The gathering of Confederate troops at
Manassas Junction (q. v.) required prompt and vigorous movements for the defence of
Washington, D. C. Beauregard was there with the main Confederate army, and
Gen. J. E. Johnston was at
Winchester, in the
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Shenandoah Valley, with a large body of troops, with which he might reinforce the former.
Gen. Robert Patterson was at
Martinsburg with 18,000 Nationals to keep
Johnston at
Winchester.
Gen. Irvin McDowell was in command of the Department of Virginia, with his headquarters at Arlington House; and, at about the middle of July, 1861, he was ordered to move against the
Confederates.
With 20,000 troops he marched from
Arlington Heights (July 16), for the purpose of flanking the
Confederate right wing.
A part of his troops under
General Tyler had a severe battle with them at Blackburn's Ford (July 18), and were repulsed (see Blackburn's Ford,
battle of). McDowell found he could not flank the
Confederates, so he proceeded to make a direct attack upon them, not doubting
Patterson would be able to keep
Johnston in the valley.
On the morning of July 21,
McDowell's forces were set in motion in three columns, one under
General Tyler on the
Warrenton road, to make a feigned attack, and the other two, commanded respectively by
Generals Hunter and
Heintzelman, taking a wide circuit more to the left, to cross
Bull Run at different points and make a real attack on
Beauregard's left wing, which was to be menaced by
Tyler.
The Confederate right was to be threatened by troops under
Colonels Richardson and
Davies, moving from
Centreville.
These movements were all executed, but with so much delay that it was nearly noon before the battle began.
Meanwhile the
Confederates had made a movement unknown to
McDowell.
The Confederate government, just seated at
Richmond, hearing of the movements of the Nationals, immediately ordered
Johnston to hasten from the valley, and reinforce
Beauregard.
This was done at noon (July 20) with 6,000 fresh troops.
Hunter's column crossed
Bull Run at Sudley Church, led by
General Burnside, with
Rhode Island,
New Hampshire, and
Massachusetts troops.
Soon after crossing, it encountered the
Confederates, and a battle ensued in open fields.
The batteries of
Griffin and
Reynolds were brought to bear by the Nationals.
Only a small stream in a little vale separated the combatants.
The Confederates were led by
Colonel Evans.
The contest raged most fiercely.
Hard pressed,
Evans's line began to waver, when
General Bee advanced with fresh troops, and gave it strength.
Then the
National line began to tremble, when
Col. Andrew Porter sent a battalion of regulars under
Major Sykes to strengthen it. More fiercely the battle raged.
General Hunter was severely wounded.
Colonel Slocum, of the
Rhode Island troops, was killed, when
Sprague, the youthful governor of the commonwealth, took command of his troops.
The wearied
Nationals, who had been on their feet since midnight, began to flag, when they were reinforced by troops under
Heintzelman,
Sherman, and
Corcoran.
A charge made by a New York regiment, under
Col. Henry W. Slocum (q. v.), shattered the bending Confederate line, and the troops fled in confusion to a plateau whereon
Gen. T. J. Jackson had just arrived with reserves.
The flight was checked, and order was brought out of confusion.
Alarmed by this show of unsuspected strength in the Nationals,
Johnston, who had arrived and taken the chief command, looked anxiously towards the mountain gaps through which he expected more of his troops from the Shenandoah Valley.
Without these he had small hopes of success.
There had been a lull in the conflict; and at 2 P. M. it was announced they were not in sight.
At that time the
Confederates had 10,000 soldiers and twenty-two heavy guns in battle order on the plateau.
The
Nationals proceeded to attempt to drive them from this vantage-ground.
To accomplish this, five brigades —
Porter's,
Howard's,
Franklin's,
Wilcox's, and
Sherman's — with the batteries of
Ricketts,
Griffin, and
Arnold, and cavalry under
Major Palmer, advanced to turn the
Confederate left, while
Keyes's brigade was sent to annoy them on their right.
General Heintzelman accompanied
McDowell as his lieutenant in the field, and his division began the attack.
