Rebellion Record: a Diary of American Events: Documents and Narratives, Volume 2.
Frank Moore, Ed.

The enemy has planted a battery on the Warrenton turnpike to defend the passage of Bull Run; has seized the stone bridge and made a heavy abatis on the right bank, to oppose our advance in that direction. The ford above the bridge is also guarded, whether with artillery or not is not positively known, but every indication favors the belief that he proposes to defend the passage of the stream.

It is intended to turn the position, force the enemy from the road, that it may be reopened, and, if possible, destroy the railroad leading from Manassas to the valley of Virginia, where the enemy has a large force. As this may be resisted by all the force of the enemy, the troops will be disposed as follows:

The first division (General Tyler's) with the exception of Richardson's brigade, will, at half-past 2 o'clock in the morning precisely, be on the Warrenton turnpike to threaten the passage of the bridge, but will not open fire until full daybreak.

The second division (Hunter's) will move from its camp at two o'clock in the morning precisely, and, led by Captain Woodbury, of the Engineers, will, after passing Cub Run, turn to the right and pass the Bull Run stream above the ford at Sudley's Spring, and then turning down to the left, descend the stream and clear away the enemy who may be guarding the lower ford and bridge. It will then bear off to the right and make room for the succeeding division.

The third division (Heintzelman's) will march at half-past 2 o'clock in the morning, and follow the road taken by the second division, but will cross at the lower ford after it has been turned as above, and then, going to the left, take place between the stream and second division.

The fifth division (Miles's) will take position on the Centreville Heights, (Richardson's brigade will, for the time, form part of the fifth division, and will continue in its present position.) One brigade will be in the village, and one near the present station of Richardson's brigade. This division will threaten the Blackburn Ford, and remain in reserve at Centreville. The commander will open fire with artillery only, and will bear in mind that it is a demonstration only he is to make. He will cause such defensive works, abatis, earthworks, &c., to be thrown up as will strengthen his position. Lieutenant Prime, of the Engineers, will be charged with this duty.

These movements may lead to the gravest results, and commanders of divisions and brigades should bear in mind the immense consequences involved. There must be no failure, and every effort must be made to prevent straggling.

No one must be allowed to leave the ranks without special authority. After completing the movements ordered, the troops must be held in order of battle, as they may be attacked at any moment.

By command of

Colonel:--I have the honor to submit the following report of the battle of the 21st of July, near Manassas, Virginia. It has been delayed till this time from the inability of the subordinate commanders to get earlier a true account of the state of their commands.

In my communication to you of the 20th ult., I stated it as my intention to move that afternoon, and drive the enemy from the east side of Bull Run, so as to enable the engineers to make a sufficiently accurate reconnoissance to justify our future movements. Later in the day they had obtained enough information of the passage across the stream to dispense with this reconnoissance, and it was decided to move without delay. It had been my intention to move the several columns out on the road a few miles on the evening of the 20th, so that they would have a shorter march in the morning; but I deferred to those who had the greatest distance to go, and who preferred starting early in the morning, and making but one move.

On the evening of the 20th ultimo my command was mostly at or near Centreville. The enemy was at or near Manassas, distant from Centreville about seven miles to the southwest. Centreville is a village of a few houses, mostly on the west side of a ridge running nearly north and south. The road from Centreville to Manassas junction was along this ridge, and crosses Bull Run about three miles from the former place. The Warrenton turnpike, which runs nearly east and west, goes over this ridge, through the village, and crosses Bull Run about four miles from it, Bull Run having a course between the crossing from northwest to southeast. The first division (Tyler's) was stationed on the north side of the Warrenton turnpike, and on the eastern slope of the Centreville ridge, two brigades on the same road, and a mile and a half in advance, to the west of the ridge, and one brigade on the road from Centreville to Manassas, where it crosses Bull Run at Blackburn's Ford, where General Tyler had the engagement of the 18th ultimo. The second division (Hunter's) was on the Warrenton turnpike, one mile east of Centreville. The third division (Heintzelman's) was on a road known as the Old Braddock road, which comes into Centreville from the southeast, about a mile and a half from the village. The fifth division (Miles's) was on the same road with the third division, and between it and Centreville. A map which is herewith, marked A, will show these positions better than I can describe them.

On Friday night a train of subsistence arrived, and on Saturday its contents were ordered to be issued to the command, and the men required to have three days rations in their haversacks. On Saturday orders were issued for the available force to march. As reported to you in my letter of the 19th ultimo, my personal reconnoissance of the roads to the south had shown that it was not practicable to carry out the original plan of turning the enemy's position on their right. The affair of the 18th at Blackburn's Ford showed he was too strong at that point for us to force a passage there without great loss, and if we did, that it would bring us in front of his strong position at Manassas, which was not desired. Our information was that the stone bridge over which the Warrenton road crossed Bull Run, to the west of Centreville, was defended by a battery in position, and the road on his side of the stream impeded by a heavy abatis. The alternative was, therefore, to turn the extreme left of his position. Reliable information was obtained of an undefended ford about three miles above the bridge, there being another fiord between it and the bridge, which was defended. It was therefore determined to take the road to the upper ford, and after crossing, to get behind the forces guarding the lower ford and the bridge, and after occupying the Warrenton road east of the bridge, to send out a force to destroy the railroad at or near Gainesville, and thus break up the communication between the enemy's forces at Manassas and those in the valley of Virginia, before Winchester, which had been held in check by Major-General Patterson.

Brigadier-General Tyler was directed to move with three of his brigades on the Warrenton road, and commence cannonading the enemy's batteries, while Hunter's division, moving after him, should, after passing a little stream called Cub Run, turn to the right and north, and move around to the upper ford, and there turn south and get behind the enemy. Colonel Heintzelman's division was to follow Hunter's as far as the turning off place to the lower ford, where he was to cross after the enemy should have been driven out by Hunter's division; the fifth division (Miles's) to be in reserve on the Centreville ridge.

I had felt anxious about the road from Manassas by Blackburn's Ford to Centreville, along the ridge, fearing that whilst we should be in force to the front, and endeavoring to turn the enemy's position, we ourselves should be turned by him by this road; for if he should once obtain possession of this ridge, which overlooks all the country to the west to the foot of the spurs of the Blue Ridge, we should have been irretrievably cut off and destroyed. I had, therefore, directed this point to be held in force, and sent an engineer to extemporize some field-works to strengthen the position.

The fourth division (Runyon's) had not been brought to the front further than to guard our communications by way of Vienna and the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. His advanced regiment was about seven miles in the rear of Centreville.

The divisions were ordered to march at half-past [3] two o'clock A. M., so as to arrive on the ground early in the day, and thus avoid the heat which is to be expected at this season. There was delay in the first division getting out of its camp on the road, and the other divisions were in consequence between two and three hours behind the time appointed — a great misfortune, as events turned out. The wood road leading from the Warrenton turnpike to the upper ford was much longer than we counted upon, the general direction of the stream being oblique to the road, and we having the obtuse angle on our side.

General Tyler commenced with his artillery at half-past 6 A. M., but the enemy did not reply, and after some time it became a question whether he was in any force in our front, and if he did not intend himself to make an attack, and make it by Blackburn's Ford. After firing several times, and obtaining no response, I held one of Heintzelman's brigades in reserve, in case we should have to send any troops back to reinforce Miles's division. The other brigades moved forward as directed in the general orders. On reaching the ford, at Sudley's Spring, I found part of the leading brigade of Hunter's division (Burnside's) had crossed, but the men were slow in getting over, stopping to drink. As at this time the clouds of dust from the direction of Manassas indicated the immediate approach of a large force, and fearing it might come down on the head of the column before the division could all get over and sustain it, orders were sent back to the heads of regiments to break from the column and come forward separately as fast as possible. Orders were sent by an officer to the reserve brigade of Heintzelman's division to come by a nearer road across the fields, and an aide-de-camp was sent to Brigadier-General Tyler to direct him to press forward his attack, as large bodies of the enemy were passing in front of him to attack the division which had crossed over. The ground between the stream and the road leading from Sudley's Spring south and over which Burnside's brigade marched, was for about a mile from the ford thickly wooded, whilst on the right of the road for about the same distance the country was divided between fields and woods. About a mile from the road the country on both sides of the road is open, and for nearly a mile further large rolling fields extend down to the Warrenton turnpike, which crosses what became the field of battle through the valley of a small water course, a tributary of Bull Run.

Shortly after the leading regiment of the first brigade reached the open space, and whilst others and the second brigade were crossing to the front and right, the enemy opened his fire, beginning with artillery and following up with infantry. The leading brigade (Burnside's) had to sustain this shock for a short time without support, and did it well. The battalion of regular infantry was sent to sustain it, and shortly afterwards the other corps of Porter's brigade, and a regiment detached from Heintzelman's division to the left, forced the enemy back far enough to allow Sherman's and Keyes's brigades of Tyler's division to cross from their position on the Warrenton road. These drove the right of the enemy, understood to have been commanded by Beauregard, from the front of the field, and out of the detached woods, and down to the road, and across it up the slopes on .the other side. Whilst this was going on, Heintzelman's division was moving down the field to the stream, and up the road beyond. Beyond the Warrenton road, and to the left of the road, down which our troops had marched from Sudley's Spring, is a hill with a farmhouse on it. Behind this hill the enemy had, early in the day, some of his most annoying batteries planted. Across the road from this hill was another hill, or rather elevated ridge, or table of land. The hottest part of the contest was for the possession of this hill with a house on it. The force engaged here was Heintzelman's division, Wilcox's and Howard's brigades on the right, supported by part of Porter's brigade and the cavalry under Palmer, and Franklin's brigade of Heintzelman's division, Sherman's brigade of Tyler's division in the centre and up the road, whilst Keyes's brigade of Tyler's division was on the left, attacking the batteries near the stone bridge. The Rhode Island battery of Burnside's brigade also participated in this attack by its fire from the north of the turnpike. The enemy was understood to have been commanded by J. E. Johnston. Rickett's battery, which did such effective service and played so brilliant a part in this contest, was, together with Griffin's battery, on the side of the hill, and became the object of the special attention of the enemy, who succeeded — our officers mistaking one of his regiments for one of our own, and allowing it to approach without firing upon it — in disabling the battery, and then attempted to take it. Three times was he repulsed by different corps in succession, and driven back, and the guns taken by hand, the horses being killed, and pulled away. The third time it was supposed by us all that the repulse was final, for he was driven entirely from the hill, and so far beyond it as not to be in sight, and all were certain the day was ours. He had before this been driven nearly a mile and a half, and was beyond the Warrenton road, which was entirely in our possession from the stone bridge westward, and our engineers were just completing the removal of the abatis across the road, to allow our reinforcements (Schenck's brigade and Ayers's battery) to join us.

The enemy was evidently disheartened and broken. But we had been fighting since half-past 10 o'clock in the morning, and it was after three o'clock in the afternoon. The men had been up since two o'clock in the morning, and had made what to those unused to such things seemed a long march before coming into action, though the longest distance gone over [4] was not more than nine and a half miles; and though they had three days provisions served out to them the day before, many no doubt either did not eat them, or threw them away on the march or during the battle, and were therefore without food. They had done much severe fighting. Some of the regiments which had been driven from the hill in the first two attempts of the enemy to keep possession of it had become shaken, were unsteady, and had many men out of the ranks.

It was at this time that the enemy's reinforcements came to his aid from the railroad train, understood to have just arrived from the valley with the residue of Johnston's army. They threw themselves in the woods on our right and towards the rear of our right, and opened a fire of musketry on our men, which caused them to break and retire down the hillside. This soon degenerated into disorder, for which there was no remedy. Every effort was made to rally them, even beyond the reach of the enemy's fire, but in vain. The battalion of regular infantry alone moved up the hill opposite to the one with the house on it, and there maintained itself until our men could get down to and across the Warrenton turnpike, on the way back to the position we occupied in the morning. The plain was covered with the retreating troops, and they seemed to infect those with whom they came in contact. The retreat soon became a rout, and this soon degenerated still further into a panic.

Finding this state of affairs was beyond the efforts of all those who had assisted so faithfully during the long and hard day's work in gaining almost the object of our wishes, and that nothing remained on the field but to recognize what we could no longer prevent, I gave the necessary orders to protect their withdrawal, begging the men to form in line, and offer the appearance, at least, of organization. They returned by the fords to the Warrenton road, protected, by my order, by Colonel Porter's force of regulars. Once on the road, and the different corps coming together in small parties, many without officers, they became intermingled, and all organization was lost.

Orders had been sent back to Miles's division for a brigade to move forward and protect this retreat, and Colonel Blenker's brigade was detached for this purpose, and was ordered to go as far forward as the point where the road to the right left the main road.

By referring to the general order it will be seen that, while the operations were to go on in front, an attack was to be made at Blackburn's Ford, by the brigade (Richardson's) stationed there. A reference to his report, and to that of Major Hunt, commanding the artillery, will show that this part of the plan was well and effectively carried out. It succeeded in deceiving the enemy for a considerable time, and in keeping in check a part of his force. The fire of the artillery at this point is represented as particularly destructive.

At the time of our retreat, seeing great activity in this direction, much firing, and columns of dust, I became anxious for this place, fearing if it were turned or forced, the whole stream of our retreating mass would be captured or destroyed. After providing for the protection of the retreat by Porter's and Blenker's brigades, I repaired to Richardson's, and found the whole force ordered to be stationed for the holding of the road from Manassas by Blackburn's Ford to Centreville, on the march, under the orders from the Division-Commander for Centreville. I immediately halted it and ordered it to take up the best line of defence across the ridge that their position admitted of, and subsequently taking in person the command of this part of the army, I caused such disposition of the forces which had been added to by the First and Second New Jersey and the De Kalb regiments, ordered up from Runyon's reserve before going forward, as would best serve to check the enemy. The ridge being held in this way, the retreating current passed slowly through Centreville to the rear. The enemy followed us from the ford as far as Cub Run, and, owing to the road becoming blocked up at the crossing, caused us much damage there, for the artillery could not pass, and several pieces and caissons had to be abandoned. In the panic the horses hauling the caissons and ammunition were cut from their places by persons to escape with, and in this way much confusion was caused, the panic aggravated, and the road encumbered. Not only were pieces of artillery lost, but also many of the ambulances carrying the wounded.

By sundown most of our men had gotten behind Centreville ridge, and it became a question whether we should or not endeavor to make a stand there. The condition of our artillery and its ammunition, and the want of food for the men, who had generally abandoned or thrown away all that had been issued the day before, and the utter disorganization and consequent demoralization of the mass of the army, seemed to all who were near enough to be consulted — division and brigade commanders and staff — to admit of no alternative but to fall back; the more so as the position at Blackburn's Ford was then in the possession of the enemy, and he was already turning our left. On sending the officers of the staff to the different camps, they found, as they reported to me, that our decision had been anticipated by the troops, most of those who had come in from the front being already on the road to the rear, the panic with which they came in still continuing and hurrying them along.

At — o'clock the rear guard (Blenker's brigade) moved, covering the retreat, which was effected during the night and next morning. The troops at Fairfax station leaving by the cars took with them the bulk of the supplies which had been sent there. My aide-de-camp, Major Wadsworth, stayed at Fairfax court-house [5] till late in the morning, to see that the stragglers, and weary and worn-out soldiers, were not left behind.

I transmit herewith the reports of the several division and brigade commanders, to which I refer for the conduct of particular regiments and corps, and a consolidated return of the killed, wounded, and missing. From the latter it will be seen that our killed amounted to nineteen officers and four hundred and sixty-two non-commissioned officers and privates, and our wounded to sixty-four officers and nine hundred and forty-seven non-commissioned officers and privates. Many of the wounded will soon be able to join the ranks, and will leave our total of killed and disabled from further service under one thousand. The return of the missing is very inaccurate, the men supposed to be missing having fallen into other regiments and gone to Washington — many of the Zouaves to New York. In one brigade the number originally reported at six hundred and sixteen was yesterday reduced to one hundred and seventy-four. These reductions are being made daily. In a few days a more correct return can be made.

Of course, nothing accurate is known of the loss of the enemy. An officer of their forces, coming from them with a flag of truce, admitted eighteen hundred killed and wounded, and other information shows this to be much under the true number.

The officer commanding the Eleventh New York Zouaves, and Colonel Heintzelman, say that the returns of that regiment cannot be relied on, as many of those reported among the casualties have absented themselves since their return and have gone to New York. Among the missing reported are many of our surgeons, who remained in attendance on our wounded, and were, against the rules of modern warfare, made prisoners.

The issue of this hard-fought battle, in which certainly our troops lost no credit in their conflict on the field with an enemy ably commanded, superior in numbers, who had but a short distance to march, and who acted on his own ground, on the defensive, and always under cover, whilst our men were of necessity out on the open fields, should not prevent full credit being given to those officers and corps whose services merited success if they did not attain it.

To avoid repetition, I will only mention here the names of those not embraced in reports of division and brigade commanders. I beg to refer to their reports for the names of those serving under their immediate orders, desiring that on this subject they be considered as part of my own. I claim credit for the officers of my staff, and for those acting as such during the day. They did every thing in their power, exposing themselves freely when required, and doing all that men could do; communicating orders, guiding the columns, exhorting the troops, rallying them when broken, and providing for them the best the circumstances permitted. They are as follows:

First Lieutenant H. W. Kingsbury, Fifth Artillery, aide-de-camp. Major Clarence S. Brown, New York Militia Volunteers, aide-de-camp. Major James S. Wadsworth, New York Militia Volunteers, aide-de-camp; the latter, who does me the honor to be on my personal staff, had a horse shot under him in the hottest of the fight. Captain James B. Fry, Assistant Adjutant-General. Captain O. H. Tillinghast, Assistant Quartermaster, who discharged alone the important and burdensome duties of his department with the army, and who was mortally wounded while acting with the artillery, to which he formerly belonged, and in which he was deeply interested. Captain H. F. Clark, Chief of Subsistence Department. Major Meyer, Signal Officer, and Major Malcolm McDonnell, who acted as aides. Surgeon W. S. King, and Assistant Surgeon Magruder, Medical Department. Major J. G. Barnard, Engineer, and senior of his department with the army, gave most important aid. First Lieutenant Fred. S. Prime, Engineers. Captain A. W. Whipple. First Lieutenant H. L. Abbott, and Second Lieutenant H. S. Putnam, Topographical Engineers. Major W. F. Barry, Fifth Artillery, Chief of Artillery. Lieutenant George C. Strong, Ordnance Officer. Major W. H. Wood, First Infantry, Acting Inspector-General. Second Lieutenant Guy Henry, who joined me on the field, was of service as an aide-de-camp.

The following officers commanded divisions and brigades, and in the several places their duty called them, did most effective service and behaved in the most gallant manner:

Brigadier-General Tyler, Connecticut Volunteers. Colonel David Hunter, Third Cavalry, severely wounded at the head of his division. Colonel S. P. Heintzelman, Seventeenth Infantry, wounded in the arm while leading his division into action on the hill. Brigadier-General Schenck, Ohio Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade, First Division. Colonel E. D. Keyes, Eleventh Infantry, commanding First Brigade, First Division. Colonel W. P. Frank-lin, Twelfth Infantry, First Brigade, Third Division. Colonel W. T. Sherman, Thirteenth Infantry, commanding Third Brigade, First Division. Colonel Andrew Porter, Sixteenth Infantry, commanding First Brigade, Second Division. Colonel A. E. Burnside, Rhode Island Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade, Second Division. Colonel O. B. Wilcox, Michigan Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade, Third Division, who was wounded and taken prisoner while on the hill, in the hottest of the fight. Colonel O. O. Howard, Maine Volunteers, commanding Third Brigade, Third Division. Colonel J. B. Richardson, Michigan Volunteers, commanding Fourth Brigade, First Division. Colonel Blenker, New York Volunteers, commanding First Brigade, Fifth Division. Colonel Davies, New York Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade, Fifth Division. [6]

As my position may warrant, even if it does not call for some explanation of the causes, as far as they can be seen, which led to the results herein stated, I trust it may not be out of place if I refer in a few words to the immediate antecedents of the battle. When I submitted to the General-in-Chief, in compliance with his verbal instructions, the plan of operations and estimate of force required, the time I was to proceed to carry it into effect was fixed for the 8th of July, Monday. Every facility possible was given me by the General-in-Chief, and the heads of the administrative departments, in making the necessary preparations. But the regiments, owing, I was told, to a want of transportation, came over slowly. Many of them did not come across till eight or nine days after the time fixed upon, and went forward without my even seeing them, and without having been together before.in a brigade. The sending reinforcements to General Patterson, by drawing off the wagons, was a further and unavoidable cause of delay. Notwithstanding the Herculean efforts of the Quartermaster-General, and his favoring me in every way, the wagons for ammunition, subsistence, &c., and the horses for the trains and the artillery, did not arrive for more than a week after the time appointed to move. I was not even prepared as late as the 15th ultimo, and the desire I should move became great, and it was wished I should not, if possible, delay longer than Tuesday, the 16th ultimo. When I did set out, on the 16th, I was still deficient in wagons for subsistence. But I went forward, trusting to their being procured in time to follow me. The trains thus hurriedly gathered together, with horses, wagons, drivers, and wagon managers, all new and unused to each other, moved with difficulty and disorder, and was the cause of a day's delay in getting the provisions forward, making it necessary to make on Sunday the attack we should have made on Saturday. I could not, with every exertion, get forward with the troops earlier than we did. I wished to go to Centreville the second day, which would have taken us there on the 17th, and enabled us, so far as they were concerned, to go into action on the 19th, instead of the 21st; but when I went forward from Fairfax Court House, beyond Germantown, to urge them forward, I was told it was impossible for the men to march further. They had only come from Vienna, about six miles, and it was not more than six and a half miles farther to Centreville — in all a march of twelve and a half miles; but the men were foot weary; not so much, I was told, by the distance marched, as by the time they had been on foot, caused by the obstructions in the road, and the slow pace we had to move to avoid ambuscades. The men were, moreover, unaccustomed to marching, their bodies not in condition for that kind of work, and not used to carying even the load of light marching order.

