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- Winter quarters.
-- rations reduced.
-- Hays's Louisiana brigade.
-- officers' servants.
-- Hooker's reorganization.
-- Confederate organization.
-- Hooker's plan of attack.
-- Lee's proposed aggressive.
-- Hooker crosses.
-- Hooker's fatal mistake.
-- Lee's prompt action.
-- the Wilderness.
-- Hooker advances.
-- Lee's advance.
-- Hooker Retreats.
-- Hooker Intrenches.
-- Lee Reconnoitres.
-- Lee's plan of attack.
-- Jackson's march.
-- the movement discovered.
-- Sickles advances.
-- Jackson Deploys.
-- Jackson attacks.
-- Colquitt's blunder.
-- Dowdall's Tavern.
-- casualties.
-- at Hooker's headquarters.
-- defensive measures.
-- Jackson Pauses.
-- a cannonade.
-- wounding of Jackson.
-- Stuart in command.
-- formation for attack.
-- Sickles's midnight attack.
-- Hooker's interior line.
-- Hooker abandons Hazel Grove.
-- Stuart attacks.
-- assaults repulsed.
-- Hazel Grove guns.
-- Federals withdraw.
-- Lee and Stuart meet.
-- Sedgwick's advance.
-- Wilcox on Taylor's Hill.
-- assaults renewed.
-- Early falls back.
-- Salem Church.
-- casualties.
-- Early's division.
-- Lee organizes an attack.
-- Sedgwick driven across.
Soon after the
battle of Fredericksburg,
Lee placed his army in winter quarters.
Jackson was extended along the river, below the town, as far as
Port Royal, his own headquarters being at a hunting lodge on the lawn of
a Mr. Corbin, at
Moss Neck, 11 miles below
Fredericksburg.
Longstreet was encamped from a little above
Fredericksburg to
Massaponax Creek.
Lee established his headquarters in a camp a short distance in rear of
Hamilton's Crossing.
Most of the artillery was sent back to the
North Anna River for convenience of supply.
My own battalion occupied a wood at Mt. Carmel church, five miles north of
Hanover Junction, the horses being sheltered in an adjoining pine thicket.
On the occasion of
Burnside's Mud March, we marched about halfway to
Fredericksburg, but were then allowed to return.
The infantry generally did not leave their camps, as there was nowhere any fighting.
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Although so near to
Richmond, the army was inadequately clothed, shod, and fed, in spite of
Lee's earnest efforts.
As far back as April 28, 1862, the meat ration had been reduced from 12 to 8 ounces, and a small extra allowance of flour (two ounces) was given.
It was claimed that but for this reduction, the supply of meat would not have held out throughout the fall.
On Jan. 23, 1863, a further reduction was ordered, by the
commissary-general, to four ounces of salt meat with one-fifth of a pound of sugar.
Lee wrote of the situation on March 27:—
‘The men are cheerful, and I receive but few complaints, still I do not consider it enough to maintain them in health and vigor, and I fear they will be unable to endure the hardships of the approaching campaign.
Symptoms of scurvy are appearing among them, and, to supply the place of vegetables, each regiment is directed to send a daily detail to gather sassafras buds, wild onions, garlic, lamb's quarter, and poke sprouts; but for so large an army the supply obtained is very small.’
Some idea of the situation is given in the following extracts from a letter of a staff-officer of
Hays's La. brigade to his representative in Congress:—
Among 1500 men reported for duty there are 400 totally without covering of any kind for their feet.
These men, of course, can render no effective service, as it is impossible for them to keep up with the column in a march over frozen ground.
There are a large number of men who have not a single blanket.
There are some without a particle of underclothing, having neither shirts, drawers, nor socks, while overcoats, from their rarity, are objects of curiosity.
The 5th regiment is unable to drill for want of shoes.
The 8th regiment will soon be unfit for duty from the same cause; and indeed, when shoes are supplied, the men will be unable to wear them for a long while, such is the horrible condition of their feet from long exposure.
This destitution, in the way of clothing, is not compensated by close shelter or abundant food, for the troops have no tents, and are almost totally unprovided with cooking utensils for the petty rations they receive. . . .
‘Troops from other States are supplied, indeed, in a great degree by individual contributions from their homes, while we of Louisiana have received nothing whatever, since the fall of New Orleans, with the exception, I believe, of a company of the 9th regiment.’
Troops from the more distant States suffered many more privations, both in food and clothing, than those near home.
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Some of the
State governments also did much toward the clothing of their own troops, and private families, too, sent largely both of food and clothing to their members in the armies.
Without such help, Confederate officers would often have suffered for food.
Early in the war, officers received no rations, but were allowed to purchase from the commissaries, for themselves and servants.
But as rations became scarce, the privilege of purchase was taken away, and a ration was given each officer.
Nothing, however, was allowed for a servant.
Thereafter, officers had to divide with their servants and supply the deficiency as best they could.
Personally, my mess received constant supplies of bacon and peas from our country homes in S. C. and
Ga., and other articles giving the most nourishment in the least space.
Our scarcities were due entirely to insufficient railroad transportation.
Before the war, our roads had but a light traffic.
They were now loaded with a very heavy one, and as cars, engines, and rails wore out, they could not be replaced.
When complaint was made to the
commissary-general of insufficient supplies, he would answer, ‘Stop running passenger trains, and I can run more freight trains and supply you.’
The great need of rations for the coming summer led the War Dept.
to send
Longstreet with two divisions for a campaign in the vicinity of
Suffolk.
Its object was to collect forage and provisions from counties near the
Federal lines.
The campaign was not initiated by
Lee, and he thought that one division would have been sufficient, as the result showed.
For the little fighting done was unnecessary, being initiated by the
Confederates.
And, although
Lee at
Chancellorsville repulsed
Hooker's attack, it was poor policy to take the risk of battle against enormous odds, with one-fourth of his infantry absent.
As might have been expected, under the difficult circumstances attending our transportation either by wagon or by rail,
Pickett's and
Hood's divisions could not be gotten back in time for the battle, and our victory was the product of lucky accident combined with sublime audacity, desperate fighting, and heavy losses.
Hooker proved himself a good organizer.
When placed in command, the army was much discouraged and desertions were
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numerous.
Hooker abolished the grand divisions; devised a system of furloughs as a check to desertion; improved the transportation and supply departments, and organized his cavalry into a corps.
In addition, he instituted the system of badges, showing at a glance the corps and division to which the wearer belonged.
It was simply a piece of flannel, sewed on the top of the cap, whose shape designated the corps, and its color the division.
A circle indicated the 1st corps; a trefoil the 2d; a lozenge the 3d; a Maltese cross the 5th; a Latin cross the 6th; a crescent the 11th; and a star the 12th.
These shapes cut from
red flannel were worn by the 1st divisions; from white flannel by the 2d; from blue flannel by the 3d, and from green flannel by the 4th divisions, should there be so many.
Discipline, drill, and instruction were well maintained, supplies of all kinds abundantly furnished.
The spirit of the men revived with the consciousness of their immense superiority in numbers and equipment, and it was with good show of reason that
Hooker spoke of his army when it took the field, as ‘the finest army on the planet.’
His organization was as follows, with the strength of each corps present for ‘duty equipped’ on April 30.
corps | DIVISIONS | BRIGADES | ARTILLERY |
| | | Batts. | Guns |
1st | Wadsworth | Phelps, Cutler, Paul, Meredith | 10 | 52 |
Reynolds | Robinson | Root, Baxter, Leonard |
16,908 | Doubleday | Rowley, Stone |
2d | Hancock | Caldwell, Meagher, Zook, Brook | 8 | 48 |
Couch | Gibbon | Sully, Owen, Hall |
16,893 | French | Carroll, Hays, MacGregor |
3d | Birney | Graham, Ward, Hayman | 9 | 54 |
Sickles | Berry | Carr, Revere, Mott |
18,721 | Whipple | Franklin, Bowman, Berdan |
5th | Griffin | Barnes, McQuade, Stockton | 8 | 42 |
Meade | Sykes | Ayres, Burbank, O'Rorke |
15,724 | Humphreys | Tyler, Allabach |
6th | Brooks | Brown, Bartlett, Russell | 9 | 54 |
Sedgwick | Howe | Grant, Neill |
| Newton | Shaler, Brown, Wheaton |
23,667 | Burnham | Burnham |
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corps | DIVISIONS | BRIGADES | ARTILLERY |
| | | Batts. | Guns |
11th | Devens | Von Gilsa, McLean | 6 | 36 |
Howard | Von Steinwehr | Buschbeck, Barlow |
12,977 | Schurz | Schimmelpfennig, Krzyzanowski |
12th | | | 5 | 28 |
Slocum | Williams | Knipe, Ross, Ruger |
13,450 | Geary | Candy, Kane, Greene |
Cavalry | Pleasonton | Davis, Devin | 5 | 22 |
Stoneman | Averell | Sargent, McIntosh |
| Gregg | Kilpatrick, Wyndham |
11,544 | Reserve Brig. | Buford |
1,610 | | Artillery Reserve | 12 | 58 |
2,217 | | Provost Guard | 2 | 10 |
8 Corps, 23 Divisions, 64 Brigades, 133,711 Men, 74 Batteries, 404 Guns |
The nearest Confederate return is for March 21.
It is not entirely complete for the artillery and cavalry, but, estimating for them,
Lee's organization and strength at that date was as follows:
1ST corps,
Longstreet's, march 31, 1863
DIVISIONS | STRENGTH | BRIGADES | BATTS. | guns |
Anderson's | 8,232 | Wilcox, Wright, Mahone, Posey, Perry | 4 | 18 |
McLaws's | 8,567 | Wofford, Semmes, Kershaw, Barksdale | 4 | 18 |
| 850 | Corps' Reserve Artillery | 10 | 36 |
2 Divisions | 17,649 | 9 Brigades | 18 | 72 |
2D corps,
Jackson's
A. P. Hill's | 10,400 | Heth, Thomas, Lane, McGowans, Archer, Pender | 6 | 26 |
Rodes's | 9,632 | Rodes, Colquitt, Ramseur, Doles, Iverson | 4 | 18 |
Early's | 8,243 | Gordon, Hoke, Smith, Hays | 4 | 18 |
Colston's | 6,629 | Paxton, Jones, Warren, Nichols | 4 | 18 |
| 900 | Corps' Reserve Artillery | 9 | 83 |
4 Divisions | 35,795 | 19 Brigades | 27 | 118 |
| 600 | General Reserve Artillery | 6 | 26 |
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Allowing for about 3500 reenforcements during the month of April,
Lee's whole force was about 60,000, of whom some 57,000 were infantry and artillery.
Of these arms
Hooker had about 122,000.
Each commander planned to take the initiative.
Hooker knew that he had double
Lee's infantry, and great superiority in artillery, and he desired only to get at
Lee away from breastworks.
On April 13 he ordered
Stoneman's cavalry upon a raid to
Lee's rear, which expedition was to be the opening of his campaign.
A rain-storm on the 14th, lasting 36 hours, halted the movement, after its leading brigade had forded the
Rappahannock.
