George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-General United States Army
George Gordon Meade, Ed.

I trust you have not placed any fond hopes on seeing me come back from this place. I found on my arrival here this morning that there was nothing to be done but to proceed to the destination assigned me. Since leaving Philadelphia the news is more belligerent from Mexico, and though I have not the slightest fear of any hostilities on the part of the Mexicans, yet the existence of such reports renders it a point of honor for me to go. From all I can hear (for besides seeing many people who pretend to know, I have met one gentleman who resides at the very place I am going to,) all agree in pronouncing it as healthy a country as any in the world, and if I can only escape New Orleans, that there will be but little danger afterwards. Of course I shall take every precaution at New Orleans, and leave the city as soon as I possibly can, and I really am in hopes that I shall get safely there and in a short time return to our dear home.

In the meantime keep up your spirits and take care of your health and that of the children. No one can tell how my heart was rent at parting with you; but I believe it is for the best that we should be parted, if I am to go, for the terrible agony I endured at the very sight of you and my dear children, it would be impossible to describe. However, there is no use in fretting over what cannot be helped, and there only remains for us to pray God to protect us and bring us again together in his good pleasure.

I suppose you have to-day seen Mr. Pemberton,¹ who was kind enough to accompany me to New Castle. I found his society most agreeable, as it prevented me from giving way to my pent — up and lacerated feelings, and I felt deeply grateful to him for his kindness. [20] We arrived at Baltimore about twelve o'clock, and I went up to the Exchange Hotel and got a bed, and had quite a comfortable sleep till breakfast this morning, at half past 7, after which I got into the cars and came down here. After seeing Salvadora,² and afterwards Margaret,³ I went to the Bureau and reported myself to Colonel Abert. He was very civil to me, gave me some additional articles to take with me, and impressed upon me the necessity of staying as short a time as possible in New Orleans. I then saw Captain Swift, and had some conversation with him, and learned from him that there was no absolute necessity of very great hurry. He said I might go down the river if I wanted to, and gave it as his opinion that there would be no trouble there (that is, in Texas), and that the Colonel would recall me as soon as it could possibly be done, as he wanted now officers for other duty. All this is of course consoling, and we must hope for the best. After this I called on the Secretary of War to offer to take despatches. He also was very polite, but had nothing to send by me, although I met in his office a Colonel Rogers from Corpus Christi, Texas, which, if you look on your map, you will find is just below the Aransas Pass. He it was who told me the place was most healthy and delightful as a residence, and gave me some letters to take to his sons there. Upon the whole, I feel better after coming here, and now I shall start with a lighter heart.

Keep up your spirits; all will yet be well, and it may not be long before I will be with you again.

I think now of going by the river route, going from here to Wheeling, and thence to Cincinnati, and from thence to New Orleans, in which case I shall leave here to-morrow morning early, at six o'clock. Write to me at New Orleans, and tell me all about the dear children and mother and all your family. Do not write despondingly, but give me the aid of your cheerfulness to assist me in my trials, and may the Almighty ruler of all things, bless and protect you and the dear children, and in his own time restore me to you.

I have progressed far on my long journey, having thus arrived here last night too late to do anything but go to bed. I cannot say that I am any more reconciled to our parting than the first moment I was made aware we had to part.

I will give you now a little account of my journey. I left [21] Washington on Friday morning, having received all the kindness and attention possible from Salvadora and her husband. In the cars from Washington I met Major Craig,⁴ on his return to Philadelphia, who said he would call and tell you he had met me. At the Relay House I parted with him and got into the cars for Cumberland, where I met Mr. Randall,⁵ who married Miss Wirt, and was in Congress with your father the last session he served. Mr. Randall being a very intelligent gentleman, we sat together and conversed during the whole day, till evening, when we arrived at Cumberland, where he remained. I found his society most agreeable. At Cumberland I took the mail stage for Wheeling, and found myself with but one passenger, a young merchant, from Huntsville, Alabama, returning from Philadelphia, where he had been purchasing goods. On account of his admiration of Philadelphia, he being a sterling Whig, and withal a very intelligent man, I took to him. We arrived at Wheeling at eleven o'clock Sunday night, and finding the water very low, I determined to go overland to this place and depend upon taking the river here. I left Wheeling at six o'clock Monday morning, and reached Zanesville late that night, started early the next morning, travelled all night, and got here about ten last night. I took a bath, went to bed, and had sweet dreams of you and my children. I have found here many acquaintances, mostly of the army; one, Captain Irwin, an old friend, who has been running round the town with me this morning, assisting me in making purchases of articles necessary for my outfit, such as horse equipments, bed and bedding, etc. I very much fear this will be a most ruinously expensive business, and I wish to heaven I was out of it; but it was absolutely necessary to procure these things, and I could get them cheaper here than in New Orleans, besides my intention of spending no longer time than absolutely necessary in that city. I shall leave here to-night or early to-morrow morning for down the river, and may probably spend a day at Louisville, where I understand that Elizabeth⁶ and her children are staying. I also expect to overtake there a young officer of our corps, on his way to Texas, whom I find by the books at the hotels is just one day ahead of me. I shall then proceed immediately to New Orleans, and if there is not a vessel going soon to this place, [22] I will go to some place in the neighborhood of New Orleans known to be healthy, and wait there till one should be ready. At New Orleans I expect to see your dear handwriting, as I am some days behind the mail. I cannot tell you how anxious I am to hear from you, of my dear mother, who I trust is more reconciled to my departure, and of my dear boys, who, alas, are too young to feel it. Give my very best love to dear mother, and tell her I will soon write to her, maybe I will do it before I leave here, but I am in such a whirl of excitement, that I can hardly keep still, and writing makes me most melancholy.

I want you to subscribe for me to the Tri-weekly National Intelligencer and the Weekly Herald, and have them sent to New Orleans, to the care of Colonel Hunt, Quartermaster U. S. Army. I also want you to get off my bookcase the ‘Maps of the Stars,’ published by the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge.

I arrived here early this morning, and should have proceeded immediately on, as there were boats going on; but knowing that they were subject to a detention of two or three hours in going through the canal, which is here cut round the falls or ripples of the Ohio, I determined to come on shore and see Elizabeth and her girls, whom I found at a lovely spot on the banks of the river, about three miles below here. She looked and said she was very well, all the children were so, and she was very much gratified at my visit. After staying with her as long as I thought myself justified in doing, I returned, and took a hack with my luggage and drove to the end of the canal, three miles from here, and arrived just in time to see the boat gliding gracefully down stream. I had nothing to do but return to the excellent house where I am now stopping, and wait for the next boat, which will probably leave to-morrow morning. I was exceedingly put out and disappointed.

I am well thus far, and had an agreeable passage of about twentyfour hours from Cincinnati here. After I start from here I shall make every effort to push on. We have dates from New Orleans to the 14th inst.; it was then perfectly healthy. God grant it may continue so. Nothing new in Mexican affairs, which I still think is a mere bubble to induce the offer of mediation from England or France, and thus give them (Mexico) a chance to creep out of an awkward position.

I arrived here to-day about 2 P. M., very well in health and much improved in spirits. The city is as yet perfectly healthy, and I find here a vessel loading for Aransas Bay, which will probably leave to-morrow afternoon; I have therefore a chance of getting out of this pestilential hole unharmed.

I had a tedious, though, on the whole, a pleasant journey here. I wrote you from Louisville, telling you of my missing a steamboat. The next day I got one, and had very good luck till we got to the mouth of the Ohio; there I took the first boat that passed down, and she proved to be one very heavily laden from St. Louis, with a most prudent captain, who lay by every night for fear of snags and getting aground. At first I complained of this as wasting so much time, but in the end I was reconciled, for almost every day we passed some less prudently managed boat, some aground on a bar, others snagged and in a sinking condition, while we met with no accident, but once grounding when opposite Natchez, when we had supposed ourselves beyond all danger and were running at night. Luckily, it was so near Natchez we were enabled to get the ferryboat there, that lightered us, and we continued our journey, after a detention of twelve hours, and reached here safely, as I said before, about 2 P. M. The vessel I go in to-morrow is an excellent one, which has been running as a packet between this and Vera Cruz, and is now in the employ of the Government. The voyage is about three days, and every one represents the situation there as healthy and desirable, so you must cheer up yourself and also dear mother.

There are a great many rumors of war and hostile operations on the part of the Mexicans, but none that are authentic, or to be relied on. I cannot believe as yet the Mexicans are so blind to their true interests as madly to rush into a war with us, especially after they find, as they have done by this time, that we are expecting and preparing for such a contingency. General Taylor⁷ will in a few weeks have with him a force amounting to between four and five thousand men, and any number of militia in the States of Louisiana, Mississippi, Arkansas, and others, only waiting for the call to rush to his assistance. When the Mexicans ascertain this, and that our Government is in earnest, they will deliberate a good deal before they commence active operations, and it appears to be well understood we are to [24] wait for them to commence. All this I mention to make your mind easy as to my safety. I fear nothing but disease, and I shall have excellent medical attendance, and every care in case I am sick.