We crossed Bull Run with about 18,000 men of all arms, the fifth division (Miles's and Richardson's brigade) on the left, at Blackburn's Ford to Centreville, and Schenck's brigade of Tyler's division on the left of the road, near the stone bridge, not participating in the main action. The numbers opposed to us have been variously estimated. I may safely say, and avoid even the appearance of exaggeration, that the enemy brought up all he could, which were not kept engaged elsewhere. He had notice of our coming on the 17th, and had from that time until the 21st to bring up whatever he had. It is known that in estimating the force to go against Manassas, I engaged not to have to do with the enemy's forces under Johnston, then kept in check in the valley by Major-General Patterson, or those kept engaged by Major-General Butler, and I know every effort was made by the General-in-Chief that this should be done, and that even if Johnston joined Beauregard, it would not be because he could be followed by General Patterson, but from causes not necessary for me to refer to, you knew them all. This was not done, and the enemy was free to assemble from every direction in numbers only limited by the amount of his railroad rolling-stock and his supply of provisions. To the forces, therefore, we drove in from Fairfax Court House, Fairfax Station, Germantown, and Centreville, and those under Beauregard at Manassas, must be added those under Johnston from Winchester, and those brought up by Davis from Richmond, to other places at the South, to which is to be added the levy en masse ordered by the Richmond authorities, which was ordered to assemble at Manassas. What all this amounted to, I cannot say — certainly much more than we attacked them with.

I could not, as I have said, more early push on faster, nor could I delay. A large and the best part of my forces were three months volunteers, whose term of service was about to expire, but who were sent forward as having long enough to serve for the purpose of the expedition. On the eve of the battle the Fourth Pennsylvania regiment of volunteers, and the battery of volunteer artillery of the New York Eighth militia, whose term of service expired, insisted on their discharge. I wrote to the regiment, expressing a request for them to remain a short time, and the Hon. Secretary of War, who was at the time on the ground, tried to induce the battery to remain at least five days. But in vain. They insisted on their discharge that night. It was granted, and the next morning, when the army moved forward into battle, these troops moved to the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon.

In the next few days, day by day, I should have lost ten thousand of the best armed, drilled, officered, and disciplined troops in the army. In other words, every day which added to the strength of the enemy made us weaker.

In conclusion, I desire to say, in reference to the events of the 21st ultimo, that the general [7] order for the battle to which I referred was, with slight modifications, literally conformed to; that the corps were brought over Bull Run in the manner proposed, and put into action as before arranged, and that up to late in the afternoon every movement ordered was carrying us successfully to the object we had proposed before starting — that of getting to the railroad leading from Manassas to time valley of Virginia, and going on it far enough to break up and destroy the communication and interviews between the forces under Beauregard and those under Johnston. And could we have fought a day or a few hours sooner, there is every thing to show how we could have continued successful even against the odds with which we contended.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

Your most obedient servant,

General: In obedience to order No. 22, dated Centreville, July 20, Sherman's, Schenck's, and Keyes's brigades, of this division — Richardson's brigade having been left in front of Blackburn's Ford — moved at half-past 2 A. M., on the 21st inst., to threaten the passage of the Warrenton turnpike bridge, on Bull Run. I arrived in front of the bridge with Schenck's and Sherman's brigades, and Ayres's and Carlisle's batteries, about six A. M., Keyes's brigade having been halted by your order to watch the road coming up from Manassas, and about two miles from the run. After examining the position, and posting Sherman's and Schenck's brigades and artillery, I fired the first gun at half-past 6 A. M., as agreed upon, to show that we were in position. As my orders were to threaten the passage of the bridge, I caused Schenck's brigade to be formed into line, its left resting in the direction of the bridge, and the battery which the enemy had established to sweep the bridge and its approach, so as to threaten both. Sherman's brigade was posted to the right of the Warrenton turnpike, so as to be in position to sustain Schenck, or to move across Bull Run in the direction of Hunter's column.

The thirty-pounder gun attached to the Carlisle battery was posted on the Warrenton turnpike, with Ayres's battery considerably in its rear, Carlisle's battery was posted on the left of Sherman's brigade. In this position we awaited the appearance of Hunter's and Heintzleman's columns as ordered, until such time as the approach to the bridge should be carried, and the bridge rebuilt by Capt. Alexander, of the engineers, who had on the spot the necessary structure for that purpose.

Soon after getting into position we discovered that the enemy had a heavy battery, with infantry in support, commanding both the road and bridge approaches, on which both Ayers and Carlisle at different times tried the effect of their guns without success; and a careful examination of the banks of Bull Run satisfying me that they were impracticable for the purpose of artillery, these batteries had to remain comparatively useless until such time as Hunter's column might clear the approach by a movement on the opposite bank. During this period of waiting the thirty-pounder was occasionally used with considerable effect against bodies of infantry and cavalry, which could be seen from time to time moving in the direction of Hunter's column, and out of the range of ordinary guns. Using a high tree as an observatory, we could constantly see the operations of Hunter's and Heintzelman's column from the time they crossed Bull Run, and through one of my staff, Lieut. O'Rourke, of the engineers, I was promptly notified as to any change in the progress of their columns up to the time when it appeared that the heads of both — were arrested, and the enemy seemed to be moving heavy reinforcements to support their troops. At this time I ordered Colonel Sherman, with his brigade, to cross Bull Run, and to support the two columns already in action. Colonel Sherman, as appears by his reports, crossed the run without opposition, and after encountering a party of the enemy flying before Hunter's forces, found General McDowell, and received his orders to join in the pursuit. The subsequent operations of this brigade and its able commander having been under your own eye and directions, I shall not follow its movements any further, but refer you to Colonel Sherman's report, which you will find herewith.

So soon as it was discovered that Hunter's division had been arrested, I ordered up Keyes's brigade, which arrived just as the left of Sherman's was crossing the run, and having satisfied myself that the enemy had not the force nor the purpose to cross Bull Run, I ordered Keyes's brigade to follow Sherman, accompanying the move in person, as I saw it must necessarily place me on the left of our line, and in the best possible position, when we should have driven the enemy off, to join Schenck's brigade and the two batteries left on the opposite side. I ordered Colonel Keyes to incline the head of his column a little to the right of the line of march taken by Sherman's brigade, to avoid the fire of a battery which the enemy had opened. This movement sheltered the men to a considerable degree, and resulted in closing on the rear of Sherman's brigade; and, on reaching the high ground, I ordered Colonel Keyes to form into line on the left of Sherman's brigade, which was done with great steadiness and regularity. After waiting a few moments the line was ordered to advance, and came into conflict on its right with the enemy's cavalry and infantry, which, after some severe struggles, it drove back, until the further march of the brigade was arrested by a severe fire of artillery and infantry, sheltered by some buildings [8] standing on the heights above the road leading to Bull Run. The charge was here ordered, and the Second Maine and Third Connecticut regiments, which were opposed to this part of the enemy's line, pressed forward to the top of the hill until they reached the buildings which were held by the enemy, drove them out, and for a moment had them in possession. At this point, finding the brigade under the fire of a strong force behind breastworks, the order was given to march by the left flank across an open field until the whole line was sheltered by the right bank of Bull Run, along which the march was conducted, with a view to turn the battery which the enemy had placed on the hill below the point at which the Warrenton turnpike crosses Bull Run. The march was conducted for a considerable distance below the stone bridge, causing the enemy to retire, and giving Captain Alexander an opportunity to pass the bridge, cut out the abatis which had been placed there, and prepared the way for Schenck's brigade and the two batteries to pass over. Before the contemplated movement could be made on the enemy's battery it was removed and placed in a position to threaten our line; but before the correct range could be obtained, Colonel Keyes carried his brigade, by a flank movement, around the base of the hill, and was on the point of ascending it in time to get at the battery, when I discovered that our troops were on the retreat, and that, unless a rapid movement to the rear was made, we should be cut off, and through my aid, Lieutenant Upton, Colonel Keyes was ordered to file to the right and join the retreating column. The order was executed without the least confusion, and the brigade joined the retreating column in good order. When this junction was made I left Keyes's brigade and rode forward to ascertain the condition of Schenck's brigade and the artillery left this side of Bull Run, and on arriving there found Ayers's battery and Lieutenant Haines's 30-pounder waiting orders. I immediately ordered Lieutenant Haines to limber up and move forward as soon as possible. This was promptly done, and the piece moved on towards Centreville. I then went into the wood where the ammunition wagon of this piece had been placed, out of the reach of the fire, and found that the driver had deserted and taken away part of the horses, which made it impossible to move, it. I then returned to Ayers's battery, which I found limbered up, and ordered it to move forward and cover the retreat, which was promptly done by its gallant officers, and when the cavalry charge was made, shortly afterward, they repulsed it promptly and effectually. I then collected a guard, mainly from the Second Maine regiment, and put it under the command of Colonel Jameson, with orders to sustain Captain Ayers during the retreat, which was done gallantly and successfully, until the battery reached Centreville. Before ordering Colonel Jameson to cover Ayers's battery, I passed to the rear to find General Schenck's brigade, intending, as it was fresh, to have it cover the retreat. I did not find it in the position in which I had left it. and supposed it had moved forward and joined the retreating column. I did not see General Schenck again until near Cub Run, where he appeared active in rallying his own or some other regiments. General Schenck reports that the two Ohio Regiments left Bull Run after the cavalry charge, and arrived at Centreville in good order.

In closing this report, it gives me great pleasure to express my admiration of the manner in which Colonel Keyes handled his brigade, completely covering it by every possible accident of the ground, while changing his positions, and leading it bravely and skilfully to the attack at the right moment, to which the brigade responded in every instance in a manner highly creditable to itself and satisfactory to its commanding officers. At no time during the conflict was this brigade disorganized, and it was the last off the field, and in good order.

Colonel Keyes says:--“The gallantry with which the Second Maine and Third Connecticut regiments charged up the hill upon the enemy's artillery and infantry, was never, in my opinion, surpassed, and the conduct of Colonels Jameson and Chatfield in this instance and throughout the day merits the highest commendation. Colonel Terry rendered great assistance by his gallantry and excellent conduct. Lieutenant Hascall, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General Lieutenants Walter and Ely, rendered gallant and effective assistance.” It gives me pleasure to be able to confirm the above from personal observation, and to express my personal satisfaction with the conduct of this brigade. For further particulars as to gallant conduct of individuals, I beg leave to refer you to the reports of commanders of brigades, hereunto attached. Colonel Sherman speaks highly of Colonel McCoon, of Wisconsin, and Lieutenants Piper and McQuester--all on his personal staff.

From my own personal staff I received, in every instance, prompt and gallant assistance, and my thanks are due to Captains Baird and Merrill; Lieutenants Houston, Abbott, Upton, O'Rourke, and Audenreid, for gallant conduct and the prompt and valuable assistance they rendered me. Lieutenants Abbott and Upton were both wounded, and each had a horse killed under him, as also had Lieutenant O'Rourke.

I enclose herewith a table of casualties showing our losses at Bull Run.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

General: I have the honor to submit this report of the movements and service of my brigade in the battle at Bull Run off the Gainesville road on the 21st inst.

Leaving my camp, one mile south of Centreville, at 2 1/2 o'clock A. M. of that day, I marched at the head of your division, as ordered, with my command in column, in the following order: the First Regiment of Ohio Volunteers, Col. McCook; the Second Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Mason; the Second New York State Militia, Col. Tompkins; and Capt. Carlisle's Battery of Light Artillery, six (6) brass guns. To Capt. Carlisle's command was also attached the large Parrott gun, 30-pounder, under direction of Lieut. Haines, of the artillery corps.

Proceeding slowly and carefully, preceded by five companies of skirmishers of the First and Second Ohio, which I threw out on either side of the road, we approached the bridge over Bull Run, beyond which the rebels were understood to be posted and intrenched, and to within a distance of perhaps three-fourths of a mile of their batteries, on the other side of the stream.

In obedience to your command, on first discovery of the presence of the enemy's infantry forming into line on the hill-side beyond the run, I deployed my three regiments of infantry to the left of the road, and formed them in line of battle in front of his right. Thus my command was constituted the left wing of our division, Col. Sherman's brigade coming up and taking position to the right of the road.

After the fire had been opened by discharge of the large Parrott gun from the centre in the direction of the enemy's works, I moved my extended line gradually forward at intervals, taking advantage of the ground until I had my force sheltered partly in a hollow covered by a ridge and wood in front, and partly by the edge of the timber lying between us and the run. Here we lay, in pursuance of your orders, for perhaps two and a half or three hours, with no evidence of our nearness to the enemy except the occasional firing of musketry by our skirmishers in the wood in front, answered by the muskets or rifles of the enemy, to whom our presence and position were thus indicated, with a view to distract his attention from the approach of Col. Hunter's force from above and in his rear. At this time I received your notice and order, announcing that Hunter was heard from — that he had crossed, and was coming down about two miles above us, and directing that if I saw any signs of a stampede of the enemy in front, I should make a dash with the two Ohio regiments, keeping the New York regiment in reserve. For this movement I immediately formed and prepared.

Soon after, and when, by the firing of artillery and musketry in front at the right, it appeared that the rebels were actively engaged in their position by our forces on the other side of the stream, I received your order to extend my line still further to the left, sending forward Col. McCook's regiment to feel the battery of the enemy, which was ascertained to be on the hill covering the ford, half a mile below the bridge, and supporting him with my two other regiments. This was immediately done. Col. McCook advanced in that direction along the road, which we found to be a narrow track through a pine wood, thick and close with undergrowth, and flanked on either side by ambuscades of brush work, which were now, however, abandoned. Reaching the head of this narrow road, where it opened upon the stream, Col. McCook found the battery to be a strong earthwork immediately opposite, mounted with at least four heavy guns, and commanding the outlet from the wood. An open space of low ground lay between, with a cornfield to the left, the direct distance across the enemy's battery being 350 yards.

Behind the battery, and supporting it, were discovered some four regiments of the rebel troops, while rifle pits were seen directly in front of it. The First regiment was then deployed to the left in the edge of the woods, and into the cornfield; one company, Captain Kells's, being thrown forward towards the run, up to within, perhaps, twenty yards of the battery. While this was done, I advanced the Second Ohio, followed by the Second New York, towards the head of the road, in supporting distance from the First Ohio, Lieut.Col. Mason's regiment filing also to the left. Receiving Col. McCook's report of the battery, and that it would be impossible to turn it with any force we had, I immediately despatched a message to the centre to bring up some pieces of artillery to engage the enemy from the head of the road. In the mean time the enemy, discovering our presence and position in the woods, and evidently having the exact range of the [10] road we were occupying, opened on us with a heavy fire of shells and round and grape shot.

To avoid the effects of this as much as possible, I ordered the men to fall back into the woods on each side of the road, and was presently reinforced by two guns of Ayres's battery, under Lieutenant Ransom, which passed to the head of the road. A brisk cannonading was then opened, but a very unequal one, on account of the superior force and metal of the enemy. While this continued, I left my horse and passed through the wood, and remained some time by our guns, to be satisfied whether we were making any impression upon the enemy's work. I soon found that it was not thus to be carried, and such also was the opinion of the officer in charge of the guns. Retiring, I found that the most of my two regiments in the rear had fallen back out of range of the hot and constant lire of the enemy's cannon, against which they had nothing to oppose. The suffering from this fire was principally with the Second New York, as they were in the line where most of the shell and shot fell that passed over the heads of the Second Ohio.

Taking with me two companies of the Second Ohio which were yet in the woods maintaining their position, I returned to cover and bring away Ransom's guns. It was just at this place and point of time that you visited yourself the position we were leaving. I must not omit to speak with commendation of the admirable manner in which these guns of ours were handled and served by the officers and men having them in charge. And I may notice the fact, also, that as we were withdrawing from this point we saw another heavy train of the enemy's guns arrive, and move up the stream on the other side of their battery with which we had been engaged, along what I supposed to be the road from Manassas, towards where the battle was raging with our troops on the right.

My three regiments being all called in, then retired and rested in good order, at the centre of the front, near the turnpike. Here I was informed by Col. McCook that you had crossed the run above, with other portions of our division, and left with him an order for me to remain with my infantry in that position, supporting Carlisle's battery, which was posted close to the road on the right. This was 1 P. M. Capt. Carlisle, while we thus rested, was playing with much apparent effect upon the enemy's works across the run, with his two rifled pieces, as was also Lieut. Haines with the large Parrott gun. Soon after, having successive and cheering reports, confirmed by what we could observe, of the success of our army on the other side of the run, I discovered that bodies of the enemy were in motion probably retreating, to their right. To scatter these and hasten their flight, I ordered into the road towards the bridge, the two rifled guns, and several rounds fired with manifest severe effect. This, however, drew from the enemy's batteries again a warm and quick fire of shell, and with rifled cannon on our position on the road, which continued afterwards and with little intermission, with loss of some lives again in my New York regiment, until the close of the fight.

While this was going on, Capt. Alexander, of the Engineer Corps, brought up the company of pioneers, or axe-men, which, with its officers and sixty men, had been entirely detailed from the regiments of my brigade, to open a communication over the bridge, and through the heavy abatis which obstructed the passage of troops on our front beyond the run. To support him while thus engaged I brought up, and placed in the road towards the bridge, McCook's and Tompkins's regiments, detailing also, and sending forward to the bridge, a company of the Second New Yorkers, to cover the men while cutting through the enemy's abatis. A second company from Lieut.-Col. Mason's command was also brought forward with axes, afterwards, to aid in clearing the obstructions, and thus, in a short time, Capt. Alexander succeeded in opening a passage. Capt. Carlisle's battery was now posted on the hillside, in the open field, to the left of the road towards the bridge.

Very soon after, some reverses of fortune appearing to have taken place with our troops on the other side, who were falling back up the run, it was discovered and reported to me that a large body of the enemy had passed over the stream below the bridge, and were advancing through a wood in the low ground at our left with an evident purpose to flank us. To intercept this movement, I ordered forward into the road, still lower down, two of Carlisle's brass howitzers, a few rounds from which, quickly served, drove the rebels from the woods and back to the other side of the stream. It was not long after this that the unpleasant intelligence came of our army being in retreat from the front across the ford above, and the order was received to fall back on Centreville. The retreat of my Brigade, being now in the rear of our Division, was conducted in the reverse order of our march in the morning, the Second New York moving first, and being followed by the Second and First Ohio, the two latter regiments preserving their lines in good degree, rallying together, and arriving at Centreville with closed ranks, and sharing comparatively little in the panic which characterized so painfully that retreat, and which seemed to be occasioned more by the fear of frightened teamsters and of hurrying and excited civilians, (who ought never to have been there,) than even by the reckless disorder and want of discipline of straggling soldiers. Near the house which was occupied as a hospital for the wounded, about a mile from the battle ground, a dashing charge was made upon the retreating column by a body of the rebel cavalry, which was gallantly had repelled, and principally by two companies of the Second Ohio, with loss on both sides. Here, also, in this attack, occurred some of the [11] casualties in the Second New York regiment. From this point to Centreville, a portion of the First Ohio was detailed, under the command of Lieut.-Col. Parrott, and acted efficiently as a rear guard covering the retreat. Arrived at Centreville I halted the two Ohio regiments on the hill, and proceeded to call on Gen. McDowell, whom I found engaged in rallying the reserve of the army and other troops in line of battle to meet an expected attack that night of the enemy at that point. I offered him our services, and asked for orders, premising, however, that unfed and weary troops, who had been 17 hours on the march and battle-field, might not be very effective, unless it were to be posted as a reserve in case of a later emergency. Gen McDowell directed me to take them to the foot of the hill, there to stay and encamp. This I did, establishing the two regiments together in the wood to the left of the turnpike.

After resting here about two hours, I was notified that your division, with the rest of the forces under the General commanding, were leaving Centreville, and received your order to fall back on Washington. I took the route by Fairfax Court House, and thence across to Vienna, arriving at the latter place at 3 1/2 A. M., on the morning of the 22d, and there resting the troops for two hours in an open field. During the march we did what was possible to cover the rear of the column then scattered on the road. Two miles or less this side of Vienna, Col. Cook, with the main body of his regiment, turned upon the road leading to the Chain Bridge over the Potomac, thinking it might be a better way, and at the same time afford, by the presence of a large and organized body, protection to any stragglers that might have taken that route. Lieutenant-Colonel Mason, with the Second Ohio, marched in by the way of Fall's Church and Camp Upton.

The return of the Ohio regiments to Washington was made necessary by the fact that their term of service having expired, they are at once to be sent home, to be mustered out of service. Not having been able to obtain yet complete or satisfactory returns of all the casualties in the battle, in the different corps of my brigade, I shall reserve the list of them for a separate report, which I will furnish as soon as practicable.

