Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Chapter XXII: Operations in Kentucky, Tennessee, North Mississippi, North Alabama, and Southwest Virginia. March 4-June 10, 1862., Part II: Correspondence, Orders, and Returns.
Lieut. Col. Robert N. Scott, Ed.

[27] much demoralized by this plundering as was that of Bull Run by the defeat.

There is but one effectual way of putting an end to this system of plunder and pillage, which has such a baneful influence on the morals and discipline of the Army; it is to pass a bill putting the Army and Navy on an equality in regard to prize-money. It should be done speedily. Officers and men will not take proper care of captured property unless they are interested in its preservation.

It may be alleged, in opposition to such a bill, that in England there is no statute for military captures as there is for prizes at sea. Such is the fact; but there military captures belong to the Crown, and they are distributed according to regulation established by the Crown. No statute is therefore required to pass for this purpose, as in the case of prizes condemned in admiralty.

If desired, I will assist in the preparation of a bill.

You are at liberty to show this letter to the Military Committees of the two Houses or to others.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

The hard-fought battle and signal victory by General Curtis in the Southwest relieves the reserves intended for his support. They will be sent to you immediately. Transports with cavalry and artillery can each take an infantry regiment from Fort Henry up the Tennessee. Arrange for them as they arrive, and be ready yourself to take the general command.

The possession and absolute security of the country north of the Tennessee, with Nashville as a center, is of vital importance, both in a political and military point of view. Under no circumstances should it be jeopardized. It enables us, with the Tennessee as a base, to operate east, west, or south. All our arrangements should-look to a centralization of our forces for that object. We cannot tell now what direction to take when we get our troops within reach of the enemy. You cannot well tell what force you may meet to the west. Still less can I tell what may come in the direction of Stevenson. With this view the establishment of your force on this bank of the river as high up as possible is evidently judicious, and with the same view it would be unnecessary and inadvisable to change the line on which I propose to advance. I can join you almost if not quite as soon as by water, in better condition, and with more security to your operations and mine. I believe you cannot be too promptly nor too strongly established on the Tennessee. I shall advance in a few days, as soon as our trans. portation is ready.