The vessel did not sail to-day, as was expected, owing to its raining, which prevented her being loaded, as she is carrying over a quantity of hay, which would have been damaged. She only waits for a few clear hours to take this hay on board, and she will be off, and as the night is fair (now 9 P. M.), I expect this will be done to-morrow, and we will sail during the course of the day. I paid her a visit this morning, and found her a staunch, well-built vessel, what is called an hermaphrodite brig, one of the kind best suited to the navigation of the Gulf, and as she was built for a packet schooner to Vera Cruz, she has excellent accommodation for the cabin. I esteem myself exceedingly fortunate in going in her, as they have been sending the troops in river steamboats, and vessels of a kind entirely unsuited to the weather to be expected, and it is very lucky no accident has yet happened.

I shall have several fellow-passengers to-morrow, one a surgeon in the army, and another a young officer joining his regiment; there are also some citizens going over.

Lieutenant Ringgold, who left a few days before me with despatches for General Taylor, left this morning on his return to Washington, where he will be in a week. Happy fellow, I felt very badly as I saw him going off in the finest spirits! Well, well, who knows? it may not be long before I am in a similar position, though I fear at present view, and from all I can learn, that it will be a prolonged affair, and probably occupy all winter and spring; however, let us hope for the best.

We have had to-day fine, clear weather, the vessel is loaded, and we shall be off in an hour or two (5 P. M.).

I wrote you a long letter last night; this is my last from here, and the next will be from Aransas Bay, and will probably not reach you for ten or twelve days after this. I feel much better to-day than yesterday, when I was fatigued and heated. I believe I am quite well, and look with great gratification upon getting out of this pestilential hole, without disease, or there being any in it.

Parts of Texas and Mexico covering the seat of the War.

[25]

Captain Cram, my senior officer, arrived to-day, and accompanies us to Aransas Bay; also Captain Sanders,⁸ who married Miss Wilkins, and who is an old friend of mine.

I arrived here two days ago, well, hearty, and in good spirits, having made the most delightful voyage from New Orleans I ever made; not at all sea-sick, pleasant company, cool breezes, and good fare. God be thanked!

If you look on your map you will find the Aransas Pass laid down; I am there, just inside the open sea, on the point of the island to the north. This point is a large depot of provisions, having a bar to enter it, on which is only eight feet of water, consequently all large vessels anchor outside, are lightered by two steamers, and their contents forwarded to Corpus Christi (where is the main army) by two smaller steamers of light draft. I have been for the last two days getting my things ashore here, very much occupied, and am now going to join the army at Corpus Christi, twenty-five miles from here, on the right bank of the river Nueces, immediately at its mouth; so you can follow me.

Captain Cram, my senior officer, goes down with me, also Mr. Wood, the subaltern of our corps, below me. I presume after we get fixed at Corpus Christi, where we shall be to-night, I shall know something of my movements. I never was better in my life, and I can see at a glance that this point and Corpus Christi, of similar formation, are as delightful and as healthy spots as any in the world. It is a pure sand formation, surrounded by salt water and always having a fresh breeze, without mosquitoes, ticks, or any of the annoying vermin of the South. Nothing but the hot sun, from which, if you are shaded, you are cooler than at any place in the North.

A terrible disaster occurred yesterday, which I only mention to guard you against false rumors. The steamer Dayton, chartered by the Government in the commencement of the affair, the only one that could be procured, yesterday, on her return from Corpus Christi, where she had been discharged, owing to the arrival here of staunch and good boats to take her place, exploded, killing two officers, Lieutenant Higgins and Lieutenant Berry, of the Fourth Infantry, and some eight or ten men, and badly wounding some three or four other officers, none of whom are dangerously hurt, but badly bruised. [26] I was not on her, and the boat I am going on has since been examined and pronounced to be in perfect order; so be easy on my account.

I wrote you some days ago, from the Depot at St. Joseph's Island, about twenty-five miles from here, where we were landed from the vessel that brought us from New Orleans. The same day we came up here in a steamboat, and arrived at night. The next morning we came on shore, and reported ourselves to General Taylor, whom I found to be a plain, sensible old gentleman, who laughs very much at the excitement in the Northern States on account of his position, and thinks there is not the remotest probability of there being any war. He is said to be very tired of this country, and the duty assigned to him, and it is supposed will return on the arrival of General Worth,⁹ who is expected daily, and who will then assume the command.

General Taylor, so says rumor, is a staunch Whig, and opposed in toto to the Texas annexation, and therefore does not enter heart and soul into his present duties; all this, however, is mere rumor and is entre nous.

Since my arrival we have been fixing ourselves in camp, and preparing for orders, which we have received to-day. We are to start to-morrow early, with an escort of thirty soldiers and two officers, to make a survey of the river Nueces, which empties itself at this point, from the village of San Patricio, down here, a distance of thirty miles. We expect to be absent about two weeks, and all going in boats. Should the weather be fine I have no doubt we shall have a pleasant expedition, but at present it looks very threatening, and we have had showers and squalls for two days past, doubtless the commencement of the equinoctial gale.

I find matters pretty much as I expected here; Colonel Abert's¹⁰ grand plan to carry out which, I was added to the number of officers asked for, is an entire failure, as General Taylor has his own views and plans, and does not intend to trouble himself with those of other people, so that there was no use in my coming, and I might have been of more service at the Tortugas.¹¹ But now that I am here [27] I want to see it out. I find the climate thus far delicious, the sun hot in the middle of the day, but when shaded from it, a fine cool breeze always felt blowing.

The command, consisting of nearly three thousand men, has a very small sick report, and nearly all of them are cases of dysentery, attributable to the water we drink here. The camp is situated on a beautiful shell beach, having a fine surf on it, where we can bathe, and an extensive plain on which the troops are encamped. The only drawbacks are the wood and water. The only wood is what is here called the Mesquite, which is a scrubby little tree, more resembling a brush than a tree, and which is so crooked, rough, and dwarfish, that it can be used for no other purpose than for fire wood, and is very poor for that. The water is obtained by digging holes in the beach, and letting the water percolate into them, when it becomes fresh enough to drink. Of course the supply, both of wood and water, is limited, and the latter so brackish as to induce its moderate use.

Major William Graham,¹² who is here, has been as kind as a brother to me, and took me into his tent and treated me with all possible attention until I was fixed in my own quarters. Captain Alden, who married Miss Coleman, is also here; so is Captain Waggaman, Tyler's nephew, who dined with us on that celebrated day; so also is Captain McCall,¹³ who, by-the-bye, is looking very badly, as he had been very sick before he came here, but is recruiting rapidly here; all my acquaintances from Houston are coming down here, and, in fact, I am among all my old associates.

I believe I have never yet given you any account of our expedition up the river Nueces, from which we have returned about a week, and on which we were absent some thirteen days. I do not know that it will interest you, but as this place is, independent of army movements, exceedingly dull, you must prepare yourself to hear a great deal about things which, doubtless, you consider very trifling and insignificant; but to my story:

