It now appears to be fully established by the records that Hood's infantry force in the battle of Nashville was very far inferior to that of Thomas, and he had sent a large part of his cavalry, with some infantry, away to Murfreesboroa. This disparity must have been perfectly well known to Hood, though not to Thomas. Hence it would seem that Hood must have known that it was utterly
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not whipped until the 16th.
He, the responsible leader of a desperate cause, could not yield as long as there was a ray of hope.
Under any ordinary circumstances a commander even of the most moderate capacity must have admitted his campaign a failure the morning after Franklin.
It would be absurd to compare the fighting of Hood's troops at Nashville, especially on the second day, with the magnificent assaults at Atlanta and Franklin.
My own appreciation of the result was expressed in the following despatch:
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