I am very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

General: I have the honor to submit the following report as to the operations of my brigade in front of the enemy at Bull Run, on Sunday, July 21. On the night of July 20 I was summoned to attend a meeting of commanders of brigades at the Headquarters of the commanding officer in the field, Gen. McDowell; and, in common with the other commanders of brigades, I was instructed as to what was expected of my particular command on the following day — that is, I was to defend the position which I then occupied in front of the enemy, called the Blackburn Ford, and about one mile in his front, where we had been for the last three days. I was also ordered to consider myself under the command of Col. D. S. Miles, United States Army, who was to command his own brigade at Centreville, as well as my own and that of Col. Davies, midway between the two--these three brigades constituting what was then called the reserve. Attached to my brigade was the field battery of Major Hunt, United States Army, and also the rifled battery of ten-pounders, under Lieut. Green, United States Army. I was to open fire on the enemy, for the purpose of making a diversion, not before, but soon after hearing the report of Gen. Tyler's cannonade on my right, to carry out which purpose I made the following disposition of the brigade: The two batteries I placed upon the ridge of the hill, in view of the enemy; the 3d Michigan infantry on the left of the road, in line of battle. Still further, six hundred yards to the left, on a commanding hill, I had placed the day before two companies of the 1st Massachusetts regiment, for the purpose of occupying a log barn and a frame barn; which companies pushed pickets still farther to our left for the security of that point, which I considered a good position for artillery. In a ravine, half way between the two positions, I placed also a company of the 1st Massachusetts regiment, which pushed pickets down the ravine to its front; and on the extreme right of all I placed the balance of the Massachusetts regiment, in line of battle, with two companies of that regiment pushed 400 yards to the right and front, which two companies again threw pickets in advance. The New York and 2d Michigan regiments I placed in the road, 500 yards in rear of the line, as a reserve. Soon after making these arrangements, which I did on hearing the report of our artillery on the right, Col. Davies's brigade made its appearance, with him at his head; and inquiring of me the date of my commission, found that he ranked me by two days, and he assumed the command. That officer wished a good position for artillery to open, and I immediately proposed the position on our left, near the log house, from which a good view of a large stone house — called by the people of the country the enemy's Headquarters — might be obtained. Col. Davies brought up with him the rifled 20-pounder battery of Lieut. Benjamin, and ordered it to open fire immediately. He directed also Hunt's battery to his assistance, and I ordered Green's battery to open its fire at the same time. The enemy appeared to have withdrawn his guns from that position, as He returned no fire, or he might have been reserving his fire for the last attack. An hour's cannonading, however, brought in view a column [12] of the enemy's infantry, which I observed with my glass, of at least 2,500 men, and soon after two other bodies of men, of at least a regiment each, who now occupied the lines on the other side of the run, which lines now appeared full to overflowing. Supposing now that they intended to make a push across our front in column, or would endeavor to turn our left, about 11 A. M. I began to fortify my position by throwing up an earthen parapet for three guns, with embrasures across the road, and commenced an abatis of timber, by felling trees, pointing outward, between this battery and the log house to the left. About this time the enemy on the opposite side appeared to be falling back in confusion from our right attack, which continued for some time, and then the tide changed, and they seemed to be returning in large masses. At the interval between these two extremes, I was ordered by Col. D. S. Miles to throw forward my skirmishers and feel the enemy, and accordingly two companies of the 3d Michigan regiment were sent forward and down the ravine, to cover our front and advance. These were supported by Capt. Brutchshmeider's light infantry battalion, which also advanced down the ravine, accompanied by Lieut. Prime, corps of United States Engineers, who went for the purpose of ascertaining the enemy's position — he volunteering his services for that particular purpose. Col. Davies also threw forward a company of skirmishers on his right. The enemy's skirmishers were in force in the woods in front, and covered themselves with trees and rifle-pits which had been thrown up before. Our two advance companies were driven back, the enemy pursued, and were in turn driven back by the spherical case-shot of Green's battery, and 1 ordered back the light infantry, and also the two companies, to the former position. The company in front of Col. Davies's command retired about the same time. By 5 P. M. I had the battery and the abatis nearly completed, making my defences as secure as the short time and few implements used would allow. No enemy appeared in force in my front with a disposition to assault, but about this time a heavy column of infantry appeared to the left of Colonel Davies, in a ravine, moving up to the attack. This brigade opened a heavy fire upon them and gallantly drove them back, as he informed me afterward. During this firing, which was shortly after 5 o'clock, I received orders from Col. Miles, through one of his staff, to retreat upon Centreville, and endeavor to hold that position. I immediately collected my brigade and put it in motion on the road towards Centreville, and was at the head of the 2d Michigan regiment in rear of the brigade, when a staff officer proposed to me to throw my regiment in line, face toward the enemy, between the house occupied the night before by Hunt's battery and the Union and Centreville road, upon which road the enemy was supposed to be advancing. I had gained a position near the desired point, when I was met by Col. Davies, who informed me that he had beaten the enemy handsomely in front. I told him that I had been ordered back to Centreville by Col. Miles; that the rest of my brigade had gone on, and that I had been directed to go to that point with my regiment for the purpose of facing the enemy there, which I had done, and Col. Davies went, as I supposed, to his brigade. Soon after this I was met by a staff officer of Gen. McDowell's, who told me to put my brigade in position on the left of the road from Centreville to Blackburn's Ford, and stretching toward the Union and Centreville road, facing the enemy. Other troops had also fallen back to this point — distant about a mile from Centreville — and about 6 o'clock P. M., Capt. Alexander, of the Corps of Engineers, directed me, by order of Gen. McDowell, to take the general arrangement of the troops at that point in my own hands, he suggesting, as a good line of defence, between a piece of woods on the right and one on the left, the line facing equally towards the enemy, who were supposed to be coming either on the Union or the Blackburn road. I immediately formed that line as best I could of the regiments nearest the position, placing the men in the ravines, and the artillery, as far as possible, on the hills in the rear of the infantry. Before Captain Alexander gave me this last direction I learned that Col. Miles had altered the position of some regiments which I had placed before, especially the 3d Michigan regiment, which I had ordered to form close column by division, to remain as a reserve, and await further orders from me. The officer in command of the regiment at that time, Lieutenant-Colonel Stevens, (Colonel McConnel being unwell, but on the ground,) immediately executed that order, and put his regiment in close column. I went to some other part of the field, and on returning found this regiment deployed in line of battle, and in another position. I immediately inquired of Colonel Stevens the reason of their position being altered. He told me that Colonel Miles had directed this movement. I asked him why? Col. Stevens replied, “I do not know, but he had no confidence in Col. Miles.” I inquired the reason why? Col. Stevens answered, “Because Col. Miles is drunk.” That closed the conversation. I sent Col. Stevens back with his regiment, to form close column by division, as at first. I then reported to Capt. Alexander that I had been interfered with in my disposition of the troops during the day, and I could not carry out Gen. McDowell's orders as long as I was interfered with by a drunken man. Capt. Alexander then answered that Gen.McDowell now vested the whole disposition of the troops with me, and that I must use my own judgment. I went to place another battalion in line, and I was met by Col. Miles, who ordered me to form that regiment in another direction. I replied that “I should obey no more orders that he might see fit to give me.” Colonel Miles [13] then said, “Colonel Richardson I shall put you in arrest.” I told him “I never should obey his arrest, and that he never could put me in that position.” Col. Miles answered that he did not understand this. I said nothing, and went on with further disposition of the troops, which was done according to the diagram. As soon as the line of battle was well formed, the enemy's cavalry made its appearance on the Centreville and Manassas road, and I ordered Lieut. Benjamin to open his rifled cannon upon them, which he did, and the cavalry disappeared after a few shots. It was now nearly dark, and the troops encamped in their present position. About ten o'clock P. M. General McDowell informed me that retreat was resolved upon; that the troops must be started on the road to Fairfax as soon as possible, and ordered me to move last and cover the retreat of the army with my brigade. I told the General I would do so, and would stand by him as long as any man would. I left with my brigade at 2 o'clock A M., after all the other regiments and batteries had retired. On reaching Fairfax, found it abandoned by our troops, and I covered the rear, bringing up my brigade in good order, the New York regiment in front, then the Massachusetts regiment, and the two Michigan regiments in rear of the whole. Arrived at Arlington at 2 o'clock P. M., on Monday after the action. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, Your obedient servant,

I marched with my command from Centreville, Va., on Sunday, at 2 o'clock A. M., and proceeded along the Warrington turnpike to Bull Run; after being on the road several hours, formed on the east side of the run, and marched against a body of the enemy and routed them; then changed position to the left, formed, and charged upon the enemy's battery, which was supported by a large body of infantry. The regiment made a fine charge, but was obliged to fall back, (the enemy being in very much larger force of infantry, beside their battery,) which we did in good order. After engaging the enemy some three hours at different points, we were ordered off the field, which we did in good order, and, on our route, covered the retreating forces, and brought in two pieces of artillery, one caisson, and several baggage wagons, and the wagon of the sappers and miners, together with all their tools and twenty horses. During the whole engagement both officers and men behaved well and stood up to the work. I would here mention more particularly, Major Warner and Adjutant Redfield Duryee, for their coolness during the whole action, in assisting to keep the men in line, and urging them on to action.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

sir:--I have the honor to submit this my report of the operations of my brigade during the action of the 21st instant. The brigade was composed of the Thirteenth New York Volunteers, Col. Quimby; Sixty-ninth New York, Col. Corcoran; Seventy-ninth New York, Col. Cameron; Second Wisconsin, Lieut.-Col. Peck; and Company E, Third Artillery, under command of Capt. R. B. Ayres, Fifth Artillery. We left our camp near Centreville, pursuant to orders, at 2 A. M., taking place in your column next to the brigade of Gen. Schenck, and proceeded as far as the halt before the enemy's position, near the stone bridge at Bull Run. Here the brigade was deployed in line along the skirt of timber, and remained quietly in position till after 10 A. M. The enemy remained very quiet, but about that time we saw a regiment leave its cover in our front, and proceed in double quick time on the road toward Sudley Springs, by which we knew the column of Colonels Hunter and Heintzelman was approaching. About the same time we observed in motion a large force of the enemy below the stone bridge. I directed Capt. Ayres to take position with his battery near our right, and opened fire on this mass, but you had previously directed the two guns belonging to this battery; and, finding the smooth bore guns did not reach the enemy's position, we ceased firing, and I sent a request that you should send to me the 30-pounder rifled gun attached to Capt. Carlisle's battery. At the same time I shifted the New York Sixty-ninth to the extreme right of the brigade. There we remained till we heard the musketry fire across Bull Run, showing that the head of Col. Hunter's column was engaged. This firing was brisk, and showed that Hunter was driving before him the enemy, till about noon, when it became certain that the enemy had come to a stand, and that our force on the other side of Bull Run was all engaged, artillery and infantry.

Here you sent me the order to cross over with the whole brigade to the assistance of Col. Hunter. Early in the day, when reconnoitring the ground, I had seen a horseman descend from a bluff to a point, cross,the stream, and show himself in the open field. And, inferring we should cross over at the same point, I sent forward a company as skirmishers, and followed with the whole brigade, the New York Sixty-ninth leading. We found no difficulty in crossing over, and met no opposition in ascending the steep bluff opposite with our infantry, but it was impassable to the artillery; and I sent word back to Capt. Ayres to follow if possible, [14] otherwise to use his discretion. Capt. Ayres did not cross Bull Run, but remained with the remainder of your Division. His report herewith describes his operations during the remainder of the day. Advancing slowly and continuously with the head of the column, to give time for the regiments in succession to close up their ranks, we first encountered a party of the enemy retreating along a cluster of pines. Lieut.--Col. Haggerty of the Sixty-ninth regiment, without orders, rode over and endeavored to intercept their retreat. One of the enemy, in full view and short range, shot Haggerty, and he fell dead from his horse. The Sixty-ninth opened fire on this party, which was returned, but, determined to effect our junction with Hunter's Division, I ordered this fire to cease, and we proceeded with caution toward the field, when we then plainly saw our forces engaged. Displaying our colors conspicuously at the head of our column, we succeeded in attracting the attention of our friends, and soon formed the brigade in rear of Col. Porter's. Here I learned that Col. Hunter was disabled by a severe wound, and that Gen. McDowell was on the field. I sought him out and received his orders to join in the pursuit of the enemy, who were falling back to the left of the road by which the army had approached from Sudley Springs. Placing Col. Quimby's Regiment of Rifles in front, in column by division, I directed the other regiments to follow in line of battle, in the order of the Wisconsin Second, New York Seventy-ninth, and New York Sixty-ninth.

Quimby's regiment advanced steadily down the hill and up the ridge, from which he opened fire upon the enemy, who had made another stand on ground very favorable to him, and the regiment continued advancing as the enemy gave way till the lead of the column reached the point near which Rickett's battery was so severely cut up. The other regiments descended the hill in line of battle, under a severe cannonading, and the ground affording comparative shelter against the enemy's artillery, they changed directions by the right flank and followed the road before mentioned. At the point where this road crossed the bridge to our left the ground was swept by a most severe fire by artillery, rifle, and musketry, and we saw in succession several regiments driven from it, among them the Zouaves and battalion of marines. Before reaching the crest of the hill the roadway was worn deep enough to afford shelter, and I kept the several regiments in it as long as possible; but when the Wisconsin Second was abreast of the enemy, by order of Maj. Wadsworth, of Gen. McDowell's staff, I ordered it to leave the roadway by the left flank and to attack the enemy. This regiment ascended to the brow of the hill steadily, received the severe fire of the enemy, returned it with spirit, and advanced delivering its fire. This regiment is uniformed in gray cloth, almost identical with that of the great bulk of the secession army, and when the regiment fled in confusion and retreated toward the road there was a universal cry that they were being fired upon by our own men. The regiment rallied again, passed the brow of the hill a second time, and was again repulsed in disorder. By this time the New York Seventy-ninth had closed up, and in like manner it was ordered to cross the brow of the hill and drive the enemy from cover. It was impossible to get a good view of the ground. In it there was one battery of artillery, which poured an incessant fire upon our advancing column, and the ground was irregular, with small clusters of pines, affording shelter, of which the enemy took good advantage. The fire of rifles and musketry was very severe. The Seventy-ninth, headed by its colonel, (Cameron,) charged across the hill, and for a short time the contest was severe. They rallied several times under fire, but finally broke and gained the cover of the hill. This left the field open to the New York Sixty-ninth, Col. Corcoran, who, in his turn, led his regiment over the crest, and had in full open view the ground so severely contested. The firing was very severe, and the roar of cannon, musketry, and rifles, incessant. It was manifest the enemy was here in great force, far superior to us at that point. The Sixty-ninth held the ground for some time, but finally fell back in disorder.

At this time Quimby's regiment occupied another ridge to our left, overlooking the same field of action, and similarly engaged. Here (about 3 1/2 P. M.) began the scene of disorder and confusion that characterized the remainder of the day. Up to that time all had kept their places, and seemed perfectly cool and used to the shell and shot that fell comparatively harmless. Crossing Bull Run, I sought it at its last position before the Brigadier crossed, but it was not there; then passing through the wood where in the morning we had first formed line, we approached the blacksmith's shop, but there found a detachment of rebel cavalry; then made a circuit, avoiding Cub Run bridge into Centreville, where I found Gen. McDowell. From him I understood that it was his purpose to rally the forces and make a stand at Centreville.

But about 9 o'clock at night I received from Gen. Tyler in person, the order to continue the retreat to the Potomac. This retreat was by night, and disorderly in the extreme. The men of different regiments mingled together, and some reached the river at Arlington, some at Long Bridge, and the greater part returned to their former camps at or near Fort Corcoran. I reached this point at noon next day, and found a miscellaneous crowd crossing over the aqueduct and ferries. Conceiving this to be demoralizing, I at once commanded the guard to be increased, and all persons attempting to pass over to be stopped. This soon produced [15] its effect. Men sought their proper companies and regiments, comparative order was restored, and all now posted to the best advantage.

I herewith enclose the official report of Capt. Kelly, the commanding officer of the New York Sixty-ninth; also full lists of the killed and wounded and missing. Our loss was heavy, all around us; but the short exposure to an intense fire of small-arms, at close range, had killed many, wounded more, and had produced disorder in all the battalions that had attempted to destroy it. Men fell away talking and in great confusion. Col. Cameron had been mortally wounded, carried to an ambulance, and reported dying. Many other officers were reported dead or missing, and many of the wounded were making their way, with more or less assistance, to the buildings or hospitals. On the ridge to the west we succeeded in partially re-forming the regiments, but it was manifest they would not stand, and I directed Col. Corcoran to move along the ridge to the rear, near the position where we had first formed the brigade. Gen. McDowell was there in person, and used all possible efforts to reassure the men. By the active exertions of Col. Corcoran we formed an irregular square against the cavalry, which was then seen to issue from the position from which we had been driven, and we began our retreat towards that ford of Bull Run by which we had approached the field of battle. There was no possible order to retreat, although for an hour it had been going on by the operations of the men themselves. The ranks were thin and irregular, and we found a stream of people stirring from the hospital across Bull Run, and far toward Centreville.

After putting in motion the irregular square, I pushed forward to find Capt. Ayres's battery, occupied chiefly at the point where Rickett's battery was destroyed. Lieut.-Col. Haggerty was killed about noon, before we effected a junction with Col. Hunter's Division. Colonel Cameron was mortally wounded leading the regiment in the charge, and Colonel Corcoran has been missing since the cavalry charge near the building used as a hospital.

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
Ayres's Battery,	6	3	--	9
New York Thirteenth,	11	27	20	58
New York Sixty-ninth,	38	59	95	192
N. Y. Seventy-ninth,	32	51	115	198
Wisconsin Second,	24	65	63	152
Total,	111	205	293	609

For names of rank, &c., of the above I refer to the lists herewith. Lieuts. Piper and McQuesten of my personal staff were under fire all day, and carried orders to and fro with as much coolness as on parade. Lieut. Bagley of the New York 69th, a volunteer aid, asked leave to serve with his company during the action, and is among those reported missing. I have intelligence that he is a prisoner, and slightly wounded. Colonel McCoon, of Wisconsin, a volunteer aid, also rendered good service during the day. I have the honor to be your obedient servant.

sir:--In compliance with the orders of Brig.-Gen. Tyler, I have the honor to report the operations of the First Brigade, First Division, in the action of the 21st inst., at Bull Run, and during the two succeeding days.

Leaving my camp near Centreville at 2 o'clock A. M., I took my place in the First Division as a reserve. At 9 1/4 o'clock A. M., at the distance of half a mile from Bull Run, I was ordered by Gen. Tyler to incline the head of my column to the right, and direct it through an open field to a ford about 800 yards above the stone bridge. Before the whole brigade had entered upon the new direction, the enemy opened fire from a battery across the run, and threw upon the First and Second regiments, Connecticut Volunteers, some 25 or 30 rounds of shot and shell, which caused a temporary confusion and wounded several men. Order was shortly restored, and the brigade closed up on Sherman's column before passing the fords.

After crossing I marched at once to the high ground, and, by order of Gen. Tyler, came into line on Sherman's left. The order to advance in line of battle was given at about 10 o'clock A. M., and from that hour until 4 P. M., my brigade was in constant activity on the field of battle. The First regiment Connecticut Volunteers was met by a body of cavalry and infantry, which it repelled, and at several other encounters of different parts of the line the enemy constantly retired before us.

At about 2 o'clock P. M. Gen. Tyler ordered me to take a battery on a height in front. The battery was strongly posted, and supported by infantry and riflemen, sheltered by a building, a fence, and a hedge. My order to charge was obeyed with the utmost promptness. Col. Jameson of the Second Maine, and Col. Chatfield of the Third Connecticut Volunteers, pressed forward their regiments up the base slope about 100 yards, when I ordered them to lie down at a point offering a small protection, and load. I then ordered them to advance again, which they did in the face of a movable battery of eight pieces and a large body of infantry, toward the top of the hill. As we moved forward we came under the fire of other large bodies of the enemy posted behind breastworks, and on reaching the summit of the hill the firing became so hot that an exposure to it of five minutes would have annihilated my whole line.

As the enemy had withdrawn to a height beyond, and to the support of additional troops, I ordered the Maine regiment to face by the left [16] flank and move to a woodslope, across an open field, to which point I followed them. The balance of the brigade soon rejoined me, and after a few moments' rest I again put it in motion, and moved forward to find another opportunity to charge.

The enemy had a light battery, which he manoeuvred with extraordinary skill, and his shot fell often among and near us. I advanced generally just under the brow of the hill, by a flank movement, until I found myself about half a mile below the stone bridge. Our advance caused the rebels to retire from the abatis, and enabled Capt. Alexander of the Engineers to clear it away. In a short time the enemy moved the battery to a point which enabled him to enfilade my whole line; but as he pointed his guns too far to the right, and only improved his aim gradually, I had time to withdraw my brigade, by a flank movement, around the base of a hill in time to avoid a raking fire. At this time a lull in the discharge of our artillery, and an apparent change in the position of the enemy's left flank, made me apprehensive that all was not right. I continued my march, and sent aid, Lieut. Walter, to the rear to inquire of Gen. McDowell how the day was going. The discontinuance of the firing in our lines becoming more and more apparent, I inclined to the right, and after marching 600 or 700 yards further, I was met by Lieut. Upton, aid to Gen. Tyler, and ordered to file to the right, as our troops were retreating. I moved on at an ordinary pace, and fell into the retreating current about 150 yards in the rear of Gen. McDowell and staff. Before crossing Bull Run, and until my brigade mingled with the retreating mass, it maintained perfect freedom from panic, and at the moment I received the order to retreat, and for some time afterward, it in as good order as in the morning on the road. Half an hour earlier I supposed the victory to be ours.

The gallantry with which the Second regiment of Maine, and the Third regiment of Connecticut Volunteers, charged up the hill upon the enemy's artillery and infantry, was never, in my opinion, surpassed. I was with the advancing line, and closely observed the conduct of Cols. Jameson, and Chatfield, which merits in this instance and throughout the the highest commendation.