Ricketts and
Griffin advanced with their troops, and planted their batteries on an elevation that commanded the whole plateau, with the immediate support of
Ellsworth's Fire Zouaves, commanded by
Colonel Farnham.
To the left of these batteries, New York,
Massachusetts, and
Minnesota troops took a position.
As the artillery and the Zouaves were advancing, they were suddenly
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attacked on the flank by Alabamians in ambush, and then by
Stuart's Black Horse Cavalry in the rear, and the Zouaves recoiled.
At that moment
Heintzelman ordered up a Minnesota regiment to support the batteries, when the
Confederates in overwhelming force delivered a fire on these guns that disabled them by prostrating the men. Both sides suffered dreadfully.
When
Johnston heard of the slaughter, he exclaimed, “Oh, for four regiments!”
It was now three o'clock. His wish was more than gratified.
Just then he saw a cloud of dust in the direction of the Manassas Gap Railroad.
It was a part of his troops, 4.000 strong, from the valley, under
Gen. E. Kirby Smith.
They were immediately ordered into action, when the
Confederates, so reinforced, struck the Nationals a stunning blow, just as the latter were about to grasp the palm of victory.
It was so unexpected, heavy, and overpowering that in fifteen minutes the Nationals were swept from the plateau.
As regiment after regiment gave way, and hurried towards the turnpike in confusion, panic seized others, and at 4 P. M the greater portion of the
National army was flying across
Bull Run towards
Centreville — leaving behind them over 3.000 men, killed, wounded, or made prisoners.
The Confederates lost over 2,000.
The
Nationals lost twenty-seven cannon, ten of which were captured on the field, and the remainder were abandoned in the flight to
Centreville.
They took only a single cannon in safety to
Centreville.
They also lost many small-arms and a large quantity of munitions
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Battle of Bull Run. |
of war, and medicine and hospital supplies.
The
Nationals were pursued some distance.
Had the
Confederates pressed on after the panic-stricken fugitives.
the coveted prize of the national capital.
with all its treasures, might have been won by them within twenty-four hours.
Johnston had escaped from
Patterson, reinforced
Beauregard at a critical moment, and won a great victory through the forgetfulness of
Lieutenant-General Scott.
who had given
Patterson positive directions not to move until he should receive further orders.
These the
commanding general forgot to send!
Patterson knew of
Johnston's movement, but his orders to wait were imperative.
The first he heard of the disaster at
Bull Run was through a morning paper from
Philadelphia, on July 22.
The result of the battle was published with great exaggeration on both sides.
It produced unbounded joy among the
Confederates and their friends, and the loyal people were, at first, greatly depressed
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by it. While the
Confederates were elated beyond measure, by the evidence the battle seemed to give of their superior skill and courage, and thousands flocked to the standard of revolt from all parts of the
Southern States, the loyalists were stunned by the great disaster, and the 75,000 men, whose three months term of service was about to expire, were, for the moment, made eager to leave the field, and return home.
The President of the
Confederacy, who arrived at
Manassas just after the victory, made an exultant speech at
Richmond, now become its capital, and said to the multitude, when referring to the vanquished, with bitter scorn, “Never be haughty to the humble” : and predicted that the national capital would soon be in their possession.
While the streets of
Richmond were populous with prisoners from the vanquished army, and eager volunteers were pressing forward towards the camps of the victors at
Manassas, the streets of
Washington were crowded with a discomfited and disheartened soldiery, without leaders and without organization — the personification of the crushed hopes of the loyal people.
Such was the sad picture of the situation of the republic, much exaggerated, which was presented to
Europe in August, 1861.
The intelligence was given first to
Europe through
The times of
London — the accredited exponent of the political and social opinions of the ruling class in
England--by the pen of D)r.
Russell, its war-correspondent in the
United States.
He did not see the battle, and his account was, in a great degree, a tale of the imagination.
It excited among the ruling classes a derision of the government and loyal people of the
United States, and gratified the opponents of republicanism.
To them the ruin of the great republic of the rest seemed to be a fact accomplished.
English statesmen and journalists dogmatically asserted it, and deplored the folly and wickedness of the
President and Congress in “waging war upon sovereign States.”
and attempting to hold in union, by force, a people who “had the right and the desire to withdrawn from a hated fellowship.”