The brigade was recalled, having to swim horses across the fast-rising river, and two weeks elapsed before the movement could be renewed.
It was intended that
Stoneman should destroy the railroads, which would force
Lee to retreat.
Stoneman should then harass and delay him as he fell back, pursued by
Hooker.
Lee's proposed campaign was another invasion; this time of Pa. He could neither attack
Hooker, nor even threaten his rear across the
Rappahannock.
But he could again sweep the
Valley and cross the
Potomac; and beyond, both
Lee and
Jackson imagined great possibilities.
1 Three months later the opportunity offered, and
Lee put it to the test; but his great lieutenant,
Jackson, was no longer at the head of his 2d corps.
On April 29,
Lee found himself anticipated by
Hooker's having, the night before, laid pontoon bridges across the
Rappahannock, below
Deep Run, at the site of
Franklin's crossing in
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Dec.
Hooker had commenced his movement, on the 27th, by going with the 5th, 11th, and 12th corps to cross the
Rappahannock at
Kelly's Ford, above the mouth of the
Rapidan, 27 miles from
Fredericksburg.
A picket, at this point, was driven off, a pontoon bridge laid, and the whole force, about 42,000 men, was across the river on the 29th, when the 6th corps, under
Sedgwick, was crossing in front of
Jackson.
Hooker immediately pushed his force by two roads from
Kelly's to Germanna and Ely's fords of the
Rapidan — about 11 miles off, and, on arriving, the troops forded, although the water was nearly shoulder deep.
The fording was kept up all night by light of large bonfires, and the next morning the march to
Chancellorsville, six miles away, was resumed.
Meanwhile, two divisions of the 2d corps had moved up from
Fredericksburg to
United States Ford, where they laid a pontoon bridge about noon on the 30th.
By 9 P. M. they had crossed and united with the 5th, 11th, and 12th corps at
Chancellorsville.
No resistance had been encountered anywhere, but that of picket forces.
Hooker, in 84 hours, had covered about 45 miles, crossing two rivers, and had established a force of 54,000 infantry and artillery upon
Lee's flank at
Chancellorsville.
2 Hooker was naturally elated at his success, and issued an order to his troops, congratulating them, and announcing that now —
‘the enemy must either ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his defences, and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him.’
And, indeed, if a general may ever be justified in enumerating his poultry while the process of incubation is incomplete, this might be an occasion.
He was on the left flank and rear of
Lee's only strong position with a force fully equal to
Lee's, while another equal force threatened
Lee's right.
And somewhere in
Lee's rear — between him and
Richmond — was
Stoneman with 10,000 sabres, opposed only by two regiments of cavalry,
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tearing up the railroads and waiting to fall upon
Lee's flank when he essayed the retreat which
Hooker confidently expected to see. He had said to those about him that evening: —
‘The rebel army is now the legitimate property of the Army of the Potomac.
They may as well pack up their haversacks and make for Richmond, and I shall be after them.’
But
Hooker had made one mistake, and it was to cost him dearly.
He had sent off, with
Stoneman, his entire cavalry force, except one brigade.
This proved insufficient to keep him informed of the
Confederate movements, even though their efforts were supplemented by many signal officers with lookouts and field telegraphs, and by two balloons.
It was during the morning of the 30th, that
Lee learned that
Hooker had divided his army, and that one-half of it was already at
Chancellorsville, while most of the remainder was in his front.
By all the rules of war, one-half or the other should be at once attacked, and as
Sedgwick's was the nearest, and
Lee's whole force was already concentrated,
Jackson at first proposed to attack
Sedgwick.
Lee, however, thought the position impregnable, and
Jackson, after careful reconnoissance, came to the same conclusion.
Orders were then at once prepared to march and attack
Hooker before he could move from
Chancellorsville.
Early with his division,
Barksdale's brigade,
Pendleton's artillery reserve, and the Washington artillery, in all about 10,000 men, were left to hold the lines before
Fredericksburg.
These covered about six miles, and the force averaged about one man to each yard, and nine guns to each mile.
About midnight on the 30th,
Jackson marched from
Hamilton's Crossing with his three remaining divisions, under
A. P. Hill,
Rodes, and
Colston.
He was joined on the road in the morning by
Lee with the remaining brigades of
McLaws, and by
Anderson's division, and
Alexander's battalion of artillery.
Jackson's three divisions numbered about 25,000,
Anderson's division about 8000, and three brigades of
McLaws about 6000.
Thus,
Lee had in hand nearly 40,000 men, with which to attack
Hooker at
Chancellorsville, where
Hooker now had four corps — the 3d, 5th, 11th, and 12th — and two divisions of the 2d; a total
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effective of about 72,000 infantry and artillery, and was intrenching himself.
Chancellorsville was situated about a mile within the limits of a tract called the
Wilderness.
It stretched some 12 or 14 miles westward along the
Rapidan and was some 8 or 10 miles in breadth.
The original forest had been cut for charcoal many years before, and replaced by thick and tangled smaller growth.
A few clearings were scattered at intervals, and a few small creeks drained it.
Chancellorsville was merely a
brick residence at an important junction of roads, with a considerable clearing on the west.
Three roads ran toward
Fredericksburg: the old Turnpike most directly; the
Plank road to its right, but uniting with the
Turnpike at Tabernacle Church—about halfway; the
River road to the left, by a roundabout course passing near Banks Ford of the
Rappahannock.
Hooker's line of battle ran from
Chancellorsville, about two miles northeastward to the
Rappahannock, covering
United States Ford.
Westward it covered the
Plank road for about three miles, ending in a short offset northward.
Intrenchment was quickly done by cutting abattis, or an entanglement, in front, and throwing up slight parapets, or piling breastworks of logs.
About 11 A. M., however,
Hooker prepared to resume his advance, and ordered the 5th and 12th corps to move out on the three roads toward
Fredericksburg and establish a line in the open country beyond the
Wilderness.
Griffin's and
Humphreys's divisions of the 5th were sent down the
River road, on the left,
Sykes's division down the
Turnpike in the centre, and the 12th corps, under
Slocum, down the
Plank road on the right.
Meanwhile,
Lee and
Jackson disposed
Anderson's division for an advance, covering both the
Pike and the
Plank roads.
Wilcox's and
Mahone's brigades, with
Jordan's battery of
Alexander's battalion, moved upon the former;
Wright's,
Perry's, and
Posey's brigades, with the remainder of
Alexander's battalion, on the latter.
McLaws's division moved by the
Pike, and
Lee, with
Jackson's three divisions, followed the
Plank road.
Thus the two armies were marching toward each other on these two roads, while on the
River road two of the
Federal divisions were
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marching toward Banks Ford, which was at this time undefended, although some intrenchments had been erected there.
The possession of Banks Ford by
Hooker would shorten the distance between
Chancellorsville and his left wing under
Sedgwick, by several miles.
The advancing forces first came into collision on the
Pike.
Sharp fighting followed,
Semmes's brigade coming up on the left of
Mahone and bearing the brunt of it against
Sykes's regulars.
Sykes's orders had been, however, only to advance to the first ridge beyond the forest, and he maintained his position there, though menaced by the extension of the
Confederate lines beyond his flank, until orders were received from
Hooker to withdraw to the original position within the forest.
Similar orders were also sent to
Slocum on the
Plank road, and to
Griffin and
Humphreys who had advanced, nearly five miles down the
River road, entirely unopposed, and who were within sight of Banks Ford when the orders for the countermarch reached them.
Slocum's corps had not become seriously engaged, but its skirmishers had been driven in and its right flank threatened by
Wright's brigade.
This advanced upon the line of an unfinished railroad, which, starting from
Fredericksburg, ran through the
Wilderness generally a mile or two south of the
Plank road.
Up to the moment of the withdrawal of his troops,
Hooker's campaign had been well planned and well managed, and its culmination was now at hand in the open field—as he had desired.
He could scarcely hope for more propitious circumstances, and, by all the rules of the game, a victory was now within his grasp.
His lieutenants received the order to fall back with surprise and regret.
The advance, upon both the
Plank road and the
Pike, had cleared the forest and reached fairly good positions.
An officer was sent to
Hooker to explain and request permission to remain, but he returned in a half-hour, with the orders repeated.
Hooker has been severely blamed for these orders, subverting all the carefully prepared plans only published to the army that morning.
It is interesting to learn the cause.
Reports from the balloons and signal officers had informed him of the march
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of a force toward
Chancellorsville, estimated at two corps.
Rumors had also been brought by deserters, the night before, that
Hood's division had rejoined
Lee, coming from
Suffolk, but
Hooker's information from
Fortress Monroe should have shown that to be impossible.
There is no sign of any hesitation upon his part until 2 P. M. At that hour he wired
Butterfield, his chief of staff, at
Falmouth:—
‘From character of information have suspended attack.
The enemy may attack me, —I will try it. Tell Sedgwick to keep a sharp lookout, and attack if he can succeed.’
This despatch makes clear
Hooker's mind.
He realized from the rapid manner of
Lee's approach, and from the sounds of battle already heard, both on the
Pike and the
Plank road, that
Lee meant to attack.
He had confidently expected
Lee to retreat without a battle, and finding him, instead, so quick to take the aggressive, he lost his nerve and wished himself back on the line he had taken around
Chancellorsville, where he would enjoy the great advantage of acting upon the defensive.
He had seen in Dec. the enormous advantage which even slight breastworks could confer, and now he saw the chance of having his battle a defensive one behind intrenchments.
It was surely the safest game to play, and
Hooker is fully justified in electing to play it. No remonstrances shook his confidence in the least.
He said to
Couch, —
‘It is all right, Couch, I have got Lee just where I want him. He must fight me on my own ground.’
Orders were given to intrench, and work was at once begun with abundance of men and tools, and it was pushed during most of the night.
Couch says,—
‘At 2 A. M. the corps commanders reported to Gen. Hooker that their positions could be held; at least so said Couch, Slocum, and Howard.’
Indeed, no better field fortification can be desired than what it was the quickest to build in the
Wilderness.
A wide belt of dense small growth could be soon felled in front of shallow ditches, with earth and log breastworks.
Any charging line is brought to
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a halt by the entanglement, and held under close fire of musketry and canister, while the surrounding forest prevents the enemy from finding positions to use his own artillery.
So the corps commanders, responsible only for the front of their own lines, might truly report that their positions could be held.
Yet the line, as a whole, may have a weak feature.
This was the case here.
Its right flank ‘rested in the air,’ and was not even covered by a curtain of cavalry.
Hooker, however, was not entirely blind to this weakness of his line.
He inspected it early next morning, May 2, and ordered changes and enjoined vigilance which might have saved him from the surprise of the afternoon, had he not, like
Pope in his campaign of the previous fall, failed to fathom the boldness of
Lee's designs even after discovering the
Confederate movements.
Lee appreciated that
Hooker's withdrawal into the
Wilderness was not forced, but to fortify and concentrate.
He could, therefore, lose no time in finding how and where he might attack.
Until nightfall the skirmishes were pushed forward everywhere, in order to locate the exact position of the enemy.
