repeating the trick he so successfully played upon
Rosecrans, to draw
Grant into action prematurely, before his re-enforcements should arrive.
It succeeded in a degree, for before
Sherman's troops had crossed the river, he ordered
Thomas to move the center forward to find out what was going on behind the strong line of Confederate pickets in front of
Chattanooga.
The fact was,
Bragg, instead of preparing to retreat, was making dispositions for a formidable resistance to the impending attack.
In the arrangement for the attack on the 21st,
Hooker was to assail
Bragg's left on
Lookout Mountain.
This movement was suspended, and
Howard's corps was called to
Chattanooga and temporarily attached to
Thomas's command.
The Fifteenth Army Corps (
Sherman's) was now under the command of
General Blair, with orders to take position on the extreme left, near the mouth of the West Chickamauga River.
They had with them on their march up the north side of the
Tennessee, a concealed train of one hundred and sixteen pontoon boats, wherewith to construct a bridge for passing over; and on the afternoon of the 23d, when
Thomas moved out, they were at the crossing point.
When
Thomas moved, the heavy guns of
Fort Wood, at
Chattanooga, were playing upon the
Missionaries' Ridge and
Orchard Knob,
39 the latter a much lower hill considerably in front of the former.
The column
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moved in close and admirable order, the division of
General T. J. Wood, of
Granger's (Fourth) corps, leading, on the left, and advancing almost to
Citico Creek, and
Sheridan's on the right.
Palmer, of the Fourteenth Corps, supported
Granger's right, with
Baird's division refused, while
Johnston's division remained in the intrenchments, under arms, and
Howard's corps was in reserve, both ready to move to any required point.
Grant,
Thomas,
Granger, and
Howard, stood upon the ramparts of
Fort Wood, watching the advance, and were speedily gratified by hearing shouts of victory from the lips of the patriot soldiers, and seeing the foe flying in confusion.
Steadily but swiftly the Nationals had moved toward
Orchard Knob, like a
 |
|
The mission Aries' Ridge. |
deep torrent, driving every thing before them, and by a vigorous charge carrying the rifle-pits on that eminence and taking two hundred prisoners.
40 The movement was so quick and vigorous, that
Bragg had not time to throw forward supports before it was too late.
Wood immediately intrenched.
Howard moved up and took position on his left, and
Bridges's (
Illinois) battery was placed in position on the crest of
Orchard Knob, which was thus secured.
That evening
Bragg was satisfied that he had been.
almost fatally out-generaled.
It was now important to get
Sherman's army over the river without being discovered.
To attract the chief attention of the
Confederates to another quarter,
Hooker was ordered to attack them on the northern face of
Lookout Mountain.
41 He was under arms and ready for the movement at
[
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four o'clock the next morning, when he found that the recent heavy rains had. damaged his pontoon bridge at the mouth of
Lookout Creek, and the stream was not fordable.
He at once ordered
Geary to march to Wauhatchie, supported by
Cruft, cross the creek there, and hold the right bank of the stream, while the rest of the troops should build temporary bridges nearly in front of the detachment.
Fortunately for the Nationals, a heavy mist lay upon the country that morning, and while the vigilant eyes on
Lookout Mountain above were watching the bridge-builders, as the mist drifted now and then in the breeze, they did not observe
Geary's movement.
He crossed the creek at eight o'clock, seized a whole picket guard there, of forty-two men, and extended his line to the right to the foot of the mountain, facing northward.
Hooker now advanced
Gross's brigade, which seized the bridge just below the railway crossing, and pushed over the stream.
Osterhaus's division, which, as we have seen, had been left at Brown's Ferry, now came up, and
Wood's brigade was pressed to a point half a mile above
Gross, where it laid a temporary bridge and crossed.
The two batteries, meanwhile, had been well planted on little hills near, and by eleven o'clock
Hooker was at work, with a determination to assail the
Confederates and drive them from
Lookout Mountain--“an enterprise,” he said, under the circumstances, “worthy the ambition and renown of the troops to whom it was intrusted.”
42 His adversary in immediate command before him, was
General Walthall.
Hooker's guns all opened at once on the breastworks and rifle-pits along the steep, wooded, and broken slopes of the mountain, with a destructive enfilading fire.
Wood and
Gross having completed their bridges, dashed across the creek under cover of this fire, and joining
Geary on his left, pushed swiftly and vigorously down the valley, sweeping every thing before them, capturing the men in the rifle-pits, and allowing very few to escape up the mountain.
