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He had no doubt about the move October 26.
The points of the narrative, in the chapter devoted to the question of planning the March to the
Sea, are these:
Hood having moved upon
Sherman's railroad communications,
General Thomas returned to
Chattanooga with a considerable force, and on the 29th of September
Sherman telegraphed the condition of affairs to
Halleck, saying, among other things, ‘I prefer for the future to make the movement on
Milledgeville,
Millen, and
Savannah.’
On that day (October 1) he telegraphed
Grant:.
* * * * ‘Why will it not do to leave Tennessee to the forces which Thomas has, and the reserves soon to come to Nashville, and for me to destroy Atlanta and march across Georgia to Savannah or Charleston, breaking railroads and doing irreparable damage?
We can not remain on the defensive.’
On the 9th (October) he telegraphed
General Thomas at
Nashville:
‘I want to destroy all the road below Chattanooga, including Atlanta, and to make for the sea-coast.
We can not defend this long line of road.’
On that same day he telegraphed to
General Grant at
City Point:
‘It will be a physical impossibility to protect the roads, now that Hood, Forrest, Wheeler, and the whole batch of devils are turned loose without home or habitation. * * * * I propose that we break up the rail-road from Chattanooga forward, and that we strike out with our wagons for Milledgeville, Millen, and Savannah. * * * * I can make this march, and make Georgia howl!’
October 10th he telegraphed
Thomas as follows:
‘He (Hood) is now crossing the Coosa River below Rome, looking west.
Let me know if you can hold him with your forces now in Tennessee and the expected reenforcements, as, in that event, you know what I propose to do.’
And on the same day to
General Grant:
Hood is now crossing the Coosa twelve miles below Rome, bound west.
