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crossing at Tedford's and Dalton's, but, before they were ready to attack, the initiative was seized by the Federals, under the impression that only a single Confederate brigade was in front of them.
Croxton's brigade, supported by the other two brigades of Brannan's division, was ordered to advance.
This brought on the battle, which was waged all day with severe losses on each side, but with material success on neither.
The entire Federal army was engaged, except two brigades.
Of the Confederates, the brigades of Anderson, Deas, Manigault, Helm, Adams, Stovall, Gracie, Trigg, Kelley, Kershaw, and Humphreys were not engaged.
The fighting was desultory and without concert of action.
From 7 A. M. until noon, there was a gap of about two miles between the 14th and 21st Federal corps, which, had the Confederates discovered it, might have given them the victory.
The fighting was kept up until dark.
Longstreet arrived on the field at 11 P. M., having arrived at Catoosa Station about four, and ridden without a guide, narrowly missing riding into the enemy.
The battle was ordered to be renewed at daylight, but under a different organization.
The army was now divided into two wings, the right under Polk, and the left under Longstreet.
To Polk's wing was assigned Cheatham's division of his corps, and the corps of Hill and Walker, with the cavalry under Forrest on the right.
To Longstreet, Bragg gave the division of Hindman of Polk's corps, Johnson's division, Buckner's corps, and the five brigades of Hood's and McLaws's divisions, with the cavalry under Wheeler on the left.
This organization was adopted, because the troops were already approximately in the positions assigned, but it involved further subdivision of the command without any increase of staff, and led to an unfortunate delay of some hours in opening the battle.
This was to be begun by Hill's corps at daylight.
Sunrise was at 5.45.
The orders were given by Bragg to Polk about midnight, but never reached Hill until 7.30 in the morning. The locations of the different commanders were not known to each other.
When the orders to attack arrived, there were essential preparations still to be made, as the troops were not in position, and two hours were consumed in getting them even approximately so. These hours were very precious to the enemy.
All
1907.
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