General Taylor, being desirous of obtaining information concerning the country lying adjacent to the river Nueces, and through [28] which his army will have to operate, in the event of an advanced movement taking place, ordered a reconnoissance to be made by Captain Cram and party, to be escorted by thirty infantry soldiers, commanded by two officers. We left here early one morning in five Mackinaw boats, and proceeded up a large bay into which the Nueces flows, and went to the head in search of the river. Being totally ignorant of the country, we missed the mouth of the river, and the first night out was spent by some of the gentlemen in their boats; but I was lucky in finding a good place ashore to camp, where, being joined by one of the boats loaded with provisions, I pitched my tent, had a good supper that night, and breakfast next morning. The next day we made another ineffectual attempt to ascend the river, and got into a bayou, which led us into lakes, and then into other bayous, till, finally, we reached a lake having so little water that we could advance no farther. Under these circumstances we encamped for the night, and the next morning early, I was sent out with four men to explore the country around, and ascertain if the river was in our neighborhood. A few miles traveling brought me to the stream which debouched into the bay, about its middle, instead of its head. I returned, set the party on the right road, which obliged us to retrace our steps, and the third day out we encamped on the banks of the Nueces. After getting into the river we had comparatively easy work. We ordinarily arose at daybreak, had breakfast, took down our tents, loaded the boats, and by seven o'clock were en route. Then, about one o'clock, we stopped and had a little lunch and at 4 P. M. we stopped for the day, unloaded, and had the camp pitched, and supper ready by sundown. During the day, and after we halted, some of the men would take their muskets and go along the banks, and were always sure to bring us in some wild turkeys, very delicious birds. We saw plenty of deer, but were not fortunate enough to get any venison. Indeed, you would be surprised to learn that the country is very difficult to travel through. It is nearly all prairie, but having a most luxurious growth of long grass, as high as a man almost, which breaks you down in marching through it, so that starting a deer or other animal it is impossible to overtake him unless you are mounted on a horse. The roads, too, through the country, are rendered impassable by a heavy rain; the soil is so soft they become boggy after a few hours, so that traveling, and particularly marching large bodies of men, will be a very difficult operation. It took us some four days to ascend the river, when we arrived at what [29] was once the town of San Patricio, now entirely in ruins and deserted. This place was settled by almost three hundred Irish emigrants, under the protection of the Mexican Government; but, during the war that devastated this country, it was a prey to both parties, and now there is not one stone standing on another, and no traces of a settlement except some cultivated ground. We stayed at this place two days, and arrived three days afterwards here, at the main camp, in fine health, all of us improved by the trip, except Mr. Wood, our young Topographical Sub, who was obliged to return the second day of the expedition, from illness, but soon recovered here. You may imagine how healthy a place this is, when we have, collected here, nearly four thousand men who have come from all parts of the country, and many from the upper Lakes, nearly all passing through New Orleans, and many detained there, and yet until this time there have been only two or three deaths from disease, though there have been several from accidents, such as blowing up of steamboats, strokes of lightning, drowning, etc. Nearly all have been affected by the diarrhoea consequent upon the change of life and water, but these cases have all been mild, though many of the men are drunken, dissipated fellows who, you would suppose, would be carried off by any disease. We have here a fine breeze blowing constantly, which tempers the ardor of the sun; but at this season the sun begins to lose its powerful effect, and the middle of the day is the most agreeable part of it.

I find my position here most agreeable. Already have we performed one most important duty, which, as I have told you, was extremely pleasant; but, since our return, I have been much occupied in making drawings, which, as it has been done under the eyes of all the army, has enabled us to show them that we are not idlers and mere civilians, but that, in anticipation of war, we are the first employed, and our duties of a most important nature. We are now told to hold ourselves in readiness to leave at a moment's notice, and make a reconnoissance of the Brazos de Santiago, an arm of the sea, which juts in near the mouth of the Rio Grande, and approaches within twenty miles of the Mexican town of Matamoras, where they have troops and supplies. This, therefore, is not only an important, but an honorable duty, inasmuch as the Mexicans may endeavor to interrupt our labors. We will however go in a steamer from here, [30] accompanied by one hundred men from the artillery and infantry, and take a field-piece with us to keep off Mexicans. For this duty every one is applying, and we are considered most fortunate in being on it. I have not the remotest idea the Mexicans will dare to oppose us; for, in the first place, all accounts agree in representing their force at Matamoras as contemptible, and again, they know that any act of that kind would be an open act of hostility, and would inevitably bring upon them most severe retribution from our large force and an open invasion of their country; in fact, they know we would like no better chance than some such excuse to pounce upon them, and they are too wide-awake and too conscious of their weakness to give us any such argument on our side. Do not apprehend any trouble therefore. Our duty is peaceful, will be peacefully accomplished, and there is no probability of any hostilities on either side. All the troops have now arrived that are coming here. Captain Ramsay¹⁴ came yesterday. He is looking very well, but he says he left Mrs. Ramsay at Frankford, quite sick, and all alone. I wish you could get out to see her, as you might be of some service to her. He tells me Major Craig is going to live out there, so that you will lose your delightful neighbor. Talking of ladies, puts me in mind we have one in the camp here, the wife of a surgeon. Everybody unites in condemning her coming here, as she is only in the way, and has to live most uncomfortably. She is in a tent, living in the roughest manner, and has not even, I think, a female attendant. I have seen her once or twice. She appears contented and is, comparatively speaking, comfortably fixed; but she is entirely out of place.

The mail will leave early to-morrow morning, by a steamer for New Orleans; so that in twelve days you will receive this. How much I wish I could accompany it. What joy to be once more at the northeast corner of Schuylkill Seventh and Spruce Streets; but, alas, it is useless to be speculating on impossibilities! Here I am, and here I must stay, and the best thing I can do is to be cheerful and contented. My health, thank God, is excellent, and as long as it so continues I shall be reconciled. I would have preferred going with Major Bache; but I should have been much more exposed, and my life in greater danger from disease than now; though the certainty of returning to you, and having an office in Philadelphia, [31] would have reconciled me to all that. I therefore join with the major in our mutual regret at not serving together, for I have found him the most thorough-bred gentleman I ever met. Our intercourse has been of the most delightful character, and I am highly gratified that a year should have passed on duty with him, with so pleasant a conclusion.

I should like to write to mother, but the fact is I am so occupied that I have devoted all my spare time in writing to you. You tell me she has sent you a piece of Thalberg's. I trust you will practice very hard, and bring yourself back to your former exquisite performance. You cannot tell how much I now regret the opportunity I possessed the year I was in Philadelphia of learning Spanish. Its knowledge would now be to me invaluable. Here we are, four thousand strong, talking of invading Mexico, and not a man who can make himself understood to a Mexican, or who could interpret in the event of desiring to obtain information from him. Thus we are obliged to depend upon worthless characters, who, living on the frontier, have picked up a little knowledge of the language, and whose character is such that it becomes a question how far information can be communicated through them. I am asked a hundred times a day to interpret with traders and others, from the supposition that I can converse from my being in the Army Register as born in Spain; and upon one or two occasions I have been able to understand, and make myself understood, from the little I have picked up in my wanderings. How little we appreciate the value of time till, alas, it is gone!

A steamer leaves to-day for New Orleans, requiring some repairs, and gives me an opportunity of writing to you again, sooner than I expected when I last wrote, a few days ago. Nothing has since occurred of much importance, except that, much to my regret, our expedition to the Brazos Santiago has been postponed, owing to the necessity of sending the steamer to New Orleans, which was to have taken us down there. I understand we are now to be employed in making a survey of this bay and the entrances into it, which will be very pleasant duty, but not quite so interesting or so exciting as the other. I still continue pretty well, though I have just had an attack of the very prevalent disease here, of diarrhoea. The water is so bad and the climate so changeable, that almost every man in the camp [32] is affected with it more or less; but it is very mild in its effect, and easily yields to medical treatment.

I have been very much tempted here to commit extravagances. The Mexicans from the frontier, who come in great numbers to trade, bring with them the most exquisite fabrics, which they call blankets, all made by hand by the females, and of the most beautiful patterns and colors. I have been tempted to get a couple for you, as they would make beautiful piano or table covers; but their cost, varying from ten to fifty dollars, according to the workmanship and variety of colors, has prevented me. When I go away, should I have any spare cash, I may bring some.

If I only preserve my health, and can see a definite limit to my stay, I would be contented; for I am delighted beyond measure with the climate, and am thus far most agreeably surprised in my duties, finding them easier and more agreeable than I had expected. I find they are looked upon in a light more important than I had hoped they would be, for by the main body of the Army I had been led to believe we were considered a sort of incubus.

I have found here many of my old fellow-campaigners in Florida, all of whom have met me most warmly, only regretting I had ever left the service at all. This has been exceedingly gratifying to me.

We are here without any news. Everything quiet on the Mexican frontier, and not the slightest prospect of any collision. Our army is occupied in drilling and perfecting its discipline; and, as far as that is concerned, this is a very good movement. Things will remain this way, I presume, till the meeting of Congress, and then, I presume, some definite course of action will be decided upon, and I trust we shall all be out of the country by next summer.

The weather has been disagreeably cold and changeable in the last few days, and both the gentlemen of our corps who are here with me have been and are very ill-Captain Cram with a severe attack of dysentery, and Lieutenant Wood with a violent bilious remittent fever. I myself have had a return of the diarrhoea so prevalent here, and all these things combined to make me low-spirited. Do not be frightened about me, but the sight of two gentlemen so sick, with no friendly hand near them, no accommodation of any kind whatever in a flimsy tent, made me feel badly not only for them, but for myself, in anticipation of being similarly situated. Still, I trust I shall [33] keep well, and if taking care of myself will do so, I am certain of it. Both, I am glad to say, are to-day better, though still very sick, but not in any danger. The health of the army still continues good; there are very few who are really sick, but almost every one you meet is complaining of some little disorder, all trifling things, but still making them uncomfortable and preventing that enjoyment of life which results from vigorous health. Though I should not call the climate bad, I by no means call it good, for it is very changeable, the mid-day sun excessively hot, the nights cold, with very heavy dews; so that you have to be most careful in your clothing, and dress yourself three or four times a day to suit the various temperatures. Then again, when the ‘Northers,’ or winds from the North, blow, the thermometer will fall forty degrees in a few hours, and from having been burned by the sun, you are frozen by the cold air, so that it requires a pretty stout constitution to stand the racket. I have been very much complimented for keeping on my legs, when both of my brother Topogs (as they call us) are down. The general impression is they got their sickness on the Nueces expedition; but I know that is a mistake, for I was in excellent health on that expedition, and after I returned.

