[673]
cheerful, confident, and courageous.
They were mostly foreign enlistments, without any great interests at stake in the ultimate success of the revolution.
A reaction set in among them during the lull of the twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth, and twenty-seventh, when there was no other excitement to arouse them than the fatigue duty of repairing our damages, and when the rumor was current that the city had surrendered, and was in the hands of the enemy.
No reply had been received from the city to my despatches, sent by couriers, on the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth, by means of which I could reassure them.
They were still obedient, but not buoyant and cheerful.
In consequence, I endeavored to revive their courage and patriotism, by publishing an order to both garrisons, attached hereto as document U. I regret to state that it did not produce the desired effect.
Everything remained quiet, however, until midnight, when the garrison at Fort Jackson revolted en masse, seized upon the guard and posterns, reversed the field-pieces commanding the gates, and commenced to spike the guns, while many of the men were leaving the fort in the meantime, under arms.
All this occurred as suddenly as it was unexpected.
The men were mostly drawn up under arms, and positively refused to fight any longer, besides endeavoring by force to bring over the St. Mary's cannoniers, and such other few men as remained true to their cause and country.
The mutineers stated that the officers intended to hold out as long as possible, or while the provisions lasted, and then blow up the forts and everything in them; that the city had surrendered, and that there was no further use in fighting; that the enemy were about to attack by land and water, on three sides at once, and that a longer defence would only prove a butchery.
Every endeavor was made by the officers to repress the revolt, and to bring the men to reason and order, but without avail.
Officers upon the ramparts were fired upon by the mutineers, in attempting to put a stop to the spiking of the guns.
I am greatly indebted to the Rev. Father Nachon for his efforts to quell the mutineers, through some of whom he learned that the revolt had been discussed among them for two days, and yet there was no one man true enough to communicate the fact to his officers.
Signals also were said to have been passed between the forts during the night, and while the mutiny was at its height.
Being so general among the men, the officers were helpless and powerless to act.
Under these circumstances, there was but one course left, viz.: to let those men go who wished to leave the fort, in order to see the number left and to ascertain what reliance could be placed upon them.
About one-half of the garrison left immediately, including men from every company, excepting the St. Mary's cannoniers, volunteers and regulars, non-commissioned officers and privates, and among them many of the very men who had stood last and best to their guns throughout the protracted bombardment and the final action when the enemy passed.
It was soon evident that there was no fight in the men remaining behind, that they were completely demoralized, and that no faith or reliance could be placed in the broken detachments of companies left in the fort.
In the mean time we were totally ignorant of the condition of affairs in Fort St. Philip,and as all of our small boats had been carried away by the mutineers, we could not communicate with that fort till the next morning.
As the next attack upon the forts was likely to be a combined operation by land and water, and as Fort St. Philip was the point most threatened, from the nature of the country around it, and from the character of the work itself, with narrow and shallow ditches, and but little relief to the main work, it was self-evident that no reduction could be made in its garrison to strengthen that of Fort Jackson, even if all the men there remained true.
In fact, two additional regiments had been asked for at quarantine, in anticipation of such an attack, to act as a reserve to strengthen the garrisons of both forts.
With the enemy above and below us, it will be apparent at once, to any one at all familiar with the surrounding country, that there was no chance of destroying the public property, blowing up the forts, and escaping with the remaining troops.
Under all these humiliating circumstances, there seemed to be but one course open to us, viz.: to await the approach of daylight, communicate then with the gunboats of the mortar flotilla below, under flag of truce, and negotiate for a surrender under the terms offered us by Commander Porter, on the 26th inst., and which had previously been declined.
April 28.
A small boat was procured, and Lieutenant Morse, Post-Adjutant, sent over to convey the condition of affairs to Fort St. Philip, as well as to Captain Mitchell, on the Louisiana.
Captain Mitchell and Lieutenant Shyrock, C. S. N., came on shore and discussed the whole question; after which they left, remarking that they would go on board, and endeavour to attack the enemy above at the quarantine, notwithstanding that reasons had been given, from time to time, for not moving this vessel into her proper position, only a few hundred yards distant. Captains Squires and Bond, Louisiana artillery, and Lieutenant Dixon, commanding the company of C. S. regular recruits, came on shore shortly afterwards from Fort St. Philip, and concurred with us that, under the circumstances, we could do nothing else than surrender, as they were not at all confident of the garrison there, after the unlooked — for revolt at Fort Jackson, although none of their men had left, or openly revolted.
For these reasons, a flag of truce was sent down to communicate with the enemy below, and to carry a written offer of surrender under the terms offered on the 26th instant.
(See at. tached Document V.) This communication 