.
The city proper is a walled one, containing a citadel and the public buildings.
The remainder of the city consists of a large, straggling business town and a wide fringe of suburban settlements.
The walled city is in the angle of land at the south of the river's mouth.
Along the sea-front, facing westward, is a narrow strip of low land which has been reclaimed by means of a breakwater.
Across the river, north of the walled city, is the large and flourishing business town.
The central part is called Binondo, which name is often applied to the whole, though the city has grown so large as to include nearly a dozen other wards.
Driving in any direction, it is about 3 miles before one gets away from built — up streets and reaches the open country.
Even then the rural settlements are found full of the residences of city business people, and so it is difficult to say exactly what should be considered part of the city and what should not.
The city is irregularly laid out, the streets very narrow, and the houses crowded together.
The principal business street is crooked and filled with commonplace, mean-looking structures.
The
is bridged in several places, connecting the old city with Binondo, and there are tramways running into the outlying parts of the town, and a steam tramway to the northern suburb of Malabon.
There is also a railway from
, a splendidly equipped institution.
Here, far removed from petty troubles, the monks pursue their meteorological observations, carefully compiling data and employing delicate instruments the like of which is not to be seen east of
.
Outside of the populous suburbs there are more rural and less settled districts, dotted with handsome residences, scattered remotely among the rice-fields and tropical woodlands.
, and is also subject to frequent earthquakes, which are often very destructive.
is celebrated for the hemp and cigars which form its principal exports.
.
In 1789 the port was opened to foreign vessels, but commerce did not thrive until the expiration of the privileges of the
, and on Aug. 15 the
land forces, assisted by the navy and the native revolutionists, gained possession of the city.
It has since been the seat of the
.
(q. v.) on the operations around
and the capture of the city, under date of Aug. 31, 1898:
I found
General Greene's command encamped on a strip of sandy land running parallel to the shore of the bay and not far distant from the beach, but, owing to the great difficulty of landing supplies, the greater portion of the force had sheltertents only, and were suffering many discomforts, the camp being situated in a low, flat place, without shelter from the heat of the tropical sun or adequate protection during the terrific downpours of rain so frequent at this season.
I was at once struck by the exemplary spirit of patient, even cheerful, endurance shown by the officers and men under such circumstances, and this feeling of admiration for the manner in which the
American soldiers, volunteer and regular, accept the necessary hardships of the work they have undertaken to do has grown and increased with every phase of the difficult and trying campaign which the troops of the Philippine expedition have brought to such a brilliant and successful conclusion.
The
Filipinos, or insurgent forces at war with
Spain, had, prior to the arrival of the
American land forces, been waging a desultory warfare with the Spaniards
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|
A typical village near Manila. |
[
88]
for several months, and were, at the time of my arrival, in considerable force, variously estimated and never accurately ascertained, but probably not far from 12,000 men. These troops, well supplied with small-arms, with plenty of ammunition and several field-guns, had obtained positions of investment opposite to the
Spanish lines of detached works throughout their entire extent.
[
General Merritt then speaks of
Aguinaldo's accomplishments previous to his arrival, and continues:]
As
General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival nor offer his services as a subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the
President fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by the
American land forces, and stated that “the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants,” I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until I should be in possession of the city of
Manila, especially as I would not until then be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce my authority, in the event that his pretensions should clash with my designs.
For these reasons the preparations for the attack on the city were pressed and military operations conducted without reference to the situation of the insurgent forces.
The wisdom of this course was subsequently fully established by the fact that when the troops of my command carried the
Spanish intrenchments, extending from the sea to the
Pasay road on the extreme
Spanish right, we were under no obligations, by prearranged plans of mutual attack, to turn to the right and clear the front still held against the insurgents, but were able to move forward at once and occupy the city and suburbs.
To return to the situation of
General Greene's brigade as I found it on my arrival, it will be seen that the difficulty in gaining an avenue of approach to the
Spanish line lay in the fact of my disinclination to ask
General Aguinaldo to withdraw from the beach and the “Calle real,” so that
Greene could move forward.
This was overcome by instructions to
General Greene to arrange, if possible, with the insurgent brigade commander in his immediate vicinity to move to the right and allow the
American forces unobstructed control of the roads in their immediate front.
No objection was made, and ac-
[
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|
Types of natives. |
cordingly
General Greene's brigade threw forward a heavy outpost line on the “Calle real” and the beach and constructed a trench, in which a portion of the guns of the
Utah batteries were placed.
The
Spanish, observing this activity on our part, made a very sharp attack with infantry and artillery on the night of July 31.
The behavior of our troops during this night attack was all that could be desired, and I have in cablegrams to the War Department taken occasion to commend by name those who deserve special mention for good conduct in the affair.