We have nothing new here. A gentleman arrived in camp to-day who has just returned from Monterey, in Mexico, the other side of the Rio Grande, where he saw Arista, the Mexican general who commands on that frontier, who said there was not the remotest probability of war, that Mexico was utterly unprepared for any such emergency, and utterly powerless and unable to make any preparations. So it seems we are not even to have the consolation of a little glory, but are to remain here rusting in idleness, or rather in drilling and parading. What my occupation will be I cannot say. The sickness of Captain Cram has prevented all the expeditions hitherto planned for us, and I have nearly completed all the drawings of our trip up the Nueces. If I can only keep well, I shall be contented to go anywhere, and do anything; and if I get sick I will try to get out of the country.

Both of our sick gentlemen have been mending since my last. Captain Cram is still confined to his bed, though the doctor thinks him decidedly better. Mr. Wood's fever has been broken, and he has regained strength enough to walk about, and has obtained sick [34] leave of two months. He will leave in a few days for Kentucky, his home, and return here at the end of his leave if he should be well enough.

The papers from New Orleans bring us the inaugural address of the new President of Mexico, Herrera, in which he gives up the whole affair, says ‘the usurped territory is occupied by our forces, but that the internal state of Mexico is such that they cannot redress by arms their grievances, to which they must submit, and calls upon the Mexicans to wake from their lethargy, and prepare themselves to resist any further invasion of their territory.’ This is acknowledging they can do nothing, and are ready to negotiate, so I suppose the question of war is settled; but, unfortunately, that will not break up this force here. It will doubtless be kept here till negotiations upon the subject of boundary are brought to a close, and then a certain portion of it will be stationed on the frontier, as settled by treaty, and the rest dispersed over the country at their old stations. In the meantime we, the Topographical Engineers, will be kept here as long as it is kept together, and then ten to one but we are retained to trace the boundary line in conjunction with Mexican officers; so that I have the pleasant prospect of spending a year here, at the least, if not more. Well, if God will only grant me good health, I will not complain. It is very expensive for me, and in that light is objectionable; but I suppose, if I were not here, I should be somewhere else separated from you, and perhaps with you not as advantageously situated as you are now.

When I last wrote to you I was not well; indeed, I had been quite unwell, though I was about and in motion. I am glad to say I am now quite well again, having gotten entirely rid of my cold and cough, and I trust, with a little prudence and precaution, to keep well.

We have no news at all, there is a complete stagnation in such matters. The orders have been received from Washington to put the troops in as comfortable winter quarters as can be made, and the only excitement now is, whether this will be done here, or whether we shall be dispersed over the country in places where there is more timber and better water. That the army is not to be recalled this winter is, however, certain; but for what purposes we are kept here, or how long our stay will be, is still indefinite. I trust, however, [35] you have gotten over your illusions of my sudden return, and that my previous letters will have prepared you for this, for it is no more than I expected.

But I must not be so gloomy; I have a great deal to be thankful for; I have been preserved thus far, and if God will only grant me good health, I can patiently wait His good will for the joyous moment that is to bring me back. Besides, there are many similarly situated with myself; some, I might almost say, even more unfortunately. There is my friend, Captain Alden; I wonder at his apparent calmness and enjoyment of life. His pride will not allow him to leave, when active service is possible; indeed he could not; and in fact, his attachment to his profession is such, that nothing but similar circumstances would induce him to think of it. Yet from conversation I think he feels very much his position. By-the-bye I wish you to call and see Mrs. Alden, and put yourself out to be civil to her, and you may say you do it because I have written to you of the extreme courtesy and kindness of Captain Alden to me. I also want you to try and get out to see Mrs. Ramsay, at Frankford, whose husband is in the tent next me, and his case is harder than mine, for he left his wife ill in bed and was obliged to leave her and his family away from her relatives and their friends, and dependent on strangers for civility and kindness.

There are now here seven officers, all of whom were in Philadelphia when I came away, Major Thomas and Major Randall having reached here a few days ago. The latter gentleman expressed great regret he had not seen you when he called on coming away.

A camp where there is no active service is a dull and stupid place, nothing but drill and parades, and your ears are filled all day with drumming and fifeing. All this is very pretty for such as have never seen it, but fifteen years of such business takes off the edge of novelty.

We are to have in a few days a grand review of the whole army, which will be an interesting sight from the number of men we have. In one point of view, my position is of advantage to me, as it enables me to make the acquaintance of nearly two-thirds the officers of the army, and you would be surprised how many there are highly educated and refined gentlemen among them. I do not believe any army in the world can compare with them in this respect. I have seen nothing like dissipation, except in some very few instances; but there will be black sheep in every flock, and I have been most [36] gratified to find such a state of high-toned gentlemanly feeling, so much intelligence and refinement, among a body of men the larger proportion of whom have been in the western wilds for years.

I had intended writing you a long letter, but the day before yesterday I received orders to proceed upon an exploration of the Laguna Madre, which is an inside passage from hence to the mouth of the Rio Grande. Being sent as principal engineer upon this occasion, owing to the continued ill-health of Captain Cram, I have had a great deal to do, and have been cheated out of the time I had proposed devoting to writing to you.

We have now some news which gives me a glimmering of hope that I may not be kept here forever. We received a few days ago an official communication from Commodore Connor,¹⁵ informing General Taylor that Mexico had at last consented to negotiate with the United States upon the subject of a boundary. This settles definitely the question of war, and leads me to hope that the whole affair will be settled before the spring, and enable me and many other victims to rejoin our disconsolate wives.

You must excuse the brevity of this epistle, and be contented with the intelligence it brings you, that I am quite well and in excellent spirits at my approaching departure. I shall be absent from here some ten days, so that you may expect an interval of two weeks between this letter and its successor.

My last letter to you was dated on the 12th ult., just on the eve of my departure on an expedition down the Laguna Madre. I was out some ten days, and since my return have been so much occupied with preparing the drawings and the reports, that I believe I have allowed an opportunity to write you to escape me.

We had very bad weather upon our expedition, and I was much exposed. Upon two separate occasions my tent was blown over my head, and I wet through and through. Indeed, I returned much the worse for my exposure, having become quite bilious and slightly jaundiced. The weather has been extremely cold, and the high winds that constantly prevail here prevent you from getting your tent comfortable. Indeed in all my experience of field service, I [37] have never been so comfortless as now. I feel the cold here more than in Maine, because there we had no wind, and plenty of fuel, and could encamp in the woods. Here it is all open beach, where the wind sweeps in gales, day and night, and there is barely wood sufficient for cooking purposes, to be procured. It is a fine climate in summer, when the wind tempers the burning rays of the sun, but now, when the winds are from the north, and cutting cold, it is the most disagreeable and trying I was ever in. I shall consider myself lucky if I can get out of it without rheumatism or some such pleasant remembrance of it.

I wrote my last letter to you on the 1st inst. I am sorry to say I have been quite unwell in the meantime, having suffered from a regular attack of jaundice. I have been as yellow as an orange, and although not sick enough to keep my bed, yet I have felt very badly, and have been under the influence of medicine all the time. You cannot imagine the total want of comfort which one is subjected to here. It has been storming and raining incessantly for the last three weeks, and when one is taking medicine it is no very agreeable accompaniment to be sleeping in wet tents.

The worst effect, however, of the disease, was upon my mind. It made me very low-spirited and gloomy, and for some days, combined with the bad weather, rendered me quite miserable. I am, however, now getting over it; all the uncomfortable sensations have left me, and my complexion is gradually clearing. I attribute the attack to my recent exposure on the Laguna Madre, though I have no doubt it has been coming on gradually ever since I left Philadelphia, for the state of mind I was in for some time after leaving home was enough of itself to produce it.