The result is briefly given in
Lee's report, as follows:—
‘The enemy had assumed a position of great natural strength, surrounded on all sides by a dense forest, filled with a tangled undergrowth, in the midst of which breastworks of logs had been constructed, with trees felled in front so as to form an almost impenetrable abattis.
His artillery swept the few narrow roads by which his position could be approached from the front, and commanded the adjacent woods.’
Hooker had, indeed, manoeuvred
Lee out of his position without a battle.
There was now nothing left but to attack the greatly superior force in the impregnable position, or to attempt a retreat already dangerously delayed.
But presently there came some more cheerful news.
Fitzhugh Lee, who held the extreme left of our cavalry, had also reconnoitred the enemy, and had discovered that his right flank was in the air.
The one chance left to
Lee was to pass undiscovered entirely across the enemy's front and turn his right flank.
The enterprise was of great difficulty and hazard.
To try it and fail meant destruction.
For the army, already divided, must now be further subdivided, and the largest fraction placed in a position whence
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retreat would be impossible.
Only a very sanguine man could even hope that 15 brigades, with over 100 guns, could make a march of 14 miles around
Hooker's enormous army without being discovered.
The chance, too, must be taken of aggressive action by the enemy at
Fredericksburg or Banks Ford, even if
Hooker himself did nothing during the eight hours in which the flanking force would be out of position in a long defile through the forest.
But no risks appalled the heart of
Lee, either of odds, or position, or of both combined.
His supreme faith in his army was only equalled by the faith of his army in him. The decision to attack was quickly made and preparations begun.
Wilcox's brigade was ordered to Banks Ford to hold the position.
This precaution was well taken, for after midnight of the 1st,
Hooker ordered
Reynolds's corps to leave
Sedgwick and join the army at
Chancellorsville.
Reynolds started at sunrise and marched by Banks Ford, where he expected to find a bridge.
But, as has been told,
Griffin's and
Humphreys's divisions, after being within sight on the afternoon of the 1st, had been recalled.
Wilcox, at dawn on the 2d, had occupied the trenches.
So
Reynolds, arriving after sunrise and seeing Confederates in possession, continued his march on the north side, and crossed at
United States Ford.
Anderson's four remaining brigades, with
McLaws's three, were ordered to intrench during the night.
Jackson, with his three divisions, his own artillery, and
Alexander's battalion of
Longstreet's corps, were assigned to make the march through the
Wilderness and turn
Hooker's right.
Lee himself would remain with
McLaws's and
Anderson's troops, and occupy the enemy while the long march was made.
Cheering was forbidden, and stringent measures taken to keep the column closed.
Fitz-
Lee, with his cavalry, would precede the infantry and cover the flank.
Two hours after sunrise,
Lee, standing by the roadside, watched the head of the column march by, and exchanged with
Jackson the last few words ever to pass between them.
Rodes's division led the column,
Colston's division followed, and
A. P. Hill's brought up the rear.
The sun rose on May 2 a few minutes after five, and set at
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6.50 P. M. The moon was full that night.
The march led by a cross-roads near the
Catherine Furnace, thence southward for over a mile and then southwestward for two miles before turning west and striking the
Brock road within another mile.
At the cross-roads, the line of march was nearest the
Federal lines and was most exposed.
Here the 23d Ga. regiment of
Colquitt's brigade,
Rodes's division, was left to cover the rear.
When the line of march reached the
Brock road, it turned southward for about a mile, and then, almost doubling back upon itself, it took a woods road running a trifle west of north, nearly parallel to the
Brock road itself, and coming back into it about three miles north of the point at which it was first entered.
This made a route two miles longer than would have been made by turning northward when the
Brock road was first reached.
And as this part of the road was farthest of all from the enemy (over three miles), and in the densest woods, it would seem that two miles might have been saved, had there been time and opportunity for reconnoissance.
Where the
Brock road crossed the
Plank road, the column halted, while Fitz-Lee took
Jackson to the front to a point whence he could see the
Federal lines, with arms stacked, in bivouac behind their intrenchments, and utterly unconscious of the proximity of an enemy.
Until that moment it had been uncertain exactly where
Jackson would attack.
But he now saw that by following the
Brock road about two miles farther he would get upon the old turnpike, beyond the enemy's flank, and could take it in the rear.
So the march was at once resumed to reach that position.
But
Paxton's brigade of
Colston's division was here detached and placed with the cavalry, in observation on the
Plank road, and did not rejoin its division until near midnight.
The head of the column made about two and a half miles an hour, the rear about one and a half, for in spite of all efforts the column lost distance.
During the day there were three halts for rest of perhaps twenty minutes each.
There were no vehicles except the artillery, ambulances, and ammunition wagons.
These, marching each behind its division, made the column 10 miles in length, of which the infantry occupied over six.
The head, marching at about 6 A. M., reached the deploying point
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on the turnpike by 4 P. M. The distance had proven greater than anticipated, and time was now of priceless value.
Meanwhile the movement, though misunderstood, had been detected by the enemy.
3 About a mile southwest of
Chancellorsville was a settlement called
Hazel Grove, on a cleared ridge.
From this ridge, about 8 A. M.,
Birney, of
Sickles's corps, discovered a column of infantry, trains, and artillery passing his front.
He brought up a battery and opened on the train at a range of 1600 yards, throwing it into much confusion, and compelling it to find other routes around the exposed point.
Jackson sent a battery to reply and check the enemy from advancing.
Sickles came to
Birney's position and observed
Jackson's column.
His official report says:—
This continuous column — infantry, artillery, trains, and ambulances — was observed for three hours, moving apparently in a southerly direction toward Orange C. H., on the O. & A. R. R. or Louisa C. H. on the Va. Cen.
The movement indicated a retreat on Gordonsville, or an attack upon our right flank — perhaps both, for if the attack failed, the retreat would be continued.
‘I hastened to report these movements, through staff-officers, to the general-in-chief, . . . to Maj.-Gen. Howard and also to Maj.-Gen. Slocum, inviting their cooperation in case the general-in-chief should authorize me to follow up the enemy and attack his columns.
At noon I received orders to advance cautiously toward the road followed by the enemy, and attack his columns.’
Sickles advanced
Birney's division, which engaged an outpost on the flank and captured a regiment, the 23d Ga. The two rear brigades, under
Thomas and
Archer, with
Brown's battalion of artillery, were halted for an hour in observation, but were not engaged, and then followed on after the column.
They were only able to overtake it, however, after night.
It was about 4 P. M. when the head of
Jackson's column began its deployment on both sides of the
Plank road, beyond
Hooker's right, in the tangled forest; and it was nearly 6 P. M. when eight
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of the 12 brigades now in his column, had formed in two lines of battle, and one of the remaining four in a third line.
Meanwhile
Sickles, though now unopposed in front, had brought up
Whipple's division of his own corps, and, having asked for reenforcements, had also received
Barlow's brigade from the right flank of the 11th corps,
Williams's division of the 12th corps, and three regiments of cavalry and some horse artillery under
Pleasonton.
Posey's brigade held the left flank of
Lee's line of battle in
Hooker's front, while
Jackson conducted the flanking movement.
Posey had a strong force of skirmishers in front, which became hotly engaged with the left flank of
Sickles's advance, when it engaged
Jackson's rear-guard.
While bringing up their reinforcements, the
Federals made several efforts to carry
Posey's position, but were always repulsed.
Sickles then planned to outflank and surround it, but he had been so slow that, before he was ready to act,
Jackson had attacked, and
Sickles was hastily recalled.
Otherwise there might have been a strange spectacle.
Sickles might have routed
Anderson at the same time that
Jackson was routing
Howard.
For he was on
Anderson's flank with over 20,000 infantry, a brigade of cavalry, and some horse artillery.
He wandered off, however, to the south and west, for miles, where there was no enemy before him.
Along the front of
Lee's line the six brigades present of
Anderson's and
McLaws's divisions, aided by their artillery, had spent the day in more or less active skirmishing and cannonading with the enemy.
Where the enemy showed a disposition to advance, the
Confederates were well satisfied to lie quiet and repel them, as on the left in front of
Posey.
But on the
Confederate right the
Federal skirmish-line, under
Col. Miles, being strongly posted and showing no disposition to advance, it was wise to be moderately aggressive and keep the enemy in hopes of an attack.
Kershaw and
Semmes did this handsomely throughout the day, though the threat of
Sickles's movements caused
Lee to draw his troops to his left, and reduce his right to less than a full line.
About 6 P. M., the sun being then about one hour high,
Jackson gave the signal to
Rodes to move forward.
His brigades were in the following order from left to right:
Iverson,
O'Neal,
Doles,
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and
Colquitt, with
Ramseur's brigade 100 yards in rear of
Colquitt on the right.
Colston's three brigades formed in line with
Ramseur, and in the following order from the left:
Nichols,
Jones,
Warren.
About half of each division was on each side of the pike, and two Napoleons of
Breathed's horse artillery stood in the pike ready to follow the skirmishers.
Two hundred yards behind
Colston,
A. P. Hill had deployed
Pender on the left of the pike.
Lane,
McGowan, and
Heth were coming in column down the pike.
Archer and
Thomas were following, but some miles behind.
Jackson had made his play so far with fair success, and he now stood ready with over 20,000 men to surprise
Howard's 13,000.
He was sure of an important victory, but the fruits to be reaped from it would be limited for two reasons.
1st. Two brigades were some hours behind, for
Archer, without orders, had taken them to protect the rear.
2d.
There were now but two hours of daylight left, and only in daylight can the fruits of victories be gathered.
The question is suggested whether or not time had been anywhere lost unnecessarily.
It would seem that 12 hours should not be needed to march 14 miles and form 20,000 men in line of battle.
Briefly, it may be said, that with good broad roads, or with troops formed, ready to march at the word, and disciplined to take mud holes and obstructions without loss of distance, two hours could have been saved.
But none of these conditions existed.
Especially was time lost in the morning in getting the column formed.
Rodes reports it about 8 A. M. before the start was made.
Further on, his report notes, ‘a delay was caused by an endeavor on our part to entrap some Federal cavalry.’
There may have been, during the morning, lack of appreciation of the value, even of the minutes, in an enterprise of the character now on foot, and an inadequate idea of the distance to be covered.
Some time was also lost in deploying
Pender's brigade in the third line just before the charge was ordered.
It would have saved a half-hour of great value to have ordered the charge as soon as the 2d line was formed, and allowed
A. P. Hill's division to follow
Rodes and
Colston in column from the first, as they actually did at last.
For, after advancing some distance through the tangled undergrowth,
Pender's brigade was brought back to
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the road and placed at the head of the column for the rest of the advance.
It was nearly 6 P. M. when the signal for the advance was given by a bugle, and taken up and repeated for each brigade by bugles to the right and left through the woods.
But the sounds seem to have been smothered in the forest, for the
Federal reports make no mention of them.
Their first intimation of anything unusual was given by wild turkeys, foxes, and deer, startled by the long lines of infantry and driven through the
Federal camps.
