[Our readers will receive with great interest the following sketches from the facile pen of the gallant soldier whose position on the staff gave him special opportunities for knowing whereof he affirms.]
While the Army of Tennessee was in winter quarters at
Dalton, Georgia,
General Breckinridge was, early in February, 1864, ordered to the command of the Department of
Southwestern Virginia.
He repaired to
Richmond about the middle of that month, and there remained nearly a fortnight in consultation with the
President and War Department, gathering information and receiving instructions concerning his new command.
On the 5th of March he relieved
General Samuel Jones, and formally assumed command of the Department of
Southwestern Virginia, with headquarters at Dublin station, a depot on the Virginia and East Tennessee railroad a few miles west of
New river.
His new command included all of
East Tennessee occupied by the Confederate forces and all of
Virginia west of the
Blue Ridge.
Its great extent of exposed front, with
[
258]
the small force for its protection, had always rendered it a precarious command, and it had proved disastrous to several of his predecessors.
With the prospect of a trying ordeal bofore him as soon as the
spring and
summer campaign should open,
General Breckinridge addressed himself at once to the work of placing his troops in an effective condition.
To this end he made a tour of inspection to all the posts in
Virginia on horseback, going in an inclement season as far as the
Warm Springs, in Bath county, and traversing the line as far to the southwest as
Abingdon, a trip of nearly four hundred miles. Wherever he went, the officers and men were animated by his presence, and new life was infused into all branches of the service.
About this time, the command of
General Longstreet, which had wintered in
East Tennessee, was transferred by rail to
General Lee's army, thus uncovering his left and leaving it guarded only by cavalry.
The scope of this sketch will not admit of a statement of the forces of the Department, further than to say that
Vaughan's cavalry was on the
East Tennessee front,
Morgan's at
Abingdon,
Jenkins' at or near the Narrows of
New River, and
W. L. Jackson's on the extreme right at
Warm Springs — the largest command not exceeding a good brigade; while the only infantry in the Department was
Echols' brigade at Union Draught, in
Monroe county, and
Wharton's brigade at the Narrows of
New River--twenty-six miles north of
Dublin.
Such was the disposition when information was received that
General Crook was advancing in the direction of
Dublin, with a strong force, from the
Kanawha.
General Breckinridge was engaged in preparations to receive him, when, on the evening of the 4th of May, he received a telegram from
President Davis, saying that
Siegel was advancing up the Shenandoah Valley on
Staunton, and that the indications were that he (
Breckinridge) would have to go at once to meet him, closing with directions to communicate with
General Lee.
A dispatch was sent
General Lee the same night, informing him of the attitude in the Department and asking instructions.
Early on the morning of the 5th of May--the day on which the
battle of the Wilderness was fought — an answer was received from
General Lee, directing
General Breckinridge to march at once with all of his available force to the defence of
Staunton.
Orders having been previously sent to
Generals Echols and
Wharton to hold themselves in readiness to march at a moment's warning,
General Breckinridge proceeded on the same day with his staff to the Narrows, and on the 6th the brigades of
Wharton and
Echols
[
259]
took up their march for
Staunton, at which place
General Breckinridge arrived on the 9th--the last of the troops reaching there on the 11th.
Immediately on his arrival he proceeded to organize to meet
Siegel.
The reserves of
Augusta were called out, under
Colonel John H. Harmon, numbering several hundred men, and the cadets of the military institute at
Lexington, two hundred strong.
These reported promptly; and
General Breckinridge, learning that
Siegel was proceeding up the
Valley, determined to march to attack him, instead of standing on the defensive.
Accordingly on the morning of the 13th he left
Staunton with the forces named, camping that night twenty miles from
Staunton.
Next day he advanced to
Lacy's spring; about thirty-five miles from
Staunton, and went into camp, heavy rains falling almost continually both days.
General Imboden, who was in front with a cavalry force of several hundred, reported the enemy in the neighborhood of
New Market, ten miles off. After dark he visited
General Breckinridge in person, and informed him that
Siegel had occupied
New Market.
General Breckinridge then determined to attack him early in the morning before information of his advance could be received.
Accordingly he put his troops in motion at one o'clock that night, and by day-light was in line of battle two miles south of
New Market, his front being covered by
Imboden's cavalry;
Harmon's command being left as rear guard to the trains, a mile further in the rear.
Siegel was apparently unconscious of the presence of infantry in his front, and was advancing confident of the capture of
Staunton, with no obstruction except a small cavalry force.
The situation will be taken in at a glance.
Lee was being pressed at
Spotsylvania;
Crook was moving on the extreme left of the line from the
Kanawha, apparently occupying
Breckinridge with the defence of the important country of
Southwest Virginia, where lay the salt works, the lead mines and the chief source of commissary supplies for
Richmond; while
Siegel was moving upon
Staunton, the center of the line, the key to the
Valley — which was apparently hopelessly indefensible.
Besides its strategic importance, as the immediate left flank of
General Lee's line, it was at that time the location of large hospitals for the Army of Northern Virginia and depots of commissary, quartermaster and ordnance stores.
The importance, therefore, of success by
Breckinridge will be appreciated.
To accomplish the defeat of
Siegel's advance he had but a meagre force — the aggregate of infantry muskets being but thirty-one hundred.
With this command, as the morning opened, he advanced
[
260]
in line of battle; the cavalry of
Imboden giving way to our infantry skirmishers and going to the right, with instructions to operate during the day as a cover to our right flank, and to endeavor, as the battle progressed, to gain the rear of
Siegel and to burn the bridge across the
Shenandoah near
Mount Jackson, four miles from
New Market.