I must now tell you of a very great temptation to which I have been subjected, and am in fact still so. The Medical Director, or Chief Surgeon, here is Doctor Craig,¹⁶ a brother of Major Craig, our neighbor. He has been attending me, and the other day he came to me and said: ‘I think you had better go out of the country, you are not well, and it may take some time for you to get over this thing. Everything is settled here, and there is confessedly no necessity of your services any longer. I will give you the necessary certificate, and General Taylor will give you a leave in a minute.’ I thanked [38] him for his good offices, but told him I would prefer trying to get over it here, as I did not like leaving on sickness, unless it were a case of absolute necessity. I made him this answer for these reasons: In the first place, it always operates injuriously against an officer to leave active service on account of sickness; for, even if malicious people do not impute his sickness to a desire to get away, it will certainly militate against him on the score of efficiency, and he will be looked upon as unable to perform hard service. Then again, I inquired of some of the younger medical officers with whom I was intimate, and they frankly told me they did not consider my case one which required change of climate, that I could be cured here as well as elsewhere, although they acknowledged the utter want of comfort and proper means of taking care of the sick might render my recovery longer than if I were in a good house. Then again, General Taylor could only give me leave for two months, and at the end of that time, should I be well, (and I have no doubt I would be,) I would be obliged to return here; so that, using all the despatch practicable, I would not have more than two or three weeks to spend with you, and should have to endure again all the agony of another departure. Finally, I should be obliged to bear all my own expenses from here home and back again, as the Government makes no allowance to officers travelling on leave. This, at the least, would be two hundred dollars out of my pocket, which I did not think myself authorized to spend. Still, you may imagine what a powerful temptation it was. At night, when I thought of seeing you and my dear children, the happiness I should enjoy in once more having you all around me, I would be almost crazy, and determined the next morning I would go and get my leave. Could I have been assured that I would not be obliged to return here, and that they would put me on some other duty, I would go in spite of the expense; but I had no such assurance, and the general impression in the camp seems to be that in the course of two or three months this large force will be broken up and we engineer officers all sent home. All accounts agree in stating the Mexican question, as far as war is concerned, to be settled, and there is no reason to suppose so large a force will be kept here; especially as our relations with Great Britain are assuming so belligerent an aspect. All these things considered, I thought it and still think it best to wait. If I find I do not get over this jaundice, that it is likely to hang on and unfit me for service, of course I will then, as I have told you all along, have no hesitation in [39] taking a sick leave; but I am very confident there is no apprehension of that kind, and I believe Dr. Craig offered to get me out, more from his kindness of heart, having taken a fancy to me, and seeing there was no particular use in my remaining, and presuming I was very anxious to join you and our dear children. I hope you will not blame me for the course I have taken, and, rest assured, whenever I conceive a change of climate to be necessary, I will not hesitate an instant about going.

Since I last wrote the weather has been much more favorable, the sun having actually shone for two days, which it had not done before for six weeks. My jaundice, too, is almost entirely gone, my appetite and spirits returned, and altogether life is another thing to what it was a week ago. I now congratulate myself very much for having refused a sick-leave; for although I was sure I should get well here, yet I did not expect to be restored so soon.

There are a thousand reports in the camp, making the period of our remaining almost any length from one month to a year; but I presume the truth is nothing is known about it, even at Washington, and my own opinion is that it depends entirely on the negotiations with Mexico which are at present being carried on. We will without doubt await the termination of these. Should it be favorable, and the questions at issue be settled, we will be withdrawn; but, should it be unfavorable, I think we will be thrown forward to occupy the line of boundary as claimed by the United States, and take forcible possession of it and let Mexico do what she can. In the first case, I should suppose next spring would be ample time to come to a definite conclusion, and I might therefore look to getting out in April or May; but should the second case occur, there would be no telling how long we might be kept here. As to the Tortugas, I fear there is but little chance of my getting there. I have a letter from Pemberton, of the 16th of November. He says they have been three weeks at the Tortugas, and expect to finish by the middle of this month; and if they have as good luck in favorable weather as they already have experienced, they will finish the whole by May, about the time I hope to get away from here. I have therefore pretty much made up my mind to being absent from you till next summer, and this I shall consider good luck. If I only keep my health I shall be contented, hard as is the separation from you and [40] my dear children; but then I am a soldier and must take a soldier's fortune.

This will reach you about Christmas time. God bless you all and grant you a Merry Christmas.

This did not go yesterday, as I expected, the steamer from New Orleans, which is at St. Joseph's, having postponed her departure for a day. This will probably reach you more rapidly than my letters usually do, but still not soon enough to be a Christmas gift. It may get there by New Year's, and probably on our wedding day. Only think, five years have elapsed since our fortunes were united!

I suppose you know that, in a camp like this, where we are supposed to be awaiting active service, allusions to wives and children are considered in bad taste, and one who is always talking about his wife is an object of ridicule. General Taylor was telling me, no later than yesterday, of what he considered a fine joke, of a young officer coming to him and frankly saying: ‘General, my wife keeps writing to me constantly to come home, and really seems very unhappy at my absence. I have come to ask a furlough to visit her.’ The general said he laughed and told him that, if he granted him permission to be absent on such grounds, he would not have a married officer in camp, as he presumed all wives were unhappy at their husbands' absence, and all wanted them back.

It appears to me strange that there should be so many married officers; I suppose at least two-thirds of the officers here are married. To be sure, under ordinary circumstances, they are pretty well off, as when in garrison, they can always have their families with them. I believe our corps is decidedly the worst for married men, for this kind of work is our only duty, and we are necessarily absent the greater portion of our time; but with the rest of the army it is only on occasions of this kind, when they take the field, and leave their posts, that they are separated from their families. Still, I would not exchange, for neither you nor I could exist at those posts, mostly on the Western frontiers. No, the more I see of our army, the more am I reconciled to the corps I belong to; indeed it is the only one I would be attached to. In a few days I shall be thirty years of age. Only think how old, what a dream has the last ten years been to me since I left West Point, what a waste of energy and time! I tremble sometimes when I think what I might have been, [41] and remember what I am, when I reflect on what I might have accomplished if I had devoted all my time and energies to one object, an object where my exertions would have told in my advancement; but, alas, it is useless to speculate on what is passed! It is said that the road to Satan's Dominions is paved with good intentions, and I have no doubt many an acre is covered with mine. It is the better part now to make the most of a bad bargain, and put the best face on it.

You never say anything about Willie¹⁷ in your letters. How does he get on at college? I presume he is with you by this time for the Christmas vacation. I have often thought of him while here, on account of his military mania, and should like to have him here for a few weeks, to give him some insight into the pomp and circumstance. Remember me to him and to Spencer,¹⁸ who, I suppose, is most an M. D. by this time, ready to kill people on the most approved and scientific principles.

To-day is Christmas. Need I say how I have longed to be with you, and how my heart has beat with the recollections of former happy Christmas Days! Last night I lay for hours on my rude bed, in my tent, with the cold wind whistling around me, and felt warm and happy, as I related to memory the truly happy Christmas Eves I had spent with you. I thought of last year. Do you recollect what a beautiful, clear night it was, and mother and Mariamne¹⁹ and myself going out in a cab and making purchases; how thronged the streets were with crowds of happy faces; what hustle and commotion in each house when the bell was rung; what joyous and merry meetings then were held? And, afterwards, at the Major's²⁰ to see the interest with which he was putting aside the various presents for each of his children! Alas, poor fellow, like myself, he has but the recollection of these pleasures to support him now! Here nothing is seen or heard but the regular sound of the drum, sending the men to bed, and the shouts of drunken men in the little town adjoining our camp, which has sprung into existence since the arrival of the [42] army. Still, I am most thankful to Almighty God for the blessings He has thus far showered upon us; you and my dear children, healthy, comfortable, and happily fixed; me, though separated from you, still in good health and as good spirits as I could be under the circumstances. With ample means to support us, all our wants gratified, blessed with the loveliest children, at once a source of pride and the most perfect happiness, who that reflects on this picture but must say 'tis black ingratitude to complain! And if I have complained, it has been because I was not well, irritable from indisposition, and because I did not reflect, and instead of expatiating on my annoyances, turn over in my mind all the blessings of which I was the recipient.

I wrote you, I believe, in my last letter, that I had quite gotten over my attack of jaundice; indeed it was quite a trifling affair, though I was a funny object to look at and felt much depressed. I have been quite well now, over a week, the weather has cleared up, and I have been riding every day. In addition to which I have had my tent made more comfortable, by lining inside, and having a rough chimney-place constructed, in which I have a little fire that I sit by to read and write. I am now, in fact, very snug, and have really enjoyed myself the last few days. The last mail, too, brought the Message, and the Secretary of War's Report, by which we see there is no probability of leaving here before the negotiations with Mexico are definitely settled. All appear now to have made up their minds to a residence here, at least till June, and though this is a long time, yet it is definite, it has a limit, and is preferable to the annoying state of mind one was in before, when there was a hope of an earlier return, and the probabilities were constantly being discussed and the subject agitated, so that you could not help thinking about it all the time. Now it is settled, and every one is occupied in making himself comfortable, and finding out means of occupation and amusement, and I have no doubt the time will thus soon fly.

I am in hopes you will see Captain Alden, who will be able to give you some account of me, as we were often together. He is a most excellent gentleman and officer, very pious withal, but never obtruding his religion on those around him. I was unfortunately absent when he left here, or I should have requested him especially to make you a visit. [43]

My friend, Captain Ramsay, my next door neighbor in the camp, of whom I see a great deal, has been quite under the weather for some days past.