Then came shots from the
Federal pickets, and then the guns on the turnpike opened and were soon followed by Confederate volleys and yells, impressing upon the enemy the fact that an overwhelming force had surprised them.
Nevertheless, a gallant effort at resistance was made.
The extreme right of the
Federals was held by
Von Gilsa's brigade of four regiments, about 1400 strong, which was formed, a half facing south and half facing west.
They stood to fire three volleys, but by that time the
Confederate lines were enveloping their flanks, and enfilade and reverse fire was being opened upon them.
Only prompt flight could save the brigade from annihilation.
After the third volley the brigade very wisely took to its heels and made its escape with a loss of 264 killed, wounded, and captured. Two guns with
Von Gilsa were also captured.
The next brigade to the left,
McLean's, endeavored to change front.
But it did not take long for the stern facts of the situation to become clear to every man of the brigade.
As the canister fire of the
Confederate guns was added to the enfilade fire of the Confederate infantry, this brigade also dissolved into a mass of fugitives, and two more guns, serving with them, were captured.
But that they had fought well is shown by their losses, which were 692 out of about 2500.
The division commander and four out of five
regimental commanders were killed or wounded.
For a while, now, the fight degenerated into a foot race.
Howard's original force of 13,000 had been reduced to 10,000 by the sending off of
Barlow's large brigade.
Of the 10,000, in a half-hour 4000 had been routed.
The Confederates, recognizing the importance of pushing the pursuit, exerted themselves to the utmost.
The lines broke into the double-quick wherever the
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ground was favorable, stopping only to fire at fugitives, or when completely out of breath.
The horse artillery kept nearly abreast, and directed its fire principally at the
Federal batteries which endeavored to cover the retreat.
Some of these were fought gallantly, and some were overrun and captured.
More might have been, and more prisoners taken, but for a blunder by
Colquitt.
His brigade was on the right of the front line, and its advance was least obstructed either by woods or the enemy.
It could have moved most rapidly, and might have narrowed the enemy's avenue of escape.
Jackson's instructions had been explicit.
Rodes's report says:—
‘Each brigade commander received positive instructions which were well understood.
The whole line was to push ahead from the beginning, keeping the road for its guide. . . . Under no circumstances was there to be any pause in the advance.’
Ramseur's brigade was ordered to move in rear of
Colquitt's and to support it.
Colquitt, early in the advance, halted to investigate a rumor of a body of the enemy on his right flank, which proved to be a small party of cavalry.
He delayed so that neither his brigade or
Ramseur's rejoined the line until late at night.
Thus two brigades, by disregard of instructions and without need, were kept entirely out of action during the whole afternoon.
So it happened that five of
Jackson's 15 brigades (
Thomas,
Archer,
Paxton,
Colquitt and
Ramseur) were missing from his line of battle during the whole afternoon, and, as
A. P. Hill's four remaining brigades were not deployed until after dark, only six brigades were in the attack and pursuit of the 11th corps: to wit,
Rodes,
Doles, and
Iverson of
Rodes's division, and
Jones,
Warren, and
Nichols of
Colston's division.
The great advantage of the
Confederates lay in their being able to bring the centre of their line of battle against the flank of the enemy's line.
This overwhelmed the two right brigades in a very short while, as we have seen, and the line pushed rapidly on, hoping to overwhelm the succeeding brigades likewise, one at a time.
The next division was
Schurz's of two brigades, in line of battle along the
Plank road, with two batteries which took positions and fired on the approaching Confederates.
Schurz endeavored to
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form at right angles to their approach, but the mass of fugitives with wagons, ambulances, beef cattle, etc., entirely overwhelmed some of his regiments, and only two or three isolated ones were able to march in good order, and, facing about, to fire from time to time at their pursuers.
Next, at
Dowdall's tavern, was a line of rifle-pits at right angles to the
Plank road, and already occupied by
Buschbeck's brigade of
Von Steinwehr's division, the last of
Howard's corps — its companion brigade,
Barlow's, being away with
Sickles.
Three or four batteries were here established upon the line, and to it were rallied numbers of fugitives.
At last an organized resistance was prepared.
When the
Confederates approached, in very scattered shape, they met a severe fire, and the advance was checked.
Had
Colquitt here been on the
Confederate right with his and
Ramseur's brigades, an opportunity was offered for a large capture.
It might have been accomplished by the force at hand with a little delay.
But they were already flushed with victory and would not be denied.
After a sharp fight of perhaps 20 minutes,
Colston's second line merged into the first, and the two lines pushed forward everywhere.
The Federal artillery foresaw the end and fled, five guns being too late and captured.
Buschbeck followed in fairly good order, but preceded by a stampede of troops and trains, principally down the
Plank road, though a part diverged to the left by a road to the
White House, called the
Bullock road.
The casualties in
Schurz's division were 919.
In
Buschbeck's brigade were 483.
The total loss of
Howard's corps was: killed,
217; wounded, 1221; missing, 974; total, 2412; only about 20 per cent of the corps.
It was a very trifling loss, compared with what it might
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have been had all of
Jackson's troops been upon the field, and had his orders been strictly observed.
The casualties of the
Confederates are not known, their returns consolidating all separate actions together.
Much undeserved obloquy was heaped upon the 11th corps for their enforced retreat.
No troops could have acted differently.
All of their fighting was of one brigade at a time against six.
With the capture of the Buschbeck position, the fighting of the day practically ceased.
The Confederate troops were at the limit of exhaustion and disorganization.
Daylight was fading fast, and commands badly intermingled.
The pursuit was kept up, however, for some distance, although the enemy was no longer in sight.
A few hundred yards beyond the Buschbeck position, the
Plank road entered a large body of forest, closing on both sides of the road for nearly a mile before the open Chancellorsville plateau is reached.
At the entrance of the wood a single Federal gun, with a small escort, was formed as a rearguard, and followed the retreat to
Chancellorsville without seeing any pursuers.
A notable case of acoustic shadows occurred during this action.
Sickles, some two and a half miles away, heard nothing of the attack upon
Howard until word was brought him, which he at first refused to believe.
At 6.30 P. M.,
Hooker sat on the veranda of the
Chancellorsville house in entire confidence that
Lee was retreating to
Gordonsville and that
Sickles was ‘among his trains.’
Faint sounds of distant cannonading were at first supposed to come from
Sickles.
Presently, an aid looking down the road with his glass suddenly shouted, ‘My God!
here they come.’
All sprang to their horses and, riding down the road, met, in a half-mile, the fugitive rabble of
Howard's corps, and learned that
Jackson, with half of
Lee's army, had routed the
Federal flank.
Had there been some hours of daylight,
Hooker's position would have been critical.
For
Lee and
Jackson were now less than two miles apart, and between them were of infantry less than two divisions;
Geary's of the 12th corps in front of
Lee, and two brigades of
Berry's of the 3d, near the path of
Jackson.
But darkness puts an embargo upon offensive operations in a
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wooded country.
Troops may be marched during the night, where there is no opposition, but the experiences of this occasion will illustrate the difficulty of fighting, even when the moon is at its best.
The night restored to the
Federals nearly all the advantages lost during the day.
Hooker acted promptly and judiciously.
Urgent recalls were sent for
Sickles and his entire force.
His advance had gone two miles to the front and was preparing to bivouac, when orders overtook it. It did not reach the field until after 10 P. M.
The force first available against
Jackson was the artillery of the 12th corps, for which a fine position was offered along the western brow of the
Chancellorsville plateau, south of the
Plank road.
This position was known as
Fairview, and it now became the key-point of the battle.
In front of it the open ground extended about 600 yards to the edge of the forest.
A small stream, between moderate banks at the foot of the plateau, offered shelter for a strong line of infantry in front of the guns.
Here, within an hour, was established a powerful battery of 34 guns, and during the night all were protected by parapets.
The position was essentially like the
Confederate position at Marye's Hill before
Fredericksburg, but on a larger scale.
The forest in front offered no single position for a Confederate gun.
Only from one point could it be assailed by artillery.
Across the stream in front, about 1000 yards obliquely to the left, was the small settlement called
Hazel Grove, occupying some high open fields, from which, as has been told,
Birney had that morning discovered
Jackson's march.
Hazel Grove offered excellent positions for attacking the
Fairview lines, but
Hazel Grove was itself within the
Federal lines, and, about sundown, was occupied by a few cavalry with some artillery of the 3d corps, and some miscellaneous trains.
4
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The only Federal infantry near at hand when the fugitives reached
Chancellorsville were
Carr's and
Revere's brigades of
Berry's division of the 3d corps.
These brigades were formed in line of battle in the forest north of the
Plank road, with their left resting on the guns at
Fairview.
Here they promptly set to work to intrench themselves in the forest across the
Plank road, and to cut an abattis in front.
They were soon reinforced by
Hays's brigade of
French's division of the 2d corps, and later by
Mott's, the remaining brigade of
Berry's division, which had been guarding bridges at
United States Ford.
Meanwhile, as darkness fell, the
Confederate pursuit died out upon entering the forest beyond the open lands about
Dowdall's tavern.
The cessation was not voluntary on
Jackson's part, but it was necessary that
Rodes's and
Colston's divisions should be re-formed, and that
Hill's division should take the lead.
It had followed the pursuit, marching in column, and was in good order and comparatively fresh.
The other divisions were broken, mingled, and exhausted, and several brigades were far behind.
During the long pause in the advance, while
Hill's brigades filed into the woods to the right and left, and the disorganized brigades were withdrawn to re-form,
Jackson impatiently supervised and urged forward the movements.
It is possible that he proposed to push his attack down the
Bullock road which, a short distance ahead, diverged to the left, toward the river, instead of following the
Plank road to
Chancellorsville, as he had said to
Hill: ‘Press them,
Hill!
Press them!
Cut them off from
United States Ford.’
It would, however, have
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been an error to make such a diversion, for the attack would have met an overwhelming force.
Its only hope of success was to reunite with
Lee at
Chancellorsville with the least delay.
Meanwhile, partaking of the impatience of
Jackson, his chief of artillery,
Col. Crutchfield, pushed some guns forward on the
Plank road, and opened a random fire down it toward
Chancellorsville, now less than a mile away.
It was an unwise move, for it provoked a terrific response from the 34 guns now in position upon
Fairview plateau.
The
Plank road was now crowded with troops and artillery in column, and the woods near it were full of the reorganizing brigades.
Under such a fire, even in the dim light of the rising moon, great confusion soon resulted, and although actual casualities were few, it became necessary to discontinue our fire before order could be restored and the formation of the line of battle be resumed.
Lane's N. C. brigade was at the head of
Hill's division.
One regiment, the 33d, was deployed and sent some 200 yards ahead as skirmishers, and the other four formed line of battle with the centre on the
Plank road in the following order from left to right: 28th, 18th, 37th, 7th.
The
Bullock road here diverged to the left, toward
United States Ford, but the enemy was evidently close in front, and
Jackson said to
Lane, ‘Push right ahead,
Lane.
Right ahead.’
