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white flag had been raised on the defenses.
At 8 A. M., a capitulation was agreed to, under which 11,583 men were passed over to the enemy — about half of them New Yorkers; the residue mainly from Ohio and Maryland.
Nearly all were raw levies; some of them militia, called out for three months. Among the spoils were 73 guns, ranging from excellent to worthless; 13,000 small arms, 200 wagons, and a large quantity of tents and camp-equipage.
Of horses, provisions, and munitions, the captures were of small account.
Jackson, whose appreciation of the value of time was unsurpassed, did not wait to receive the surrender; but, leaving that duty to Hill, hurried off the mass of his followers to rejoin Gen. Lee; and, by marching day and night, reached the Antietam next morning.1
It is impossible to resist the conclusion that Miles, in this affair, acted the part of a traitor.
He had been ordered, one month before his surrender, to fortify Maryland Heights; which he totally neglected to do. He refused or neglected to send the axes and spades required by Col. Ford, giving no reason therefor.
He paroled, on the 13th, 16 Rebel prisoners, authorizing them to pass out of our lines into those of the enemy; thus giving the Rebel commanders the fullest knowledge of all wherewith ours should have wished to keep them ignorant.
Another Rebel, an officer named Rouse, who had been captured and had escaped, being retaken, was allowed a private interview by Miles, and thereupon paroled to go without our lines.
He, still under parole, appeared in arms at the head of his men, among the first to enter our lines after the surrender.
As to Gen. McClellan, his most glaring fault in the premises would seem to have been his designation2 of Col. Miles, after his shameful behavior at Bull Run, to the command of a post so important as Harper's Ferry.
It is easy now to reproach him with the slowness of his advance from Washlington to Frederick; but it must be borne in mind that his force consisted of the remains of two beaten armies — his own and Pope's;--not so much strengthened as swelled by raw troops, hastily levied for an emergency; while opposed to him was an army of veterans, inferior indeed in numbers, but boasting of a succession of victories from first Bull Run onward, and proudly regarding itself as invincible.
Perplexed as to Lee's intentions, and hampered by the necessity of covering at once Washington and Baltimore, McClellan moved slowly, indeed; but only a great military genius, or a rash, headstrong fool, would have ventured to do otherwise.
After he learned at Frederick that Lee had divided his army, in his eagerness to clutch the tempting prize, McClellan blundered sadly in not hurling his army at once on McLaws, and thus cutting his way swiftly to the Ferry; yet, with all his mistakes, he moved vigorously enough to have seasonably relieved Miles, had that officer evinced loyalty and decent fitness for his position, or had Ford defended Maryland Heights with vigor and tenacity.
Halleck's insisting that Harper's Ferry should be held, after he knew
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