I was interrupted last night by the entrance into my tent of several officers, who remained with me, smoking cigars and chatting, until it was too late to resume my letter. It was as well, for this morning I have received yours of the 7th inst., unsealed. I suppose it has edified some young post-office clerk on the route, and perhaps, who knows, but it has been copied as a model. I would advise you in the future to look to the sealing of your letters.

I am very glad to find by your letters that you go out sometimes, as you mention having been to Mrs. Hopkinson's and were going to Mrs. Vanderkemp's. I see no earthly reason to prevent your going upon any occasion that presents itself, and particularly to musical parties where you are invited to play. It is your duty to enjoy yourself rationally and in moderation; and by abstaining from the pleasures of refined society, you are as censurable as if you went to the other extreme and gave your whole time and attention to it. So, take my advice and follow my example; make yourself as happy and enjoy yourself as much as you can, consistently with a proper regard for your position. For I readily grant it is unbecoming to see a woman, whose husband is absent, running anywhere and everywhere in search of pleasure, forgetting her self-respect, and making herself the subject of comment. But upon this score I have no fears of you, and I should really be glad to hear, as I have already stated above, of your going out sometimes; and the more agreeably is your time spent, the more contented and happy I shall be here.

I have had rather a stupid day of it for the First of the year. In the morning I was engaged making official complimentary visits to the ‘big-bugs’ of the camp, all of whom had egg-nogg and cake for their visitors; then we had a race, gotten up by the officers for their amusement; and then I dined with a party who endeavored to be as merry as they could be under the circumstances; and, in the evening, I accompanied them to the theatre; for you must know that since our arrival here they have built a theatre and imported a company of strolling actors, who murder tragedy, burlesque [44] comedy, and render farce into buffoonery, in the most approved style. And now late at night I am jotting down a few thoughts to you.

I have no idea we will go to war with England about the Oregon.²¹ Both countries have too much at stake to hazard their prosperity for the small strip of land in dispute; but I fear the talk about war will have its influence on the Mexican Government, and the hope of seeing us involved in difficulties will give it an opportunity of prolonging the negotiations, and if a good chance offers, of breaking them off, in the hopes of assistance from England. On the other hand, England will exert all her influence with Mexico to keep off a settlement of her difficulties with us, in order to embarrass us, and render us more ready to compromise upon the Oregon. In other words, England and Mexico will play into each other's hands against us, in the hope that by both pressing us at the same time they will each obtain more favorable terms. This view is confirmed by intelligence received within a few days from Matamoras, on the Mexican frontier, by which we learn that General Paredes (in command of the army destined to operate against Texas), has declared against the existing government, on the ground of its compromising the national honor, in consenting to negotiate with the United States; that he has effected a revolution, and, by the last accounts, was within thirty leagues of the capital, with seven thousand men. Should he succeed in overturning the existing government,²² there would be an end to negotiations, and the whole affair will return to the state in which it was three months ago. I have no idea he would declare war, and if he did, it would be a mere paper affair; but it will cause postponements and delays, and our course will without doubt be to take possession of the line of boundary which we had proposed to treat for, and to hold it with our troops till they have the good sense to give us peaceable possession of it. Under all these circumstances I see no probability of this force being broken up, though we may in a short time advance to the Rio Grande.

It may be that things will turn out better, and that a treaty may be made before Paredes succeeds. I trust in heaven it will be so, for I am heartily sick and tired of this country, though I am more [45] comfortable and better off than I have been since my arrival here, but I dislike the state of uncertainty in which everything is, and would prefer being in a place where, though I might have harder work, yet I would have the satisfaction of knowing that after having finished a certain amount of it, I could return.

Your letters of the 29th ultimo and 1st instant have come to hand since I last wrote you. I had been in perfect ignorance of the prevalence of the small-pox in Philadelphia, till you informed me, for I never see here a Philadelphia paper. I endeavor to hope from your letters that all danger is over; still, I am and shall continue very anxious till I hear again. I try not to dwell on the risk you have been running, and am sometimes frightened to death when I think what may have happened since you last wrote. I, however, place my trust in that Gracious Providence which has hitherto so wonderfully blessed and protected us.

I received a sweet letter from my dear mother, written on my birthday and our wedding day. It was in a melancholy tone, which drew tears to my eyes. She looks back thirty years, to the day of my birth, when she says she was living in affluence and luxury, and fondly hoped her children would never know want, and then she speaks—but I will quote her own words, for I fear upon this point we have both done her injustice: ‘Although in my ignorance I was cruel enough to send you to West Point, an act for which I never shall forgive myself, and never cease to regret, I did not dream that you would enter the army, my dear George. It was the moral standing of the Institution, and the education which you could not escape if you remained there, also the intention of your lamented father, who said your mathematical head fitted you for it, that led me to commit the act; but I was not then as wideawake as I am now.’

This infernal revolution in Mexico is deranging all plans and destroying all hopes. The accounts from that country are contradictory and vague.

I am much obliged to Captain Alden for reporting me so well and in such good spirits. No doubt in his happiness in the restoration to his wife and in the delightful post he has been assigned to, he saw everything couleur de rose.

By an accidental delay this letter has not gone when I intended to forward it, and I am better satisfied, as it gives me an opportunity of informing you that I am ordered on another expedition and shall leave here immediately. It will be under the charge of Captain Mansfield, Corps of Engineers, and I shall return to my humble vocation of a sub. Like the former ones, it will also be a marine expedition, the object being to examine the Aransas Bay, a large body of water lying to the north of this place. I believe it is presumed we shall be gone some two weeks; you must therefore not be surprised if you do not hear from me for some time after you get this.

I am of course very glad to have professional occupation, but would have preferred a land expedition, on which I should have had the advantage of being on horseback, the exercise being so beneficial; but I would rather go in boats than be doing nothing.

We have reached this point on our expedition. We are about thirty miles from Corpus Christi, and shall leave here immediately, on our way up the coast along the inside passage. We will visit the little towns of Copano, Lamar, La Baca, Linnville, and Matagorda, in succession. You will see most of these places marked on the map I left with you, and thus can trace our route. We are fitted out for a month's expedition, though I trust to be back sooner, and, in fact, the General intimated he would probably have to send for us, as the recent intelligence from Mexico is of an important character. It appears that the revolution under Paredes has made great headway, that Vera Cruz and all the important towns have declared in his favor, and but little confidence is placed in the troops of the City of Mexico, upon which Paredes is marching with a large force. All things look as if the next news would be his having overturned the Government and established himself in power. This must lead to some action on the part of ours, either in the shape of declaration of war, or acts of hostilities, or possessing ourselves of such portion of territory as we deem ourselves entitled to, through Texas.

Even the existing Government, which consented to negotiate with us, has declined to receive Mr. Slidell²³ as a Minister [47] Plenipotentiary, though it is willing to receive him as an agent simply. This will demand some action on our part, even if Paredes is unsuccessful; so that all things look like protraction and delay. I have no idea we will ever get a fight out of them; it will be a paper war entirely; but we shall be detained here upon the contingency, and Heaven only knows when they will settle the thing.

At length I have an opportunity of sending you a few lines to let you know where I am and what I am doing. My last letter to you was of the date of the 26th ultimo, written at St. Joseph's, just on the eve of my departure. Since then we have been knocking about the bays between Corpus Christi and this place, making surveys, and visiting towns, and places where towns are to be.

I am glad to say our expedition has been more agreeable than I anticipated, although we have had as bad weather as we could well have anticipated. Indeed we have experienced a succession of ‘Northers’ and rains, but most fortunately have managed always to reach good quarters just as they made their appearance. I have never experienced more hospitality than has been extended to us by the inhabitants wherever they have had it in their power, and at this place we are quite in clover. This little town has about five hundred people, but they are of a much better class than those you generally meet with, as it is one of the old settlements of the country, and has a great deal of substantial wealth in it. I have, besides, met here several people from Philadelphia, and have been much gratified at being able to talk of the old place. I am writing this letter in the office of Mr. Fisher, a son of Rhodes Fisher, the brother of Coleman, and half-brother of William. Mrs. Fisher resides here with her family, consisting of two daughters, one married to a young lawyer of this place, the other quite a pretty and sweet girl, named Rebecca, unmarried. There are three sons, one of whom has been a great deal in Philadelphia, and was there when we were married. Upon this we had a good joke. When we came here, three of us, all married, we heard so much of the beauty of the young ladies here that we agreed to keep silence and pass ourselves off for young men, and enjoy our few days under the delusion. But most unfortunately [48] each one of us found an acquaintance, like Mr. Fisher, who asked me if I was the Mr. Meade who married Miss Sergeant, when of course I had to say, yes, and thus was blown. However, it has served to make all merry at our expense.

