previous next

[449] and Early's division within ten miles of Stuart's column. Could General Stuart have known of this movement, he might have freed himself from embarrassment by burning his captured wagons (which, indeed, he atone time prepared to do), and withdrawing from the engagement with Kilpatrick he could have effected a junction with Early during the afternoon or the night of the same day. This would have brought him to Gettysburg in time to participate in the battle of the first day. But Providence directed otherwise; and still believing that our army was upon the Susquehanna, Stuart pressed forward to Carlisle, and two days, precious days, were lost in a useless march.

Many of our ablest Confederate generals have expressed the opinion that the separation of any part of our cavalry from the main army, during this campaign, was an error in strategy on the part of Lee and Stuart, and that the failure of the campaign is largely to be attributed to this cause. I believe the time has passed when any one would be disposed to censure Stuart for this movement; and that it is conceded that if blame must fall, it must fall upon the Commanding-General who authorized and stimulated his lieutenant in this course of action. But it is noticable that no writer on this subject has endeavored to show how General Stuart's presence with the army would have caused other results. Before this strategy of General Lee is condemned, or Stuart can be blamed, it must be shown that more accurate information of the enemy's movements would have been obtained by the opposite course; or that Stuart failed to leave in communication with the army a force of cavalry sufficient for the duty of observation. And here it must be conceded that had Stuart followed Longstreet's crossing at Shepherdstown, and operated upon that flank, he could have gained information concerning the enemy only by using individual scouts, or by making reconnoissances in force. For the latter purpose, the cavalry under his command was utterly insufficient. Unless provided with an infantry support, Stuart could have made no movement which would have held out any hope of piercing the cavalry which enveloped Hooker's advance; and a reconnoissance of Southern cavalry, supported by infantry, is something which I do not remember ever to have occurred in the army of Northern Virginia. General Early speaks wisely when he says: “It is doubtful whether the former alternative would have enabled him (Stuart) to fulfill General Lee's expectations.”

The only other ground upon which complaint could justly be urged against Stuart is that he denuded the army of its cavalry. But I have already shown that he left upon the front, vacated by him, two brigades, which numbered at least 2500 men, commanded by two of

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.

An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.

hide People (automatically extracted)
Sort people alphabetically, as they appear on the page, by frequency
Click on a person to search for him/her in this document.
J. E. B. Stuart (12)
W. H. F. Lee (3)
J. A. Early (3)
J. Longstreet (1)
Kilpatrick (1)
Hooker (1)
hide Display Preferences
Greek Display:
Arabic Display:
View by Default:
Browse Bar: