Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 10.
Reverend J. William Jones, Ed.

Major :--The Second Corps at the time of leaving Hamilton's Crossing, June 4th, 1863, was organized as follows:

Early's Division--Major General Jubal A. Early. Hays's Louisiana Brigade, Brigadier-General H. T. Hays; Gordon's Georgia Brigade, Brigadier-General John B. Gordon; Smith's Virginia Brigade, Brigadier-General William Smith; Hoke's North Carolina Brigade, Colonel Avery, Sixth North Carolina Regiment, commanding (General Hoke absent, wounded).

Rodes's Division--Major-General R. E. Rodes. Daniel's North Carolina Brigade, Brigadier-General Junius Daniel; Doles's Georgia Brigade, Brigadier-Genera] George Doles; Iverson's North Carolina Brigade, Brigadier-General A. Iverson; Ramseur's North Carolina Brigade, Brigadier-General S. D. Ramseur; Rodes's (old) Alabama Brigade, Colonel E. A. O'Neil, commanding.

Johnson's Division--Major-General Ed. Johnson. Steuart's Virginia and North Carolina Brigade, Brigadier-General Geo. H. Steuart; “Stonewall” Virginia Brigade, Brigadier-General Jas. A. Walker; [290] John M. Jones's Virginia Brigade, Brigadier-General John M. Jones; Nicholls's Louisiana Brigade, Colonel J. M. Williams, commanding General Nicholls absent, wounded).

Lieutenant-Colonel Hilary P. Jones's battalion of artillery was attached to General Early's division. Lieutenant-Colonel Thos. H. Carter's battalion of artillery was attached to General Rodes's division. Lieutenant-Colonel R. Snowden Andrews's batallion of artillery was attached to General Johnson's division. Lieutenant-Colonel Nelson's battalion of artillery and four batteries of the First Virginia artillery, all under Colonel Thompson Brown, formed the artillery reserve of the corps.

To Culpeper and Winchester.

Marching via Verdiersville and Somerville Ford, the corps reached Culpeper on the 7th.

On the 9th, the enemy being reported to have crossed the Rappahannock in force, I moved my corps, by direction of the General commanding, to General Stuart's support, but on reaching Brandy Station with General Rodes's division, found the enemy already retiring.

Resuming the march on the 10th, we passed by Gaines's Cross Roads, Flint Hill and Front Royal, arriving at Cedarville on the 12th. At that point I detached General Rodes's division, together with General Jenkins's cavalry brigade, which had reported to me, to capture if possible a force of eighteen hundred men under Colonel McReynolds reported at Berryville, and thence to press on to Martinsburg. With the remaining two divisions and the 16th Virginia cavalry battalion, Major Newman, of Jenkins's brigade, I proceeded to attack Winchester.

From all the information I could gather, the fortifications of Winchester were only assailable on the west and north-west, from a range of hills which commanded the ridge occupied by their main fortification. The force there was represented at from 6,000 to 8,000 under General Milroy. On the 13th I sent Early's division and Colonel Brown's artillery battalion (under Captain Dance) to Newtown on the Valley pike, where they were joined by the Maryland battalion of infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert, and the Baltimore Light Artillery, Captain Griffin. General Early was directed to advance towards the town by the Valley pike. The same day Johnson's division, preceded by Newman's cavalry, drove in the enemy's pickets on the Front Royal and Winchester road, and formed line of battle two miles from town preparatory to an attack. After some skirmishing, the enemy opened from a battery near the Milwood road, and Carpenter's battery (Lieutenant [291] Lamber commanding) was placed by Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews to the left of the Front Royal road and opened vigorously, soon driving off the opposing battery and blowing up a caisson. This drew upon our battery a heavy fire from twelve to fifteen pieces in and near the town, but beyond the range of our guns.

About 5 P. M. General Early had a pretty sharp skirmish with the enemy's infantry and artillery near Kearnstown — Gordon's brigade, supported by Hays, driving them at a run as far as Milltown Mills. Here Early, coming within reach of the enemy's fortifications, halted for the night.

Before morning the enemy withdrew all their artillery into their fortifications from Bower's Hill and the south and east sides of the town.

On examining the enemy's fortifications from General Johnston's position, I found they had put up works on the hills I had intended gaining possession of, and were busy strengthening them. Having reconnoitered with General Early from Bower's Hill, I coincided with his views as to the best point of attack, and directed him to move his main force to the left and carry by assault a small open work on a commanding hill near the Pughtown road, which overlooked the main fort. About 11 A. M., finding there was no danger of a sortie, and seeing the enemy fortifying a hill north of the main fort, I directed General Johnson to move to the east of the town and interfere with their work as much as possible, so as to divert attention from General Early. He accordingly took up position between the Milwood and Berryville pikes, and threw forward the Fifth Virginia infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel H. J. Williams, as skirmishers, who annoyed the enemy so as to force them to leave off work and effectually engross their attention.

General Gordon's brigade and Lieutenant-Colonel Herbet's Maryland battalion, with two batteries, were left by General Early at Bower's Hill, and pushed their skirmishers into Winchester — who were recalled for fear of drawing the enemy's fire on the town.

By 4 P. M. General Early had attained, undiscovered, a wooded hill, one of the range known as Little North Mountain, near the Pughtown road, on the north side of which a corn-field, and on the south side an orchard, afforded excellent positions for artillery, in easy range of the work to be attacked — which was a bastion front open towards the town. Hays's brigade was designated for the attack, and Smith's for its support; and about 6 o'clock Colonel Jones ran his pieces and those of the 1st Virginia artillery (under Captain Dance) forward by hand into position, and opened simultaneously from twenty guns, completely [292] surprising the enemy, whose entire attention at this point was engrossed by Gordon. In half an hour their battery was silenced, our artillery firing excellently; and General Hays moved quietly to within two hundred yards of their works, when our guns ceased firing, and he charged through an abattis of brushwood and captured the works, taking six rifled pieces, two of which were at once turned upon and dispersed the column that the enemy were endeavoring to press forward. The works to the left of the one taken were immediately abandoned, their defenders retreating to the main fort. It was now too late to do more than prepare to improve this important advantage promptly in the morning.

This result established the correctness of General Early's views as to the point of attack, and rendered the main fort untenable; and accordingly, anticipating the possibility of the enemy's attempting to retreat during the night, I ordered General Johnson with the “Stonewall,” Nicholls', and three regiments of Steuart's brigade and Dement's battery, with sections of Rains's and Carpenter's (the whole under Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews) to proceed to a point on the Martinsburg road, about two and one-half miles east of Winchester, so as to intercept any attempt to escape, or to be ready to attack at daylight if the enemy held their ground. Finding the road to this point very rough, General Johnson concluded to march via Jordan's Springs to Stephenson's Depot, where the nature of the ground would give him a strong position. Just as the head of his column reached the railroad, two hundred yards from the Martinsburg pike, the enemy was heard retreating down the pike towards Martinsburg. Forming line parallel with the pike, behind a stone wall, Steuart on the right and the Louisiana brigade on the left, twelve hundred men in all, and posting the artillery favorably, he was immediately attacked by Milroy with all his force of infantry and cavalry, his artillery having been abandoned at the town. The enemy made repeated and desperate attempts to cut their way through. Here was the hardest fighting that took place during the attack — the odds being greatly in favor of the enemy, who were successfully repulsed and scattered by the gallantry of General Johnson and his brave command. After several front attacks had been steadily met and repulsed, they attempted to turn both flanks simultaneously, but were met on the right by General Walker and his brigade, which had just arrived on the field (having been left behind by mistake), and on the left by two regiments of Nicholls's brigade, which had been held in reserve. In a few minutes the greater part of them surrendered--2,300 to 2,500 in number. The rest scattered through the [293] woods and fields, but most of them were subsequently captured by our cavalry. General Milroy with 250 or 300 cavalry made his way to Harper's Ferry.

The fruits of this victory were twenty-three pieces of artillery, nearly all rifled, 4,000 prisoners, 300 loaded wagons, more than 300 horses, and quite a large amount of commissary and quartermaster stores.

My loss was forty-seven killed, 219 wounded, and three missing. Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews, who had handled his artillery with great skill and effect in the engagement of the 15th, was wounded just at the close of the action.

Berryville and Martinsburg.

General Rodes encamped on the night of the 12th June near Stone Bridge on the road to Milwood, and moving on next morning towards Berryville, his infantry were met by a detachment of Yankee cavalry before reaching Milwood. Finding himself discovered, he pushed on rapidly: but before reaching Berryville the enemy's infantry had retreated on the Charlestown road, holding Jenkins at bay for a while with their artillery, which was withdrawn as soon as ours came up. Turning off by the road to Summit Point, the enemy retreated to Winchester. After securing the small amount of supplies at Berryville, General Rodes, sending Jenkins in pursuit, followed with his infantry to Summit Point, where he encamped. Jenkins failed, from some cause, to overtake the enemy. Late on the 14th General Rodes came to Martinsburg, before reaching which place Jenkins drove the enemy from some barricaded houses at Bunker Hill, capturing seventy-five or 100 prisoners. At Martinsburg General Rodes found the enemy's infantry and artillery in position before the town. He immediately sent Jenkins's command to the left and rear of the place, and putting some of Carter's artillery in position, drove off the opposing battery, which retreated towards Williamsport, so closely pursued by Jenkins's dismounted cavalry and two squadrons mounted, that they were forced to abandon five out of their six guns, and many prisoners were taken. The infantry fled by way of Shepherdstown, a fact not known for some hours, and which, together with the darkness, will account for their escape. The enemy destroyed many of the stores at Martinsburg, but about 6,000 bushels of grain and a few quartermaster and commissary stores fell into our hands.

The results of this expedition were 5 pieces of artillery, 200 prisoners, [294] and quartermaster and subsistence stores in some quantity. General Rodes mentions with commendation the conduct of Major Sweeny, of Jenkins's brigade, wounded in charging the enemy's rear near the Opequon as they retreated from Berryville to Winchester.

Crossing the Potomac and march to Carlisle.

I sent notice to General Rodes of Milroy's escape, but he was not in a position to intercept him, Jenkins's cavalry being already (10 A. M., 15th June) on the Potomac near Williamsport. General Rodes crossed at Williamsport with three brigades, sending Jenkins forward to Chambersburg, and on the 19th his division moved by my orders to Hagerstown, where he encamped on the road to Boonsboroa, while Johnson crossed to Sharpsburg, and Early moved to Shepherdstown to threaten Harper's Ferry.

In these positions we waited for the other two corps to close up until the 21st of June, on the afternoon of which day I received orders from the General commanding to take Harrisburg, and next morning Rodes and Johnson moved towards Greencastle, Pa.; Jenkins reoccupied Chambersburg, from which he had fallen back some days before, and Early marched by Boonsboroa to Cavetown, where the Seventeenth Virginia cavalry (Colonel French) reported to him and remained with him till the battle of Gettysburg.

Continuing our march, we reached Carlisle on the 27th, halting one day at Chambersburg to secure supplies.

The marching was as rapid as the weather and the detours made by Major-General Early and Brigadier-General George H. Steuart would admit. Early, having marched parallel with us as far as Greenwood, there turned off towards Gettysburg and York. At Carlisle General George H. Steuart, who had been detached to McConnellsburg from Greencastle, rejoined the corps, bringing some cattle and horses. At Carlisle, Chambersburg, and Shippensburg requisitions were made for supplies and the shops were searched, many valuable stores being secured. At Chambersburg a train was loaded with ordnance and medical stores and sent back. Near 3,000 head of cattle were collected and sent back by my corps; and my chief commissary, Major Hawks, notified Colonel Cole of the location of 5,000 barrels of flour along the route travelled by my command.

From Carlisle I sent forward my engineer, Captain Richardson, with General Jenkins's cavalry to reconnoitre the defences of Harrisburg, and was starting on the 29th for that place when ordered by the General [295] commanding to join the main army at Cashtown, near Gettysburg.

Agreeably to the views of the General commanding, I did not burn Carlisle barracks.

Expedition to York and Wrightsville.

Colonel E. V. White's cavalry battalion reported to me at Chambersburg, and was sent to General Early, then at Greenwood. Arriving at Cashtown, General Early sent Gordon's brigade with White's cavalry direct to Gettysburg, taking the rest of the division by the Mummasburg road.

In front of Gettysburg White charged and routed the Twenty-Sixth regiment Pennsylvania militia, of whom 175 were taken and paroled. From Gettysburg, Gordon, with Tanner's battery and White's cavalry, was sent on the direct road to York. General Gordon met the Mayor and a deputation of citizens, who made a formal surrender of the place. Pushing on by order of General Early to Wrightsville on the Susquehanna, he found 1,200 militia strongly entrenched but without artillery. A few shots drove them across the magnificent railroad bridge, a mile and a quarter long, which they burned as they retreated over it. The little town of Wrightsville caught fire from the bridge, and General Gordon setting his brigade to work, succeeded in extinguishing the flames. Yet he is accused by the Federal press of having set fire to the town.

General Early levied a contribution on the citizens of York, obtaining among other things $28,600 in United States currency (the greater part of which was turned over to Colonel Corley, Chief Q. M. Army of Northern Virginia), 1,000 hats, 1,200 shoes, etc.

Gettysburg.

On the night of June 30th, Rodes's division, which I accompanied, was at Heidlersburg, Early three miles off on the road to Berlin, and Johnson's division with Colonel Brown's reserve artillery between Green Village and Scotland. At Heidlersburg I received orders from the General commanding to proceed to Cashtown or Gettysburg, as circumstances might dictate, and a note from General A. P. Hill, saying he was at Cashtown. Next morning I moved with Rodes's division to. wards Cashtown, ordering Early to follow by Hunterstown. Before reaching Middletown I received notice from General Hill that he was advancing upon Gettysburg, and turned the head of Rodes's column towards that place by the Middletown road, sending word to Early to [296] advance directly on the Heidlersburg road. I notified the General commanding of my movement, and was informed that in case we found the enemy's force very large, he did not want a general engagement brought on till the rest of the army came up. By the time that this message reached me, General A. P. Hill had already been warmly engaged, and had been repulsed, and Carter's artilley battalion of Rodes's division had opened on the flank of the enemy with fine effect. The enemy were rapidly preparing to attack me, while fresh masses were moving into position in my front. It was too late to avoid an engagement without abandoning the position already taken up. I determined to push the attack vigorously.

General Rodes had drawn up his division with Iverson's brigade on the right, Rodes's old brigade (Colonel O'Neil) in the centre (these two on the ridge leading to the west of Gettysburg), and Doles on the left in the plain. The Fifth Alabama regiment was kept by General Rodes to guard the wide gap left between O'Neil and Doles. Daniel and Ramseur were in reserve.

He at once moved forward, and after advancing for some distance in line, he came in sight of the enemy, and O'Neil and Iverson were ordered to attack, Daniel advancing in line 200 yards in rear of Iverson to protect that flank. At this time only desultory artillery firing was going on in Hill's front; Carter was warmly engaged. O'Neil's brigade, advancing in some disorder in a different direction from that indicated by Major-General Rodes in person to Colonel O'Neil, and with only three regiments (the Third Alabama by some mistake being left with Daniel's brigade), was soon forced to fall back, although the Fifth Alabama was sent to its support. Iverson's brigade was thus exposed, but the gallant troops obstinately stood their ground till the greater part of three regiments had fallen where they stood in line of battle. A few of them being entirely surrounded, were taken prisoners; a few escaped. The unfortunate mistake of General Iverson at this critical juncture in sending word to Major-General Rodes that one of his regiments had raised the white flag and gone over to the enemy, might have produced the most disastrous results. The Twelfth North Carolinia, being on the right of his brigade, suffered least.

A slight change of Iverson's advance had uncovered the whole of Daniel's front, and he found himself opposed to heavy bodies of infantry, whom he attacked and drove before him till he reached a railroad cut extending diagonally across his front and past his right flank, which checked his advance. A battery of the enemy beyond this cut, near a barn, enfiladed his line, and fresh bodies of infantry poured [297] across the cut a destructive fire, enfilade and reverse. Seeing some troops of the Third Corps lying down beyond the railroad in front of the enemy, who were on his right flank, General Daniel sent an officer to get them to advance. As they would not, he was obliged (leaving the Forty-Fifth North Carolina and Second North Carolina battalion to hold his line) to change the front of the rest of his brigade to the rear and throw them across the railroad beyond the cut, where having formed line directly in front of the troops of Hill's corps already mentioned, he ordered an advance of his whole brigade, and gallantly swept the field, capturing several hundred prisoners in the cut. About the time of his final charge, Ramseur, with his own and Rodes's brigades and remnants of Iverson's, under Captain D. P. Halsey, A. A. G. of the brigade (who had rallied the brigade and assumed command), had restored the line in the centre. Meantime, an attempt by the enemy to push a column into the interval between Doles and O'Neil had been handsomely repulsed by Doles, who changed front with his two right regiments and took them in flank, driving them in disorder towards the town.

All the troops of General Rodes were now engaged, the enemy were moving large bodies of troops from the town against his left, and affairs were in a very critical condition, when Major-General Early, coming up on the Heidlersburg road, opened a brisk artillery fire upon large columns moving against Doles's left, and ordered forward Gordon's brigade to the left of Doles, which, after an obstinate contest, broke Barlow's division, captured General Barlow and drove the whole back on a second line, when it was halted, and General Early ordered up Hays's and Hoke's brigades on Gordon's left, and then drove the enemy precipitately towards and through the town, just as Ramseur broke those in his front.

General Gordon mentions that 300 of the enemy's dead were left on the ground passed over by his brigade. The enemy had entirely abandoned the north end of the town, and Early entering by the York railroad at the same time that Rodes came in on the Cashtown road, they together captured over 4,000 prisoners and three pieces of artillery, two of which fell into the hands of Early's division. As far as I can learn, no other troops than those of this corps entered the town at all.

The enemy had fallen back to a commanding position known as “Cemetery Hill,” south of Gettysburg, and quickly showed a formidable front there. On entering the town I received a message from the commanding General to attack the hill, if I could do so to advantage. I [298] could not bring artillery to bear on it: all the troops with me were jaded by twelve hours marching and fighting, and I was notified that General Johnson was close to the town with his division, the only one of my corps that had not been engaged, Anderson's division of the Third Corps having been halted to let them pass. Cemetery Hill was not assailable from the town, and I determined with Johnson's division to take possession of a wooded hill to my left, on a line with and commanding Cemetery Hill. Before Johnson got up, the enemy was reported moving to our left flank-our extreme left-and I could see what seemed to be his skirmishers in that direction. Before this report could be investigated by Lieutenant T. T. Turner, of my staff, and Lieutenant Robert Early, sent to investigate it, and Johnson placed in position, the night was far advanced.

I received orders soon after dark to draw my corps to the right in case it could not be used to advantage where it was, that the commanding General thought from the nature of the ground that the position for attack was a good one on that side. I represented to the commanding General that the hill above referred to was unoccupied by the enemy at dark, as reported by Lieutenants Turner and Early, who had gone upon it, and that it commanded their position and made it untenable, so far as I could judge. He decided to let me remain, and on my return to my headquarters, after 12 o'clock at night, I sent orders to Johnson by Lieutenant and T. T. Turner, A. D. C., to take possession of this hill, if he had not already done so. General Johnson stated in reply to this order that after forming his line of battle this side of the wooded hill in question, he had sent a reconnoitering party to the hill, with orders to report as to the position of the enemy in reference to it. This party, on nearing the summit, was met by a superior force of the enemy, which succeeded in capturing a portion of the reconnoitering party, the rest of it making its escape. During this conversation with General Johnson a man arrived, bringing a despatch dated at 12 mid-night, and taken from a Federal courier making his way from General Sykes to General Slocum, in which the former stated that his corps was then halted four miles from Gettysburg, and would resume its march at 4 A. M. Lieutenant Turner brought this despatch to my headquarters, and at the same time stated that General Johnson would refrain from attacking the position until I had received notice of the fact that the enemy were in possession of the hill, and had sent him further orders. Day was now breaking, and it was too late for any change of place. Meantime orders had come from the General commanding for me to delay my attack until I heard General Longstreet's guns open on the [299] right. Lieutenant Turner at once returned to General Johnson and delivered these instructions, directing him to be ready to attack; Early being already in line on the left, and Rhodes on the right of the main street of the town, Rodes' right extending out on the Fairfield road.

Early in the morning I received a communication from the General commanding, the tenor of which was that he intended the main attack to be made by the First Corps, on our right, and wished me, as soon as their guns opened, to make a diversion in their favor, to be converted into a real attack if an opportunity offered. I made the necessary arrangements preparatory, and about 5 P. M., when General Longstreet's guns opened, General Johnson commenced a heavy cannonade from Andrews' battalion and Graham's battery, the whole under Major Latimer, against the “Cemetery Hill,” and got his infantry into position to assault the wooded hill. After an hour's firing, finding that his guns were overpowered by the greater number and superior position of the enemy's batteries, Major Latimer withdrew all but one battery, which he kept to repel any infantry advance. While with this battery, this gallant young officer received, from almost the last shell fired, the wound which has since resulted in his death. Colonel Brown says justly of that calamity : “No greater loss could have befallen the artillery of this corps.” Major Latimer served with me from March, 1862, to the second battle of Manassas (August 28th, 30th, 1862). I was particularly struck at Winchester (25th May, 1862), his first warm engagement, by his coolness, self-possession and bravery under a very heavy artillery fire, showing, when most needed, the full possession of all his faculties. Though not twenty-one when he fell, his soldierly qualities had impressed me as deeply as those of any officer in my command.

Immediately after the artillery firing ceased, which was just before sundown, General Johnson ordered forward his division to attack the wooded hill in his front, and about dusk the attack was made. The enemy were found strongly entrenched on the side of a very steep mountain, beyond a creek with steep banks, only passable here and there. Brigadier-General J. M. Jones was wounded soon after the attack began, and his brigade, which was on the right, with Nichols' Louisiana brigade (under Colonel Williams), was forced back, but Steuart on the left took part of the enemy's breastworks, and held them until ordered out at noon next day.

As soon as information reached them that Johnson's attack had commenced, General Early, who held the centre of my corps, moved Hays's and Hoke's brigades forward against “Cemetery Hill.” Charging over [300] a hill into a ravine, where they broke a line of the enemy's infantry posted behind a stone wall, up the steep face of another hill and over two lines of breastworks, these brigades captured several batteries of artillery, and held them until finding that no attack was made on the right, and that heavy masses of the enemy were advancing against their front and flank, they reluctantly fell back, bringing away seventy-five to one hundred prisoners, and four stands of captured colors.

Major-General Rodes did not advance for reasons given in his report. Before beginning my advance I had sent a staff-officer to the division of the Third corps on my right, which proved to be General Pender's, to find out what they were to do. He reported the division under command of General Lane (who succeeded Pender, wounded), and who sent word back that the only order he had received from General Pender was to attack if a favorable opportunity presented. I then wrote to him that I was about attacking with my corps, and requesting that he would co operate. To this I received no answer, nor do I believe that any advance was made. The want of co-operation on the right made it more difficult for Rodes's division to attack, though had it been otherwise I have every reason to believe from the eminent success attending the assault of Hays and Avery¹ that the enemy's lines would have been carried.

I was ordered to renew my attack at daylight Friday morning, and as Johnson's position was the only one affording hopes of doing this to advantage, he was reinforced by Smith's brigade of Early's division, and Daniel's and Rodes's (old) brigades of Rodes's division.

Half an hour after Johnson attacked (on Friday morning), and when too late to recall him, I received notice that General Longstreet would not attack until ten o'clock; but as it turned out, his attack was delayed till after two o'clock. Just before the time fixed for General Johnson's advance, the enemy attacked him to regain the works captured by Steuart the evening before. They were repulsed with very heavy loss, and he attacked in turn, pushing the enemy almost to the top of the mountain, where the precipitous nature of the hill and an abattis of logs and stones, with a very heavy work on the crest of the hill, stopped his further advance. In Johnson's attack the enemy abandoned a portion of their works in disorder, and as they ran across an open space to another work, were exposed to the fire of Daniel's brigade, at sixty or seventy yards. Our men were at this time under fire of no consequence, [301] their aim was accurate, and General Daniel thinks that he killed here, in half an hour, more than in all the rest of the fighting.

Repeated reports from the cavalry on our left that the enemy was moving heavy columns of infantry to turn General Johnson's left, at last caused him, about 1 P. M., to evacuate the works already gained. These reports reached me also, and I sent Captain Brown, of my staff, with a party of cavalry to the left, to investigate them, who found them to be without foundation, and General Johnson finally took up a position about three hundred yards in rear of the works he had abandoned, which he held under a sharp fire of artillery and exposed to the enemy's sharpshooters until dark.

At midnight my corps fell back, as ordered, to the range of hills west of the town taken by us on Wednesday, where we remained until and during the fourth, unmolested.

The behavior of my troops throughout this campaign was beyond praise, whether the point considered be their alacrity and willing endurance of the long marches, their orderly and exemplary conduct in the enemy's country, their bearing in action, or their patient endurance of hunger, fatigue and exposure during our retreat. The lists of killed and wounded, as well as the results gained, will show the desperate character of the fighting.

In the infantry, Daniel's brigade of Rodes's division, and in the artillery, Andrews's battalion of Johnson's division, suffered most loss. The Second North Carolina battalion of Daniel's brigade loss two hundred out of two hundred and forty men, killed and wounded, without yielding an inch of ground at any time.

Back to Darksville.

By order of the commanding General, the Third Corps was to move at dark on July 4th, and the First Corps to follow with the prisoners — mine being the rear-guard. Next day, the 3d, was to take the rear, etc. At 10 A. M. on the 5th, the other corps were not all in the road, and consequently mine did not take up the march till near noon, and only reach Fairfield at 4 P. M. Here the enemy, who had been threatening our rear, and occasionally opening a fire of artillery on the rear-guard (Gordon's brigade of Early's division), showed more boldness in attacking, throwing out a line of skirmishers over a mile in length. They were repulsed, and a battery which was shelling our column driven off. We encamped for the night on a hill one and a half miles west of Fairfield; and next day, July 6th, the Third Corps moving by [302] another road, we were still in the rear; Rodes's division acting as rear-guard and repelling another attack of the enemy. The Forty-Fifth North Carolina of Daniel's brigade being summoned to surrender, attacked the troops making the summons, and drove them out of a wood in which they were posted. The enemy did not follow much beyond Fairfield. The road was again blocked till noon. That night we encamped near Waynesboroa, and reached Hagerstown about noon of the 7th of July.

On the 11th we were moved into line between Hagerstown and Williamsport, our right joining the left of the Third Corps, and began fortifying; and in a short time my men were well protected. Their spirits were never better than at this time, and the wish was universal that the enemy would attack. On the night of the 14th I was ordered with my infantry and artillery to ford at Williamsport, the ammunition chests going in the ferry-boat. I could find no ferry-boat nor any one in charge — it was dark and raining — the entrance to the river would have been impracticable for artillery in daylight; and as well as I could ascertain, the exit was worse. Everything was in confusion. Colonel Corley, Chief Quartermaster Army of Northern Virginia, who had charge of the arrangements, recommended Colonel Brown, my chief of artillery, to cross by the pontoons, and sent to the same point my reserve train of ambulances with wounded, originally intended to cross by the ferry-boats. Just before midnight my advance (Rodes's division) commenced crossing. The men had directions to sling their cartridge-boxes over their shoulders, but many rounds of ammunition were necessarily lost, as the water was up to their armpits the whole way cross, sometimes deeper. By 8 o'clock my whole corps was over, all fording except Hays's brigade, which was sent with the artillery to the pontoons.

While in camp near Darksville, the enemy under Kelly were reported between Martinsburg and Hedgesville, protecting the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and occasionally skirmishing with Johnston's division, which was destroying the track. General Lee directed on the 21st an effort to be made to capture this force, said to be 6,000 strong. Sending Early's division to get in the rear through Mill's Gap and down North Creek, I joined Rodes to Johnson and marched against their front. Though these movements were made in the night of the 21st, the enemy heard of them through spies, and early on the 22d had retreated out of reach.

The other corps had already marched towards the Blue Ridge, and accordingly we followed and bivouacked near Winchester, and next [303] day, on reaching Manassas Gap, found Wright's brigade of Anderson's division deployed to repel a large force of the enemy, who were advancing upon it through the Gap. The insignia of two corps could be seen in the Gap and a third was marching up. Over ten thousand men were in sight.

The enemy were so close to Wright's brigade that the line of battle had to be chosen some distance in the rear, and accordingly some two hundred and fifty sharpshooters of Rodes's division, under Major Blackford, were added to Wright's brigade to hold the enemy in check while the line was formed. Rodes's brigade (Colonel O'Neil), deployed as skirmishers, formed the first line, and the remainder of Rodes's division with Carter's battalion of artillery, the second line. These dispositions were made by General Rodes, with his usual promptness, skill and judgment. The enemy were held in check for some time by the line of Wright's brigade and the skirmishers under Major Blackford, which they at last drove back, with considerable loss to themselves, by flanking it.

These troops, in our full view, showed great gallantry, and though in very weak line and intended merely to make a show, held the enemy back so long and inflicted such loss that they were satisfied not to come within reach of O'Neil, but remained at a safe distance, where they were leisurely shelled by Carter's artillery. Johnson's division was ordered to take position near the river, to prevent the enemy's cutting us off from the ford at Front Royal, and though not required in action, was promptly in place. Early's division, much jaded, was fifteen miles off near Winchester, and could not possibly reach me before the afternoon of the next day.

I had reason to believe that Meade's whole army was in our front, and having but two divisions to oppose him I decided to send Early up the Valley to Strasburg and New Market, while I marched the other two divisions up the Page valley to Luray, the route pursued by Jackson in 1862 in his campaign against Banks. Johnson's and Rodes's divisions moved back two to four miles and encamped near Front Royal — the rear-guard, under Colonel Bradley T. Johnson, of Johnson's division, leaving Front Royal after 10 o'clock next day — the enemy making only a slight advance, which was driven back by a few rounds of artillery.

Rodes's division, the only troops of my corps that I saw during this affair, showed great eagerness and alacrity to meet the enemy, and had he advanced, would have given him a severe lesson. I was indebted for correct and valuable information regarding the strength and movements [304] of the enemy at this point, to Captain W. Randolph, commanding cavalry escort attached to my headquarters, and to Captain Wilbourn, of the Signal Corps.

Summary.

In this campaign the loss of my corps was as follows: At Winchester and in the Valley, 47 killed, 219 wounded, and 3 missing--269 aggregate.

At Gettysburg and in Pennsylvania, 883 killed, 3,857 wounded, and 1,347 missing--6,094 aggregate. Aggregate for the entire campaign, 930 killed, 4,076 wounded, and 1,350 missing--making in all 6,356.

Before crossing the Potomac it captured 28 pieces of artillery, and about 4,500 prisoners. About 200 prisoners were taken before reaching Gettysburg.

At that place over 4,000 prisoners, 3 pieces of artillery, and 4 stands of colors — memorable as having been brought off Cemetery Hill — were the spoils gained, making altogether nearly 9,000 prisoners and 31 pieces of artillery. A large number of small arms, a large amount of quartermaster, ordnance and subsistence stores were taken in Pennsylvania and sent to the rear.

The Fifty-fourth North Carolina regiment, of Hoke's brigade, and the Fifty-eighth Virginia, of Smith's brigade, Early's division, sent to Winchester from Staunton with prisoners, returned in time to aid General Imboden in repelling the enemy's attack on the wagon-train at Williamsport.

Iverson's brigade, sent back to guard my wagon-train from Fairfield, had a handsome affair with the enemy's cavalry at Hagerstown, in which they are reported by General Iverson as “killing, wounding and capturing a number equal to their whole force.”

The conduct of Hays's Louisiana brigade and Hoke's North Carolina brigade, the latter under Colonel Avery, at “Cemetery Hill,” Gettysburg, was worthy of the highest praise. Here and at Winchester the Louisiana brigade and their gallant commander gave new honor to the name already acquired on the old fields of Winchester and Port Republic, and wherever engaged.

Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews, of the artillery, not fully recovered from his serious wound at Cedar Run, was again wounded at Winchester, and while suffering from his wounds appeared on the field at Hagerstown and reported for duty.

The rapid and skilful advance of Gordon's brigade on the 13th of June near Winchester, with great spirit driving the enemy in confusion [305] towards the town, was one of the finest movements I have witnessed during the war, and won for the troops and their gallant commander the highest commendation.

At Winchester the Maryland battalion was attached to General Steuart's brigade; and the Baltimore Light Artillery to Colonel Brown's battalion, with which they served with their usual gallantry throughout the campaign.

At Gettysburg, July 1st, I was much pleased with the conduct of Captain Carter's battery, which came under my immediate observation.

I beg leave to call attention to the gallantry of the following men and officers:--

At Winchester.

Lieutenant John Orr, Adjutant Sixth Louisiana, was the first man to mount the enemy's breastworks on the 14th, receiving in the act a bayonet wound in the side. General Early recommends him for captain of cavalry, “he being desirous of entering that branch of the service, for which he is so eminently qualified.”

Lieutenant C. S. Contee's section of Dement's battery was placed in short musket-range of the enemy on the 15th June, and maintained its position till thirteen of the sixteen men in the two detachments were killed or wounded, when Lieutenant John A. Morgan, of the First North Carolina regiment, and Lieutenant R. H. McKim, A. D. C. to Brigadier-General George H. Steuart, volunteered and helped to work the guns till the surrender of the enemy. The following are the names of the gallant men belonging to the section: Lieutenant C. S. Contee, A. J. Albert, Jr., John Kester, William Hill, B. W. Owens, John Glascock, John Harris, William Wooden, C. C. Pease, Frederick Frayer,----Duvall, William Compton, John Yates, William Brown, Wm. H. Gorman, Thomas Moor, Robert B. Chew. Colonel Brown, Chief of Artillery, recommends Lieutenant Contee for promotion to the captaincy of the Chesapeake artillery, vice Captain W. D. Brown, a most gallant and valuable officer, killed at Gettysburg.

At Gettysburg.

Captain D. P. Halsey, A. A. G. of Iverson's brigade, displayed conspicuous gallantry and rendered important service in rallying the brigade, which he led in its final attack.

General Rodes speaks of the services rendered by Colonel D. H. Christie (mortally wounded July 1st) as having been especially valuable. [306]

First Lieutenant T. M. Harney, Fourteenth North Carolina, while in command of sharpshooters, defeated the One Hundred and Fiftieth Pennsylvania regiment, and took their colors with his own hands, falling mortally wounded soon after.

Captain A. H. Galloway, Forty-Fifth North Carolina, recaptured the flag of the Twentieth North Carolina of Iverson's brigade. Lieutenant James W. Benton, Forty-Fifth North Carolina (killed), showed as much or more gallantry than any man in the regiment, though but seventeen years of age.

Sergeant Thomas J. Betterton, Company A Thirty-Seventh Virginia, took a stand of colors and was dangerously wounded. Private W. H. Webb, orderly to General Johnson, remained on the field after being severely wounded. General Johnson says “his conduct entitles him to a commission.”

The following non-commissioned officers and privates are mentioned for gallantry: Sergeant Grier, Company B, Sergeant Wills, Company D Forty-Third North Carolina, Sergeant Neill and Private McAdoo, Company A Fifty-Third North Carolina, Sergeant Christ. Clark, Twelfth Alabama, Private A. F. Senter, Company H Twenty-Fifth Virginia (detailed in ambulance corps).

Many officers, besides those named above, are distinguished by their commanders for gallant conduct. I have only space for the names of a few, whose acts of gallantry are specified.

I was fortunate in this campaign in the assistance of three division-commanders, Major-Generals J. A. Early, Ed. Johnson and R. E. Rodes, whose wise counsels, skilful handling of their men, and prompt obedience to orders are beyond praise — Generals whose scars bear testimony to the manner in which were won their laurels and rank. Colonel J. Thompson Brown, commanding artillery of this corps, showed himself competent to his position, and gave me perfect satisfaction.

I have to express my thanks to the officers of my staff for their valuable services during the campaign: Major (now Lieutenant-Colonel A. S. Pendleton), chief of staff, Major Campbell Brown, A. A. G., Lieutenant T. T. Turner, A. D. C., Lieutenant James P. Smith, A. D. C., Colonel A. Smead and Major B. H. Greene, Assistant Inspectors General; Surgeon Hunter McGuire, Medical Director; Major J. A. Harman, Chief Quartermaster; Major W. J. Hawks, Chief Commissary of Subsistence; Major William Allan, Chief of Ordnance; Captain R. E. Wilbourn, Chief of Signals; Captain H. B. Richardson, Chief Engineer; Captain Jed. Hotchkiss, Topographical Engineer.

Colonel J. E. Johnson, formerly of the Ninth Virginia cavalry, Lieutenant [307] Elliott Johnston, of General Garnett's staff, and Lieutenant R. W. B. Elliott, of General Lawton's staff, were with me as volunteer aides-de-camp.

Colonel Pendleton's knowledge of his duties, experience and activity relieved me of much hard work. I felt sure that the medical department under Surgeon McGuire, the Quartermaster's under Major Harman, and the Subsistence under Major Hawks, would be as well conducted as experience, energy and zeal could ensure. The labor and responsibility of providing the subsistence of the whole army during its advance rested in a great measure on Major Hawks, and could not have been more successfully accomplished. Colonel J. E. Johnson was placed in charge of the pickets on the Shenandoah, covering my flank and rear during the attack on Winchester, and I rested secure in that respect, trusting to his experience, judgment and coolness. Captain H. D. Richardson, Chief Engineer, was severely wounded at Gettysburg, and left, I regret to say, in the enemy's hands — a loss I have very severely felt ever since that engagement. The efficiency and value of Major Allan and Captain Wilbourn in their respective departments are well known.

The reports of the division commanders accompany this report; also those of the brigade commanders and the chief of artillery. To these I beg leave to refer for greater detail in their respective operations than is practicable in the report of the corps commander.

I have the pleasure to send you the accompanying maps of the campaign by Captain Jed. Hotchkiss, Topographical Engineer, being the map of routes to and from Gettysburg, map of the battlefield of Winchester, and map of the battlefield of Gettysburg.

Respectfully, &c.,

(Signed)