Our position was extended and strengthened after this and resisted successfully repeated night attacks, our forces suffering, however, considerable loss in wounded and killed, while the losses of the enemy, owing to the darkness, could not be ascertained.
The strain of the night fighting and the heavy details for outpost duty made it imperative to reinforce
General Greene's troops with
General MacArthur's brigade, which had arrived in transports on July 31.
The difficulties of this operation can hardly be overestimated.
The transports were at anchor off
Cavite, 5 miles from a point on the beach where it was desired to disembark the men. Several squalls, accompanied by floods of rain, raged day after day, and the only way to get the troops and supplies ashore was to load them from the ship's side into native lighters (called “cascos” ) or small steamboats, move them to a point opposite the camp, and then disembark them through the surf in small boats or by running the lighters head on on the beach.
The landing was finally accomplished, after days of hard work and hardship, and I desire here to express again my admiration for the fortitude and cheerful willingness of the men of all commands engaged in this operation.
Upon the assembly of
MacArthur's brigade in support of
Greene's I had about 8,500 men in position to attack, and I deemed the time had come for final action.
During the time of the night attacks I had communicated my desire to
Admiral Dewey that he would allow his ships to open fire on the right of the
Spanish line of intrenchments, believing that such action would stop the night firing and loss of life, but the admiral had declined to order it unless we were in danger of losing our position by the assaults of the
Spanish, for the reason that, in his opinion, it would precipitate a general engagement, for which he was not ready.
Now, however, the brigade of
General MacArthur was in position and the
Monterey
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had arrived, and under date of Aug. 6
Admiral Dewey agreed to my suggestion that we should send a joint letter to the captain-general notifying him that he should remove from the city all non-combatants within forty-eight hours, and that operations against the defences of
Manila might begin at any time after the expiration of that period.
This letter was sent Aug. 7, and a reply was received the same date to the effect that the Spaniards were without places of refuge for the increased numbers of wounded, sick, women, and children now lodged within the walls.
On the 9th a formal joint demand for the surrender of the city was sent in. This demand was based upon the hopelessness of the struggle on the part of the Spaniards, and that every consideration of humanity demanded that the city should not be subjected to bombardment under such circumstances.
The
captain-general's reply, of same date, stated that the council of defence had declared that the demand could not be granted, but the captain-general offered to consult his government if we would allow him the time strictly necessary for the communications by way of
Hong-Kong.
This was declined on our part, for the reason that it could, in the opinion of the admiral and myself, lead only to a continuance of the situation, with no immediate result favorable to us, and the necessity was apparent and very urgent that decisive action should be taken at once to compel the enemy to give up the town, in order to relieve our troops from the trenches and from the great exposure to unhealthy conditions which were unavoidable in a bivouac during the rainy season.
The sea-coast batteries in defence of
Manila are so situated that it is impossible for ships to engage them without firing into the town, and as the bombardment of a city filled with women and children, sick and wounded, and containing a large amount of neutral property, could only be justified as a last resort, it was agreed between
Admiral Dewey and myself that an attempt should be made to carry the extreme right of the
Spanish line of intrenchments in front of the positions at that time occupied by our troops, which, with its flank on the seashore, was entirely open to the fire of the navy.
It was, not my intention to press the assault at this point, in case the enemy should hold it in strong force, until after the navy had made practicable breaches in the works and shaken the troops holding them, which could not be done by the army alone, owing to the absence of siege guns.
This is indicated fully in the orders and memorandum of attack hereto
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appended.
It was believed, however, as most desirable and in accordance with the principles of civilized warfare, that the attempt should be made to drive the enemy out of his intrenchments before resorting to the bombardment of the city.
By orders issued some time previously
MacArthur's and
Greene's brigades were organized as the 2d Division of the 8th Army Corps,
Brig.-Gen. Thos. M. Anderson commanding; and in anticipation of the attack
General Anderson moved his headquarters from
Cavite to the brigade camps and assumed direct command in the field.
Copies of the written and verbal instructions referred to above and appended hereto were given to the division and brigade commanders on the 12th, and all the troops were in position on the 13th at an early hour in the morning.
About 9 A. M. on that day our fleet steamed forward from
Cavite, and before 10 A. M. opened a hot and accurate fire of heavy shells and rapid-fire projectiles on the sea flank of the
Spanish intrenchments at the powder-magazine fort, and at the same time the
Utah batteries, in position in our trenches near the
Calle Real, began firing with great accuracy.
At 10.25, on a prearranged signal from our trenches that it was believed our troops could advance, the navy ceased firing, and immediately a light line of skirmishers from the
Colorado regiment of
Greene's brigade passed over our trenches and deployed rapidly forward, another line from the same regiment from the left flank of our earthworks advancing swiftly up the beach in open order.
Both these lines found the powder-magazine fort and the trenches flanking it deserted, but as they passed over the
Spanish works they were met by a sharp fire from a second line situated in the streets of Malate, by which a number of men were killed and wounded, among others
 |
|
A Street in the suburbs of Manila. |
[
92]
the soldiers who pulled down the
Spanish colors still flying on the fort and raised our own.
The works of the second line soon gave way to the determined advance of
Greene's troops, and that officer pushed his brigade rapidly through Malate and over the bridges to occupy Binondo and
San Miguel, as contemplated in his instructions.
In the mean time the brigade of
General MacArthur, advancing simultaneously on Pasay road, encountered a very sharp fire coming from the blockhouse, trenches, and woods in his front, positions which it was very difficult to carry, owing to a swampy condition of the ground on both sides of the roads and the heavy undergrowth concealing the enemy.
With much gallantry and excellent judgment on the part of the brigade commander and the troops engaged, these difficulties were overcome with a minimum loss, and
MacArthur advanced and held the bridges and the town of Malate, as was contemplated in his instructions.
The city of
Manila was now in our possession, excepting the walled town, but shortly after the entry of our troops into Malate a white flag was displayed on the walls, whereupon
Lieut.-Col. C. A. Whittier, United States Volunteers, of my staff, and
Lieutenant Brumby, United States Navy, representing
Admiral Dewey, were sent ashore to communicate with the
captain-general.
I soon personally followed these officers into the town, going at once to the palace of the governorgeneral, and there, after a conversation with the
Spanish authorities, a preliminary agreement of the terms of the capitulation was signed by the
captain-general and myself.
This agreement was subsequently incorporated into the formal terms of capitulation, as arranged by the officers representing the two forces.
Immediately after the surrender the
Spanish colors on the sea-front were hauled down and the
American flag displayed and saluted by the guns of the navy.
The 2d Oregon Regiment, which had proceeded by sea from
Cavite, was disembarked and entered the walled town as a provost-guard, and the colonel was directed to receive the
Spanish arms and deposit them in places of security.
The town was filled with the troops of the enemy driven in from the intrenchments, regiments formed and standing in line in the streets, but the work of disarming proceeded quietly, and nothing unpleasant occurred.
In leaving the subject of the operations of the 13th, I desire here to record my appreciation of the admirable manner in which the orders for attack and the plan for occupation of the city were carried out by the troops exactly as contemplated.
I submit that for troops to enter under fire a town covering a wide area, to
[
93]
rapidly deploy and guard all principal points in the extensive suburbs, to keep out the insurgent forces pressing for admission, to quietly disarm an army of Spaniards
 |
|
The capture of Manila-attack on Fort San Antonio. |
more than equal in number to the
American troops, and finally by all this to prevent entirely all rapine, pillage, and disorder, and gain entire and complete possession of a city of 300,000 people filled with natives hostile to the
European interests and stirred up by the knowledge that their own people were fighting in the outside trenches, was an act which only the law-abiding, temperate, resolute American soldier, well and skilfully handled by his regimental and brigade commander, could accomplish.
It will be observed that the trophies of
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Manila were nearly $900,000, 13,000 prisoners, and 22,000 arms.
[
General Merritt then details the inauguration of the military movement of
Manila by the
Americans.
Further he says: ]
On the 16th a cablegram containing the text of the
President's proclamation directing a cessation of hostilities was received by me, and at the same time an order to make the fact known to the
Spanish authorities, which was done at once.
This resulted in a formal protest from the
governor-general in regard to the transfer of public funds then taking place, on the ground that the proclamation was dated prior to the surrender.
To this I replied that that status quo in which we were left with the cessation of hostilities was that existing at the time of the receipt by me of the official notice, and that I must insist upon the delivery of the funds.
The delivery was made under protest.
After the issue of my proclamation and the establishment of my office as military governor, I had direct written communication with
General Aguinaldo on several occasions.
He recognized my authority as military governor of the town of
Manila and suburbs, and made professions of his willingness to withdraw his troops to a line which I might indicate, but at the same time asking certain favors for himself.
The matters in this connection had not been settled at the date of my departure.
Doubtless much dissatisfaction is felt by the rank and file of the insurgents that they have not been permitted to enjoy the occupancy of
Manila, and there is some ground for trouble with them owing to that fact, but notwithstanding many rumors to the contrary, I am of the opinion that the leaders will be able to prevent serious disturbances, as they are sufficiently intelligent and educated to know that to antagonize the
United States would be to destroy their only chance of future political improvement.
I may add that great changes for the
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better have taken place in
Manila since the occupancy of the city by the
American troops.
The streets have been cleaned under the general management of
General MacArthur, and the police, under
Colonel Reeve, 13th Minnesota, were most proficient in preserving order.
A stranger to the city might easily imagine that the
American forces had been in control for months rather than days.