At the same time the troops scaling the rugged sides from the
valley, pushed on over bowlders and ledges, rocky crests and tangled ravines,
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cutting their way through the felled trees with which the mountain-side had been covered, under the very muzzles of the
Confederate cannon, driving the foe from his camp in the hollow or plateau well up toward the crest, and forcing him around the arable belt toward the
Chattanooga Valley.
In this work,
Cobham's brigade, posted on high ground, did effective service, by pouring destructive volleys from above and behind the
Confederates, while
Freeland's brigade was rolling them up on the flank.
Both were supported, closely and warmly, by the brigades of
Whittaker and
Creighton.
Not knowing to what extent the
Confederates might be re-enforced, and fearing a fatal entanglement and disordering of his troops in the mountain,
Hooker now directed them to halt.
But they could not be restrained.
Inspired by their success they pushed on, and notwithstanding their adversaries had been re-enforced, they continued to be irresistible.
Two of
Osterhaus's regiments, meanwhile, had been sent forward on the
Chattanooga road, near the base of the mountain, and the remainder of his division joined
Geary.
After a little more struggle the plateau was cleared, and from near Craven's house, where the
Confederates made their last stand, they were seen flying pell-mell, in utter confusion, down the precipices, ravines, and rugged slopes, toward the
Chattanooga Valley.
During all the struggle, a battery planted on a little wooded hill on
Moccasin Point, under
Captain Naylor, had been doing excellent service.
It actually dismounted one of the guns in the Confederate battery on the top of
Lookout Mountain, nearly fifteen hundred feet above it.
It was now about two o'clock in the afternoon.
The mountain was completely enveloped in a dense cloud — so dense as to make further movements perilous, if not impossible.
All the morning, while the struggle was going
on, the mountain was hooded with vapor that went up from the valley, and it was only at intervals, when it broke away, that glimpses of the lines and banners of the Nationals might be caught by straining eyes at
Chattanooga
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and
Orchard Knob, where ears, filled with the thunders of battle high in air, were making all hearts anxious.
Hooker had been literally fighting in the clouds, and gaining a substantial victory, while all below was doubt and painful suspense.
He established his line firmly on the eastern face of the mountain, his right resting on the palisades at the summit, and his left near the mouth of
Chattanooga Creek, completely commanding, by an enfilading fire, the line of the
Confederate defenses, stretching across the
Chattanooga Valley to the
Missionaries' Ridge.
Communication with
Chattanooga was established toward evening, and at sunset
General Carlin, with his brigade, joined
Hooker, and was placed on his right, to relieve the troops of
Geary, exhausted by hours of climbing and fighting.
During the night the right was attacked, but the assailants were gallantly repulsed.
The assault was to mask the retreat of the
Confederates from the top of the mountain, to which they were impelled by the fear of being cut off in the morning from the only road leading down to the
Chattanooga Valley.
They left behind them, in their haste, twenty thousand rations, the camp and garrison equipage of three brigades, and other war material.
45 Before daylight, in anticipation of this retreat, parties from several regiments were detached to scale the palisades at some broken point.
The Eighth Kentucky were the first to do so, climbing up a narrow, rocky passage, one at a time, for there was no one above to oppose them.
At sunrise,
in the clear, crisp autumn air, they unfurled the National banner from
Pulpit Rock, on the extreme point of the mountain overlooking
Chattanooga, with cheers that were re-echoed by the troops below.
From that “pulpit”
Jefferson Davis had harangued his troops only a few days before, when he gave them assurances that all was well with the
Confederacy.
This brilliant victory made absolutely secure the navigation of the river from
Bridgeport to
Chattanooga, the needful highway for supplies for the
National army.
While
Hooker was fighting on
Lookout Mountain,
Sherman's troops were crossing the
Tennessee above
Chattanooga.
At one o'clock in the morning,
three thousand men embarked on the pontoon boats already mentioned, at the mouth of the
North Chickamauga Creek, behind the shelter of
Friar's Island.
They floated silently down the river, landed some troops above the mouth of the
South Chickamauga, to capture Confederate pickets
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there, and then moved in equal silence to a point just below the mouth of the last-named stream.
Then the boats, with the assistance of a river steamer and two barges, ferried over troops., and at dawn eight thousand were on the south shore of the
Tennessee.
These, under the direction of
General W. F. Smith, commenced the construction of a pontoon bridge there thirteen hundred and fifty feet long, and also one across the
Chickamauga.
