Edward Porter Alexander, Military memoirs of a Confederate: a critical narrative

[319] Some of the State governments also did much toward the clothing of their own troops, and private families, too, sent largely both of food and clothing to their members in the armies.

Without such help, Confederate officers would often have suffered for food. Early in the war, officers received no rations, but were allowed to purchase from the commissaries, for themselves and servants. But as rations became scarce, the privilege of purchase was taken away, and a ration was given each officer. Nothing, however, was allowed for a servant. Thereafter, officers had to divide with their servants and supply the deficiency as best they could.

Personally, my mess received constant supplies of bacon and peas from our country homes in S. C. and Ga., and other articles giving the most nourishment in the least space.

Our scarcities were due entirely to insufficient railroad transportation. Before the war, our roads had but a light traffic. They were now loaded with a very heavy one, and as cars, engines, and rails wore out, they could not be replaced. When complaint was made to the commissary-general of insufficient supplies, he would answer, ‘Stop running passenger trains, and I can run more freight trains and supply you.’

The great need of rations for the coming summer led the War Dept. to send Longstreet with two divisions for a campaign in the vicinity of Suffolk. Its object was to collect forage and provisions from counties near the Federal lines. The campaign was not initiated by Lee, and he thought that one division would have been sufficient, as the result showed. For the little fighting done was unnecessary, being initiated by the Confederates. And, although Lee at Chancellorsville repulsed Hooker's attack, it was poor policy to take the risk of battle against enormous odds, with one-fourth of his infantry absent.

As might have been expected, under the difficult circumstances attending our transportation either by wagon or by rail, Pickett's and Hood's divisions could not be gotten back in time for the battle, and our victory was the product of lucky accident combined with sublime audacity, desperate fighting, and heavy losses.

Hooker proved himself a good organizer. When placed in command, the army was much discouraged and desertions were