It was declared that “the bubble of democracy had burst.”
The London
Times said (Aug. 13), “It is evident that the whole volunteer army of the
Northern States is worthless as a military organization, . . . a screaming crowd” ; and spoke of it as a collection of “New York rowdies and
Boston abolitionists desolating the villages of
Virginia.”
The depression of spirits among the loyal people was, however, only momentary.
Within a few days they were buoyant with faith and hope.
There was a second uprising of the friends of free institutions more marvellous than the first.
Volunteers flocked to the standard of the Stars and Stripes by thousands.
The Confederates were amazed by the spectacle, and did not venture near the capital in force, where loyal regiments were continually arriving.
Five days after the battle,
Secretary Seward wrote to
Minister Adams in
London: “Our Army of the Potomac, on Sunday last, met a reverse equally severe and unexpected.
For a day or two the panic which had produced the result was followed by a panic that seemed to threaten to demoralize the country.
But that evil has ceased entirely.
The result is already seen in a vigorous reconstruction upon a scale of greater magnitude and increased enthusiasm.”
The
Pennsylvania reserves were transferred to the
National army at
Washington.
The government and people were satisfied that a long and desperate struggle was before them, and they put forth most extraordinary energies to meet the crisis.
On the contrary, when, the shouts of victory having died away, and the smoke of battle dissipated, the people of the
Confederacy saw their victorious army immovable at
Manassas and indisposed to follow up their triumph, they were filled with apprehensions and a feeling akin to despondency took possession of the hearts of the
Southern people.
The
second battle of Bull Run (or
Manassas) was fought on Aug. 29, 30, 1862.
the fighting on the first day being sometimes called the battle of
Groveton (q. v.). On the morning after the
battle at Groveton,
Pope's army was greatly reduced.
It had failed to prevent the unity of
Lee's army, and prudence dictated its immediate flight across
Bull Run, and even to the defences of
Washington.
But
Pope determined to resume the battle the next morning.
He had received no reinforcements or supplies since the 26th, and
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had no positive assurance that any would be sent.
He confidently expected rations and forage from
McClellan at
Alexandria (a short distance away), who was to supply them; and it was not until the morning of the 30th (August, 1862), when it was too late to retreat and perilous to stand still, that he received information that rations and forage would be sent as soon as he (
Pope) should send a cavalry escort for the train — a thing impossible.
He had no alternative but to fight.
Both commanders had made dispositions for attack in the morning.
Lee's movements gave
Pope the impression that the
Confederates were retreating, and he ordered
McDowell to pursue with a large force,
Porter's forces to advance and attack them, and
Heintzelman and
Reno, supported by
Ricketts's division, were ordered to assail and turn the
Confederate left.
This movement, when attempted, revealed a state of affairs fearful to the
National army.
The latter, as their advance moved forward, were opened upon by a fierce fire of cannon, shot, shell, and bullets, and at the same moment a large number of
Lee's troops were making a flank movement that might imperil the whole of
Pope's army.
A very severe battle soon occurred.
Porter's corps, which had recoiled at the unexpected blow, was rallied, and performed specially good service; and
Jackson's advanced line was steadily pushed back until five o'clock in the afternoon, when
Longstreet turned the tide of battle by pouring a destructive artillery fire upon the Nationals.
Line after line was swept away, and very soon the whole left was put to flight.
Jackson advanced, and
Longstreet pushed his heavy columns against
Pope's centre, while the Confederate artillery was doing fearful execution.
The left of the Nationals, though pushed back, was unbroken, and held the
Warrenton pike, by which alone
Pope's army might safely retreat.
Pope had now no alternative but to fall back towards the defenses at
Washington.
At eight o'clock in the evening he gave orders to that effect.
This movement was made during the night, across
Bull Run, to the heights of
Centreville, the brigades of
Meade and
Seymour covering the retreat.
The night was very dark, and
Lee did not pursue; and in the morning (Aug. 31)
Bull Run again divided the two great armies.
So ended the
second battle of Bull Run.