By noon both bridges were finished, when the rest of
Sherman's troops passed over, and in a slight drizzle of rain from the low, hanging clouds, which, as we have seen, hooded
Lookout Mountain, proceeded in three columns,
en echelon,
47 to attack the
Confederates on the northern end of the
Missionaries' Ridge, between the
Chickamauga and the tunnel, where the railway passes through.
Between three and four o'clock in the afternoon the desired point was gained, after some sharp fighting, and near the tunnel
Sherman rested and fortified his position, making it a strong point of departure for the grander movements the next day. In the mean time
Colonel Loring, with a brigade of
Thomas's cavalry, had been raiding on
Bragg's communications with
East Tennessee, along the line of the railway between
Chattanooga and
Cleveland.
He burned
Tyner's Station, and, pushing on to
Cleveland, captured two hundred Confederates, with one hundred wagons, and destroyed the railway station there, a gun-cap factory, and a large amount of stores, gathered for the supply of
Longstreet.
The night of the 24th was spent in preparations for a great struggle on the morrow.
The nearly full moon shone out resplendently in the unclouded sky. Camp-fires blazed along the heights from
Lookout Mountain to the
Chickamauga.
On
Bragg's flanks, in strong positions gained by hard struggling, hung two of the most determined fighters in the armies of the
Republic.
Hooker was on his left, holding the field of victory on
Lookout Mountain, and
Sherman was on his right, well intrenched, on the north end of the
Missionaries' Ridge.
There was now an uninterrupted communication between these extremes of
Grant's army,
Carlin, as we have seen, connecting
Hooker with the center, and now
Howard, with his (Eleventh) corps, connected that center with
Sherman.
The Headquarters of the chief were with
Thomas, at
Orchard Knob.
Bragg, in the mean time, had also been preparing for the inevitable encounter.
He went to the summit of
Lookout Mountain toward sunset, and found, to his dismay, that all the advantages of position at that point were irretrievably lost.
He then gave orders for the ground to be disputed until he could withdraw all the troops of his left across
Chattanooga Creek to the
Missionaries' Ridge.
That movement was accomplished during the night, and on Wednesday morning
his whole force was concentrated on the
Ridge, and extended heavily to the right, to meet what seemed to be the point chosen for the most formidable assault on his lines, and to protect the railway between the
Ridge and
Dalton, to
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which his supplies were sent up from
Atlanta.
He had placed
Lieutenant-General W. J. Hardee in command of his right wing, facing
Sherman, and
Major-General J. Ac. Breckinridge in command of his left, to confront
Hooker.
That night he evacuated all of his works at the foot of the
Ridge, excepting the rifle-pits, and formed a new line on its top.
Hooker moved down from
Lookout Mountain on the morning of the 25th, and proceeded to cross
Chattanooga Valley in the direction of
Rossville.
There he was delayed until about two o'clock in the afternoon, in consequence of the destruction, by the
Confederates; of the bridge over
Chattanooga Creek, where the road that wound down from
Summertown, on
Lookout Mountain, crossed it.
As soon as possible
Osterhaus's division was thrown across the creek on the timbers of a new bridge the troops were constructing.
Pushing on toward
Rossville, they drove the
Confederates out of the
Gap there by a flanking movement, capturing a large quantity of artillery, small-arms, ammunition, wagons, ambulances, and stores that filled
Ross's house.
In the mean time
Hooker's whole force had passed the creek and pushed on toward
Rossville.
There he set about his prescribed duty of clearing the
Ridge of Confederates, who, under the immediate command of
General Stewart, were well posted behind intrenchments cast up there by
Thomas at the time of the
battle of Chickamauga.
Hie sent
Osterhaus through the
Gap to move parallel with the
Ridge on its eastern side.
Cruft was ordered to move along its crest, and
Geary, with the batteries, marched up the valley at its base on the western side.
Bragg's skirmishers were ordered to meet this dangerous movement, when the Ninth Indiana dashed forward, formed a line under a heavy fire, and, charging furiously upon the foe, drove them back to the main body.
The remainder of
Cruft's column, meanwhile, formed in battle-line and moved forward at a charging pace,
Gross's brigade, with the Fifty-first Ohio and Thirty-fifth Indiana of
Whittaker's brigade, in advance, closely supported by the remainder of the latter's command.
Back, back, back, they steadily pushed the
Confederates, their front line, under
General Stewart retreating, while fighting, upon the second line, under
General Bate, while
Geary and
Osterhaus were pouring murderous fires upon their flanks.
So the half-running fight continued until near sunset, when the
Confederates broke into hopeless confusion and fled.
