explains itself and is of great historic value.
It was not intended for publication, and is written with that caution so characteristic of the man. But
from our grand old Chief is highly prized, while it deepens the regret that he was not spared to fulfill his purpose of writing the history of his campaigns.]
My Dear Sir — I thank you for your kind letter of the 3d instant, which I have been unable to answer till to-day.
I hope that your school history may be of such character as will insure its broadest circulation, and prove both interesting and instructive to the youth of the whole country.
As regards the information you desire, if you will refer to my official report of March 6th, 1863, which was published in
Richmond in 1864, you will find the general reasons which governed my actions; but whether they will be satisfactory to others is problematical.
In relation to your first question, I will state that in crossing the
Potomac I did not propose to invade the
North, for I did not believe that the Army of Northern Virginia was strong enough for the purpose, nor was I in any degree influenced by popular expectation.
My movement was simply intended to threaten
Washington, call the
Federal army north of that river, relieve our territory and enable us to subsist the army.
I considered it useless to attack the fortifications around
Alexandria and
Washington, behind which the
Federal army had taken refuge, and indeed I could not have maintained the army in
Fairfax, so barren was it of subsistence and so devoid were we of transportation.
After reaching Frederick City, finding that the enemy still retained his positions at
Martinsburg and
Harper's Ferry, and that it became necessary to dislodge him, in order to open our communication through the
Valley for the purpose of obtaining from
Richmond the ammunition, clothing &c., of which we were in great need, after detaching the necessary troops for the purpose, I was left with but two divisions (
Longstreet's and
D. H. Hill's) to mask the operation.
That was entirely too weak a force to march on
Baltimore, which you say was expected, even if such a movement had been expedient.