I also observed throughout the day the gallantry and excellent conduct of Col. Terry's Second regiment, Connecticut Volunteers, from whom I received most zealous assistance. At one time a portion of his regiment did great execution with their rifles from a point of our line which was thin, and where a few of our men were a little tardy in moving forward. Col. Terry, in his report, calls attention to the coolness, activity, and discretion of Lieut.-Col. Young, and Major Colborn. The latter with the Adjutant of the regiment, Lieut. Charles L. Russell, showed conspicuous gallantry in defending their regimental colors during the retreat this side of Bull Run against a charge of cavalry. Col. Terry also commends the devotion of Doctors Douglas and Bacon to the wounded while under the hottest fire of artillery. Private Arnold Leach is also highly praised for having spiked three abandoned guns with a ramrod, and then bringing away two abandoned muskets. Col. Jameson, of the Second Maine regiment, gives great credit in his report to Lieut.-Col. C. W. Roberts, Major Varney, and Adjutant Reynolds for their coolness on the field. Sergeant G. W. Brown, of Company F, A. J. Knowles and Leonard Carver, of Company D, A. P. Jones and Henry Wheeler, of Company A, and Peter Welch, of Company I, he mentions for their noble conduct in accompanying him to remove the dead and wounded from the field, under a very heavy fire of artillery and musketry. He mentions also Capt. Foss, Sergeant Samuel Hinckly, of Company A, and Corporal Smart, of Company H, for important extra services during the day. He also speaks in high praise of Sergeant W. J. Dean, who was mortally wounded while in the my advance of the line, bearing the beautiful stand of colors which were presented the day before on the part of ladies from Maine residing in California. Capt. E. W. Jones, of the same regiment, fell mortally wounded while exhibiting great courage in rallying his men to the charge. Lieut.-Col. Speidal, of the First regiment Connecticut Volunteers, was set upon by three of the enemy, who undertook to make him a prisoner. The Lieut.-Col. killed one and drove off the other two of his assailants, and escaped. I observed the activity of Capts. Hawley and Chapman, Adjutant Bacon, and Lieut. Drake, on the field. Col. Chatfield, of the Third regiment Connecticut Volunteers, was gives special credit to Major Warner and Adjutant Duryee, for their coolness and energy in assisting to keep the men in line, and in urging them forward into action. The men of the Third regiment brought off in the retreat two of our abandoned guns, one caisson and several baggage wagons, and behaved with great coolness in the retreat, and the bulk of the regiment was present to repel the charge of cavalry this side of Bull Run.

I received during the day and on the retreat day the most gallant and efficient assistance from Lieut. Hascal, Fifth United States Artillery, Assistant Adjutant-General. Lieut. Walter, First Connecticut Volunteers, and Lieut. Gordon, Second United States Cavalry, aids, obeyed my orders on the field with accuracy, and Lieut. Ely, First Connecticut Volunteers, Brigade Commissary, assisted me zealously. Lieut. Walter, First Connecticut Volunteers, and Lieut. Gordon, Second United States Cavalry, are both missing. The former I sent to the rear at about 4 o'clock P. M. to ascertain from Gen. McDowell how the day was going, since which time I have not seen him, nor do I know his fate. Lieut. Gordon was with me two miles this side of. Bull Run, on the retreat, where I [17] saw him the last time. I trust he will yet be found. My two mounted orderlies, Cooper and Ballou, were both with me until near the end of the conflict, and are now both missing. My brigade being far in advance, and the ground very hilly and interspersed with patches of wood, rendered it difficult to avoid being enveloped by the enemy. The last individuals probably missed their way, and were killed or captured. I have delayed this report of the action until all the wanderers could be gathered in, and the following may therefore be taken as a very close approximation of the actual casualties in my brigade. Those reported missing are supposed to be killed or taken prisoners:

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
Second Regt. Conn. Vols	2	5	9	16
First Regt. Conn. Vols	--	8	9	17
Third Regt. Conn. Vols	4	13	18	35
Second Regt. Maine Vols	15	40	115	170
Prisoners killed and wounded of Second Maine Regt.	--	--	--	4
Total,				242

In addition to the above reported loss of the Second Maine regiment, Lieut. Skinner, Surgeon Allen and his son, while assisting the wounded, were taken prisoners. The aggregate loss of this gallant regiment was therefore 174 out of 640, which was the complete strength on going into action. It was impossible to obtain exact returns of my brigade on the morning of the 21st, but I am certain its aggregate strength was about 2,500 men. We captured fifteen of the enemy and brought six prisoners to Washington. In concluding the account of the battle, I am happy to be able to add that the conduct of the First Brigade, First Division, was generally excellent. The troops composing it need only instruction to make them as good as any in the world.

I take the liberty to add, in continuation of this report, that the three Connecticut regiments, and a part of the Second Maine Volunteers, of my brigade, left their camp near Centreville at about 10 o'clock P. M., by order of Gen. Tyler, and arrived at Camp McDowell, six and a half miles from the Potomac, at dawn of day the morning after the battle. The camps of my four regiments and half of one company of cavalry were standing, and during the day I learned that the Ohio camp, a mile and a quarter this way, was vacant of troops, and the camp of the New York Second had only a guard of fifty or sixty men left in it. Not wishing the enemy to get possession of so many standing tents and such an abundance of camp equipage, I ordered my brigade to retreat no further until all the public property should be removed. The rain fell in torrents all the 22d. The men were excessively fatigued, and we had only eleven wagons. Brigade Quartermaster Hodge made two journeys to the city to obtain transportation, but, with four or five exceptions, the drivers refused to come out. Over eleven wagons were kept in motion, and at nightfall the troops were drenched to the skin, and without shelter. So, leaving guards at the regimental camps of my brigade, I moved forward with the bulk of the Third Connecticut regiment, and by 11 o'clock at night the majority were housed in the Ohio and New York camps.

We kept good watch throughout the night, and early in the morning of the 23d inst., Quartermaster-General Meigs sent out long trains of wagons, and Brigade Quartermaster Hodge walked six miles to Alexandria and brought up a train of cars, and the work of removal proceeded with vigor. As early as at 5 1/2 o'clock P. M., the last thing of value had been removed and sent forward to the amount of 175 four-horse wagon loads. The order to fall in was then given, and the brigade marched in perfect order, every man with his firelock, and at sunset bivouacked near Fort Corcoran.

I acknowledge great indebtedness to Brigade Quartermaster Hodge. But for his untiring exertions in procuring the means of transportation, nearly all the public property must have been abandoned. The men of the different regiments labored with extraordinary zeal, considering their great fatigue, and they merit the highest praise. I had given permission to about 100 sick and lame to limp forward in advance, and about an equal number of cowards and recreants had fled without permission. The balance of my brigade, faithful and laborious, stood by, and they may claim the right to teach that it is unmanly to destroy the public property, and base to abandon it to the enemy, except in cases of the extremest necessity.

I have the honor to be, sir,

Your most obedient servant,

sir:--Having had the honor to command the Second division of the army before Manassas on the 21st of July, 1861, and having been wounded early in the action, the command, as well as the duty of making the division report, devolved on Colonel Andrew Porter, of the United States Army. I deem it, however, a duty I owe to the gallant gentlemen of my staff, briefly to mention their services.

The Hon. Isaac N. Arnold, of the United States House of Representatives, one of my volunteer aids, was with me on the field till I received my wound, and then devoted himself to having the wounded removed, and to alleviating their sufferings.

Captain G. P. Woodbury, Chief Engineer of the division, fearlessly exposed himself in front of the skirmishers during our whole advance, and determined, with great judgment, the route of the division.

Captain W. D. Whipple, Assistant Adjutant-General; Captain Cook, of the Fourth Pennsylvania [18] Volunteers, aide-de-camp; Lieutenant Cross of Engineers, and Lieutenant D. W. Flagler, aide-de-camp, all performed their duties to my entire satisfaction: they were absent, conveying orders, during the short time I was in the field.

My aid, Lieutenant Samuel W. Stockton, of the First Cavalry, was with me on the field, and his conduct, under a heavy fire, was perfectly beautiful.

Dr. Rouch, of Chicago, Ill., a citizen surgeon, accompanied the Hon. Mr. Arnold to the field, and devoted himself to the care of the wounded during the whole battle.

I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully, your most obt. servt.,

sir:--I have the honor to report that the brigade under my command, in common with the rest of the division, left Washington at three P. M. on Tuesday, July 15; encamped that night at Annandale; occupied Fairfax Court House, and encamped there on Wednesday. On Thursday, July 17, proceeded to Centreville, where we remained till Sunday morning, July 21, when the whole army took up the line of march to Bull Run.

Nothing of moment occurred till the arrival of the division at the crossing of Bull Run, at half-past 9 o'clock, when intelligence was received that the enemy was in front with considerable force. The brigade was ordered to halt for a supply of water and temporary rest. Afterwards an advance movement was made, and Col. Slocum, of the Second Rhode Island regiment, was ordered to throw out skirmishers upon either flank and in front. These were soon confronted by the enemy's forces, and the head of the brigade found itself in presence of the foe. The Second regiment Rhode Island Volunteers was immediately sent forward with its battery of artillery, and the balance of the brigade was formed in a field to the right of the road. At this time, much to my sorrow, I met you returning from the field severely wounded, and was requested to take charge of the formation of the division in the presence of the enemy. Finding that the Second regiment Rhode Island Volunteers was closely pressed by the enemy, I ordered the Seventy-first regiment New York Militia, and the Second regiment New Hampshire Volunteers to advance, intending to hold the First Rhode Island Volunteers in reserve; but owing to delay in the formation of the two former regiments, the First Rhode Island regiment was at once ordered on the field of action. Major Balch, in command, gallantly led the regiment into it, where it performed most effective service in assisting its comrades to repel the attack of the enemy's forces. The Second Rhode Island regiment of volunteers had steadily borne the enemy's attack, and had bravely stood its ground, even compelling him to give way. At this time Col. Slocum fell, mortally wounded, and soon after Major Ballou was very severely injured by a cannon ball, that killed his horse and crushed one of his legs. The regiment, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Wheaton, continued gallantly to hold its position. Soon after Colonel Martin, of the Seventy-first regiment New York State Militia, led his regiment into action, and planting the two howitzers belonging to the regiment upon the right of his line, worked them most effectively against the enemy's troops. The battery of the Second Rhode Island regiment on the knoll upon the extreme right, was used in silencing the heavy masked battery of the enemy in front, occasionally throwing in shot and shell upon the enemy's infantry, six regiments of which were attempting to force our position. Captain Reynolds, who was in command of this battery, served it with great coolness, precision, and skill. The Second regiment of New Hampshire Volunteers, under Colonel Marston, was now brought into the field, and rendered great service in defending the position. Colonel Marston was wounded early in the action, and Lieutenant-Colonel Fiske ably directed the advance of the regiment. Thus my whole brigade was brought into the engagement at the earliest possible moment, and succeeded in compelling the enemy to retire. We were wholly without support, bearing the brunt of the contest until relieved by Major Sykes, of the Third Infantry United States Army, who formed his battalion most admirably in front of the enemy, and pouring in a destructive fire upon his lines, assisted in staggering him. At that moment, after the fight had continued an hour or more, Colonel Heintzelman's division was seen marching over the hill opposite our left flank, and, attacking the enemy at that point, the opposing force was soon dispersed. This point being gained, and the enemy retiring in confusion before the successful charge of Colonel Heintzelman's division, I withdrew my brigade into the woods in the rear of the line, for the purpose of supplying the troops with ammunition, which had become well-nigh exhausted. The Second regiment New Hampshire Volunteers was sent forward to assist one of Colonel Heintzelman's brigades at that time three-quarters of a mile distant, and driving the enemy before them. The battery of the Second Rhode Island Volunteers changed its position into a field upon the right, and was brought to bear upon the force which Colonel Porter was engaging. The enemy's infantry having fallen back, two sections of Captain Reynolds's battery advanced and succeeded in breaking the charge of the enemy's cavalry, which had now been brought into the engagement.

It was nearly four o'clock P. M., and the [19] battle had continued for almost six hours since the time when the Second brigade had been engaged, with every thing in favor of our troops and promising decisive victory, when some of the regiments engaging the enemy upon the extreme right of our line, broke, and large numbers passed disorderly by my brigade, then drawn up in the position which they last held. The ammunition had been issued in part, when I was ordered to protect the retreat. The Seventy-first regiment, New York State Militia, was formed between the retreating columns and the enemy by Colonel Martin, and the Second regiment Rhode Island Volunteers, by Lieutenant Colonel Wheaton. The First regiment Rhode Island Volunteers moved out into the field at the bottom of the gorge, near the ford, and remained for fifteen minutes, until a general retreat was ordered. The regiment then passed on to the top of the hill, where it was joined by the remainder of the brigade, and formed into column. Large bodies of stragglers were passing along the road, and it was found impossible to retain the order, which otherwise would have been preserved. Yet the brigade succeeded in retiring in comparatively good condition, with Arnold's battery of artillery and Capt. Armstrong's company of dragoons bringing up the rear. The retreat continued thus until the column was about emerging from the woods and entering upon the Warrenton turnpike, when the artillery and cavalry went to the front, and the enemy opened fire upon the retreating mass of men. Upon the bridge crossing Cub Run a shot took effect upon the horses of a team that was crossing. The wagon was overturned directly in the centre of the bridge, and the passage was completely obstructed. The enemy continued to play his artillery upon the train carriages, ambulances, and artillery wagons that filled the road, and these were reduced to ruin. The artillery could not possibly pass, and five pieces of the Rhode Island battery, which had been safely brought off the field, were here lost. Captain Reynolds is deserving of praise for the skill with which he saved the lives of his men. The infantry, as the files reached the bridge, were furiously pelted with a shower of grape and other shot, and several persons were here killed or dangerously wounded. As was to be expected, the whole column was thrown into confusion, and could not be rallied again for a distance of two or three miles.

The brigade reached Centreville at nine o'clock P. M., and entered into the several camps that had been occupied the night before, where the brigade rested until ten o'clock, when, in pursuance of orders from the general-commanding, the retreat was continued. The column reached Washington about nine o'clock A. M., Monday morning, when the several regiments composing the brigade repaired to their respective encampments.

In the movements of my brigade, upon this unfortunate expedition, I was greatly assisted and advised by his Excellency Governor Sprague, who took an active part in the conflict, and who was especially effective in the direction and arrangement of the battery of Light artillery attached to the Second regiment Rhode Island Volunteers. It would be invidious to mention officers of the different corps who distinguished themselves upon the field for coolness and bravery, where all performed their duty so well. I cannot feel justified in specifying particular instances of fidelity. The officers and men were prompt, steady and brave, and performed the several parts assigned to them in the most gallant manner.

Our loss has been very severe. The Second regiment particularly suffered greatly. The death of Colonel Slocum is a loss, not only to his own State, which mourns the death of a most gallant and meritorious officer, who would have done credit to the service, while his prominent abilities as a soldier would have raised him high in the public estimation. He had served with me as Major of the First regiment of Rhode Island Volunteers, and when he was transferred to a more responsible position, I was glad that his services had been thus secured for the benefit of his country. His associate, Major Ballou, of the same regiment, is deserving of the highest commendation as a brave soldier and a true man.

Captain Tower, of the Second regiment, Rhode Island Volunteers, received his death wound at the very commencement of the battle. He was a young, brave, and promising officer, who is deeply lamented by his comrades and friends. Captain Smith, of the Second Rhode Island Volunteers, was known among us for his many good qualities of head and heart. Lieutenant Prescott, of the First Rhode Island regiment, was also killed in the early part of the action, while gallantly encouraging his company. He was a noble-hearted Christian man, whose memory will be ever fresh in the hearts of his friends. Among those who are missing I have to mention the names of Lieutenant Knight, of the First regiment Rhode Island Volunteers, and Dr. James Harris, of the same regiment. Both are men whom we can hardly afford to lose, and I trust that some measures may be taken by which their fate may be known. Dr. Harris was especially active upon the field of battle in dressing the wounds of disabled soldiers; and, knowing no distinction between friend and foe, treated the enemy's wounded with the same kindness and consideration as those of our own troops. He is probably a prisoner. Other officers might be mentioned, had I the data at hand to specify; but I have not yet received reports from the Seventy-first New York and Second New Hampshire Volunteers.

I append a list of casualties so far as reports have been received. It is a sad duty to record a defeat, accompanied with the loss of so many valuable lives. But defeat should only make us more faithful still to the great cause of humanity and civilization, in order that every [20] disaster should be more than compensated for by an enduring victory.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Colonel: You will observe that my report of the movements of my brigade at Bull Run, on the 21st ult., is dated July 24, but three days after the battle. It was made out in the rough on that day, and the next morning (25th) orders came to my camp, directing me to get my First Rhode Island regiment in readiness to leave for Providence on the 7 P. M. train. The work incident to moving a regiment, with its baggage, so occupied me that I had no time to revise my report, but sent it in as it was, intending, at my leisure, to make a supplementary one. It will not seem strange that many omissions and some inaccuracies should have occurred, which I now hope to correct. I stated that after Col. Hunter was wounded he directed me to “take charge of the formation of the division in the presence of the enemy,” when I should have said that part of the division in presence of the enemy. I of course knew that you commanded the division by virtue of your superior rank; but you were at that time, as you will remember, in command of your brigade in another part of the field.

In another part of my report I mention the arrival of Col. Heintzleman's division on our left. It was Sherman's brigade, with the Sixty-ninth New York Militia in advance, that arrived at about 12 1/2 o'clock, and by a most deadly fire assisted in breaking the enemy's lines, and soon after 1 o'clock the woods on our front, which had been so obstinately held, were cleared of the enemy. My brigade had now been engaged since about 10 1/2 o'clock.

In my first report I mentioned the opportune arrival of Major Sykes's battalion, and it is not necessary to repeat what I then said of their gallant support of my brigade. I beg to again mention the bravery and steadiness manifested by Colonel Martin and his entire regiment, (Seventy-first,) both on the field and during the retreat. Col. Marston, of the Second New Hampshire, was badly wounded in the shoulder, but notwithstanding that he remained in the saddle under fire after his wound was dressed, his horse being led by his orderly. The regiment under charge of Lieut.-Col. Fiske conducted itself most gallantly; both officers and men deserve great praise.

Of the two Rhode Island regiments I have already spoken more fully, but cannot close this without again attesting to the admirable conduct of Lieut.-Col. Wheaton of the Second regiment, and Majors Balch and Goddard of, the First, with the Staff and company officers and men, of both regiments. No troops could have behaved better under fire. By an omission in copying my first report the name of Capt. Wm. L. Bowers, Quartermaster First Rhode Island regiment, who is reported missing, was not mentioned. He was a brave and efficient officer, whom I could ill afford to lose. I have good reason to hope that he is alive in the hands of the enemy and well cared for. Since my original report I have learned that some others of our missing are in Richmond, among them Lieut. Knight and Dr. Harris, of the First Rhode Island regiment.

I beg to supply an important omission in my first report, by attesting to the courage and efficiency of my personal staff, Chaplain Woodbury, of the First Rhode Island regiment, aide-de-camp; Adjutant Merriman, First Rhode Island regiment, A. A. A. G.; and Lieut. Beaumont, United States Cavalry, aidede-camp, who were all active in their assistance on the field. Lieut. Beaumont being in the regular service, I beg to recommend him to the notice of the Commanding-General as a most gallant and deserving young officer.

Capt. Curson, Seventy-first New York, division-quartermaster, and Capt. Goodhue, Second New Hampshire, division-commissary, rendered most efficient service in their departments. Capt. Reynolds's battery did such good service in so many parts of the field, that it has a place in several reports, which renders it unnecessary for me to make further mention of it.

I have the honor to be, Colonel,

Very respectfully, your ob't servant,

Capt. J. B. Fry, A. A. J. :--I have the honor to submit the following account of the operations of the First Brigade, Second Division of the army, in the battle before Manassas on the 21st inst. The brigade was silently paraded in “light marching order” at 2 o'clock in the morning of that day, composed as follows, viz.: 1. Griffin's Battery. 2. Marines, Major Reynolds. 3. Twenty-seventh N. Y. V., Col. Slocum. 4. Fourteenth N. Y. S. M., Col. Wood. 5. Eighth N. Y. S. M., Col. Lyons. 6. Battalion of Regulars, Major Sykes. 7. First Co. 2d Dragoons; four companies Cavalry, Major Palmer. Total strength, 3,700.

The marines were recruits, but through constant exertions of their officers, had been brought to present a fine military appearance, without being able to render much active service; they were therefore attached to the battery, as its permanent support through the day. Owing to frequent delays in the march of troops in front, the brigade did not reach Centreville until 4:30 A. M., and it was an hour after sunrise when the head of it was turned to the right to commence the flank movement.

The slow and intermittent movements of the 2d Brigade (Burnside's) were then followed [21] through the woods for four hours, which brought the head of our division to Bull Run and Sudley's Mills, where a halt of half an hour took place, to rest and refresh the men and horses. From the heights on this side of the run a vast column of the enemy could be plainly descried, at the distance of a mile or more on our left, moving rapidly towards our line of march in front. Some disposition of skirmishers were then directed to be made at the head of the column by the division-commander, in which Col. Slocum, of the 2d Rhode Island regiment, was observed to bear an active part. The column moved forward, however, before they were completed, and in about thirty minutes emerged from the timber, where the rattle of the musketry and occasional crash of round shot, through the leaves and branches of the trees in our vicinity, betokened the opening of battle.

The head of the brigade was immediately turned slightly to the right, in order to gain time and room for deployment on the right of the 2d brigade. Griffin's battery found its way through the timber to the fields beyond, followed promptly by the marines, while the 27th took direction more to the left, and the 14th followed upon the trail of the battery — all moving up at a double-quick step.