The few who ran down the western slope of the
Ridge were captured by
Geary, and the many who sought safety in flight down the eastern slope were made prisoners by
Osterhaus, full two thousand in number; while those who skurried along the
Ridge toward the stronger right, fell into the hands of
Johnson's division, of the Fourteenth (
Palmer's) Corps, which had been advanced from
Chattanooga.
Few escaped.
Hooker's victory on that part of the field was complete at twilight, and his troops went into bivouac for the night “with cheers and rejoicing.”
48
While
Hooker was thus clearing one portion of the
Missionaries' Ridge,
Sherman was busy at the other extremity of the battle-line.
He had strongly intrenched his position during the night, and, in obedience to
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orders, prepared to attack
Hardee at daylight, leaving the brigades of
General Lightburn and
Colonels Cockrell and
Alexander to hold his fortified position as his key-point.
His order of battle was similar to that of
Hooker, sweeping along the crest and flanks of the
Ridge.
All was in readiness at sunrise, when
General Corse, with three of his own regiments and one of
Lightburn's, moved forward, while
General M. L. Smith and his command advanced along the eastern base of the
Ridge, and
Colonel Loomis, with his brigade, supported by two brigades under
General J. E. Smith, moved along the western base.
Sherman found the ground to be traversed more difficult than he had supposed.
Instead of a continuous ridge, there was a chain of hills,
49 each wooded and well fortified, so that, should one elevation be gained, another equally commanding would confront it. But no difficulties were formidable to men who had been taught by experience to disregard them; and
Corse moved on, the Fortieth Illinois in advance, supported by the Twentieth and Forty-sixth Ohio.
They swept rapidly down the hill held by
Sherman and up the next eminence to within eighty yards of the
Confederate works, where they found, seized, and held a secondary crest.
Then
Corse called up his reserves and asked for re-enforcements to attempt to carry the position before him, by assault.
A severe hand-to-hand struggle ensued, which lasted for an hour, the tide of battle ebbing and flowing with equal success on both sides, and heavy loss on the part of the Nationals, who were subjected to an enfilading fire.
Corse was unable to carry the works on his front, and the
Confederates were equally unable to drive him from his position.
Meanwhile,
Smith and
Loomis, on each side of the
Ridge, were steadily advancing, fighting their way to the
Confederate flanks without wavering.
A heavy and unexpected artillery fire made the supporting brigades of
General J. E. Smith recoil, and gave the impression to the anxious watchers at
Chattanooga that
Sherman was losing ground.
It was not so. The real attacking forces under
Corse (who was severely wounded at ten o'clock, and his place taken by
Colonel Wolcott, of the Forty-sixth Ohio),
M. L. Smith, and
Loomis, made no retrograde movement, but held their ground, and struggled “all day persistently, stubbornly, and well.”
50 When
J. E. Smith's reserves recoiled, the
Confederates made a show of pursuit, but were soon struck on their flank and compelled to seek safety in retiring to the shelter of their works on the wooded hills.
Up to three o'clock in the afternoon,
Sherman had not been able to gain any thing of decisive importance.
General Grant, meanwhile, from his position on
Orchard Knob, had been watching the progress of the battle, and waiting impatiently for tidings from
Hooker, intending, if he should be successful, to order
Thomas to advance on the
Confederate center.
He was ignorant of
Hooker's detention at
Chattanooga Creek, and expected to hear from him by noon.
No tidings came, but when, between one and two o'clock,
Grant saw that
Bragg was weakening his center to support his right, and believing
Hooker to be at or near
Rossville, he gave
Thomas an order to advance.
It was promptly obeyed at two o'clock. The divisions of
Wood,
Baird,
Sheridan, and
Johnson moved steadily forward, with a
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double line of skirmishers in front, followed at a short distance by the whole body.
Pressing in a continuous line, they created such a panic among the occupants of the rifle-pits at the base of the
Ridge, that they fled precipitately toward the crest, swarming up the hill-side,
Grant said, “like bees from a hive.”
The
Nationals stopped but for a moment to re-form, when, inspired by an irresistible impulse, they pushed vigorously forward up the steep and
rugged declivities in pursuit, in the face of a terrible storm of grape and canister-shot from about thirty guns on the summit, and from murderous volleys of musketry in the well-filled rifle-pits at the crest.
51 But the
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Nationals did not waver for a moment.
They pressed on, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Langdon, of the First Ohio, with a group of men of his own regiment and several others, who were foremost in the chase, sprang forward and made the first lodgment on the hill-top, within five hundred yards of
Bragg's Headquarters, with shouts that were repeated by thousands of voices.
