Jackson's Valley campaign of 1862.
Address delivered before the Virginia division, A. N. V., October 31st, 1878, by Colonel William Allan, late Chief of Ordnance, Second ( “Stonewall” ) corps, A. N. V.
[Published by unanimous request of the association].
After the disastrous termination of Braddock's campaign against Fort Duquesne, in the summer of 1756,
Colonel George Washington, to whom was entrusted the duty of protecting the
Alleghany frontier of Virginia from the
French and
Indians, established himself at Winchester, in the lower Shenandoah Valley, as the point from which he could best protect the district assigned to him. Here he subsequently built Fort Loudoun, and made it the base of his operations.
A grass-grown mound, marking the site of one of the bastions of the old fort, and Loudoun street, the name of the principal thoroughfare of the town, remain to recall an important chapter in Colonial history.
It was this old town that
Major-General T. J. Jackson entered on the evening of November 4, 1861, as commander of the
Valley
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district, and his headquarters were established within musket-shot of
Fort Loudoun.
He had been made
Major General on October 7 for his services at the
first battle of Manassas, and was now assigned to this important command because of the expectations formed of his capacity, and because of his acquaintance with the country.
His district embraced the territory bounded north by the
Potomac, east by the
Blue Ridge, and west by
the Alleghanies.
Born and reared in
Western Virginia, and filled with a patriot's devotion to the land of his birth, he had manifested a strong desire to be employed in the operations in that region, and had cherished the ambition of freeing his former home from hostile domination.
The Confederates, during the summer, had in that region been unsuccessful.
General Robert Garnett had been forced to retreat by
General McClellan, and had then met defeat and death at Corrick's Ford on
Cheat river, July 13th.
This gave the
Federals control of the greater part of
Virginia west of
the Alleghanies, and the subsequent efforts of
Generals Floyd and
Wise, and still later of
General Lee, availed only to prevent further encroachments of the enemy — not to regain the lost territory.
When, therefore,
General Jackson assumed command of the
Valley of Virginia, the enemy had possession of all the
State north of the
Great Kanawha and west of
the Alleghanies, and had pushed their outposts into that mountain region itself, and in some cases eastward of the main range.
Thus,
General Kelly had captured
Romney, the county seat of
Hampshire, forty miles west of
Winchester, and now occupied it with a force of 5,000 men.
1 This movement gave the
Federals control of the fertile valley of the south branch of the
Potomac.
Another, though much smaller force, occupied
Bath, the county seat of
Morgan, forty miles due north of
Winchester, while the north bank of the
Potomac was everywhere guarded by Union troops.
The Baltimore and Ohio railroad was open and available for the supply of the
Federal troops from
Baltimore to
Harper's Ferry, and again from a point opposite
Hancock westward.
The section of this road of about forty miles from
Harper's Ferry to
Hancock, lying for the most part some distance within the
Virginia border, had been interrupted and rendered useless by the
Confederates, but this gap was now supplied by the
Chesapeake and Ohio canal, which was open all the way from
Cumberland, Maryland, to
Georgetown in the District of Columbia.
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The plan of operations, that
Jackson had conceived for regaining
West Virginia, was to move along the Baltimore and Ohio railroad and the turnpikes parallel to it, and thus enter
Western Virginia at the northeastern end. In this way he could turn the left flank of the enemy's forces, place himself on their communications, and force them to evacuate or fight under circumstances of his own selection.
Having seen how his predecessors had been hampered in trying to operate from
Staunton westward, by the difficult and inaccessible nature of the country, composed almost entirely of mountains destitute of supplies, and penetrated by nothing but indifferent wagon roads, he was anxious to try a mode of approach which, if more exposed to the enemy, had the advantage of being easier, of lying through a much more populous and cultivated region, of affording to some extent the use of a railroad for supplies, and which would soon place him in the midst of some of the most fertile parts of
West Virginia.
In order to carry out this scheme he asked for his old brigade, which had been left at
Manassas, and that all the forces operating along the line of
the Alleghanies southwest of
Winchester, and lately commanded by
General Lee, should be concentrated under his command.
This would have given him 15,000 or 16,000 men, the least force with which he thought it possible to undertake so bold an enterprise.
His wishes were complied with in part.
His own brigade was promptly sent to him, and one of the brigades of
Loring's troops (
General Loring had succeeded
General Lee) reached him early in December.
Subsequently two more brigades under
General Loring himself were added, but all these troops only increased the small force of 3,000 State militia which he had assembled in the district itself to about 11,000 men.
2 The greater part of
General Loring's force did not arrive at
Winchester until
Christmas, thus preventing any important movements during November and December.
But meantime
Jackson was not idle.
He spent the time in organizing, drilling and equipping the militia and the scattered cavalry commands, which he consolidated into a regiment under
Colonel Ashby; and in sending expeditions against the
Chesapeake and Ohio canal, by breaking which he annoyed the enemy and interrupted an important line of communication.
3
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By the last week in December all the troops that the War Department thought it judicious to spare him had arrived, and though the season was far advanced, he determined at once to assume the offensive.
The winter had so far been mild, the roads were in excellent condition, and though his force was not large enough for the recovery of
West Virginia, important advantages seemed within reach.
The forces and positions of the enemy opposed to
Jackson at the beginning of 1862 were as follows:
General Banks, commanding the Fifth corps of
McClellan's army, with headquarters at
Frederick, Maryland, had 16,000 effective men,
4 the greater part of whom were in winter quarters near that city, while the remainder guarded the
Potomac from
Harper's Ferry to
Williamsport.
General Rosecrans, still holding command of the Department of West Virginia, had 22,000 men scattered over that region,
5 but was concentrating them on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad.
He says in his testimony (Report on Conduct of War, 1865, volume III): “On the 6th of December, satisfied that the condition of the roads over
the Alleghanies into
Western Virginia, as well as the scarcity of subsistence and horse-feed, would preclude any serious operations of the enemy against us, until the opening of the spring, I began quietly and secretly to assemble all the spare troops of the department in the neighborhood of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, under cover of about 5,000 men I had posted at
Romney, with the design of obtaining
General McClellan's permission to take nearly all these troops and suddenly seize, fortify and hold
Winchester, whereby I should at once more effectually cover the northeastern and central parts of
Western Virginia, and at the same time threaten the left of the enemy's position at
Manassas, compel him to lengthen his line of defence in front of the Army of the Potomac, and throw it further south.”
This plan of
Rosecrans was anticipated and foiled by
Jackson's movements.
On the first of January, 1862, the latter left
Winchester at the head of between 8,000 and 9,000 men,
6 and moved towards
Bath, in Morgan county.
The fine weather of the preceding month changed on the very first night of the expedition, and
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a terrible storm of sleet and snow and cold set in, which for the next three weeks subjected the troops to the severest hardships, and finally forced their commander to suspend his forward movement.
At first the troops marched cheerfully on in spite of cold and sleet.