While the formation was still in progress,
Jackson, followed by several staff-officers and couriers, rode slowly forward upon an old road, called the
Mountain road, which left the
Bullock to its left near the
Plank road, and ran parallel to the latter, about 80 yards distant, toward
Chancellorsville.
5
Up this road the party advanced for 100 or 200 yards, but not passing the 33d N. C. skirmish-line.
They then halted and listened for a while to the axes of the
Federals, cutting abattis in the forest ahead.
Beyond the
Plank road, the
Federal troops who had been off with
Sickles were now returning, and were slowly working their way to reoccupy some breastworks which
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had been built the night before in the forest south of the
Plank road.
Between their skirmishers and those of the 33d N. C. on their side of the
Plank road, there suddenly began some firing.
The fire spread rapidly in both directions, along the picket-lines, and was presently taken up by Federal regiments and lines of battle in the rear.
Jackson, at the head of his party, was slowly retracing his way back to his line of battle, when this volley firing began.
Maj. Barry, on the left of the 18th N. C., seeing through the trees by the moonlight a group of horsemen moving toward his line, ordered his left wing to fire.
Two of the party were killed, and
Jackson received three balls; one in the right hand, one through the left wrist and hand, and one shattering the left arm between shoulder and elbow.
The reins were dropped, and the horse, turning from the fire, ran into overhanging limbs which nearly unhorsed him; but, recovering the rein, he guided into the
Plank road where
Capt. Wilbourn of his staff helped him off. Meanwhile, the enemy had advanced guns to their skirmish-line, and presently began to sweep the
Plank road with shell and canister.
A litter was brought and
Jackson placed in it, but a bearer was shot, and
Jackson fell heavily on his wounded side.
With great difficulty he was finally gotten to an ambulance, which already held his chief of artillery,
Col. Crutchfield, with a shattered leg.
During the night
Jackson's left arm was amputated, and the next day he was taken in an ambulance via
Spottsylvania, to a small house called
Chandler's, near Guinea Station.
For a few days his recovery was expected, but pneumonia supervened, and he died on May 10.
In his last moments his mind wandered, and he was again upon the battle-field giving orders to his troops: ‘Order
A. P. Hill to prepare for action.
Pass the infantry to the front.
Tell
Maj. Hawks —’There was a pause for some moments, and then, calmly, the last words, ‘Let us pass over the river, and rest under the shade of the trees.’
Jackson's fall left
A. P. Hill in command, but
Hill was himself soon disabled by a fragment of shell, and sent for
Stuart.
Rodes ranked
Stuart, but the latter was not only best known to the army, but was of great popularity, and
Rodes cheerfully acquiesced.
His whole career, until his death at
Winchester, Sept.
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19, 1864, was brilliant, and justifies the belief that he would have proven a competent commander, but, as will be seen,
Stuart's conduct, upon this occasion, was notably fine.
A little before dark,
Stuart, with
Jackson's consent, had taken his cavalry and a regiment of infantry and started to attack the camps and trains of the enemy near Ely's Ford.
He had reached their vicinity and was forming for the assault, when one of
Jackson's staff brought the message of recall.
He ordered the command to fire three volleys into the nearest camp and then to withdraw, while he rode rapidly back—about five miles—and took command between 10 and 11 P. M.
There was but one course to take — to make during the night such preparation as was possible, and, at dawn, to renew the attack and endeavor to break through the enemy's line and unite with
Lee at
Chancellorsville.
The wounding of
Crutchfield had left me the senior artillery officer present, and I was sent for, and directed to reconnoitre, and to post before dawn as many guns as could be used.
I spent the night in reconnoissance and, beside the
Plank road, could find but one outlet through the forest, a cleared vista some 200 yards long and 25 wide, through a dense pine thicket, opening upon a cleared plateau held by the enemy.
This plateau afterward proved to be the
Hazel Grove position, and I concentrated near it several batteries.
In his
Life of Stuart, Maj. McClellan, his adjutant, writes:—
‘Col. Alexander's reconnoissance convinced Stuart that Hazel Grove was the key to the Federal line, and to this part of the field Stuart directed a large share of his personal attention on the morning of the 3d.’
One of
Jackson's engineers was sent by a long detour and found
Lee before daylight and explained to him
Stuart's position and plans, that he might, during the action, extend his left and seek a connection with our right.
During the night, the brigades in rear rejoined, and the three divisions were formed for the attack in the morning, with
Hill's division in front,
Colston's in a second line, and
Rodes's in a third.
Two brigades on
Hill's right were placed obliquely to the rear, to present a front toward that flank.
The positions of the different brigades are roughly shown thus: —
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|
Diagram of military positions. |
When
Hooker found that the
Confederate attack had come to a standstill in front of the
Fairview line, with
Sickles near
Hazel Grove upon its right flank, he ordered
Sickles to move forward by the moonlight, and attack.
Birney's division, in two lines with supporting columns, about midnight, advanced from
Hazel Grove upon the forest south of the
Plank road and in front of the Fairview position.
The left wing of this force grazed the skirmishers of
McGowan and struck the right flank of
Lane's brigade, of which two and a half regiments became sharply engaged.
But the whole Federal advance glanced off, as it were, and, changing its direction, it turned toward the
Federal line in front of
Fairview, where it approached the position of
Knipe's and
Ruger's brigades of
Williams's division of the 12th corps.
Hearing their noisy approach, and believing them to be Confederates, the Fairview guns and infantry opened fire upon the woods, while the approaching lines were still so distant that they were unable to locate their assailants, and supposed the fire to come from the
Confederate line.
And now for a long time, for one or perhaps two hours, the
Confederates listened to a succession of furious combats in the forest in their front, accompanied by heavy shelling of the woods, volleys of musketry, and a great deal of cheering.
Our pickets and skirmish-lines were forced sometimes to lie down or seek protection of trees from random bullets, but we had no other part in it. It extended northward sometimes even across the
Plank road.
And the official reports of many Federal officers give glowing accounts of the repulse of desperate Confederate attacks, and even of the capture of Confederate guns.
These stories were founded on the finding of some Federal guns, which had been abandoned in one of the stampedes of the afternoon.
Col. Hamlin's book, above referred to, says: —
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‘Some of the reports of this midnight encounter are missing, and their publication will throw much light on the details.
On the Federal side it was undoubtedly a mixed — up mess, and some of the regiments complain of being fired into from the front and from both flanks. . . . At all events, after reading the reports of Gen. Sickles at the time, and his statement a year afterward to Congress . . . the brilliant array of gallant troops in the moonlight . . . the bold attack . . . the quick return of one of the columns to be stopped by the bayonets of the 63d Pa. . . . the advance of the other column deflecting to the right, until it met Gen. Slocum in person . . . certainly there is occasion for a slight smile on the part of the reader.
And this smile may be lengthened on reading the story of Gen. De Trobriand, who was a participator, or the account left by Col. Underwood of the 23d Mass., who returned from the depths of the wilderness in time to witness and describe the ludicrous scene.’
Hooker had little cause for apprehension after darkness had come to his relief, yet the shock to his overconfidence had been so severe that his only new dispositions were defensive.
Yet he had over 60,000 fresh troops present, while
Lee had on the east but about 16,000 and on the west about 24,000.
His first care was to order the intrenchment of an interior line, upon which he could fall back in case
Stuart forced his way through to a junction with
Lee. A short line was quickly selected, of great natural strength, behind
Hunting Run on the west, and behind Mineral Spring Run on the east, with both flanks resting on the river and covering his bridges.
This line will be more fully described and referred to later.
It took in the
White House, some three-fourths of a mile in the rear of
Chancellorsville, and was probably the strongest field intrenchment ever built in Va. Next,
Hooker sent orders to
Sedgwick at 9 P. M., as follows:—
The major-general, commanding, directs that you cross the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg on receipt of this order, and at once take up your line of march on the Chancellorsville road until you connect with him, and will attack and destroy any force you may fall in with on your road.
‘You will leave all your trains behind, except pack trains of your ammunition, and march to be in the vicinity of the general at daylight.
You will probably fall upon the rear of the forces commanded by Gen. Lee, and between you and the major-general, commanding, he expects to use him up. Send word to Gen. Gibbon to take possession of Fredericksburg.
Be sure not to fail.’
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These orders were good, and would have insured victory, had they been carried out. And
Hooker took a further precaution, most desirable whenever important orders are issued.
He despatched a competent staff-officer,
Gen. Warren, his chief engineer, to supervise their execution.
Unfortunately for him, however, under the conditions it proved impossible to execute the orders within the time set, as will be told later.
Here it is only necessary to note that
Sedgwick was never able to get near
Chancellorsville.
Even as the field stood, with or without the arrival of
Sedgwick, the battle was still
Hooker's, had he fought where he stood.
But about dawn he made the fatal mistake of recalling
Sickles from the
Hazel Grove position, which he was holding with
Whipple's and
Birney's divisions, and five batteries.
There has rarely been a more gratuitous gift of a battle-field.
Sickles had a good position and force enough to hold it, even without reenforcements, though ample reinforcements were available.
The Federal line was longer and overlapped ours on its right, and our only opportunity to use artillery was through the narrow vista above referred to, which was scarcely sufficient for four guns, and had but a very restricted view.
Had
Stuart's attack been delayed a little longer, our right flank might have marched out upon Hazel Grove plateau without firing a shot.
A Federal battery, supported by two regiments, had been designated as a rear-guard, and it alone occupied the plateau when our advance was made, though the rear of the retiring column was still near.
Stuart's men, when the lines were finally formed, got from two to three hours rest before dawn.
About that time, cooked rations were brought up. Before the distribution, however, was finished,
Archer's and
McGowan's brigades were moved forward, from their retired positions as the right flank, to straighten the line.
They soon came upon a picket-line of the enemy, and sharp firing began.
Stuart, without waiting further, ordered the whole line to the attack.
Archer's brigade, about 1400 strong, in advancing through the pine thickets, drifted to the right, and gradually opened a gap between it and
McGowan's brigade, emerging from the
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forest alone, and in front of the enemy's rear-guard.
A sharp action ensued, while
Archer extended his right and threatened the enemy's rear, forcing the battery to retreat.
He then charged and captured 100 prisoners, and forced the abandonment of four of the guns.
He attempted to push his advance much farther, but was checked by the fire of the enemy's artillery and of the rear brigade,
Graham's, of
Sickles's column.
After two efforts, realizing that his force was too small, and leaving one of his captured guns, he fell back to Hazel Grove ridge, about 6.30 A. M. This was now being occupied rapidly by our guns.
Thus, so easily that we did not at once realize its great value, we gained space for our batteries, where we soon found that we could enfilade the enemy's adjacent lines.
Meanwhile, the first assault had been made along the whole line by
Hill's division.
The enemy's advanced line crossed the
Plank road and was held by
Williams's division of the 12th corps,
Berry's of the 3d corps, and
Hays's brigade of the 2d corps.
In rear of the front line was a second line near the edge of the forest.
Across the small stream and along the edge of the elevated plateau, their artillery had been strongly intrenched during the night, making a third line.
The two divisions from
Hazel Grove, with their four batteries, were brought up in rear of the forces already holding the front to the west.
