Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 8.
Reverend J. William Jones, Ed.

[344] the evacuation of Atlanta, which had now become a necessity. To add to my embarrassment, I was encumbered by the ordnance and subsistence trains of the army, which had been sent for safety from Atlanta to Jonesboroa, and could not now be sent further to the rear, because the superiority of the enemy in cavalry made it indispensable to their safety that they should remain under the protection of the infantry. It is difficult to imagine a more perplexing or perilous situation.

Yet it is the engagement of this day, fought under such circumstances, which General Hood disposes of in two contemptuous sentences — an engagement in which my corps was attacked by six corps, commanded by General Sherman in person, and where, upon my ability to hold the position during the day, depended the very existence of the remainder of the army; for it is not too much to say that if the enemy had crushed my corps, or even driven it from its position at Jonesboroa, on the 1st September, no organized body of the other two corps could have escaped destruction. Through the splendid conduct of the troops, the position was held against the fierce and repeated assaults of the enemy.

At night the object of the stand, which was to secure the successful retreat of the two corps in Atlanta, having been gained, I retired about four miles and took up a position in front of Lovejoy station, which was maintained against a renewal of the attack, on the following day, and until the remainder of the army formed a junction with my corps, and Sherman withdrew to Atlanta.

General Hood sums up the total losses of his entire army, from the date of his assuming command on the 18th July to the Jonesboroa fight inclusive, at five thousand two hundred and forty-seven (5,247). The casualties in my corps alone during that time considerably exceeded seven thousand (7,000) in killed, wounded and captured.

General Hood says: “The vigor of the attack (on the 31st August) may be, in some sort, imagined when only 1,400 were killed and wounded out of two corps engaged.” This attack was made principally by Lee's corps, and the loss was chiefly in that corps. It is true that the attack could scarcely have been called a vigorous one. Nor is it surprising that troops which, for two months, had been hurled against breastworks, only to be repulsed, or to gain dear-bought and fruitless victories, should now have moved against works with reluctance and distrust; but dispositions were made to renew the attack, which would probably, have resulted bloodily enough to have satisfied even the sanguinary expectations of the Commanding-General, but for developments of the enemy's forces and movements, which made it necessary for me to assume the defensive. I now consider this a fortunate circumstance, for success against such odds, could, at best, only have been partial and bloody, while defeat would have been almost inevitable destruction to the army.

The fall of Atlanta does not date from the result of the battle of