Among other people here I found a Dr. Hultner, an excellent musician, especially on the harp, who resided some time in Philadelphia, and had given lessons to many of our acquaintances, and to whom I was drawn from the simple fact of his telling me he had often heard you play, as he used to go to the Bories, where he gave lessons.

We arrived here last night and expect to stay here to-morrow. I send this through the Texas post-office, and trust it will reach you in good time to let you know I am well and am enjoying a little of civilization.

I regret to say that everything looks unfavorable. Paredes has succeeded in his revolution, and now we must either look for war, or delays, and dilly-dallyings; for negotiations, and then long parleys, before this question is settled. I hope for a war and a speedy battle, and I think one good fight will settle the business; and, really, after coming so far and staying so long, it would hardly be the thing to come back without some laurels.

We have just arrived at this place (now 9 P. M.), and as there is a steamer here that will probably leave to-morrow, I avail myself of the opportunity to send you a few lines without waiting for my reaching Corpus Christi, where all your letters are waiting for me. We shall go there to-morrow, and I will write you again as soon as I can. In the meantime I can only tell you I am quite well and have stood my expedition in open boats, now thirty-two days long, much better than I thought at first I would.

The report down here is that the army is in a few days to move from Corpus Christi and take up a position on the left bank of the Rio Grande, opposite Matamoras. It is believed here that this will be effected without any opposition on the part of the Mexicans; in fact, at present they have not the means of making any, as they only have three hundred men at Matamoras. We have received the intelligence of the success of Paredes, and also divers proclamations from him, calling out troops and making grand preparations on paper to reconquer Texas. But all this is believed to be palaver, unless we get into a war with England about Oregon, and then [49] British troops may be sent to assist the Mexicans, and we may have some work. But, unless that occurs, with all the bluster of Paredes I do not believe we will be disturbed in the peaceful possession of the country, this side of the Rio Grande. Our squadron is also ordered to Vera Cruz, and I sincerely trust these movements may induce the Mexicans to come to some understanding, that this question may be settled. Still, it will take time, and now I have no hope of seeing you and my dear children this winter.

I could not in honor leave now, were I permitted to do so, although I could have done so a month ago, when things were in a comparatively quiet state. But now the forward movement of the troops and the refusal to treat with Mr. Slidell place the prospect of active operations within the range of possibility, though I do not think them probable; yet there is enough to force every one in good health to stick by the army, and no one could leave it with reputation. You, I am sure, would not wish me to jeopardize myself, and will I am confident be resigned when you are aware of the circumstances in which I am placed.

Major Craig has arrived at Corpus Christi, and left during my absence, which I regret, as I should have liked him to tell you how he had seen me. I also understand Captain Cram, of our corps, has gone off on sick leave. Thus two out of the three with whom I came here have gone home sick. Lieutenant Wood has not yet returned. So that your delicate-looking husband is not so very inefficient, after all; for, though I say it myself, there is not another officer in the army who has been more occupied and more exposed than myself during the last six months.

My last letter was written to you from Matagorda, where we spent three days most delightfully, having been treated in the kindest manner by the inhabitants.

I reached here yesterday, having been detained two days at St. Joseph's Island by bad weather. We got here about eight o'clock in the evening, and I occupied myself from that time till bedtime reading all your sweet letters and those of my dear mother, which I found here for me.

I find everyone here in a state of excitement incident to our approaching march on the Rio Grande. It appears General Taylor has received positive orders from Washington to march, and he is to [50] take up a position on the river, immediately opposite Matamoras. The good people of Corpus Christi, who have been living on us as did the flies on the fox in the fable, and who see in our departure the total breaking up of their place, have been making the most gigantic efforts to frighten the General from going, on the plea of there being a very large Mexican force ready to oppose him; but General Taylor is not to be turned in this way from a matter of duty, and he told them if there were fifty thousand Mexicans he would try his best to get there. These reports of Mexican forces, all exaggerated, and most of them coined here, will doubtless find their way into the Northern papers, but you must not mind them, and give credence to nothing but what you get from me. General Taylor is well advised of the movements of the opposite party, and we know that they have no more troops there than they have had all along, except a column of three thousand, under a General Ampudia, who left the city of Mexico the middle of January, and who had not reached San Luis Potosi, half of the distance, by the last accounts, though five weeks had elapsed since he started. This is but slow marching, and does not betray much impatience to drive the d—d Yankees out of the country. It is considered extremely probable that they may reinforce their army on the Rio Grande, and that they will place detached bodies in position on this side; but their object will not be to oppose us, but to demonstrate to the world that they held military occupation of the country when we came there, and were obliged to yield to superior numbers. I do not think they can be so insane as to provoke a war by an act of hostility, and the opinion among all sensible persons here is that our movement will be peaceably effected. Still, every preparation is being made for the reverse contingency, and if they do undertake to oppose us, they will have to fight pretty hard before they can succeed. I mention these things that you may not be disturbed by any of the numerous reports that will doubtless reach you.

Not much of importance to add to my letter to-day. The accounts from the Rio Grande are still conflicting, some saying the Mexicans are concentrating to meet us, and others that they have all recrossed the river to get out of our way. My own opinion is still that there is no such good luck for us as a brush with them, and that all will be quietly effected.

Major Graham left to-day, in command of one hundred men, to [51] escort a train of sixty wagons with provisions, to establish a depot on the route, some forty miles from here, about one-third the whole distance to the river. When he left, the mess to which I belonged was broken up, and I was much complimented by being invited to join General Taylor's mess, and informed I should accompany the General on the march. In fact, I believe the old man has taken something of a fancy to me, and I am considered as being in luck.

Captain Cram left here on sick leave, some weeks before I returned, and Lieutenant Wood has not yet got back from his sick leave. This makes me the senior officer of Topographical Engineers with the army, though there is another one here, Lieutenant Blake, who came here, however, under some special instructions, and is not therefore considered regularly attached, though he accompanies General Worth's brigade, a subordinate position to mine.

Everything here is hurry-scurry, preparatory for the march. The orders are out. The dragoons and Major Ringgold's company of artillery move on the eighth (Sunday), and the First, Second and Third Brigades follow on each succeeding day. My position is not yet settled, as I thought it was, as it was intimated to me I would probably accompany the dragoons in the advance. This is very agreeable to me, as my proper position is with the advance party. Should that be the case, I will leave in two days, as they go on the eighth. I will manage to send you a few more lines before I go, and then my next letter will be from the banks of the Rio Grande.

The letters of Lieutenant Meade written between March 5th and April 2d, the army then being settled opposite Matamoras, were never received, having been either lost in the mail or captured by some prowling band of the guerillas who infested the country.

As Lieutenant Meade states in his last letter that came to hand, the advance of General Taylor's army, consisting of the Second Dragoons and Ringgold's Battery, under command of Colonel D. N. Twiggs, Second Dragoons, began its march on the 8th of March for Matamoras, distant one hundred and eighty miles. He was assigned to this command, and was daily on duty with the advance guard, examining for the line of march, selecting and laying out positions for camps, and performing, in a word, the duty of a topographical engineer. [52]

The march was conducted with great regularity, and nothing of moment occurred during it until Colorado Creek was reached, when a few Mexicans appeared, who threatened to open fire in case the troops attempted to cross. They, however, all suddenly disappeared, without firing a shot or in any way attempting to dispute the passage of the stream, which the troops crossed on the same day.

After a delay of a few days at this point, awaiting the arrival of the supply train, General Taylor determined, from information received, to relinquish his intention of marching direct on Matamoras, and to march to Point Isabel, which was intended as a base of supply. Accordingly, on the 23d the column again moved, and, after advancing to within a short distance of Point Isabel and finding that the Mexicans had deserted that place, General Taylor directed the main body of the army upon Matamoras, whilst he continued with his staff and the dragoons to Point Isabel. The army, under the command of General Worth, halted within twelve miles of Matamoras and awaited the return of General Taylor with supplies. On the 22d he made his appearance, and on the following day the army took up the line of march for Matamoras, and appeared opposite that city on the same day.

This morning your letters of the 11th and 14th ultimo came to hand. With my usual luck in such matters, I did not ascertain till this minute that the mail was to return immediately, and now I have but fifteen minutes to give you the news since the date of my last letter. Nothing, however, has happened, so that much time is not required to detail it. Our position with the Mexicans on the opposite side of the river remains in statu quo. They continue to work assiduously, night and day, in putting up batteries all around their town, and to decline all intercourse with us; but they have not yet fired a gun or committed a hostile act, and when General Taylor made a formal demand for the two dragoons whom they made prisoners the day we arrived, they replied in a very civil manner, that, though they considered themselves perfectly justified in making captures, and considered us as invaders of their soil, and enemies, yet, not being disposed to complicate the already numerous questions in dispute between the two governments, they would accede to the demand, and accordingly did give up the men. It is believed this laudable disposition not to complicate affairs will prevent them from [53] interfering with us, at least until they get instructions from the City of Mexico, which will take two months. In the meantime we shall be so firmly established, and so prepared for them, that they will find it to their advantage to continue their quiet course of conduct.