52 This gap in the
Confederate line speedily widened as the assailants pressed up, and it was not long before the entire battle-line of the
Missionaries' Ridge was in possession of the
Union troops, with all the
Confederate cannon and ammunition, and many of the soldiers in the trenches; and the captured artillery was soon playing fearfully upon the defeated columns with an enfilading fire.
Sherman soon drove the
Confederates from his front, when the battle ceased at that end of the line; but the divisions of
Wood and
Baird, on the right, were obstinately resisted until dark, for the
Confederates in their front were re-enforced from
Bragg's right.
Yet these were steadily pressed back; and at the edge of the evening they fled in haste,
Breckinridge barely escaping capture.
Thus ended the
battle of Chattanooga, in complete victory for the
National arms.
Grant modestly summed up the result, in a dispatch to
Halleck, saying, “Although the battle lasted from early dawn till dark this evening, I believe I am not premature in announcing a complete victory over
Bragg.
Lookout Mountain top, all the rifle-pits in
Chattanooga Valley, and
Missionary Ridge entire, have been carried, and are now held by us.”
53
During the night succeeding the battle, the
Missionaries' Ridge blazed with the
Union camp-fires, while the discomfited Confederates were retreating in haste toward
Ringgold, by way of
Chickamauga Station.
Early the next morning,
Sherman,
Palmer, and
Hooker were sent in pursuit, the first directly in the track of the fugitives, the other two by the
Rossville road, toward
Ringgold.
Bragg destroyed the bridges behind him, and
Hooker was very much delayed at Chickamauga River by a failure to supply him promptly with bridge materials.
Sherman found every thing in flames at
Chickamauga Station, which he passed and pushed on toward
Greysville, encountering on the way, just at night, a rear-guard of the fugitives, with which he had a sharp skirmish.
There
General Grant overtook him. On the following morning he marched on to
Greysville, on the
East Chickamauga, where he found
Palmer and his command, who, on the previous evening, had struck a rear-guard under
General Gist, and captured three of his guns and some prisoners.
There
Sherman halted, and sent
Howard to destroy a large section of the railway which connected
Dalton with
Cleveland, and thus severed the communication between
Bragg and
Burnside.
Hooker, meanwhile, had pushed on to
Ringgold,
Osterhaus in advance,
Geary following, and
Cruft in the rear, and finding at every step evidences of
Bragg's precipitate flight.
Stragglers were numerous, and were made prisoners.
When the head of the pursuers
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reached
Ringgold, the rear of the pursued had just left it. A little beyond is a narrow gap in
Taylor's Ridge, sufficiently wide for the passage of the ]east Chickamauga River and the railway, with margins rising several hundred feet. There
General Cleburne (called, as we have observed, the “
Stonewall Jackson of the
West” ), covering
Bragg's retreat, had made a stand, with guns well posted, determined to impede the pursuers as long as possible.
Hooker's guns, detained at the crossing of the
Chickamauga, were not yet up. His troops, flushed with success, could not be easily restrained, and they were allowed to attack with small-arms only.
The Thirteenth Illinois made a desperate attempt to dislodge the foe, but failed, with heavy loss.
Yet the struggle went on, and finally, in the afternoon, when some of
Hooker's guns were brought into position and the post was flanked by his infantry,
Cleburne retreated, having inflicted a loss on the Nationals of four hundred and thirty-two men, of whom sixty-five were killed,
Cleburne left one hundred and thirty killed and wounded on the field.
So ended the
battle of Ringgold.
General J. C. Davis's division, which had been attached to
Sherman's command, reached
Ringgold just after
Cleburne fled, ready to press on in pursuit; but there it ended.
Grant would gladly have continued it, and would doubtless have captured or destroyed
Bragg's army; but he was compelled to refrain, because
Burnside needed immediate relief, so as to save
East Tennessee from the grasp of
Longstreet.
He had informed
Grant that his supplies would not last longer than the 3d of December, a week later.
This statement was a powerful appeal.
Grant was in a condition to respond with vigor, for his foe was utterly demoralized by defeat and almost mutinous discontent among his troops,
54 and
Sherman's forces were interposed between him and
Longstreet, so as to prevent any possibility of their forming a junction.
The victorious troops fell back toward
Chattanooga,
55 and the campaign against
Bragg ended.
56 The Confederate retreat was continued to
Dalton, where the army established a fortified camp.
