Edward Porter Alexander, Military memoirs of a Confederate: a critical narrative

It did have considerable effect of a most unfortunate kind for us. It awaked the enemy to instant appreciation of the fact that it was essential for him to hold that ground, and that it behooved him to take it before we brought up any more force. A military lesson is to be learned from the result, to wit, that dangers lurk in excess of enterprise as well as in its deficiency. In this campaign our cavalry affords two instances. Stuart's zeal, without necessity, led him to make the circuit of McClellan's army, June 11-15. The result was that McClellan was prepared to change his base to the James as soon as he found Lee threatening his communications. Now, the temptation to shell a camp and wagon trains loses to our army its last chance to take a position which would compel the enemy to assume the offensive. One howitzer could, of course, accomplish nothing but to alarm the enemy, and precipitate their attack.

When Stuart opened fire, he thought that both Longstreet and Jackson were near. In fact, neither was within miles. Jackson had been sent in direct pursuit, being nearest the most direct roads, and his troops having been least engaged during the Seven Days. Two of the four brigades of his own division had been so little exposed as to have had together but two killed and 26 wounded, in the whole campaign. His 3d brigade, Winder's, had had but 75 casualties at Gaines Mill, and 104 at Malvern. Lawton's brigade, and Ewell's and Whiting's divisions, had only been severely engaged at Gaines Mill.

Longstreet, with A. P. Hill's and his own divisions, was on the 2d moved around the field of battle to Poindexter's house, and on the 3d was sent by roads to the left of Jackson. By mistake of the guides he was conducted too far to the left, and only reached Evelington Heights about dark on the 3d; Jackson's troops came up at the same time by the direct road.

Jackson's official report says: —

‘On the morning of the 3d, my command arrived near the landing and drove in the enemy's skirmishers,’ but the date is shown by all other reports to be a clerical error for the 4th.

Had Stuart not opened fire, the enemy would not have disturbed him that day. During it McClellan wrote to the Secretary of War, as follows: —