This whole front from north to south was scarcely a mile and a quarter long.
It was defended by about 25,000 men, and it was being attacked by about an equal number.
The Confederates, however, had the hot end of the affair, in having to take the aggressive and advance upon breastworks protected by abattis and intrenched guns.
In his first assault, however,
Hill's division, now commanded by
Heth, after a terrific exchange of musketry, succeeded in driving the
Federals from the whole of their front line.
They followed the retreating enemy, and attacked the second line, where the resistance became more strenuous.
On the extreme right,
Archer's brigade had now fallen back to
Hazel Grove, where it remained, supporting the guns now taking position there.
This left
McGowan's flank uncovered, and a Federal force
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attacked it, and drove it back to the captured line.
This uncovered
Lane's brigade, and it was also forced to fall back.
On the left of the
Plank road, the advance of
Thomas beyond the enemy's first line met both a stronger second line and a flank attack, his left being in the air. After an hour's hard fighting, the whole line was forced back to the captured breastworks, with severe losses.
It was clear that extreme efforts would be needed to drive the enemy from his position.
Stuart ordered 30 additional guns to
Hazel Grove, and brought forward both the second and third lines, putting in at once his last reserves.
It would be useless to follow in detail the desperate fighting which now ensued and was kept up for some hours.
The Federal guns on the
Fairview heights were able to fire over the heads of two lines of infantry, and other batteries aided from the new position in which
Hooker had now established the 1st, 2d, and 5th corps.
This was so near on our left that
Carroll's and
McGregor's brigades of the 2d corps, with artillery, were sent forward to attack our flank, and were only repulsed after such fighting that they lost 367 men. With the aid of our second and third lines, fresh assaults were made on both sides of the
Plank road, and now the enemy's second lines were carried.
But his reserves were called upon, and again our lines were driven back, and countercharges south of the road again penetrated the gap between
McGowan and
Archer.
Paxton's brigade was brought across from the north and restored the situation at a critical moment,
Paxton, however, being killed.
Some of our brigades were now nearly fought out, the three divisions being often massed in one, and the men could only be moved by much example on the part of their officers.
Stuart himself was conspicuous in this, and was everywhere encouraging the troops with his magnetic presence and bearing, and singing as he rode along the lines, ‘
Old Joe Hooker, won't you come out the
Wilderness.’
There can be no doubt that his personal conduct had great influence in sustaining the courage of the men so that when, at last, our artillery had begun to shake the
Federals' lines, there was still the spirit to traverse the bloody ground for the fourth time and storm the
Fairview batteries.
Guns had been brought to
Hazel Grove from all the battalions
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on the field—Pegram's,
Carter's,
Jones's,
McIntosh's, and
Alexander's. Perhaps 50 guns in all were employed here, but less than 40 at any one time, as guns were occasionally relieved, or sent to the rear to refill.
Their field of fire was extensive, being an oblique on both the enemy's artillery and infantry.
Some ground having been gained on the
Plank road,
Cols. Jones and
Carter had also been able to establish 10 rifle guns there, which enfiladed the
Plank road as far as the
Chancellorsville house.
About nine o'clock, the Federal artillery fire was perceptibly diminished.
Many of their guns were running short of ammunition, and fresh ammunition was not supplied.
Sickles asked for it, and for reenforcements, but none were sent.
It would seem that
Hooker preferred to lose the
Chancellorsville plateau entirely, and fall back into his new position, which was like a citadel close at hand, rather than risk fighting outside of it.
At
Stuart's last charge, the
Federal lines yielded with but moderate resistance.
The guns in the Fairview intrenchments abandoned them, and fell back to the vicinity of the
Chancellorsville house.
The guns at
Hazel Grove moved forward across the valley and occupied the deserted Federal positions, here making connection with
Anderson's division which
Lee was extending to his left to meet them.
They were soon joined by
Jordan's battery of my own battalion, which had been serving with
Anderson.
The enemy, driven out of their fortified lines, attempted to make a stand near the
Chancellorsville house, but it was a brief one.
There were no breastworks here to give shelter, and their position was now so contracted that our guns from three directions crossed their fire upon it.
Hooker, in the porch of the
Chancellorsville house, was put
hors de combat for two or three hours by a piece of brick torn from a pillar by a cannon-shot.
No one took command in his place, and for a while the army was without a head.
Meanwhile,
McLaws and
Anderson had seen the enemy withdrawing from their fronts and pressed forward at the same time that
Stuart's infantry crowned the plateau from the west.
Some prisoners were cut off and captured on each flank, and a few guns also fell into our hands, but,
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as a whole, the enemy's withdrawal was orderly and well managed, and with less loss than might have been expected.
One sad feature of the occasion was that the woods on the north of the road were set on fire by shells, and the dry leaves spread the fire rapidly, although the trees and undergrowth did not burn.
Efforts were made to remove the wounded, but the rapid spread of the fire prevented, and some of the wounded of both armies were burned.
About 10 A. M.,
Lee, advancing with
McLaws's division, met
Stuart with
Jackson's corps near the site of the
Chancellorsville house, now only a smoking ruin, for our shells had set it on fire.
It was, doubtless, a proud moment to
Lee, as it was to the troops who greeted him with enthusiastic cheering.
Lee, by no means, intended the battle to end here.
Both infantry and artillery were ordered to replenish ammunition and renew the assault, but there came news from the rear, which forced a change of programme.
Sedgwick's corps had broken through the flimsy line in front of it, and was now moving up the
Plank road.
With all his audacity
Lee could not venture to attack five corps intrenched in his front, while
Sedgwick came up in his rear.
The story of events at
Chancellorsville must now pause, as the action there paused, while that is told of
Sedgwick's venture against
Lee's rear.
Hooker had sent urgent orders the night before to
Sedgwick to come to his help, and a staff-officer,
Warren, to supervise their execution.
But
Sedgwick, though already on the south side of the river, which
Hooker did not seem to know, was three miles below
Fredericksburg, near the scene of
Franklin's crossing in Dec. He had been under orders to advance toward
Richmond on the
Bowling Green road, and had disposed his troops accordingly.
To advance up the
Plank road, it was necessary to march to
Fredericksburg and force the
Confederate lines on Marye's Hill.
These lines were held from
Taylor's Hill to the
Howison house, about three miles, by only two brigades,
Barksdale's and
Hays's, with a small amount of artillery.
The regiments were strung out in single rank, the men sometimes yards apart, and with
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wide intervals at many places between regiments.
On Marye's Hill, two regiments, the 18th and 21st Miss., with six guns of the Washington Arty.
and two under
Lt. Brown of
Alexander's Bat., were distributed from the
Plank road to
Hazel Creek, about a half-mile.
Sedgwick had marched at midnight with a good moon, but his progress was slow, for the
Confederate pickets annoyed it. By daylight he was in
Fredericksburg, and his batteries from both banks of the river and from the edge of the town opened on the
Confederates.
Sedgwick had been informed by
Hooker that the
Confederate force left at
Fredericksburg was very small, and, without delay, he sent forward four regiments from
Wheaton's and
Shaler's brigades to charge the works in front of Marye's Hill.
It was sending a boy on a man's errand.
The Confederate infantry reserved its fire until the enemy were within 40 yards, when they opened and quickly drove them back.
A second assault was made, but with similar result.
Sedgwick was now convinced that a heavy force confronted him, and he waited for
Gibbon's division of the 2d corps.
This had just crossed from
Falmouth, and it made an effort upon the extreme Confederate left.
It proved futile on account of the canal along the front at that part of the field, which was defended by three regiments of
Hays's brigade of
Early's division, hurried there by
Early on seeing the enemy's preparations.
Soon afterward,
Wilcox's brigade came to the scene from Banks Ford, where it had been in observation on the 2d.
At dawn on the 3d,
Wilcox noted that the enemy's pickets on the north side were wearing haversacks, and correctly guessed that the forces opposite were leaving for
Chancellorsville.
He was preparing to march in the same direction, when a messenger brought word of the advance of
Gibbon's division.
Thereupon leaving a picket of 50 men and two guns in observation at Banks Ford,
Wilcox marched to
Taylor's Hill.
About 10 A. M.,
Gibbon having reported that an attack on our extreme left was impracticable, and
Howe's division, making no progress east of
Hazel Run,
Sedgwick had no recourse but to renew his attack upon Marye's Hill by main force.
He accordingly prepared a much stronger assault than that of the morning.
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Newton's division, supported by
Burnham's brigade, was to attack Marye's Hill, while
Howe's division assaulted
Lee's Hill beyond
Hazel Run.
This force numbered about 14,000 men, with an abundant artillery.
Across
Hazel Creek were seven guns of
Cutt's and
Cabell's battalions, and the two remaining regiments of
Barksdale's brigade and one La. of
Hays's brigade.
About 11 A. M., both
Newton and
Howe renewed the assault.
Newton advanced rapidly through the fire of the few Confederate guns, but recoiled soon after the infantry opened, although
Barksdale's line was so thin that it scarcely averaged a man to five feet of parapet.
Some of the
Federal regiments, however, suffered severely, and a number of killed and wounded were left near the
Confederate line.
This, by a strange piece of good nature on the part of one of our best officers, proved our undoing.
When
Newton's line was beaten back, the firing on both sides nearly ceased, and some Federal officer sent forward a flag of truce.
No Federal report mentions this incident.
The flag was probably sent by only a brigade commander, for the fighting, by
Howe's division, across
Hazel Run, was kept up without cessation.
Col. Griffin of the 18th Miss. received the flag.
The officer bearing it asked to be allowed to remove his dead and wounded in
Griffin's front.
Without referring to his brigade commander,
Griffin granted the request, and, still more thoughtlessly, allowed his own men to show themselves while the wounded were being delivered.
The enemy, to their great surprise, discovered what a small force was in their front.
They lost little time in taking advantage of the information.
The action was reopened, and now a charge was made with a rush, and the enemy swarmed over our works.
The
Mississippians had no chance to escape, but fought with butts of guns and bayonets, and were mostly captured, with the loss of about 100 killed and wounded. The casualties in
Newton's division and
Burnham's brigade, in the whole battle, were about 1200, of which probably 900 fell in this affair.
All of the guns on the hill were captured,
Brown's section last of all, firing until surrounded.
Meanwhile,
Howe's division had a full mile to traverse before
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reaching the
Confederate lines.
Instead of a charge, their progress was a slow advance under cover of heavy artillery fire.
Before they reached the
Confederate line,
Newton's division had made its second charge and was in possession of Marye's Hill.
Thereupon,
Early, who was in command, ordered the withdrawal of his whole division, and the formation of a new line of battle across the
Telegraph road, about two miles in the rear.
Here he concentrated
Gordon's,
Hoke's, and
Smith's brigades, with the remnants of
Barksdale's.
Hays's brigade had been cut off with
Wilcox, and these two brigades were in position to delay
Sedgwick in advancing upon the
Plank road toward
Chancellorsville.
But
Hays, under orders from
Early, crossed the
Plank road before
Sedgwick had made any advance.