The enemy appeared drawn up in a long line, extending along the Warrenton turnpike, from a house and haystack upon our extreme right to a house beyond the left of the division. Behind that house there was a heavy masked battery, which, with three others along his line on the heights beyond, covered the ground upon which we were advancing with all sorts of projectiles. A grove in front of his right wing afforded it shelter and protection, while the shrubbery along the road in the fences screened somewhat his left wing.

Griffin advanced to within 1,000 yards, and opened a deadly and unerring fire upon his batteries, which were soon silenced or driven away.

Our right was rapidly developed by the marines, 27th, 14th, and 8th, with the cavalry in rear of the right; the enemy retreating in more precipitation than order as our line advanced. The 2d brigade (Burnside's) was at this time attacking the enemy's right with perhaps too hasty vigor.

The enemy clung to the protecting wood with great tenacity, and the Rhode Island battery became so much endangered as to impel the commander of the 2d brigade to call for the assistance of the battalion. of regulars. At this time I received the information through Capt. W. D. Whipple, A. A. G., that Col. Hunter was seriously wounded, and had directed him to report to me as commander of the division, and in reply to the urgent request of Col. Burnside, I detached the battalion of regulars to his assistance.

For an account of its operations, I would respectfully beg a reference to the enclosed report of its commander, Major Sykes. The rebels soon came flying from the woods towards the right, and the 27th completed their rout by charging directly upon their centre in the face of a scorching fire, while the 14th and 8th moved down the turnpike to cut off the retiring foe and to support the 27th, which had lost its gallant colonel, but was standing the brunt of the action, with its ranks thinning in the dreadful fire. Now the resistance of the enemy's left was so obstinate that the beaten right retired in safety.

The head of Heintzelman's column at this moment appeared upon the field, and the 11th and 5th Massachusetts regiments moved forward to the support of our centre, while staff officers could be seen galloping rapidly in every direction, endeavoring to rally the broken 8th, but this laudable purpose was only partially attained, owing to the inefficiency of some of its field officers.

The 14th, though it had broken, was soon rallied in rear of Griffin's battery, which soon took up a position further to the front and right, from which his fire was delivered with such precision and rapidity as to compel the batteries of the enemy to retire in consternation far behind the brow of the hill in front.

At this time my brigade occupied a line considerably in advance of that first occupied by the left wing of the enemy. The battery was pouring its withering fire into the batteries and columns of the enemy wherever they exposed themselves. The cavalry were engaged in feeling the left flank of the enemy's position, in doing which some important captures were made, one by Sergeant Socks of the 2d dragoons of a General George Stewart of Baltimore. Our cavalry also emptied the saddles of a number of the mounted rebels.

Gen. Tyler's division was engaged with the enemy's right. The 27th was resting on the edge of the woods in the centre, covered by a hill upon which lay the 11th and 5th Massachusetts, occasionally delivering a scattering fire. The 14th was moving to the right flank, the 8th had lost its organization; the marines were moving up in fine style in rear of the 14th, and Capt. Arnold was occupying a height in the middle ground with his battery. At this juncture there was a temporary lull in the firing from the rebels, who appeared only occasionally on the heights in irregular formations, but to serve as marks for Griffin's guns. The prestige of success had thus far attended the efforts of our inexperienced but gallant troops. The lines of the enemy had been forcibly shifted, nearly a mile to their left and rear. The flags of eight regiments, though borne somewhat wearily, now pointed towards the hill from which disordered masses of rebels had been seen hastily retiring. Griffin's and Rickett's batteries were ordered by the commanding-general to the top of the hill on the right, supporting with the “Fire Zouaves” and marines, while the 14th entered the skirt of wood on their right to protect [22] that flank, and a column composed of the 27th New York, 11th and 5th Massachusetts, 2d Minnesota, and 69th New York, moved up toward the left flank of the batteries; but so soon as they were in position and before the flanking supports had reached theirs, a murderous fire of musketry and rifles, opened at pistol range, cut down every cannonier and a large number of horses. The fire came from some infantry of the enemy, which had been mistaken for our own forces; an officer in the field having stated that it was a regiment sent by Col. Heintzelman to support the batteries.

The evanescent courage of the “Zouaves” prompted them to fire perhaps a hundred shots, when they broke and fled, leaving the batteries open to a charge of the enemy's cavalry, which took place immediately. The marines also, in spite of the exertions of their gallant officers, gave way in disorder. The 14th, on the right, and the column on the left, hesitatingly retired, with the exception of the 69th and 38th New York, who nobly stood and returned the fire of the enemy for fifteen minutes. Soon the slopes behind us were swarming with our retreating and disorganized forces, while riderless horses and artillery teams ran furiously through the flying crowd.

All further efforts were futile. The words, gestures, and threats of our officers were thrown away upon men who had lost all presence of mind, and only longed for absence of body. Some of our noblest and best officers lost their lives in trying to rally them. Upon our first position the 27th was the first to rally, under the command of Major Bartlett, and around it the other regiments engaged soon collected their scattered fragments. The battalion of regulars, in the mean time, moved steadily across the field from the left to the right, and took up a position, where it held the entire forces of the rebels in check until our forces were somewhat rallied.

The commanding-general then ordered a retreat upon Centreville, at the same time directing me to cover it with the battalion of regulars, the cavalry, and a section of artillery. The rear guard thus organized followed our panic-stricken troops to Centreville, resisting the attacks of the rebel cavalry and artillery, and saving them from the inevitable destruction which awaited them had not this body been interposed.

Among those who deserve especial mention, I beg leave to place the following names, viz.: Captain Griffin, for his coolness and promptitude in action, and for the handsome manner in which he handled his battery.

Lieut. Ames of the same battery, who, after being wounded, gallantly served with it in action; being unable to ride on horseback, was helped on and off a caisson in changes of position.

Capt. Tillinghast, A. G. M., who was ever present when his services were needed, carrying orders, rallying troops, and serving with his batteries, and finally, I have to state with the deepest sorrow, was mortally wounded.

Major Sykes, and the officers of his command, (three of whom, Lieutenants Latimer, Dickenson, and Kent, were wounded,) who, by their discipline, steadiness, and heroic fortitude, gave eclat to our attacks upon the enemy, and averted the dangers of a final overthrow.

Major Palmer, and the cavalry officers under him, who, by their daring intrepidity, made the effectiveness of that corps all that it could be upon such a field in supporting batteries, feeling the enemy's position, and covering our retreat.

Major Reynolds of the marines, whose zealous efforts were well sustained by his subordinates, two of whom, Brevet-Major Zulin and Lieutenant Hale, were wounded, and one, Lieutenant Hitchcock, lost his life.

Colonel H. W. Slocum, who was wounded while leading his gallant 27th New York to the charge, and Major J. J. Bartlett, who subsequently commanded it, and by his enthusiasm and valor kept it in action, and out of the panic. His conduct was imitated by his subordinates, of whom two, Capt. N. O. Rogers and Lieutenant N. C. Jackson, were wounded, and one ensign, Asa Park, was killed.

In the last attack, Colonel H. M. Wood, of the 14th New York State Militia, was wounded, together with Captains R. B. Jordan and C. F. Baldwin, and Lieutenants J. A. Jones, J. R. Salter, R. A. Goodenough, and C. Scholes, and Adjutant Laidlaw. The officers of the 14th, especially Major James Jourdan, were distinguished by their display of spirit and efficiency throughout the action.

Surgeon Charles Keeney of the Medical Department, who by his professional skill, promptitude, and cheerfulness made the condition of the wounded of the 2d division comparatively comfortable. He was assisted to a great extent by Dr. Ranch of Chicago, a citizen.

During the action I received extremely valuable aid and assistance from my aide-de-camp, Lieut. C. F. Trowbridge, and Lieut. F. M. Bache, both of the 16th regiment.

Lieut. J. E. Howard, 14th N. Y. S. M., acting brigade-quartermaster, by his zealous attention to duty, brought the wagons of my brigade safely to Arlington.

The staff officers of the 2d division commanding, viz., Capt. N. D. Whipple, Lieuts. Cross and Flagan, served with me after the fall of Col. Hunter, and I am indebted to them for gallant, faithful services during the day. Capt. Whipple had his horse killed under him by a cannon ball. Acting Assistant Adj't-Gen., Lieut. W. W. Averill, sustained the high reputation he had before won for himself as a brave and skilful officer, and to him I am very greatly indebted for aid and assistance, not only in performing with the greatest promptitude the duties of his position, but by exposing himself most fearlessly in rallying and leading forward [23] the troops, he contributed largely to their general effectiveness against the enemy. I desire to call the attention of the commanding-general particularly to him.

In conclusion I beg leave to submit the enclosed return of killed, wounded, and missing in my brigade. Since the enclosed reports were handed in, many of the missing have returned, perhaps one-third of those reported. The report of Col. Burnside, commanding 2d brigade, was sent to me after the above report was written. While respectfully calling the attention of the general to it, I would also ask leave to notice some misconceptions under which the col. commanding 2d brigade seems to have labored: viz., 1st, of his agency in the management or formation of the 2d division on the field; 2d, of the time that his brigade was entirely out of the action with the exception of the N. Y. regiment; 3d, of the positions of his brigade in the retreat, and particularly of the position of the 71st N. Y., as he may have mistaken the rear guard, organized under my direction by your order, for the evening. Capt. Arnold's battery and the cavalry were directed, and placed in their positions by my senior staff officer, up to the time when Col. Heintzelman ordered the cavalry to the front of the column.²

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Colonel: In compliance with your instructions, I have the honor to report that Battery D, Fifth regiment of Artillery, arrived on the battlefield near Manassas at about 11 1/2 A. M. on the 21st inst., after a march of near twelve miles. The battery immediately opened on the enemy's batteries at about 1,000 yards' distance, and continued firing until his battery was silenced and forced to retire. The battery then advanced about two hundred yards and opened upon a regiment of infantry formed upon the right of their line, causing it to fall back. This battery then changed position to the right and front, and opened upon a regiment formed near the enemy's right, and a little in front of the one first referred to, doing deadly execution, and causing it to retreat in much confusion. An order was then received through Major Barry, Fifth Artillery, to advance to the brow of the hill near the position occupied by the enemy's battery when we first arrived on the field. The battery opened upon the enemy's battery amidst a galling fire from the artillery, and continued firing for near half an hour. It then changed position to the right and fired two rounds, when it was charged by the enemy's infantry from the woods on the right of our position. This infantry was mis-taken for our own forces, an officer on the field having stated that it was a regiment sent by Col. Heintzelman to support the battery. In this charge of the enemy every cannonier was cut down, and a large numb.er of horses killed, leaving the battery (which was without support except in name) perfectly helpless. Owing to the loss of men and horses it was impossible to take more than three pieces from the field. Two of these were afterwards lost in the retreat, by the blocking up of the road by our own forces, and the complete exhaustion of the few horses dragging them. The same thing happened with reference to the battery wagon, forge, and one caisson. All that is left of the battery is one of Parrott's rifle guns, and one 12-pound howitzer. Of the 95 men who went into action, 28 are killed, wounded, and missing; and of 101 horses, 55 are missing.

The following is the list of the killed, wounded, and missing, viz.:

Killed	5
Mortally wounded	3
Wounded	12
Missing	8
Total	28

In conclusion, I would state that my officers and men behaved in a most gallant manner, displaying great fearlessness, and doing their duty as becomes brave soldiers.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the movements of the Second regiment New Hampshire Volunteers, during the march and battle on the 21st inst. I give the time of the different movements as nearly as possible. The regiment left its camp, near Centreville, at two o'clock A. M., and immediately took its place in the column of the Second Brigade, under Col. Burnside. We continued in the column of the brigade until near the field of battle. On arriving at the battle field (at half-past 10 o'clock) we were ordered up to support the Rhode Island battery. Before arriving at the place indicated, we were ordered on to the crest of a hill in a field considerably to the right, exposed to the fire of the enemy's batteries. We here fired upon some battalions, said to be Georgia troops, who retired to the shelter of the woods opposite. After they retired the regiment was withdrawn under shelter of the brow of the hill. We were then ordered to the left, to support the Rhode Island battery. The men took their positions and fired several volleys. Colonel Marston was wounded here and carried to the rear. At 11.30 A. M. we were moved from here to a position on the left, and in advance of the Rhode Island battery, where we fired a few shots at the retreating enemy. After remaining here an hour, more or less, we were ordered to report ourselves to Col. Heintzelman, (one o'clock P. M.) The regiment moved to a position near his column, and I sent the sergeant-major three several times to report the regiment ready to render any succor or support they were able to afford. The sergeant-major was unable to meet with Col. Heintzelman or his staff. After remaining in our position some time, I received an order (2.30 P. M.) to advance to a position indicated, which was to the left, and a quarter of a mile in advance of the troops engaged in that part of the field. The enemy were screened from our sight. As the men were exposed to fire from a battery and from musketry, I ordered them to lie down and fire when any of the enemy were exposed.

After a short time we were ordered to withdraw. The men retired leisurely, and in perfectly good order, halting once under the shelter of some woods. On our way to join our brigade we were ordered by an officer of dragoons, whose regiment was in advance of the retreat, to make haste, or we should be cut off by the enemy's cavalry. Our column was formed again in the brigade; but before the formation was complete the retreat began, and continued, with a short rest at our former camp, near Centreville, to Washington. The men obeyed orders with coolness and precision during the whole day. They took every position they were ordered to, and never wavered or retired until ordered to do so, and were among the last, if not the last, to leave the field. Their retreat, on the whole route to the camp, was unattended by tumult or any disorder further than leaving their ranks. Their conduct throughout the day inspires me with entire confidence in their courage and steadiness, and I hope will meet your commendation.

Captain: In compliance with your circular of the 23d inst., I have the honor to report the following casualties that occurred in my command during the recent battle before Manassas: 3 commissioned officers wounded, 1 assistant surgeon missing, 13 rank and file killed, 17 wounded, 12 of whom are missing, 42 missing. Many of the latter are supposed to have taken the Alexandria turnpike by mistake, and will no doubt rejoin their colors to-day.

This battalion, composed of two companies of the 2d U. S. Infantry, five companies of the 3d U. S. Infantry, and one company of the 8th U. S. Infantry, left its camp near Centreville about half-past 3 A. M., on the 21st inst., and after a circuitous march of ten or twelve miles arrived on the enemy's left, and was immediately ordered to support the force under Colonel Burnside, which was suffering from a severe fire in its front. Our line was rapidly formed, opening fire, and a column under Colonel Heintzleman appearing at the same moment at our left, the enemy fell back to the rising ground in his rear. My battalion was then advanced to the front and took a position on the edge of a wood immediately opposite to a masked battery and a large force of the secessionists, posted around a house and the fences and trees around it. The three left companies were deployed as skirmishers under Captain Dodge, 8th Infantry, and did great execution among their ranks. At this time the whole battalion became actively engaged, and a Rhode Island battery coming into action on my right and having no supports, at the request of its commanding officer, and seeing myself the necessity of the case, I remained as a protection to his guns. For more than an hour the command was here exposed to a concentrated fire from the batteries and regiments of the enemy, which seemed doubled when the guns of the Rhode Islanders opened. Many of my men assisted in working the latter battery.

As the attack of our army became more developed on the right, and the necessity of my staying with the guns ceased, I moved my battalion in that direction, passing through crowds of retiring troops whom we endeavored in vain to rally. Taking a position on the extreme right in front of several regiments of the enemy, I opened an effective fire upon them, and [25] held my ground until all our troops had fallen back, and my flank was turned by a large force of horse and foot. I then retired a short distance in good order, and facing to the enemy on the crest of a hill, held his cavalry in check, which still threatened our flank.

At this stage of the action, my command was the only opposing force to the enemy, and the last to leave the field.

By taking advantage of woods and broken ground, I brought it off without loss, although the guns of our opponents were playing on our line of march from every height. While thus retiring, I received an order from our brigade-commander to cover the retreat of that portion of the army near me, which I did as well as I was able, remaining in rear until all of it had passed me. After crossing “Bull Run,” my command was threatened by a large force of cavalry — but its order and the regularity of its march forbade any attack. We reached our camp beyond Centreville at 8 P. M. It is but proper to mention that our officers and men were on their feet from 10 P. M., on the 20th, until 10 A. M., on the 22d--without rest, many without food, footsore, and greatly exhausted — they yet bore the retreat cheerfully, and set an example of constancy and discipline worthy of older and more experienced soldiers. My officers, nearly all of them just from civil life and the Military Academy, were eager and zealous, and to their efforts are due the soldierly retreat and safety of the battalion — as well as of many straggling volunteers who accompanied my command.

The acting Major, Capt. N. H. Davis, 2d infantry, rendered essential service by his coolness, zeal, and activity. Capt. Dodge, 8th infantry, commanding the skirmishers on the left, was equally efficient, and to those gentlemen, and all my officers, I am indebted for cordial cooperation in all the movements of the day. Lieut. Kent, although wounded, endeavored to retain command of his company, but a second wound forced him to give it up. He and Lieut. Dickinson, acting adjutant, wounded and Dr. Sternberg, U. S. A., (since escaped,) are believed to be in the hands of the enemy. I beg to call the attention of the brigade-commander to the services of Sergeant Major Devoe of the 3d infantry, who was conspicuous for his good conduct on the field.

The arms and equipments of my command are in good condition, but the men are destitute of blankets, and in want of necessary clothing.

sir: In obedience to instructions received on the 20th inst., the division under my command was under arms, in light marching order, with two days cooked rations in their haversacks, and commenced the march at half-past 2 A. M. on the 21st., the brigade of Colonel Franklin leading, followed by those of Colonels Wilcox and Howard. At Centreville we found the road filled with troops, and were detained three hours to allow the divisions of General Tyler and Colonel Hunter to pass. I followed with my division immediately in the rear of the latter. Between two and three miles beyond Centreville we left the Warrenton turnpike, turning into a country road on the right. Captain Wright accompanied the head of Colonel Hunter's column, with directions to stop at a road which turned in to the left to a ford across Bull Run, about half way between the point where we turned off from the turnpike and Sudley's Springs, at which latter point Colonel Hunter's division was to cross. No such road was found to exist, and about eleven A. M. we found ourselves at Sudley's Springs, about ten miles from Centreville, with one brigade of Colonel Hunter's division still on our side of the Run. Before reaching this point the battle had commenced. We could see the smoke rising on our left from two points, a mile or more apart. Two clouds of dust were seen, showing the advance of troops from the direction of Manassas. At Sudley's Springs, whilst waiting the passage of the troops of the division in our front, I ordered forward the first brigade to fill their canteens. Before this was accomplished the leading regiments of Colonel Hunter's division became engaged. General McDowell, who, accompanied by his staff, had passed us a short time before, sent back Captain Wright of the engineers and Major McDowell, one of his aids, with orders to send forward two regiments to prevent the enemy from outflanking them. Captain Wright led forward the Minnesota regiment to the left of the road, which crossed the run at this point. Major McDowell led the Eleventh Massachusetts up the road. I accompanied this regiment, leaving orders for the remainder of the division to follow, with the exception of Arnold's battery, which, supported by the First Michigan, was posted a little below the crossing of the run as a reserve. At a little more than a mile from the ford we came upon the battle-field. Rickett's battery was posted on a hill to the right of Hunter's division and to the right of the road. After firing some twenty minutes at a battery of the enemy, placed just beyond the crest of a hill, on their entrance left, the distance being considered too great, it was moved forward to within about 1,000 feet of the enemy's battery. Here the battery was exposed to a heavy fire of musketry, which soon disabled it. Franklin's brigade was posted on the right of a wood, near the centre of our line, and on ground rising towards the enemy's position. In the meantime, I sent orders for the Zouaves to move forward to support Rickett's battery on its right. As soon as [26] they came up I led them forward against an Alabama regiment, partly concealed in a clump of small pines in an old field. At the first fire they broke and the greater portion of them fled to the rear, keeping up a desultory firing over the heads of their comrades in front; at the same moment they were charged by a company of secession cavalry on their rear, who came by a road through two strips of woods on our extreme right. The fire of the Zouaves killed four and wounded one, dispersing them. The discomfiture of this cavalry was completed by a fire from Captain Collum's company of United States cavalry, which killed and wounded several men. Colonel Farnham, with some of his officers and men, behaved gallantly, but the regiment of Zouaves, as a regiment, did not appear again on the field. Many of the men joined other regiments and did good service as skirmishers. I then led up the Minnesota regiment, which was also repulsed, but retired in tolerably good order. It did good service in the woods on our right flank, and was among the last to retire, moving off the field with the Third United States infantry. Next was led forward the First Michigan, which was also repulsed, and retired in considerable confusion. They were rallied, and helped to hold the woods on our right. The Brooklyn Fourteenth then appeared on the ground, coming forward in gallant style. I led them forward to the left, where the Alabama regiment had been posted in the early part of the action, but had now disappeared, but soon came in sight of the line of the enemy drawn up beyond the clump of trees. Soon after the firing commenced the regiment broke and ran. I considered it useless to attempt to rally them. The want of discipline in these regiments was so great that the most of the men would run from fifty to several hundred yards to the rear, and continue to fire — fortunately for the braver ones — very high in the air, and compelling those in front to retreat. During this time Reickell's battery had been taken and retaken three times by us, but was finally lost, most of the horses having been killed--Capt. Reickell being wounded, and First Lieut. D. Ramsay killed. Lieut. Kirby behaved very gallantly, and succeeded in carrying off one caisson. Before this time heavy reinforcements of the enemy were distinctly seen approaching by two roads extending and outflanking us on the right. Col. Stewart's brigade came on the field at this time, having been detained by the General as a reserve at the point where we left the turnpike. It took post on a hill on our right and rear, and for some time gallantly held the enemy in check. I had one company of cavalry attached to my division, which was joined during the engagement by the cavalry of Col. Stanton's division Major Palmer, who cannonaded them, was anxious to engage the enemy. The ground being unfavorable, I ordered them back out of range of fire. Finding it impossible to rally any of the regiments, we commenced our retreat about half-past 4 P.. M. There was a fine position a short distance in the rear, where I hoped to make a stand with a section of Arnold's battery and the United States cavalry, if I could rally a few regiments of infantry. In this I utterly failed, and we continued our retreat on the road we had advanced on in the morning. I sent forward my staff officers to rally some troops beyond the run, but not a company would form. I stopped back a few moments at the hospital to see what arrangements could be made to save the wounded. The few ambulances that were there were filled and started to the rear. The church, which was used as a hospital, with the wounded and some of the surgeons, soon after fell into the hands of the secession cavalry, that followed us closely. A company of cavalry crossed the rear and seized an ambulance full of wounded. Captain Arnold gave them a couple of rounds of “canister” from his section of artillery, which sent them scampering away and kept them at a respectful distance during the remainder of our retreat. At this point most of the stragglers were in advance of us. Having every reason to fear a vigorous pursuit from the enemy's fresh troops, I was desirous of forming a strong rear guard, but neither the efforts of the officers of the regular army, nor the coolness of the regular troops with me, could induce them to form a single company. We relied entirely for our protection on one section of artillery and a few companies of cavalry. Most of the road was favorable for infantry, but unfavorable for cavalry and artillery. About dusk, as we approached the Warrenton turnpike, we heard a firing of rifled cannon on our right, and learned that the enemy had established a battery enfilading the road. Captain Arnold, with his section of artillery, attempted to run the gauntlet and reached the bridge over Cub Run, about two miles from Centreville, but found it obstructed with broken vehicles, and was compelled to abandon his pieces as they were under the fire of these rifled cannon. The cavalry turned to the left, and after passing through a strip of woods and some fields, struck a road which led them to some camps occupied by our troops in the morning, through which we regained the turnpike. At about eight P. M. we reached the camps we had occupied in the morning. Had a brigade from the reserve advanced a short distance beyond Centreville near one-third of the artillery lost might have been saved, as it was abandoned at or near this crossing. Such a rout I never witnessed before. No efforts could induce a single regiment to form after the retreat had commenced.

