William Boynton, Sherman's Historical Raid

[226] Confederacy; nor, consequently, its civil authorities as such. Therefore, he could not receive, for transmission, any proposition addressed to the Government of the United States by those claiming to be the civil authorities of a Southern Confederacy. He added, in a manner that carried conviction of sincerity, expressions of a wish to divert from the South such devastation as the continuance of the war would make inevitable; and, as a means of accomplishing that object, so far as the armies we commanded were concerned, he offered me such terms as those given to General Lee.

I replied that our relative positions were too different from those of the armies in Virginia to justify me in such a capitulation, but suggested that we might do more than he proposed; that, instead of a partial suspension of hostilities, we might, as other generals had done, arrange the terms of a permanent peace, and among other precedents reminded him of the preliminaries of Loeben, and the terms in which Napoleon, then victorious, proposed negotiation to the Archduke Charles, and the sentiment he expressed, that the civic crown earned by preserving the life of one citizen, confers truer glory than the highest achievement merely military. General Sherman replied, with heightened color, that he appreciated such a sentiment, and that to put an end to further devastation and bloodshed, and restore the Union, and with it the prosperity of the country, were to him objects of ambition.

We then entered into a discussion of the terms that might be given to the Southern States, on their submission to the authority of the United States. General Sherman seemed to regard the resolutions of Congress and the declarations of the President of the United States as conclusive that the restoration of the Union was the object of the war, and to believe that the soldiers of the United States had been fighting for that object. A long official conversation with Mr. Lincoln, on Southern affairs, a very short time before, had convinced him that the President then adhered to that view.

In the course of the afternoon we agreed upon the terms expressed in the memorandum drawn up on the 18th, except that General Sherman did not consent to include Mr. Davis and the officers of his Cabinet in an otherwise general amnesty. This consideration was mine of course. General Sherman did not desire the arrest of these gentlemen. He was too acute not to foresee the embarrassment their capture would cause; therefore, he wished them to escape. Much of the afternoon was consumed in endeavors to dispose of this part of the question in a manner that would be satisfactory both to the Government of the United States and the Southern people, as well as to the Confederate President; but at sunset no conclusion had been reached, and the conference was suspended, to be resumed at 10 o'clock next morning. Thinking it probable that the confidential relations of the Secretary of War with Mr. Davis might enable him to remove the only obstacle to an adjustment, I requested him by telegraph to join me as soon as possible.

General Breckinridge and Mr. Reagan came to General Hampton's