Wilcox then took position with four guns across the
Plank road, and delayed the enemy's advance as much as possible, while he fell back slowly to Salem Church, where he had been notified that
McLaws would meet him with reinforcements.
He reached this point about 3 P. M., meeting there
Wofford's,
Semmes's,
Kershaw's, and
Mahone's brigades, under
McLaws.
The five brigades rapidly formed a single line of battle across the
Plank road.
Wilcox's brigade held the centre, with the 14th and 11th Ala. on the left of the
Plank road, and the 10th and 8th on the right.
The 9th Ala. was in reserve a short distance in rear of the 10th. Four guns were posted across the
Plank road, and a company of infantry was put in Salem Church, and one in a schoolhouse a short distance in front.
Kershaw's brigade was on the right of
Wilcox, and
Wofford on right of
Kershaw;
Semmes's brigade was on
Wilcox's left, and
Mahone's brigade was on the left of
Semmes.
In front of the line of battle stretched a fringe of dense young wood, some 200 yards wide, and beyond that, for perhaps a halfmile, were open fields, which extended with a few interruptions on each side of the
Plank road back to
Fredericksburg, about four miles.
Sedgwick had been delayed over four hours in traversing that distance.
About 4.30 P. M.,
Sedgwick established a battery 1000 yards in front of
Wilcox, and opened fire.
The Confederate artillery was nearly out of ammunition, and after a few rounds it was
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withdrawn.
Encouraged by this, the
Federals now sent forward
Brooks's divison, formed across the road in two lines, with
Newton's division in the same formation upon
Brooks's right.
Now ensued one of the most brilliant and important of the minor affairs of the war.
McLaws had reached the field and assumed the command, but credit is also due to
Wilcox, who had delayed many times his number for several hours, and gained time for reinforcements to arrive.
The story of the battle may be told very briefly.
North of the road, opposite the 14th and 11th Ala., was
Torbert's Jersey brigade under
Brown, in a double line.
On the south, opposite the 8th, 9th, and 10th Ala., was
Bartlett's brigade, one of the best in the
Federal army, which boasted that it had never been repulsed, and had never failed to hold any position it was ordered to occupy.
The strength of the
Confederate position consisted in the thick undergrowth which completely hid their lines, lying down on the crest of a slight ridge in rear of the woods.
These were held by skirmishers during the enemy's approach across the open.
When the artillery was withdrawn, it left a gap of about 50 yards between the 11th Ala., on the left of the road and the 10th on the right.
Bartlett's brigade advanced gallantly through the severe skirmish fire, fought through the strip of woods, drove the company from the church, and cut off the one in the schoolhouse.
Pushing on and overlapping the left of the 10th Ala., they enfiladed it, broke its line, and drove it back in confusion.
The 8th Ala., under
Lt.-Col. Herbert, on the right of the 10th, however, did not break, but threw back its three left companies, and brought an enfilade fire on the enemy's further advance.
The 9th Ala., being in reserve a little in rear of the 10th, rose from the ground, and, giving the enemy a volley, charged them and drove them back.
Brown's brigade, on the opposite side of the road, had a wider body of woods to cross, and had not advanced as far as
Bartlett.
But when
Bartlett was driven back,
Wilcox's whole brigade joined in the counter-stroke.
Bartlett's first line was followed so rapidly that the prisoners in the schoolhouse were liberated, and the rush of the fugitives and the quick pursuit overwhelmed the second line, giving it no chance to make a stand.
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Across the
Plank road,
Semmes's two right regiments, the 10th and 51st Ga., joined the 14th and 11th Ala., and these four regiments, meeting the
Jersey brigade in the woods, drove it back in such a direction that the fugitives from each side of the
Plank road converged upon the road.
The Confederates in pursuit said that they had never had such crowds to fire upon.
The pursuit was dangerously prolonged, but fortunately the enemy contented himself by checking it, and the
Confederates then slowly withdrew.
Long-range firing, however, was kept up until night.
Bartlett's brigade reported a loss in this attack of 580 officers and men out of less than 1500 men.
Brown's brigade reported a loss of 511.
Brooks, commanding the division, said in his official report: —
‘In this brief but sanguinary conflict this division lost nearly 1500 officers and men. Col. H. W. Brown, commanding the Jersey brigade, was severely wounded; and Col. Collet, 1st N. J., Col. G. W. Town, and Lt.-Col. Hall, 95th Pa., were killed.’
Wilcox's brigade lost 75 killed, 372 wounded, and 48 missing, a total of 495.
The losses of
Semmes's brigade are included with the campaign losses.
One of its regiments, however, the 10th Ga., reports for this day: 21 killed, 102 wounded, and 5 missing, a total of 128 out of 230 present.
In the morning at
Chancellorsville, this regiment had received the surrender of the 27th Conn., which had been on picket and was cut off by the capture of
Chancellorsville.
During this charge it also captured over 100 prisoners. While this action was going on,
Early had formed line of battle to resist an advance of the enemy upon the
Telegraph road, and was bringing up his extreme right from
Hamilton's Crossing.
It was about night when his whole division was concentrated.
The enemy was holding
Gibbon's entire division idle in
Fredericksburg, guarding the pontoon bridges to
Falmouth.
Had
Gibbon moved up on
Sedgwick's flank to Banks Ford, his division would have counted for something in the next day's affairs.
His force was just what
Sedgwick needed to enable him to hold his ground.
Returning now to
Chancellorsville, we have to note a movement which involved an unfortunate Confederate delay on the
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next day — a delay which enabled
Sedgwick's corps to escape scot-free from a position which should have cost him all his artillery and half his men. The
River road, from
Chancellorsville to
Fredericksburg via Banks Ford, was left unoccupied when
Hooker took refuge in his fortified lines on the morning of the 3d.
Anderson, with his three remaining brigades, —
Wright's,
Perry's, and
Posey's,—was sent at 4 P. M. to watch that road, and threaten the enemy upon that flank.
Two hours after sunrise on the 4th,
Heth arrived with three brigades to relieve
Anderson, who was now ordered to proceed to Salem Church, about six miles, and report to
McLaws, which he did about noon.
This sending
Anderson to reinforce
McLaws might have been done the afternoon before.
He would then have been on hand at the earliest hour for the joint attack upon
Sedgwick, on the 4th, which is now to be described.
The events of the morning of the 4th had been as follows: No communication had been received by
Sedgwick from
Hooker, and he was still under orders to come to
Chancellorsville.
But at an early hour, movements of
Early's troops were discovered in his rear, and, instead of advancing,
Sedgwick had deployed
Howe's division perpendicular to the
Plank road facing to his rear, and stretching to the river above Banks Ford, where pontoon bridges had been laid the afternoon before.
Sedgwick's scouts had reported that ‘a column of the enemy, 15,000 strong, coming from the direction of
Richmond, had occupied the heights of
Fredericksburg, cutting him off from the town.’
He at once abandoned all idea of taking the aggressive, and only wished himself safely across the river.
But he did not dare to attempt a crossing, except under cover of night.
His lines were too long, and were weak in plan, as they faced in three directions, —east, south, and west.
But he dared not venture a change, for fear of precipitating an attack.
When at last he received a despatch from
Hooker, its noncommittal advice was not encouraging.
It said: —
‘Everything snug here.
We contracted the lines a little and repulsed the last assault with ease.
Gen. Hooker wishes them to attack him tomorrow, if they will.
He does not desire you to attack them again in force, unless he attacks him at the same time.
He says you are too
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far away for him to direct.
Look well to the safety of your corps, and keep up communication with Gen. Benham at Banks Ford and Fredericksburg.
You can go to either place if you think it best to cross.
Banks Ford would bring you in supporting distance of the main body, and would be better than falling back to Fredericksburg.’
A little later
Hooker sent another message, urging
Sedgwick, if possible, to hold a position on the south bank, to which
Sedgwick replied:—
‘The enemy threatens me strongly on two fronts.
My position is bad for such attack.
It was assumed for attack, not for defence.
It is not improbable that the bridges at Banks Ford may be sacrificed.
Can you help me strongly if I am attacked?’
No answer to this inquiry appears, and
Sedgwick stood on the defensive, awaiting nightfall.
Meanwhile, early in the morning,
Early's division, with
Barksdale's brigade, had moved down upon Marye's Hill, which they found held by a picket force only, and easily occupied.
An advance was attempted into
Fredericksburg, but it was found with barricades across the streets held by one of
Gibbon's brigades, supported by two other brigades and a number of guns on the north bank.
Early then sent to communicate with
McLaws and endeavor to arrange a joint attack upon
Sedgwick, but received information that
Anderson's division was coming, and was himself sent for to meet
Lee.
Before leaving
Chancellorsville that morning,
Lee had examined
Hooker's lines with the view of assaulting at once, but their strength made it imprudent to do so while
Sedgwick was still south of the river.
So he next set out to dispose of
Sedgwick, that he might then concentrate his whole force to attack
Hooker.
Probably no man ever commanded an army and, at the same time, so entirely commanded himself, as
Lee. This morning was almost the only occasion on which I ever saw him out of humor.
It was when waiting the arrival of
Anderson, with his three brigades from the
River road, after being relieved by
Heth.
Anderson was in no way to blame for the delay, but he should have been relieved the afternoon before, which would have let him move during the night.
Some delay was inevitable, as
Sedgwick's peculiar rectangular formation was not readily understood.
It was about three
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miles in extent, and occupied high ground, with a wide, open valley in its front, forcing a development of our line of nearly six miles to cover its three fronts.
An entire day would have been none too much to devote to the attack, if the fruits of victory were to be reaped.
Although
Lee urged all possible speed, it was 6 P. M. when the advance commenced.
Sunset was at seven.
Darkness fell before the lines could be gotten into close action.
In the dusk, two of
Early's brigades,
Hoke's and
Hays's, fired into each other by mistake, and were thrown into confusion.
Both had to be withdrawn and re-formed.
The enemy was, however, forced back to the vicinity of Banks Ford, and had there then been daylight to bring up our batteries, there might have been large captures.
Upon
McLaws's front, ranges were marked by daylight for firing upon Banks Ford and some guns were kept firing all night.
But all that was possible amounted only to annoyance.
It was again illustrated that afternoon attacks seldom reap any fruits of victory.
It was with great elation on the morning of the 5th, that our guns fired the last shots across the
Rappahannock at
Sedgwick's retreating columns.
But orders, soon received from headquarters, indicated that our commander was not yet satisfied.
Early's division and
Barksdale's brigade were directed to remain in observation at Banks Ford and
Fredericksburg, — which had also been evacuated by
Gibbon's division during the previous night, —while all the rest of the army was ordered to return to the front of
Hooker's lines near
Chancellorsville, which
Lee intended to assault on the morrow with his whole force.
What was known of the enemy's position gave assurance that the task would be the heaviest which we had ever undertaken.
Hooker now had his entire army concentrated, and, allowing for his losses, must have had fully 90,000 men to defend about five miles of breastworks.
These he had had 48 hours to prepare, with all the advantages for defence which the
Wilderness offered.