Our artillery was served admirably and did much execution. Some of the volunteer regiments behaved very well, and much excuse can be made for those who fled, as few of the enemy could at any time be seen. Raw troops cannot be expected to stand long against an unseen enemy. I have been unable to obtain any report [27] from the Zouaves, as Col. Farnham is still at hospital. Since the retreat more than three-fourths of the Zouaves have disappeared.

I beg leave to express my obligations to the officers of my staff, viz.:--Captain H. S. Wright, Lieut. E. S. W. Snyder, Lieutenant F. N. Farquhar, of the Engineers; Captain Chauncey McKeever, Assistant Adjutant-General; Lieutenant J. J. Sweet, of the Second Cavalry, and Lieutenant J. D. Fairbanks, of the First Michigan, for the able and fearless performance of their duties, and to recommend them to your favorable consideration.

Very respectfully,

sir: I have the honor to communicate, as Colonel of the First Minnesota regiment of Volunteers, the events connected with the movements of my command, comprising a part of your brigade.

On Tuesday morning, the 16th inst., in obedience to your order, we took up the line of march, and on the evening of Thursday arrived at Centreville and bivouacked until Sunday morning, the 21st instant, at half-past 2 o'clock, when we again took up our line of march, in obedience to your orders, to meet the enemy, then known to be in large force between Bull Run and Manassas station, Virginia.

Our march from Centreville to Bull Run was not marked by any extraordinary event, my regiment leading the advance of your brigade. On arriving at Bull Run, the battle began to rage with great warmth with the column of infantry and artillery of another division, both being hotly engaged. Here Captain Wright, of the military engineers, serving as an aid upon the staff of Colonel Heintzelman, commanding our division, informed me that my regiment was needed to flank the enemy upon the extreme left; whereupon I moved forward at “quick” and “double-quick” time, until we arrived at an open field looking out upon the enemy's lines. After holding this position a short time, Captain Wright, by your direction, ordered me through the woods to take position near the front and centre of the enemy's line, in an open field, where we came under the direct fire of the enemy's batteries, formed in “column by division.”

After remaining in this position for some ten minutes, I received orders from both your aids and those of Colonel Heintzelman to pass the whole front of the enemy's line, in support of Rickett's battery, and proceed to the extreme right of our line and the left of the enemy, a distance of about a mile or more.

This movement was effected at “quick” and “double-quick” time, both by the infantry and artillery, during which march the men threw from their shoulders their haversacks, blankets, and most of their canteens, to facilitate their eagerness to engage the enemy. On arriving at the point indicated, being the extreme left of the enemy and the extreme right of our line, and in advance of all other of our troops, and where I was informed officially that two other regiments had declined to charge, we formed a line of battle, our right resting within a few feet of the woods, and the left at and around Rickett's battery, and upon the crest of the hill, within fifty or sixty feet of the enemy's line of infantry, with whom we could have readily conversed in an ordinary tone of voice. Immediately upon Rickett's battery coming into position and we in “line of battle,” Colonel Heintzelman rode up between our lines and that of the enemy, within pistol shot of each, which circumstance staggered my judgment whether those in front were friends or enemies, it being equally manifest that the enemy were in the same dilemma as to our identity. But a few seconds, however, undeceived both — they displaying the rebel and we the Union flag. Instantly a blaze of fire was poured into the faces of the combatants, each producing terrible destruction, owing to the close proximity of the forces, which was followed by volley after volley, in regular and irregular order as to time, until Rickett's battery was disabled and cut to pieces, and a large portion of its officers and men had fallen, and until Companies H, I, K, C, G, and those immediately surrounding my regimental flag, were so desperately cut to pieces as to make it more of a slaughter-house than an equal combat, the enemy manifestly numbering five guns to our one, besides being intrenched in the woods and behind ditches and pits plainly perceptible, and with batteries upon the enemy's right, enfilading my left flank, and within three hundred and fifty yards' direct range. After an effort to obtain aid from the Fire Zouaves, then immediately upon our left, two or three different orders came to retire, as it was manifest that the contest was too deadly and unequal to be longer justifiably maintained. Whereupon, I gave the command to retire, seeing that the whole of our forces were seemingly in retreat. Every inch of ground, however, was strongly contested by skirmishers, through the woods, by the fences and over the undulating ground, until we had retired some four hundred yards in reasonably good order, to a point where the men could procure water, and then took up a regular and orderly retreat to such point as some general officer might indicate thereafter.

I feel it due to my regiment to say, that before leaving the extreme right of our line the enemy attempted to make a charge with a body of perhaps five hundred cavalry, who were met by my command and a part of the Fire Zouaves, and repulsed with considerable loss to the enemy, but without any to us. [28]

I am more than gratified to say that I kept the larger portion of my regiment together, and marched from the field in order, and on the march and near an open space where Colonel Heintzelman's column left the Centreville and Manassas road in the morning, and passed to the right, we, in conjunction with others, repulsed the enemy's cavalry, who attempted to charge.

Before leaving the field a portion of the right wing, owing to the configuration of the ground and intervening woods, became detached, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, whose gallantry was conspicuous throughout the entire battle, and who contested every inch of the ground with his forces thrown out as skirmishers in the woods, and succeeded in occupying the original ground on the right, after the repulse of a body of cavalry. I deem it worthy of remark that during a part of the engagement my regiment and that of the enemy, at some points, became so intermingled as scarcely to be able to distinguish friends from foes, and my forces made several prisoners, among whom was Lieutenant-Colonel Boone, of Mississippi, who is now in Washington, and fully recognizes his captors.

I regard it as an event of rare occurrence in the annals of history that a regiment of volunteers, not over three months in the service, marched up without flinching to the mouth of batteries of cannon supported by thousands of infantry, and opened and maintained a fire until one-fifth of the whole regiment were killed, wounded, or made prisoners before retiring, except for purposes of advantage of position.

My heart is full of gratitude to my officers and men for their gallant bearing throughout the whole of this desperate engagement, and to distinguish the merits of one from another would be invidious, and injustice might be done.

Major Dike and my adjutant bore themselves with coolness throughout. My chaplain, Rev. E. D. Neill, was on the field the whole time and in the midst of danger, giving aid and comfort to the wounded.

Dr. Stewart, while on the field, was ordered to the hospital by a medical officer of the army; Dr. Le Boutillier continued with the regiment, and actually engaged in the fight-neither of whom have been heard from since.

That I have not unfairly or unjustly to the truth of history stated the facts in regard to the gallant conduct of my regiment, is fully proven by the appended list of killed and wounded, showing forty-nine killed, one hundred and seven wounded, and thirty-four missing; the names and companies to which they belong, in detail, will more fully appear in the accompanying lists and abstracts.

Among the incidents of the engagement my command took several prisoners, among whom was Lieutenant-Colonel Boone, of the Mississippi regiment, taken personally by Mr. Irvine, of my regiment; and since said prisoner's confinement in the Capitol at Washington city, Mr. Irvine, in company with Hon. Morton S. Wilkinson, United States Senator from Minnesota, visited him, when he promptly recognized Mr. Irvine as his captor, and thanked him very cordially for his humane treatment and kindness to him as a prisoner. I deem it but just that this fact should be officially known, as Lieutenant-Colonel Boone was an officer of the highest rank taken in the battle.

The humble part which I have performed as an officer commanding one of the regiments of your brigade, individually and otherwise, is now left to you and those commanding the division.

Respectfully,

The regimental flag borne by my color-bearer has through its folds one cannon ball, two grape shot, and sixteen bullets, and one in the staff. The color guard were all wounded but the color-bearer, one mortally. The company flag of Company I was pierced with five balls and one on the spear head. Please attach this to my report.

Respectfully,

sir: The temporary command of this brigade having devolved upon me in consequence of the mishap to Col. Wilcox, I have the honor to transmit herewith the following report, also the regimental reports of a portion of the brigade, viz.: from the First Michigan regiment, the Scott Life Guard, Thirty-eighth regiment New York State Volunteers, containing detailed accounts of their action during the engagement near Bull Run, on Sunday, 21st inst.; the remaining regiments of the brigade, viz.: the Fire Zouaves (Eleventh regiment New York Volunteers) and Arnold's battery having already rendered their reports to division Headquarters.

This brigade commenced the action under command of Col. Wilcox, of Michigan, who was wounded while gallantly leading his command, and whose bravery could not have been excelled, and who is now a prisoner in the hands of the enemy. While I deeply deplore the circumstances by which it became my duty to forward this report, yet it affords me much gratification to speak in terms of the highest commendation of the brave and officer-like conduct of the gentlemen composing his staff, viz.: Lieuts. Woodruff, Parker, and Edie, in their efforts to bring order out of chaos, under a most galling and deadly fire from the enemy. [29]

Having myself been in command of the Thirty-eighth regiment (Scott Life Guard, New York State Volunteers) during the action, I am unable to speak as particularly as could be desired of other regiments of the brigade from personal observation, and respectfully refer you to their respective reports. The reports of killed and wounded furnish sufficient evidence of their fidelity and courage.

But of the field-officers of the Fire Zouaves I can speak in terms of unqualified praise. Col. Farnham, Lieut.-Col. Gregier, and Major Loeser were incessant in their exertions in rallying and encouraging their men.

The officers and men of the First Michigan nobly discharged their duty to their country, and well may their State feel proud of her defenders.

The officers and men of the Thirty-eighth being under my own supervision, I can only corroborate the report rendered by Lieut.-Col. Farnsworth.

Where all acted so well, it would appear invidious to make comparisons; but in the case of Lieut.-Col. Farnsworth, Thirty-eighth regiment, I cannot find words to express my admiration of his conduct. He was confined to a sick bed for several days previous to the engagement, and arrived on the scene of action in an ambulance; and the fact of his rising from a sick bed and entering the field with his regiment, and his courage and coolness during the day, entitle him to the highest commendation.

In conclusion, I most respectfully submit that the duty of making this report, devolving upon me at so late a day — intelligence of the absence of Col. Wilcox not having reached me until the day after the battle — renders it impossible to give a more detailed statement.

My duty as commander of the brigade being ended with this report,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

sir: In compliance with my duty, I respectfully submit the following report of the operation of my regiment during the recent battle at or near Bull Run on the 21st of July, 1861.

On the morning of the 21st, in obedience to brigade orders, the regiment was formed, the men equipped in light marching order, and prepared to leave its bivouac at or near Centreville. The march, however, was not commenced until 6 o'clock A. M., when the regiment, with others constituting the brigade, advanced towards the scene of future operations.

After a fatiguing march, over dusty roads, and at times through dense woods — the men suffering greatly from the intense heat, and a great lack of water, and submitting to the same with a true soldierly spirit — the regiment, with others of the brigade, was halted in a field in full view of the enemy, on the right of his line of intrenchments, and within range of his artillery. After a very brief rest the regiment was formed in line of battle, and ordered by Col. Wilcox, the commandant of the brigade, to advance to a slight eminence fronting the enemy's batteries, and about half a mile distant, to the support of Griffin's battery, which was then preparing to take up a position at that point.

This order was promptly executed — the men, led by yourself, and encouraged by the gallantry of their officers, moving forward in a gallant style, in double-quick time, subjected, a greater portion of the way, to a terrible and deadly fire of grape and canister, and round shot, from the enemy's works on our front and right flank.

Arriving at the brow of the eminence, in advance of the battery which it was intended to support, the regiment was halted, and commenced, in fact, the attack of Col. Heintzelman's division on the right flank of the enemy, engaging a large force of his infantry, and by a well-directed fire, completely routing an entire regiment that was advancing in good order, and driving it into a dense wood in the distance. After remaining in this position for some time, finding that the enemy's artillery was telling with fearful effect upon our ranks — subjected as we were to a direct and flank fire from his batteries — the regiment was ordered to retire down a slight, declivity, which was done in good order, affording it for a time, partial protection from the enemy's fire. At this time, Griffin's battery was moving to a position on our right, and the regiment was ordered by Col. Heintzelman in person to advance to its protection. Advancing by the flank under a galling fire, the regiment was halted within supporting distance of Griffin's battery, which had now opened upon the enemy, and properly formed to resist a threatened attack from the enemy's cavalry and infantry, which had shown themselves in large numbers on the borders of a grove to the right and front. In this position my regiment, under a spiteful and destructive fire from the enemy's batteries, remained until forced to retire, its presence not being deemed requisite because of the fact that Griffin's battery had been compelled to leave the field.

Retiring to a road about one hundred yards distant, my regiment was again formed in line of battle, and under the eye of the commander-in-chief, Gen. McDowell, the men, inspired by his presence upon the field, and led by yourself, dashed gallantly up the hill towards a point where Rickett's battery had been abandoned, in consequence of its support, the First Fire Zouaves and one Michigan regiment, having [30] been previously compelled to retreat in the face of superior numbers and a great loss in their ranks. Before arriving at the brow of the hill, we met the enemy in large force, one of his infantry regiments, apparently fresh upon the field, advancing steadily toward us in line of battle. A large number of the men of this regiment had advanced in front of their line, and had taken possession of Rickett's battery, and were endeavoring to turn the guns upon us. A well-directed and destructive fire was immediately opened upon the enemy by my regiment, and a portion of another that had rallied upon our left (I think the Fourteenth, New York State Militia), and after a sharp conflict he was forced to retreat in disorder and with great loss, seeking shelter in the woods from whence he had previously emerged.

The enemy not succeeding in taking with him Rickett's battery, which seemed to have been the chief object of his attack, it fell into the hands of my regiment, by whom three of its guns were dragged a distance of three hundred yards, and left in a road, apparently out of reach of the enemy.

Another rally was then again made by my regiment, the gallant men readily responding to the orders of their officers. Advancing in double-quick time to the right and front towards a dense wood, in which the enemy had been concealed in large force during the day, and from which evidences of a retreat were now visible, my regiment, with detached portions of others of our force, became engaged in a sharp and spirited skirmish with the enemy's infantry and cavalry, and we appeared for a time to have complete possession of the field.

This was the last rally made by my regiment: suddenly and unexpectedly the enemy, reinforced by fresh troops, literally swarming the woods, poured in upon us a perfect shower of lead from his musketry; his batteries reopened upon us with terrible effect; and a panic at this moment seeming to have taken possession of our troops generally, a retreat was ordered, and my regiment, in comparatively good order, commenced its march towards Centreville, where a greater portion of it arrived about 9 o'clock that night. Here, on the same ground that we had bivouacked previous to the battle, the regiment was halted. After a rest of about two hours, it again resumed its march, joining in the general movement made by the army towards this place.

After a forced and wearisome march of seven hours, the men suffering from the fatigue of the previous fifteen hours, without food for that length of time, with scarcely water enough to moisten their parched tongues, many of them wounded, sick, and otherwise disabled, my regiment, with the exception of about fifty, who had straggled from their respective companies and joined the mass that were thronging to the capital, halted at its original camp ground near Alexandria — the only regiment of the brigade that did so — the only regiment, in fact, that was under fire the previous day, that returned to and occupied their old camp ground previous to their advance towards the field of battle. It is with great pride, sir, that I mention this fact, evincing, as it emphatically does, a degree of subordination commendable in any regiment, and reflecting great credit upon the gallant officers and men of my own, particularly under the extraordinary circumstances connected with the occasion.

From the time my regiment was ordered into the battle-field until forced to retire therefrom, a period of four hours, it was almost constantly under fire from the enemy's batteries, and engaged with the infantry; and through your coolness and courage alone, during that time — your frequent orders for the men to lie down when the enemy's fire was the hottest, and your constant effort to protect them as far as possible at all times — was the regiment saved from presenting a larger number of casualties than its large number now shows.

Of the courage displayed by the men generally on the field during the entire day, of the readiness of the gallant fellows to obey at all times all orders, I cannot speak in too high terms, or express in words my admiration. During all my experiencing a former campaign, and presence on many a battle-field, I have never witnessed greater bravery or more soldierly requisites than were displayed by the men of my own regiment during the entire battle.

The conduct of the officers generally, I cannot speak too highly of. Always at their posts, cheering on their men by their soldierly examples, and displaying marked gallantry under the trying circumstances, I acknowledge my inability to do them justice in words. Major Potter was disabled during the early part of the engagement, while gallantly performing his duty, and subsequently fell into the hands of the enemy. The brave Captain McQuaide, while cheering on his men, fell, from a severe wound in the leg. Lieut. Thomas S. Hamblin, a gallant young officer, also received a wound in the leg while discharging his duty; and he, with the former officer, subsequently fell into the hands of the enemy. Captains McGrath and Allason both received injuries during the engagement, the former by being run down by the enemy's cavalry, (from the effects of which he is now suffering,) and the latter by a slight musket shot. Lieut. John Brady, Jr., while bravely participating in the fight, was severely wounded in the arm. Assistant Surgeon Stephen Griswold was on the field, and, under a heavy fire, at all times humanely and fearlessly discharging his duties to the wounded. He and Quartermaster Charles J. Murphy, who was assisting the wounded, were also taken prisoners.

In conclusion, I again assert my inability to do justice to the gallant conduct of the officers generally; and while it would afford me great pleasure to mention the names of many whose [31] conduct fell under my personal observation, I must refrain from doing so, lest by omitting others I should do injustice to many equally as meritorious.

Annexed is a list of the casualties in my regiment. Many of those reported missing, I have learned, have either been killed or wounded, but as yet I have not ascertained their names.

Respectfully submitted,

sir: My health being impaired and growing worse, if I delay I shall not be able to report the operation of my division on the 21st inst. before Bull Run. Believing, besides, that commanders of brigades are directed to report to Headquarters, I offer the following for the consideration of the general commanding:--

Pursuant to instructions the brigades of Blenker or Davies, soon after daylight, were in readiness to march and take position, but were prevented from so doing by other divisions [32] blocking up the road. I discovered, however, that Davies' brigade could be passed to the left and west, through fields, to Blackburn's Ford. Lieutenant Brinel, engineer officer, conducted the brigade, and as soon as possible it joined Colonel Richardson, before the crossing of this ford on Bull Run. Fire was then opened by Hunt's battery, supported by Richardson's brigade on the right. Edwards's twenty-pounder rifled guns were posted on the left, about six hundred yards from Richardson's position, and sustained by a portion of Davies' brigade. Blenker's brigade took position at Centreville, and commenced throwing up intrenchments--one regiment being located at the former work of the enemy, one to the west of the town on the Warrenton road, and two on the height towards Bull Run. With these last regiments were first placed Tidball's and Green's batteries-Green's afterwards being removed to Richardson's position, in consequence of notification being sent by that officer that about 2,000 of the enemy were about to attack him, and that he required more artillery. I may here remark that some difference existed in the order given Lieutenant Brinel and myself in regard to the defensive works to be thrown up, and also as to the quantity of tools he was to receive — my orders being, by the Lieutenant's advice, to intrench Centreville; his from Major Barnard, to throw up works at Blackburn's Ford. No tools came forward but the small amount Lieutenant Brinel had of his own. These he took to Richardson's position, commenced a battery and made several hundred yards of it. Blenker, with his pioneers, improved and extended the works at Centreville left by the enemy.