The topography of the country was as follows: The main turnpike passes down the
Valley due north through the town of
New Market, which lies rather in a depression, from which, both to the north and south, the road and country rise with a gradual ascent.
The
Massanutten mountain runs parallel with the road, at the distance of a mile or more, with an intervening wooded valley, interspersed with wet weather marshes, rendered by the rain then falling difficult for field operations, which gave
Breckinridge's right, good protection.
On the left of the turnpike, and also parallel with it, and half a mile or more distant, runs the south branch of the
Shenandoah, then swollen with the rains, a high ridge intervening and ascending by a gradual slope from the turnpike.
General Breckinridge formed his line of battle with the right resting on the turnpike and his left on the summit of the ridge, placing the cadets in the center between the two brigades.
He had but one line of battle in two ranks, with no reserves.
It was not long before the skirmish line of the opposing forces became engaged, and after sharp firing the enemy fell back beyond
New Market.
Then ensued heavy artillery firing, which occupied the greater part of the morning.
A reconnoissance showed that
Siegel, finding he was opposed by infantry instead of cavalry, had abandoned the offensive and assumed the defensive.
To.this end he had retired with his main force to the crest of the hill about a mile north of
New Market, where, with open ground in his front and his flanks well covered by the topography already described, he occupied an exceedingly strong defensive position.
The rain was almost continuous during the day, and
Breckinridge's forces had operated in wheat fields, which made it very laborious, particularly in handling artillery, beyond the reach of which
Siegel had now placed himself Notwithstanding the odds at which
General Breckinridge now found himself, he determined to press to the attack.
Putting his troops in motion, he passed beyond the village of
New Market and began to ascend the open space intervening between himself and the enemy, composed of blue grass pastures intersected occasionly with stone fences.
Seeing that his troops would be exposed to a heavy artillery fire unless there was some provision to prevent it, he boldly
[
261]
threw ten pieces of artillery, which he moved in a gallop through
New Market, upon the right of the pike and beyond the town where a series of slight knolls offered good positions for firing without its endangering his own command.
These pieces he directed in person, so arranging that as his line of battle advanced the artillery would limber up, gallop to the front and open fire — making, as it were, a skirmish line of artillery.
The boldness of the whole movement seemed to disconcert the enemy and to give a moral advantage to our side.
The first firing of
Siegel's artillery passed harmlessly over the heads of our troops, and when our artillery opened with a quartering fire upon his line it seemed to strike them with consternation; so much so, that it was afterwards ascertained that our bursting shells had stampeded his deserves before the first line gave way. Our infantry advanced with wonderful steadiness, firing, and halting at intervals to load, with the steadiness of troops on dress parade; the precision of the cadets' drill serving well as a color guide for the brigades on either side to dress by. The whole scene was one such as is rarely witnessed, the eye taking in at one glance all the forces engaged, save that a good part of the
Federal line had the advantage of a stone wall which served as a breastwork.
Every man in
Breckinridge's command was under his eye, while he, with his conspicuous form, was plain to the view of all his troops, who, though they had never fought with him, were proud of the fame he brought them as a commander and animated to heroism by his immediate presence.
When his line had reached within two hundred yards of that of the enemy, the position was very critical, and for a time it seemed doubtful as to which would be the first to give way. At this juncture,
Siegel's cavalry, on his left, were seen deploying for a charge down the pike.
Breckinridge, with his keen eye, detected the manoeuvre and ordered the guns to be double shotted with canister.
It had scarcely been done before they were seen advancing in squadron front, when, coming in range, the artillery opened and the charge was repulsed disastrously — not more than a score reaching our lines, and they as prisoners, lying on the necks of their horses.
This seemed to turn the tide of battle, for in a few moments
Siegel's line gave way and our troops pressed to the crest only to see the enemy in full retreat.
Pursuit was given as soon as our line could be reformed.
Siegel made a brief stand at Rood's hill to cover his retreat, which he effected beyond the
Shenandoah, burning the bridge as his rear guard passed over.
Had
Imboden succeeded in carrying out his
[
262]
instructions, the whole of
Siegel's command would have been captured.
As it was,
Breckinridge captured five pieces of artillery, which were abondoned on the field, besides five or six hundred prisoners, exclusive of the wounded left on the field.
His own loss, though not nearly so large as
Siegel's, was several hundred killed and wounded. That night his soldiers slept on the battlefield, going into camp with cheers of victory such as had not been heard in the
Valley since
Stonewall Jackson had led them.
In fact, every-body hailed
Breckinridge as the new
Jackson, who had been sent to guard the
Valley and redeem it from the occupation of the enemy.
General Breckinridge modestly telegraphed
General Lee the result of the battle and the same night received from him his own thanks and the thanks of the Army of Northern Virginia.
Next day
General Breckinridge issued an order thanking his brave soldiers, particularly the cadets, who, though mere youths, had. fought with the steadiness of veterans.
Immediately following
General Lee's congratulatory dispatch came another, directing
General Breckinridge to transfer his command as speedily as possible to
Hanover Junction.
The battle had been fought on the 15th. One day being given the troops for rest,
General Breckinridge gave orders for them to march to
Staunton on the 17th, he going in advance to make better disposition for their transfer by rail from
Staunton to
Hanover Junction, a distance of near one hundred miles. The energy and promptness of his movement were such that, notwithstanding the inferior facilities for transportation at that time in the
South, his whole command,, including artillery, was at
Hanover Junction on the 20th.
The
Augusta reserves being disbanded, the cadets returned to
Lexington and
Imboden left to watch the
Valley.