Lee would scarcely be able to bring into action 35,000 under all the disadvantages imposed by the
Wilderness upon the offensive and by two streams which on the southeast and northwest covered three-fourths of the enemy's front.
Behind these streams
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both flanks rested securely upon the river.
The attack would have to be made everywhere squarely in front, and our artillery would be unable to render any efficient help.
When, upon the 6th, we found the lines deserted and the enemy gone, our engineers were amazed at the strength and completeness of the enemy's intrenchments.
Impenetrable abattis covered the entire front, and the crest everywhere carried head-logs under which the men could fire as through loopholes.
In rear, separate structures were provided for officers, with protected outlooks, whence they could see and direct without exposure.
Four of
Hooker's corps had suffered casualties averaging 20 per cent, but three, the 1st, 2d, and 5th, had scarcely been engaged.
It must be conceded that
Lee never in his life took a more audacious resolve than when he determined to assault
Hooker's intrenchments.
And it is the highest possible compliment to the army commanded by
Lee to say that there were two persons concerned who believed that, in spite of all the odds, it would have been victorious.
These two persons were
Gens. Lee and
Hooker.
For
Hooker was already hurrying his preparations to retreat during the coming night.
Clearly, this decision was the mistake of his life.
During the afternoon of the 5th, there came on one of the remarkable storms which on many occasions closely followed severe engagements.
The rainfall was unusually heavy and continued long after dark, converting roads into quagmires, rivulets into torrents, and causing great discomfort to man and beast.
But its occurrence was advantageous to the
Confederates, as it prevented their pressing upon the enemy's impregnable line, and it hurried the efforts of the
Federals to cross the river, as rapidly rising waters overflowed the approaches to their bridges.
Before the rain, I had found positions for several guns close upon the river-bank, partly around a bend below the
Federal left, giving an oblique fire upon some of their batteries.
During the night we constructed pits, and, at early dawn, were putting the guns in them, when we were suddenly fired upon by guns square upon our own flank and across the river.
A lieutenant had his ankle smashed, some horses were killed, and some dismounted limber chests were exploded, before all could be gotten under
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cover in the pits.
From these we could make no reply, as they faced
Hooker's lines, and we could only lie close and wait for more daylight.
This revealed that the enemy had abandoned his works during the night and recrossed the river.
To retaliate I brought up seven other guns, under cover of a wood, and engaged the enemy for a half-hour, inflicting ‘some loss in killed and wounded,’ as reported by
Gen. Hunt, with no further loss to ourselves, but the wheel of a gun. Finding by then that the battle was over and no enemy left on our side of the river, the guns were gradually withdrawn and camps were sought in another severe rain-storm, which came up about 5 P. M. and lasted far into the night.
6
The battle made by
Stuart on the 3d, has rarely been surpassed, measured either by the strength of the lines carried or by the casualties suffered in so brief a period.
In
Colston's division four brigades lost eight brigade commanders, three killed and five disabled.
Three out of six of the division staff fell.
In
Pender's brigade of
Heth's division, six out of ten field-officers were killed or wounded.
Our brigades rarely came to the field 2000 strong, and casualties of 600 to a brigade were rarely reached even in battles prolonged over a day. Here within six hours, five of the 15 brigades lost over 600 in killed and wounded each:
Lane's N. C. brigade losing 786;
Colston's N. C. and Va. losing 726;
Pender's
N. C., 693.
The
battle of Chickamauga is generally called the bloodiest of modern battles.
The losses given by
Livermore are 22 per cent in the
Federal army and 25 per cent in the
Confederate, in two days fighting.
Jackson's three divisions had a paper strength of 26,661, and their losses were 7158, about 27 per cent. They were, doubtless, over 30 per cent of the force actually engaged.
The losses in the 3d and 12th Federal corps, which composed the principal part of our opponents, were less, as they fought behind breastworks.
Their strength on paper was 32,171.
Their losses were 4703, being about 15
[
360]
per cent of the paper strength and probably 18 per cent of the actual.
Had
Gen. Lee been present on the left, during the Sunday morning attack, and seen
Stuart's energy and efficiency in handling his reserves, inspiring the men by his contagious spirit, and in the cooperation of artillery, with the infantry, he might have rewarded
Stuart on the spot by promoting him to the now vacant command of
Jackson's corps.
Ewell, who did succeed
Jackson, was always loved and admired, but he was not always equal to his opportunities, as we shall see at
Gettysburg.
Stuart's qualities were just what were needed, for he was young, he was not maimed, and he had boldness, persistence, and magnetism in very high degree.
Lee once said that he would have won
Gettysburg, had he had
Jackson with him. Who so worthy to succeed
Jackson as the man who had successfully replaced him on his last and greatest field?
Confederate casualties
COMMANDS | KILLED | WOUNDED | MISSING | TOTAL | STREN. |
S. C. Kershaw's Brig. | 12 | 90 | 2 | 104 |
Miss.
Barksdale's Brig. | 43 | 208 | 341 | 592 |
Ga.
Semmes's Brig. | 85 | 492 | 26 | 603 |
Ga.
Wofford's Brig. | 74 | 479 | 9 | 562 |
Cabell's Battn.
A | 5 | 21 | 2 | 28 |
McLaws's Div. | 219 | 1,290 | 380 | 1,889 | 8,800 |
Ala.
Wilcox's Brig. | 72 | 372 | 91 | 535 |
Va.
Mahone's Brig. | 24 | 134 | 97 | 255 |
Miss.
Posey's Brig. | 41 | 184 | 65 | 290 |
Ga.
Wright's Brig. | 25 | 271 | | 296 |
Fla.
Perry's Brig. | 21 | 88 | | 109 |
Anderson's Div. | 183 | 1,049 | 215 | 1,485 | 8,500 |
Washington Arty. | 4 | 8 | 33 | 45 |
Alexander's Arty. | 6 | 35 | 21 | 62 |
Hardaway's Arty. | 1 | 12 | | 13 |
Total Res. Arty. | 11 | 55 | 54 | 120 |
Total 1st Corps | 413 | 2,394 | 687 | 3,494 |
[
361]
Confederate casualties (continued)
COMMAND | KILLED | WOUNDED | MISSING | TOTAL | STREN. |
Headquarters, 2d Corps | 2 | 3 | | 5 |
Headquarters, 1st Div. | 2 | 2 | | 4 |
Va.
Heth's Brig. | 44 | 259 | | 303 |
S. C. McGowan's Brig.7 | 46 | 402 | 7 | 455 |
Ga.
Thomas's Brig. | 21 | 156 | | 177 |
N. C. Lane's Brig. | 161 | 626 | 121 | 908 |
Ala.
Archer's Brig. | 44 | 305 | 16 | 365 |
N. C. Pender's Brig. | 116 | 577 | 68 | 761 |
A. P. Hill's Div. | 436 | 2,330 | 212 | 2,978 | 10,400 |
Ala.
Rodes's Brig. | 90 | 538 | 188 | 816 |
Ga.
Doles's Brig. | 66 | 343 | 28 | 437 |
Ga.
Colquitt's Brig. | 9 | 128 | 312 | 449 |
N. C. Iverson's Brig. | 67 | 330 | 73 | 470 |
N. C. Ramseur's Brig. | 151 | 529 | 108 | 788 |
Rodes's Div. | 383 | 1,868 | 709 | 2,960 | 9,600 |
Ga.
Gordon's Brig.8 | 16 | 145 | | 161 |
Va.
Smith's Brig.9 | 11 | 75 | | 86 |
N. C. Hoke's Brig.10 | 35 | 195 | | 230 |
La.
Hays's Brig.11 | 63 | 306 | | 369 |
Early's Rept.
adds | 11 | 117 | 500 | 628 |
Early's Div. | 136 | 838 | 500 | 1,474 | 8,200 |
Va.
Paxton's Brig.12 | 54 | 430 | | 484 |
Va.
Garnett's Brig.13 | 52 | 420 | | 472 |
N. C. Colston's (Va.) | 128 | 594 | 80 | 802 |
La.
Nicholls's14 | 47 | 266 | | 313 |
Colston's Div. | 281 | 1,710 | 80 | 2,071 | 6,600 |
Artillery, 2d Corps | 26 | 124 | | | 150 |
Total 2d Corps | 1,262 | 6,870 | 1,501 | 9,633 | 35,800 |
Lee, F., Cav. Brig. | 4 | 7 | | 11 |
Pelham's Arty. | 4 | 6 | 8 | 18 |
Grand Total | 1,683 | 9,277 | 2,196 | 13,156 | 56,444 |
[
362]
Federal casualties
COMMANDS | KILLED | WOUNDED | MISSING | TOTAL | STRENGTH |
Reynolds's Div. | 1 | 15 | 2 | 18 |
Robinson's Div. | 7 | 42 | 6 | 55 |
Doubleday's Div. | 1 | 23 | 38 | 62 |
Total 1st Corps | 9 | 80 | 46 | 135 | 16,908 |
Hancock's Div. | 78 | 445 | 601 | 1,124 |
French's Div. | 63 | 506 | 119 | 688 |
Two Divs.
2d Corps | 141 | 951 | 720 | 1,812 | 16,893 |
Birney's Div. | 119 | 925 | 563 | 1,607 |
Berry's Div. | | 1,037 | 244 | 1,429 |
Whipple's Div. | 111 | 682 | 289 | 1,082 |
Total 3d Corps | 378 | 2,644 | 1,096 | 4,118 | 18,721 |
Griffin's Div. | 17 | 108 | 13 | 138 |
Sykes's Div. | 27 | 167 | 91 | 285 |
Humphreys's Div. | 25 | 197 | 55 | 277 |
Total 5th Corps | 69 | 472 | 159 | 700 | 15,724 |
Deven's Div. | 61 | 477 | 432 | 970 |
Steinwehr's Div. | 27 | 248 | 244 | 519 |
Schurz's Div. | | 129 | 496 | 298 | 923 |
Total 11th Corps | 217 | 1,221 | 974 | 2,412 | 12,927 |
Williams's Div. | 135 | 801 | 676 | 1,612 |
Geary's Div. | 125 | 637 | 444 | 1,206 |
Total 12th Corps | 260 | 1,441 | 1,121 | 2,822 | 13,450 |
Deven's Brig. Cav. | 8 | 35 | 98 | 141 |
Total about Chancellorsville | 1,081 | 6,844 | 4,214 | 12,140 |
Gibbon's Div., 2d Corps | 8 | 90 | 12 | 110 |
Brooks's Div., 6th Corps | 203 | 923 | 366 | 1,492 |
Howe's Div., 6th Corps | 91 | 697 | 502 | 1,290 |
Newton's Div., 6th Corps | 98 | 605 | 307 | 1,010 |
Burnham's Div., 6th Corps | 93 | 395 | 310 | 798 |
Total 6th Corps | 48 | 2,620 | 1,485 | 4,590 | 23,667 |
Total about Fredericksburg | 493 | 2,710 | 1,497 | 4,700 |
Grand Total | 1,574 | 9,554 | 5,711 | 16,804 |