It was soon reported that the Fourth Pennsylvania regiment had left at its encampment a battery of field-guns. For this Colonel Blenker offered to organize a company of experienced European artillerists, which I accepted. The captain's name, I regret, I have forgotten, as I should recommend his having permanent command of the guns in question. He is an efficient officer. So soon as I completed my arrangements with Blenker, I visited Colonel Richardson; found him in proper position and effectively at work, Hunt's and Edwards's battery being in good position. There was no evidence of the enemy immediately about the ford until after the first opening of the fire, when he fled from barns and houses in the vicinity. Then, after ordering proper supports for the batteries, and placing a reserve force in position, returned to Centreville, finding all quiet, and the troopers at work. Remaining here some time I returned to Richardson, when it was surmised that there was no enemy at that place, and found the ammunition of the batteries rapidly diminishing. I ordered from the brigadier a few skirmishers to go forward and examine the ford, determined if I could cross to do so, and endeavor to cut the line of travel pursued by retreating and advancing detachments of the enemy. The line of skirmishers had barely entered the woods, when a large force of the enemy was discovered concealed by breastworks. He opened fire, which was handsomely returned. In this affair three of the Sixteenth New York Volunteers were wounded. The skirmishers report the force of the enemy greatly damaged by Green's battery. I made no other attempt on this ford, my orders being on no account to get into a general engagement. As I was again returning to Blenker's position, I received the notice to telegraph to Washington, which I found had been done by Lieutenant Wendell, topographical engineer in my staff, and was compelled by illness to remain at my Headquarters. It was at this time the order was received to put two brigades on the Warrenton turnpike, at the bridge. I without delay sent a staff officer to order forward Davies' brigade, but whilst this officer was executing my instructions Davies sent word he wanted a reserve regiment forward, that the enemy, some 3,000, was attempting to turn his flank. The staff officer, therefore, properly suspended the giving of my order, and immediately reported the fact to me, and this caused me to advance but the one brigade (Blenker's) to the position on the Warrenton turnpike. Blenker's advance to that point was soon impeded by fugitives from the battle-field. When these were passing my Headquarters I endeavored to rally them, but my efforts were vain.

The attack on Davies' position caused painful apprehension for the safety of the left flank of the army, and claiming it of the first importance that my division should occupy the strongest position, I sent instructions to Davies and Richardson to have their brigades fall back on Centreville. Then followed Blenker's brigade to see if it was in position, when I was informed the commanding general had passed. I then returned to Centreville, and found Davies and Richardson's brigades arriving, and commenced placing them in position — Richardson's brigade, with Green's battery, being placed about one-half mile in advance of Centreville Heights, his line of battle facing Blackburn's Ford. In rear of Richardson I posted two regiments behind fences, as a support for the first line, and still further in rear and on the heights I placed Hunt's and Edwards's batteries, two of Davies' regiments being in reserve to support them. I then followed Blenker, found Tidball's battery in admirable position, supported by the Garibaldi Guard; Blenker, with three regiments and the Fourth Pennsylvania battery, being in advance. Having great confidence in his judgment and troops, I returned to Centreville Heights to await events, when I found all my defensive arrangements changed. Not knowing who had done this, and seeing Col. Richardson giving different positions to my troops, I asked by what authority he was acting, when he told me he had instructions from my superior officer. I soon [33] thereafter met the commanding general, and complained of the change. The general's views were completed, and left me, without further control of the division. At the time the attack was made on Davies' flank, the regiments of the brigade engaged performed their duty gallantly. The batteries of Hunt's and Edwards's opening fire did great damage to the advancing troops of the enemy, soon repulsing them. I am grieved that in this engagement a brave and accomplished young officer, Lieut. Presby O'Craig, of the Second regiment artillery, and who was attached to Hunt's battery, was almost instantly killed. Several of the New York Volunteers were wounded; I have not the reports relative thereto.

Blenker's brigade, whilst on the Warrenton road, was charged by cavalry; but by a prompt and skilful fire, emptied several saddles, and relieved themselves from further annoyance. This summary embraces the operations of my division up to the evening of the 21st.

Before closing permit me to name and do justice to my staff, whose assiduity in the performance of their duties, and untiring exertions throughout the day, deserve all the commendation I am able to bestow, viz.:

Capt. Th. Vincent, Assistant Adjutant-General; Lieutenant Prime, Engineers; Lieutenant McMullan, Adjutant Second Infantry, and Acting Infantry General; Assistant Surgeon Woodward, medical direction, and Major Ritchie, New York Volunteers. My aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Wendell, Topographical Engineer, was quite ill during the day, and thereby prevented from being with me. Lieutenant Hawkins' Second infantry, my aids, were absent on detached service for supplies, &c., and had performed their duty, and were within two miles of Centreville when they met our army crowding the road. My brigade commanders, Blenker, Davies and Richardson, admirably performed their respective duties. My remarks apply also to their officers and men. The batteries of Major Green handsomely executed all required of them.

In closing this report, I would make a personal allusion to my condition during the day. I had lost my rest the two nights previous; was sick, had eaten nothing during the day, and had it not been for the great responsibility resting on me, should have been in bed.

I am, dear sir,

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

sir: I have the honor to submit to you the following report of the operations of the First Brigade, Fifth Division, during and after the action near Bull Run, on the 21st ult. Pursuant to the orders of Col. Miles, the brigade advanced from the camp and took their assigned position on the heights east of Centreville, about daybreak. The 8th regiment, N. Y. S V., commanded by Lieut.-Col. Stahel, on the left of the road leading from Centreville to Fairfax Court House; the 29th regiment, N. Y. S. V., commanded by Col. Steinwehr, on the right of the same road — both fronting toward the east; the Garibaldi Guard, commanded by Col. Utassy, formed a right angle with the 29th regiment, fronting to the south. The artillery attached to the brigade occupied the following position: The battery of Capt. Tidball stood in front of the left wing of the Garibaldi Guard; three pieces left in Centreville were placed near the right wing of the 29th regiment; three others on the left wing of the 8th regiment, where intrenchments were thrown up by the pioneers attached to the brigade. The last-named six pieces were served by experienced artillerists, detached from the 29th and 8th regiments. The 27th regiment Pa. V., Col. Einstein, was detached to the village of Centreville, for the protection of Headquarters and hospital. Four companies of the 29th regiment were detached in front of our position toward the road from Union Mills, to prevent the enemy from outflanking, unobserved, the left wing of the army. During this time I received the order to disarm one company of the 12th regiment, which was promptly executed by two companies of the 8th regiment N. Y. S. V. In this position the brigade remained until about 4 o'clock, P. M., when I received orders to advance upon the road from Centreville to Warrenton. This order was executed with great difficulty, as the road was nearly choked up by retreating baggage wagons of several divisions, and by the vast number of flying soldiers belonging to various regiments, Nevertheless, owing to the coolness of the commanding officers and the good discipline of the men, the passage through the village was successfully executed, and the further advance made with the utmost precision; and I was thus enabled to take a position which would prevent the advance of the enemy and protect the retreat of the army. The 8th regiment took position 1 1/2 miles south of Centreville, on both sides of the road leading to Bull Run. The 29th regiment stood half a mile behind the 8th, enchiquier by companies. The Garibaldi Guard stood in reserve in line behind the 29th regiment. The retreat of great numbers of flying soldiers continued until 9 o'clock in the evening, the great majority in wild confusion, and but few in collected bodies. Soon afterward, several squadrons of the enemy's cavalry advanced along the road, and appeared before the outposts. They were challenged, “Who comes here?” and, remaining without any answer, I, being just present at the outpost, called “Union forever!” whereupon the officer of the enemy's cavalry commanded, “En avant! en avant! knock him down!” Now the skirmishers fired, when the enemy turned [34] around, leaving several killed and wounded on the spot. About nine prisoners who were already in their hands were liberated by this action. Afterward, we were several times molested from various sides by the enemy's cavalry. At about midnight the command to leave the position and march to Washington was given by Gen. McDowell. The brigade retired in perfect order and ready to repel any attack on the road from Centreville to Fairfax Court House, Annandale, to Washington. Besides the six guns which were mounted by our men and thereby preserved to our army, the 8th regiment brought in in safety two Union colors left behind by soldiers on the field of battle. The officers and men did their duty admirably, and the undersigned commander deems it his duty to express herewith officially his entire satisfaction with the conduct of his brigade. The three regiments (the 8th, 29th, and Garibaldi Guard) arrived in Washington in good order at 6 o'clock last night, after a fatiguing march of nineteen hours.

The loss of the brigade amounts to fifteen or twenty killed and wounded at the outposts. Thus far my report of the action taken by my brigade in the engagement on the unfortunate day at Bull Run, in a military point of view. It was my intention to defer a final report for a better and more suitable opportunity, on account of the very unfortunate result of the battle; but I have read since so many reports in newspapers, where many a high commanding officer pretends to have been in the rear with his brigade, or regiment, at the retreat, that I am obliged to report in the most absolute terms, that, according to my order, all regiments, artillery and stragglers, had passed my arriere guard at Centreville, and the last artillery at Fairfax Court House, and that the brigade under my command marched last across the Long Bridge into Washington. I have to add, in conclusion, that the Twenty-seventh regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, with the exception of Company K, Captain Menninger, which was on guard duty in Centreville village, at Headquarters, and under order to escort Col. Miles's train, retired from Centreville at about 11 o'clock, without any orders from me, and proceeded to Washington.

sir: In accordance with the circular of the 23d inst., Headquarters Troops, Department N. E. Virginia, I have the honor of reporting the proceedings of the Second Brigade, Fifth Division, at the battle of Blackburn's Ford, six miles from the battle-ground of Bull Run, on the 21st inst. The Fifth Division, under the command of Col. Miles, consisting of the First and Second Brigades, Richardson's Brigade, and Green's and Hunt's Light Batteries, formed the left wing of the troops in action.

The first brigade, Col. Blenker, occupied during the day the heights of Centreville, and were not engaged with the enemy.

The second brigade, under my command, was in readiness to march from camp at 2 1/2 A. M., but the road was so blocked with moving troops, that my brigade was obliged to take a parallel route through the fields, Green's battery in advance, until it struck the road leading to Blackburn's Ford, about one mile south of Centreville. At this point Col. Miles gave me directions to assume the command of Richardson's brigade, and to take position in front of the batteries at Blackburn's Ford, on and near the battle-ground of 18th inst., and make the demonstration of attack in pursuance of Gen. McDowell's orders.

I immediately ordered forward the two 20-pound rifle guns of Hunt's battery, commanded by Lieut. Edwards, to an open field about 80 yards east of the road from Centreville to Bull Run, and on a line with the place where our batteries were playing on the 18th inst., and about 1,500 yards from the enemy's batteries at Blackburn's Ford, and there commenced a rapid firing. I ordered the Eighteenth regiment forward as a protection to this battery, in the open field, and formed line of battle, facing the enemy, the Thirty-second regiment being held in reserve on the road just in rear.

Having ascertained from our guide that there was a road without obstruction leading from the Centreville road to the east, and then bearing off toward the south in the direction of the enemy's position, and which could be seen about half a mile distant to the east from Edwards's battery, I ordered the Sixteenth and Thirty-first regiments, N. Y. V., on to this road at its junction with the Centreville road. One regiment deployed along the road a considerable distance, and the other remained in column to protect two guns of Hunt's battery, which I ordered to be stationed at that point. I then gave orders to Col. Richardson to make such arrangements with regard to the defence of the position in front of the enemy's batteries at Blackburn's Ford, (the immediate battle-ground of the 18th inst.,) as in his judgment the emergency of the moment might require.

At this juncture, being about 10 o'clock A. M., and finding the ammunition for the 20-pound rifled guns fast running out, and having accomplished, in my judgment, (from the movement of the troops opposite, which we could plainly see,) a demonstration ordered, I ordered Lieut. Edwards to cease firing.

About 11 o'clock A. M., Col. Miles came on to the ground, informing me that he had ordered forward the Sixteenth and Thirty-first regiments from the position in which I had previously placed them, and also two guns commanded by Lieut. Platt, and had also ordered forward the other two guns of Hunt's battery into the open field, where Lieut. Edwards [35] had been firing; that he had also ordered the Eighteenth regiment back out of the open field into the woods on the Centreville road as a reserve. The Thirty-second regiment, by Col. Miles's order, remained as a reserve, in column, on the Centreville road, about three-quarters of a mile in rear; Col. Miles then ordered me to continue the firing, without regard to ammunition, which I did, until I received an order to stop, about two hours later.

As soon as Col. Miles left me again in command, I sent back the brigade corps of pioneers to the back road whence the two regiments had been moved, with instructions to fell trees and to completely block the road, which they effectually did.

We had, during the afternoon, unmistakable evidences that a large body of cavalry and infantry had attempted to take us in the rear by means of the road, for when they were returning, having been stopped by the fallen trees, Maj. Hunt, with his howitzers, Lieut. Green and Lieut. Edwards, with the rifled guns, poured a heavy fire into their column, the effect of which we could not ascertain, but it must have been destructive, as the distance was only from half to three-quarters of a mile.

In the course of the day two companies, and later four companies, of the Thirty-first, and two of the Sixteenth were, by Colonel Miles' order, thrown forward to feel the enemy's strength, to the front and left in the direction of Bull Run. They found the enemy posted in the woods, and were recalled. They reported having killed several of the rebel scouts.

The afternoon, until about four o'clock, was passed inactively, except firing rifled cannon at moving columns of the enemy at great distances. I had seen unmistakable evidences in the afternoon, by clouds of dust, &c., of the concentration of the enemy's troops on our left, but peremptory orders from Colonel Miles to hold the position, and remain there all night, were received. He then left me in command for the night, and I immediately began to prepare for an attack. I threw out two companies of skirmishers to our rear, and ordered the Thirty-second forward to support them. About four o'clock we saw the enemy approaching down a gorge, leading into a valley, which lay directly to our left, about 500 yards distant. The.field in which I was ordered to remain was enclosed. on two sides by dense woods, and covered by light bushes on the side toward the said valley on the left.

After the enemy were discovered filing into the valley, no movement was made for some time. When it was supposed, from the appearance of things, that the last of the column was entering the valley, I ordered all the artillery (six pieces) to charge front to the left, but not to fire until the rear of the column was seen. I placed the artillery, with a company of infantry with each piece, and charged the battle front of the two regiments (the 16th and 31st) supporting the artillery to the left, and on a line with them, and ordered every man to lie down and reserve his fire.

During the whole time that this order was being carried out, the enemy's troops were still advancing down the hill, four abreast, and at “right shoulder shift.” I gave orders to Lieut. Edwards, when I saw the rear of the column, to give it a solid twenty-pound shot, which he did, knocking a horse and his rider into the air, and starting into a double-quick the rear of the column into the valley. I then ordered the whole artillery to pours grape and canister into the valley, and at every fire there went up a tremendous howl from the enemy. During all this time the enemy poured volleys of musketry over the heads of our prostrate men. This firing continued for twenty-five or thirty minutes. A portion of the enemy rushed into a barn, from which well-directed shots brought some out in great haste.

The whole force of the enemy consisted, as near as I could estimate, from the time of their passing one point, and from what I can find out, of 3,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. They were utterly dispersed. A small number of them came up into the edge of the field, to the number of about 50, and fired five volleys at our prostrate men, but did not succeed in drawing shot from them in return.

It has been ascertained that the enemy had left the field, from their having ceased firing, and from seeing them run through the bushes in every direction, and hearing at the same time that our troops were falling back on Centreville, I received orders by an aid from Col. Miles, who was in Centreville, to fall back also on that place and encamp.

I immediately went over to give the same order to Richardson's brigade on the Centreville road, and also to Green's battery, but found they had left some time before, by Col. Miles's orders through an aid.

The Thirty-first regiment, under Col. Pratt, filed out of the field in rear of the artillery, and the Sixteenth followed, under Lieut.-Col. Marsh, each in perfect order, not having fired a gun at the enemy. The Eighteenth and Thirty-second regiments were ordered by me to fall back on Centreville, which they did in good order, and my entire brigade, together with Hunt's battery, fell back on Centreville Heights, without the least confusion, and assumed position under the direct command of Gen. McDowell, who sent a major (an aid) to me, directing that my regiments should fall in, in accordance with his expressed orders. The entire left wing was then in complete order, and every man in his place. Having received this order from Gen. McDowell, I left my command and went to Centreville Centre, to look after the sick and wounded, and my own baggage train. I returned immediately to my command and found that Col. Miles had been superseded, and received an order from General McDowell to take command of the left wing, which I did, encamping on the ground. Soon after the order [36] came to fall back on Fairfax Court House. I formed my brigade, the Sixteenth regiment first, Green's battery next, and the Eighteenth, Thirty-first, and Thirty-second following, and marched them towards Fairfax Court House. I found Blenker's brigade about two miles on the road, on each side of it, and in order, at “parade rest.” I communicated with Col. Blenker, and found that he had received direct orders front Gen. McDowell to bring up the rear, and prevent any attack from the enemy. My brigade thus continued its march, and arrived in camp in Alexandria in perfect condition.

On Monday, every regiment, as I understand, having an evening parade, and being prepared for any duty, Green's battery went on to Arlington, from which place I recalled it here yesterday, and the brigade now stands complete as before the battle with the exception of casualties herewith enclosed, amounting to Lieut. Craig, of Hunt's battery, killed, and two privates wounded, (one seriously and one slightly,) and one private taken prisoner.

With respect to the conduct of the officers under my command, on the 21st, I cannot say too much of the practical and industrious perseverance of Col. Richardson, who commanded his brigade on the Centreville road, who made important impromptu defences in felling trees, and making temporary fortifications across the road, which, although they were not required, from the direction of the attack, would have proved of immense value under other circumstances. His persevering energy during the day was untiring, and I am indebted to him for valuable suggestions as to positions and defence. To Major Hunt and Lieut. Edwards, who commanded the batteries on the left, any words that I can use will fall far short of expressing the beauty with which they handled their pieces, and the rapidity and precision of their fire. It was the most surprisingly beautiful display of skill ever witnessed by those present. As to Lieut. Green, who had charge of the rifled guns on the right, and was more immediately under the eyes of Col. Richardson, I can state from my own observation that the cool and deliberate manner in which he commanded his battery on that and on previous occasions, assures me that he is entitled to more praise than his modest report, which I herewith enclose, would indicate. As to Col. Jackson, I can state that during the morning, while he was in the face of the enemy, discharging picket duty, and in line of battle, he and his command behaved with coolness and bravery, and were relied upon in the afternoon with great confidence as a reserve. Col. Pratt, commanding the Thirty-first regiment, and Lieut.-Col. Marsh, commanding the Sixteenth regiment, ordered into battle by Col. Miles, on the field, and in previous picket duty, showed superior drill and discipline, and to their strict obedience of orders in reserving their fire, under the most provoking circumstances, while they were supporting the artillery, may be attributed the safety of the latter, and probably the safety of the left wing. Col. Mathewson performed various evolutions during the day, under orders — at one time protecting one road, at another time another, and then, as a column — and the patience of himself and command while so acting within sound of fire, entitles him to great credit.

Adjutant Howland, Sixteenth regiment, my acting aide-de-camp, rendered me valuable services in changing the troops from time to time, and in generally doing all of his own duties thoroughly, and much that appertained to others. To Brevet Second Lieut. Bradford, acting brigade-commissary, and to Acting Brigade Quartermaster Woolsey R. Hopkins, and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General Cowdrey, much praise is due for the gallant manner in which they delivered orders, sometimes under heavy fire.

Surgeon Crandall and Surgeon's-mate Moore, Sixteenth regiment, performed their duties with great fidelity and skill, dressing the wounds of many not under my command. Surgeon Hamilton, of the Thirty-first regiment, dressed the wounds of over 200 men at Centreville.

To the teamsters of ordnance and baggage wagons credit is due for having returned all the wagons and teams, and public property of every description intrusted to them, safely to camp.

Joseph B. Rodden, Company K, Sixteenth regiment, remained on the field at Centreville until the morning after the battle, and brought into camp, with the aid of a negro, whom he pressed into the service, thirty head of cattle belonging to the Government, and arrived at Alexandria on Tuesday morning.

I understand from a deserter, now in my camp, that my old class-mate at West Point, Robert E. Lee, commanded the enemy's forces opposed to me at Blackburn's Ford.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your ob't serv't,

sir: On the 18th of July, at about 9 A. M., I joined the commanding general about two miles beyond Fairfax Court House, on the road to Centreville. He was then about going to Sangster's, and invited me to attend him. Not understanding his journey to have the character of a reconnoissance, but as simply to communicate with the division of Col. Heintzelman, I preferred accompanying the division of Gen. Tyler at Centreville.

Proceeding to Centreville, I joined Captain Alexander (Engineers) a short distance on the road leading to Blackburn's Ford. He was at this time preparing to encamp his pioneer party, [37] and it was my intention, as soon as the troops should be fixed in their positions, to propose to Gen. Tyler to make a reconnoissance of the enemy's position at Blackburn's Ford.

It should be borne in mind that the plan of the campaign had been to turn the position of Manassas by the left — that is to say, that from Fairfax Court House and Centreville we were to make a flank movement towards Sangster's and Fairfax station, and thence to Wolf Run Shoals, or in that direction. In my interview with the commanding general, just referred to, he said nothing to indicate any change of plan, but on the contrary, his remarks carried the impression that he was more than ever confirmed in his plan, and spoke of the advance on Centreville as a “demonstration.”

In proposing, therefore, to reconnoitre the enemy's position at Blackburn's Ford, it was not with the slightest idea that this point would be attacked. But a reconnoissance would be the carrying out of a “demonstration.”

While I was awaiting Captain Alexander I encountered Matthias C. Mitchell, who was secured as a guide. Representing himself as a Union man and a resident of that vicinity, I was engaged questioning him when intelligence was received that Gen. Tyler had sent back for artillery and infantry, and that the enemy was in sight before him. Riding to the front I joined Gen. Tyler and Col. Richardson. Proceeding with them a short distance further, we emerged from the woods, and found ourselves at the point at which the road commences its descent to Blackburn's Ford. The run makes here a curve or bow towards us, which the road bisects. The slopes from us towards it were gentle and mostly open. On the other side, the banks of the run rise more abruptly, and are wooded down to the very edge of the run. Higher up a cleared spot could be seen here and there, and still higher-higher than our own point of view, and only visible from its gently sloping towards us — the elevated plateau, comparatively open, in which Manassas Junction is situated. Although, owing to the thickness of the wood, little could be seen along the edge of the run, it was quite evident, from such glimpses as we could obtain, that the enemy was in force behind us.

I represented to Gen. Tyler that this point was the enemy's strong position, on the direct road to Manassas Junction; that it was no part of the plan to assail it. I did not, however, object to a “demonstration,” believing that it would favor what I supposed still to be the commanding general's plan of campaign. The two 20-pounders of Parrott's had been ordered up. They were opened upon the enemy's position, firing in various directions, without our being able to perceive the degree of effect they produced. We had fired perhaps a dozen rounds, when we were answered by a rapid discharge from a battery apparently close down to the run, and at the crossing of the road. The 20-pounders continued their fire, directing at this battery, and Ayres's battery was brought up and stationed on the left. The enemy's batteries soon ceased answering. After ours had continued playing for about half an hour, I thought it a useless expenditure of ammunition, and so stated to you, (who arrived on the spot shortly before this,) and presume that Gen. Tyler concurred in this opinion, as the firing soon ceased. I supposed that this would be the end of the affair, but perceiving the troops filing down towards the run, I thought it necessary to impress Gen. Tyler with the fact that it was no part of the commanding general's plan to bring on a serious engagement. I directed Capt. Alexander (Engineers) to state this fact to him, which he did in writing, having stated the same verbally before. At the same time, I directed Lieut. Houston to accompany the troops and make such observations of the enemy's position as he could. I remained on the heights, observing as well as I could the movements of the enemy's forces. The affair becoming more serious than I expected, I was about to go down to the front, when our troops retired, and I returned to Centreville with yourself, to report to Gen. McDowell. It is proper to observe that, before our artillery practice commenced, movements of troops were observed on the road leading from Manassas to Blackburn's Ford. As the road presented itself to the eye, those not very familiar with the locality might feel some doubt — judging merely by the eye-whether these troops were advancing to, or retiring from Blackburn's Ford. The impression seemed to be quite common among us that they were retiring. I was perfectly sure that they were columns moving up to meet us from Manassas.

At my interview with the commanding general that evening, he informed me that he had convinced himself that the nature of the country to the left or southward of Manassas was unfit for the operations of a large army; that he had determined to move by the right, turning the enemy's left; that the provision trains were just coming in, and that the troops would require the next day to cook their provisions for another march.

I told him I would endeavor, the next day, to obtain such information as would enable him to decide on his future movement.

The next most prominent crossing of Bull Run, above Blackburn's Ford, is the stone bridge of the Warrenton turnpike. Such a point could scarcely be neglected by the enemy. Information from various quarters gave good cause for believing that it was guarded by several thousand men — that at least four cannon were stationed to play upon it and the ford not far below, and moreover that the bridge was mined, and extensive abatis obstructed the road on the opposite shore.

Two or three miles above the Warrenton Bridge is a ford laid down on our maps as Sudley's Springs. Reliable information justified the belief that the ford was good, that it was unfortified, [38] that it was watched by only one or two companies; and, moreover, that the run above it was almost everywhere passable for wheeled vehicles.

Midway between the stone bridge and Sudley's Springs, maps indicated another ford which was said to be good.

Notwithstanding our conviction of the practicability of these fords, no known road connected with them from any of the main roads on our side of Bull Run. We had information that a road branched from the Warrenton turnpike, a short distance beyond Cub Run, by which — opening gates and passing through private grounds — we might reach the fords. It was desirable to assure ourselves that this route was entirely practicable. In company with Capt. Woodbury (Engineers) and Gov. Sprague, and escorted by a company of cavalry, I, on the 19th, followed up the valley of Cub Run until we reached a point west ten degrees north, and about four miles in an air line from Centreville, near which we struck a road which we believed to lead to the fords. Following it for a short distance we encountered the enemy's patrols. As we were most anxious to avoid attracting the enemy's attention to our designs in this quarter, we did not care to pursue the reconnoissance further. We had seen enough to be convinced of the perfect practicability of the route. To make more certain of the fords, however, Capt. Woodbury proposed to return at night, and with a few Michigan woodsmen from Col. Sherman's brigade, to endeavor to find them. On returning to camp it was determined to send Capt. Wright and Lieut. Snyder (Engineers) with Capt. Woodbury. At the same time the commanding general directed Capt. Whipple (Topographical Engineers) and Lieut. Prime (Engineers) to make a night reconnaissance of the run between Warrenton Bridge and Blackburn's Ford. Both these night expeditions failed. It was found the enemy occupied the woods too strongly on our side of the run to permit the reconnoissance to be accomplished. It was not our policy to drive in his pickets until we were in motion to attack.

On laying before you the information obtained, the commanding general believed himself justified in adopting the following plan of attack, which was decided upon on the 20th:

First--A false attack to be made by Richardson's brigade (temporarily attached to Miles's division) on Blackburn's Ford, the rest of that division remaining in reserve at Centreville.

Second--Tyler's division to move from its camp at 3 A. M. (the 21st) towards the stone bridge of the Warrenton turnpike, to feign the main attack upon this point.

Third--The divisions of Hunter and Heintzelman (in the order named) to leave their camps at 2 1/2 A. M., (they were encamped about two or three miles behind Tyler,) and, following his movement, to diverge from the Warrenton turnpike at the by-road beyond Cub Run, and take the road for Sudley's Springs — or, rather, it was provided that (if I mistake not) Hunter's division should proceed to Sudley's Springs, and Heintzelman to take the lower ford. These matters, however, to be regulated by circumstances.

It was intended that the head of Hunter's division should be at the turn off at early daylight, or about 4 A. M., and that it should reach Sudley by six or seven.

You are aware of the unexpected delay. The two leading brigades of Tyler's had not cleared the road for Hunter to this point until half-past 5, and our guide, alleging that a nearer route to the ford would bring our column in sight of the enemy's batteries, led them by so circuitous a way that Hunter did not reach Sudley until half-past 9 or thereabouts.

Accompanying the commanding general, we, as you are aware, after waiting two or three hours at the turn off, rode on to overtake the front of Hunter's division, when we emerged from the woods, nearly northeast of Sudley, into the open country, from whence the course of the run and the slopes of the opposite shore could be seen; we could perceive the enemy's column in motion to meet us. The loss of time here, in a great measure, thwarted our plan. We had hoped to pass the ford and reach the rear of the enemy's forces at Warrenton stone bridge before he could assemble in sufficient force to cope with us.

It now became necessary to have Tyler's division force the passage of the bridge. It had always been intended that this division should pass at or near the bridge, but it was hoped, by taking its defences in rear, it could be passed without force. The commanding general promptly sent orders to Tyler to press his attack with all vigor.

I had yet much confidence that, though we had been anticipated, (owing to the delays mentioned,) the enemy was not yet assembled in numbers to oppose us in great force, (a confidence which I think the facts justified;) that we might successfully attack him in front, while the division of Tyler should fall upon his flank and rear.

When we reached the front of Hunter's column the battle was just commencing. The events of the battle-field will be described in the reports you will receive from other quarters. I was near the commanding general until some time after the arrival of Sherman's brigade on our left. Being accidentally separated, I saw yourself on the right, and joining you, we observed for some time the action on the heights, where the enemy made his final and successful stand. As we were observing, the Zouave regiment of Heintzelman was driven back, leaving Rickett's battery, upon which we observed the enemy charge.

You left me here, and I remained a few minutes longer an anxious spectator, and for the first time beginning to anticipate a possible defeat. Two brigades of Tyler's division had [39] passed over the run, and I supposed (and I believed the commanding general supposed) that the entire division was over. If so, the stone bridge was unguarded, and if we were defeated our retreating columns might be cut off from Centreville by the detachments of the enemy crossing this bridge. I became so anxious on this point that I sought you again, and found you at some distance in the rear. After some consultation, you, on my assuming the responsibility, sent an order to Col. Miles to move up two of his brigades to the stone bridge, and to telegraph the Secretary of War to send up all the troops that could be spared from Washington.

While I was returning towards the front, intending to rejoin the commanding general, I saw our front give way, and it soon became evident that we were defeated.

I have stated that it was a part of the plan of the battle, that Tyler's division should pass at or near the stone bridge. Two of his brigades actually did pass, not at the bridge, (they finding fords a half mile higher up,) and connected themselves with our left. In anticipation that the stone bridge would be blown up, Capt. Alexander had been instructed to obtain a trestle bridge to replace it. This he had on the spot, but there appears to have been no mine prepared under the bridge. Capt. Alexander passed over his pioneers one by one, and set them to cutting away the abatis--two hundred yards in extent — obstructing the road. This task was accomplished, and the way was opened for Schenck's brigade to fall on the enemy's right at the moment when our lines finally gave way in front.

It will be seen from the above that the combination, though thwarted by adverse circumstances, was actually successful in uniting three entire divisions, (excepting the brigade of Schenck, which had just opened its way to fall on the enemy's right at the moment when our lines finally gave way in front,) upon the decisive point.

A fault, perhaps it was, that it did not provide earlier for bringing the two brigades of Miles's (in reserve at Centreville) into action. One of his brigades (Richardson's) actually did participate, (though not on the battle-field.) and in its affair at Blackburn's Ford probably neutralized at least an equal number of the enemy.

On retiring to Centreville my opinion was asked as to maintaining our position, and I gave it in favor of a prompt retreat; for I believed the enemy was far superior in numbers, and that, elated by his victory, he would pursue, and I believed that a defeated army, actually driven back on Washington before a pursuing enemy, would endanger the safety of the Capital.

The engineer officers under my command and attached to the different divisions were as follows:

Capt. D. P. Woodbury and Second Lieut. Charles E. Cross, to the Second Division, under Col. Hunter.

Capt. H. G. Wright and First Lieut. G. W. Snyder, to the Third Division, under Col. Heintzelman.

Capt. B. S. Alexander and First Lieut. D. C. Houston, to the First Division, under Gen. Tyler.

First Lieut. F. E. Prime, to the First Division, under Col. Miles.

They have all been most active and zealous in the discharge of the duties devolving upon them.

A report from Capt. D. P. Woodbury is herewith annexed. Reports from Capts. Wright and Alexander and Lieut. Prime will be furnished when received.

I am, very respectfully, your most obedient,

Captain: Having been appointed, by special orders No. 21, Headquarters Department Northeastern Virginia, Centreville, July 19, 1861, Chief of Artillery of the Corps d'armee, commanded by Brig. Gen. McDowell, and having served in that capacity during the battle of the 21st inst., I have the honor to submit the following report:

The Artillery of the Corps d'armee consisted of the following named batteries: Rickett's (Light Company 1, 1st Artillery) six 10-pounder Parrott rifle guns; Hunt's (Light Company M, 2d Artillery) four light 12-pounders; Carlisle's (Company E, 2d Artillery) two James's 13-pounder rifle guns, two 6-pounder guns; Tidball's (Light Company A, 2d Artillery) two 6-pounder guns, two 12-pounder howitzers; Green's (Company G, 2d Artillery) four 10-pounder Parrott rifle guns; Arnold's (Company D, 2d Artillery) two 13-pounder James's rifle guns, two 6-pounder guns; Ayres's (Light Company E, 3d Artillery) two 10-pounder Parrott rifle guns, two 12-pounder howitzers, two 6-pounder guns; Griffin's (Battery D, 5th Artillery) four 10-pounder Parrott rifle guns, two 12-pounder howitzers; Edwards's (Company G, 5th Artillery) two 20-pounders and one 30-pounder Parrott rifle guns. The 2d Regiment Rhode Island Volunteers had with it a battery of six 13-pounder James's rifle guns; the 71st Regiment New York Militia, two of Dahlgren's boat howitzers, and the 8th Regiment New York Militia a battery of six 6-pounder guns. The men of this last-named battery having claimed their discharge on the day before the battle, because their term of service had expired, the battery was thrown out of service.

The whole force of artillery, of all calibres, was therefore 49 pieces, of which 28 were rifled guns. All of these batteries were fully horsed and equipped, with the exception of the two howitzers of the 71st regiment New York Militia, which were without horses, and were drawn by drag-ropes manned by detachments from [40] the regiment. Gen. McDowell's disposition for the march from Centreville on the morning of the 21st inst., placed Tidball's and Green's batteries (8 pieces) in reserve with the division of Col. Miles, to remain at Centreville; Hunt's and Edwards's (6 pieces) with the brigade of Col. Richardson, at Blackburn's Ford; and Carlisle's, Ayres's, and the 30-pounder (11 pieces) with the division of Gen. Tyler, at the stone bridge; Rickett's, Griffin's, Arnold's, the Rhode Island, and the 71st regiment batteries (24 pieces) accompanied the main column, which crossed Bull Run at Sudley's Springs. As soon as the column came in presence of the enemy after crossing Bull Run, I received from Gen. McDowell, in person, directions to superintend the posting of the batteries as they severally debouched from the road and arrived from the field. The Rhode Island battery came first upon the ground, and took up at a gallop the position assigned it. It was immediately exposed to a sharp fire from the enemy's skirmishers and infantry, posted on the declivity of the hill and in the valley in its immediate front, and to a well-sustained fire of shot and shell from the enemy's batteries, posted behind the crest of the range of hills, about 1,000 yards listant. This battery sustained, in a very gallant manner, the whole force of this fire for nearly half an hour, when the howitzers of the 71st New York Militia came up, and went into battery on its left. A few minutes afterward, Griffin brought up his pieces at a gallop, and came into battery about 500 yards to the left of the Rhode Island and New York batteries. Rickett's battery came up in less than half an hour afterward, and was posted to the left of and immediately adjoining Griffin's. The enemy's right, which had been wavering from the moment Griffin opened fire upon it, now began to give way throughout its whole extent, and retire steadily, his batteries limbering up rapidly, and at a gallop taking up successively two new positions further to his rear. The foot troops on our left, following up the enemy's retiring right, soon left our batteries so far in our rear that their fire was over the heads of our own men. I therefore directed the Rhode Island battery to advance about 500 yards in front of its first position, accompanied it myself, and saw it open fire with increased effect upon the enemy's still retiring right. Returning to the position occupied by Rickett's and Griffin's batteries, I received an order from Gen. McDowell to advance two batteries to an eminence, specially designated by him, about 800 yards in front of the line previously occupied by the enemy's batteries. I therefore ordered these two batteries to move forward at once, and, as soon as they were in motion, went for and secured as supports the 11th (Fire Zouaves) and the 14th (Brooklyn) New York regiments. I accompanied the former regiment to guide it to its proper position, and Col. Heintzelman, 17th United States Infantry, performed the same service for the 14th on the right of the 11th. A squadron of United States Cavalry, under Captain Colburn, 1st Cavalry, was subsequently ordered as additional support. We were soon upon the ground designated, and the two batteries at once opened a very effective fire upon the enemy's left. The new position had scarcely been occupied, when a troop of the enemy's cavalry, debouching from a piece of woods close upon our right flank, charged down upon the New York 11th. The Zouaves catching sight of the cavalry a few moments before they were upon them, broke ranks to such a degree that the cavalry dashed through without doing them much harm. The Zouaves gave them a scattering fire as they passed, which emptied five saddles and killed three horses. A few minutes afterward a regiment of the enemy's infantry, covered by a high fence, presented itself in line on the left and front of the two batteries, at not more than 60 or 70 yards' distance, and delivered a volley full upon the batteries and their supports. Lieut. Ramsay, 1st Artillery, was killed, and Capt. Ricketts, 1st Artillery, was wounded, and a number of men and horses were killed or disabled by this close and well-directed volley. The 11th and 14th regiments instantly broke, and fled in confusion to the rear, and, in spite of the repeated and earnest efforts of Col. Heintzelman with the latter, and myself with the former, refused to rally and return to the support of the batteries. The enemy, seeing the guns thus abandoned by their supports, rushed upon them, and driving off the cannoneers, who with their officers stood bravely at their posts until the last moment, captured them, ten in number. These were the only guns taken by the enemy on the field. Arnold's battery came upon the field after Rickett's, and was posted on our left centre, where it performed good service throughout the day, and by its continual and well-directed fire assisted materially in breaking and driving back the enemy's right and centre.

The batteries of Hunt, Carlisle, Ayres, Tidball, Edwards, and Green (21 pieces) being detached from the main body, and not being under my immediate notice during the greater portion of the day, I respectfully refer you to the reports of their brigade and division commanders for the record of their services.

The army having retired upon Centreville, I was ordered by Gen. McDowell in person to post the artillery in position to cover the retreat. The batteries of Hunt, Ayres, Tidball, Edwards, Green, and the New York 8th regiment, (the latter served by volunteers from Wilcox's brigade,) 20 pieces in all, were at once placed in position; and thus remained until 12 o'clock P. M., when orders having been received to retire upon the Potomac, the batteries were put in march, and, covered by Richardson's brigade, retired in good order and without haste, and early next morning reoccupied their former camps on the Potomac.

In conclusion, it gives me great satisfaction to state that the conduct of the officers and enlisted [41] men of the several batteries was most exemplary. Exposed throughout the day to a galling fire of artillery and small-arms, several times charged by cavalry, and more than once abandoned by their infantry supports, both officers and enlisted men manfully stood by their guns with a courage and devotion worthy of the highest commendation. Where all did so well, it would be invidious to make distinction, and I therefore simply give the names of all the officers engaged viz.: Major Hunt; Captains Carlisle, Ayres, Griffin, Tidball, and Arnold; Lieutenants Platt, Ransom, Thompson, Webb, Barriga, Green, Edwards, Dresser, Wilson, Throckmorton, Cushing, Harris, Butler, Fuller, Lyford, Will, Benjamin, Babbitt, Haines, Ames, Hasbrouck, Kensel, Harrison, Reed, Barlow, Noyes, Kirby, Elderkin, Ramsay, and Craig. The two latter were killed.

I am, sir, very respectfully your obedient servant,

Being chief of the Medical Staff with the Army in the Department of N. E. Virginia, I have the honor to make the following report of so much of the results of the action on the 21st at Bull Run, as came within my charge. As the officers of the Medical Staff were attached to the different regiments and on duty with them, I deemed it proper to remain with and accompany the general commanding and staff from the beginning to the termination of the battle, in order that I might be present if any were wounded; and, also, that I might be enabled to visit in this way every part of the field where the killed and wounded might be found.

After the action had fairly commenced, and the wounded and the dead were lying on the field in every direction, I despatched Assistant-Surgeon D. L. Magruder to the rear, with directions to prepare a church (which I had observed as we passed before arriving at the scene of action) for the reception of the wounded, and also to send the ambulances forward as rapidly as possible to pick up the wounded and dead. In a very few minutes the ambulances made their appearance, and contrived throughout the day to visit every part of the ground which was accessible, so as to be within reach of those parts of the field where the fighting was going on, and wounded were to be found. It is due to the ambulance drivers to say that they performed their duties efficiently, and the result of their operations also shows how absolutely necessary these means of conveyance are to the comfort and relief of the wounded in giving them shelter and water when ready to perish with heat and thirst. By means of the ambulances, also, the men who go to the relief of their wounded comrades are separated but a short time from their companies, as, having deposited them in their ambulances, they can then return to their proper positions.

As the general commanding visited almost every part of the ground during the conflict, with a view to encourage or direct the movements of the troops, my position as a member of his staff gave me every opportunity of seeing the results of the action. I therefore embraced the opportunity thus offered to give directions when needed to the drivers of the ambulances where to find the dead and wounded; and also to those carrying off the wounded where they could find the needed conveyances. The stretchers were found very useful and comfortable to the wounded, and were in constant requisition, conveying them to the nearest ambulances.

So far as I am informed, the medical staff belonging to the different volunteer regiments discharged their duties satisfactorily. I observed Acting Assistant-Surgeon Miles busily engaged in dressing wounded men under the shade of a tree, in a part of the field where the fire from the enemy was very hot. He addressed me a brief inquiry as I passed relative to the safety of his father, and then resumed his occupation.

Surgeon C. C. Keeney of Col. Hunter's division, and Assistant-Surgeon D. L. Magruder, attached to the commanding general's staff, did good service in the hospital church I have mentioned, and also in two houses near the church, where the wounded were placed after the church had been filled. These officers remained busily engaged in the discharge of their duties till the enemy's cavalry made their appearance, and but narrowly escaped capture, when they left. Drs. Swift and Winston, attached to the New York 8th regiment, remained with their sick sacrificing all selfish considerations for their own safety, in order that the wounded might not be neglected, and are now prisoners. I am informed that Assistant-Surgeons Grey and Steinburg of the Regular Army, and Drs. Honiston and Swan of the New York 14th, also preferred to remain rather than abandon their charge. The conduct of these officers is worthy of all commendation.

It would be premature in me, in the absence of sufficient data — the reports of the regimental surgeons not yet being received — to express a positive opinion as to the number killed and wounded in the action on the 21st. There were, no doubt, many concealed from observation under cover of the woods and bushes, but, judging from the number that I saw in various parts of the field, and allowing a wide margin for those unobserved, I should think that the killed and wounded on our side did not exceed from 800 to 1,000.

The impossibility of making a careful survey of the field after the battle had ceased, must be my apology for the briefness and want of detail in this report.