I have a letter this morning from Palmer,²⁴ of the 2d of March. They were at Key West, and nearly finished, expecting to be through by this time. The Major²⁵ was then to return to Philadelphia, and Captain Graham to take command, to complete some unfinished work that would occupy them till about the middle of May, when all would go home. So, had I been with them, I should be with you in June. Maybe, now, I shall be with you sooner. If so, I shall never regret coming here, as I have been connected with events that will be matters of history, and have been employed on the most important duty the army has been occupied with since the late war. How I have discharged my part I leave to others to say, but I believe I have given satisfaction.

I wrote you a few days ago from this place, which at this moment is one of some little interest. Nothing has occurred since I wrote you to bring the two antagonist forces into collision, though various things constantly occur that seem to tend that way, but for the prudence and good sense displayed on both sides. I believe I wrote you of the Mexicans having captured two of our men the day we arrived, and of their subsequently giving them up on General Taylor's demanding them. Unfortunately the good treatment they received, which they communicated to their fellows, induced a great many desertions from our side, and in one night we lost fourteen men, who swam the river; and so serious an evil was it becoming, that the most active measures were taken to prevent it, and in consequence two of our men, who were attempting to swim over, were shot dead in the water by our guards. This, together with the return of one of them, who had been sent over to obtain information, and who gave such dismal accounts of the way in which they were treated, being forced either to enter the Mexican army to fight against us, or else to go to the mines to labor, have caused the desertions since to be much diminished. The men who returned said they had put one of our deserters in prison as a spy, because he spoke Spanish, and [54] last night one of our guards, composed of an officer and two men, whilst patrolling the banks of the river came to a boat with four men in it from the other side. The understanding having been distinct that no armed parties would be allowed to cross on either side, and these men being evidently Mexican soldiers, our officer attempted to capture them, but they being on the alert, got into their boat and pushed off, whereupon our people fired on them, and they returned the fire, and the guards on their side fired on ours. There the matter ended, this happening about twelve o'clock last night. But, to-day, a Mexican who came over here said our people had killed one of the men in the boat, and as an act of retaliation they had hung the man in prison, as a spy. As this last individual was a deserter, of course we do not care what they do with him, but we are somewhat surprised that they have taken no notice of our having killed one of their men, unless they conceive us justified, inasmuch as they were on this side.

Our spy informs us they have about three thousand men over there (just our force), but the most miserable beings you can conceive—he says more like monkeys than men—and that one regiment can whip the whole of them. General Ampudia is expected daily with three thousand more, and in the meantime they are putting up works, defensive and offensive batteries, and make a great parade of their troops every afternoon. Still, they do not fire upon us, and they are losing their opportunity daily, for our big guns have arrived, and are placed in battery, and we are prepared to knock their town about their ears as soon as they fire a shot.

My impression still continues that they will not disturb us, though they will make a great show and keep us in a constant state of excitement with the anticipation of an attack. The game is all in their hands. We are ordered to come here and maintain our position, if attacked, but to treat them in the most friendly manner if they are disposed to be friends. They have already told us so many falsehoods that no opinion of their acts is to be gathered from their words. They say we are enemies and must leave, and yet when we stay they do not disturb us. What they will do when their accession of force arrives I do not know, but I believe it will be a bloodless war, and that they will not be brought up to the point of attacking us. In the meantime we can do nothing but await their action.

General Worth has resigned his position in the army, owing to a decision of the President's upon rank, which he conceives operates unjustly on him. [55]

——said to me the other evening, that if I wanted an order to go home I could get it, though he declined informing me how he had obtained the knowledge of the fact. I told him I had no desire to leave, as long as affairs were in their present condition, and that I was determined to see the thing out at every sacrifice except that of health, and unless I got sick I should remain here until the matter was settled or I was relieved from Washington by another officer being sent. My opinion is that he had no ground for his assertion, because I know General Taylor has said positively he would order no one out. I merely tell you this as a piece of news relating to myself. I am sure you would not have me leave, under existing circumstances.

I was touched to tears with dear Sargie's²⁶ remembrance of me in his dream. Bless his heart! his image is ever before me, and no language can express the longing desire I have to be with you all. God knows what a struggle it is to deny myself any chance of obtaining so heavenly a gratification, and that there is nothing I would not yield but my honor and reputation, both of which would suffer were I to leave now; for I would only be permitted to retire on the ground that unwilling hearts are turned out of the ranks just before a battle. That is, if I did not want to stay, I had better be away; a conclusion I am sure you would deprecate as much as myself. And what an inheritance to leave my noble boys, that their father left the army just on the point of meeting an enemy! And suppose an action was had, with what face could I answer, when asked if I was there, ‘No, I left the army a day or two before it occurred.’ ‘Did you know it was probable?’ ‘Oh, yes, but I was anxious to see my wife and children, and embraced the first opportunity to get away.’ Oh, no, this would never do! You would blush as well as myself! I do not mean by this to say I think a collision certain, yet it is possible. Outraged Mexico may yet determine to declare war, in which case of course we should have a battle. But from all that has happened, and their distracted state at the City of Mexico, I do not anticipate any such event, and only allude to its possibility, as one excuse for not accepting ——'s offer to get me ordered away. I have no idea upon what he grounded his authority; but he gratified me very much by saying General Taylor had spoken kindly of me.

We have most delightful weather now. The summer weather has commenced, clear days and nights, with steady sea-breezes. The [56] ground on which we are encamped is a ploughed field, and is not so good for walking as the shell bank of Corpus Christi, but we have abundance of wood at hand, and a fine river of running water at our feet. The country immediately on the banks of the river is beautiful, and fully equal in fertility to the banks of the Mississippi; but the one hundred and seventy miles between Corpus Christi and this point was the most miserable desert, without wood or water, that I ever saw described, and perfectly unfit for the habitation of man, except on the banks of a few little streams we crossed.

As you may well imagine, we are in a good deal of excitement here, and thousands of rumors of the most exaggerated and improbable nature are constantly flying through the camp, some originating with the Mexicans themselves, who send people over here to tell us all sorts of stories of what they are going to do, magnifying their force, and power; others, again, are set afloat by wags in the camp to hoax their friends and see how a story will increase by being transmitted from one to the other. The mischief is that all these reports get into the newspapers, through letter-writers and others, and unless you are on your guard and prepare your people they will be in a constant state of alarm. Therefore do not believe anything. As long as I can handle a pen I shall write you, and write you the truth, to the best of my belief and judgment; and if anything happens to me I shall make arrangements for you to hear of it immediately. Do not therefore mistake silence for a misfortune.

I wrote you a few lines on the 9th instant. Since then nothing has occurred to interrupt the state of peaceable non-intercourse which existed up to that moment between the Mexicans and ourselves. Yesterday, however, a communication was received by General Taylor from General Ampudia, who arrived at Matamoras the day before with an accession of force and took the command of the Mexican Army. General Ampudia states in his letter that he is instructed by his Government to summon General Taylor to retire with his forces beyond the river Nueces (that is to say go back one hundred and seventy miles, from whence we came), and that if he failed to commence the movement within twenty-four hours, war would be the inevitable result. Of course General Taylor replied he had no discretion in the matter. He was ordered here by his Government, in a peaceable manner, and here he should remain, let the [57] consequences be what they may. He called upon General Ampudia to weigh well the responsibility he would assume in involving his country in a war with the United States; that he himself had but one course to pursue, to obey his orders, and must not be held responsible for the acts of his Government. What will be the end I cannot say, but they have so often warned and summoned and threatened to fire, that I am inclined to believe it is another case of braggadocio. However, we are prepared for the worst, and should they undertake to drive us away they will soon find out their mistake.

You know I have promised to tell you the truth as it occurs, deeming it the safest plan to prevent you from being unnecessarily alarmed. For my part I shall not believe there will be war till the first gun is fired; the consequences are too momentous to the Mexicans to enter upon it lightly.

The General has received most important intelligence from the other side, to the effect that yesterday an express had arrived from the City of Mexico, bringing orders for General Arista to supersede General Ampudia in command, and that all operations against us were to cease till the 1st of June. This intelligence was given to the General by a Mexican who left Matamoras last night and swam the river above our camp, and who says he obtained it from the courier himself on his way into town. They, however, tell us so many lies, and employ so many and such ingenious devices to deceive us, that the General will not allow any information to deter him from making the most vigorous efforts to place himself in the strongest possible position, and as he has the official declaration of the commanding general on the other side, that war would be the consequence of his not leaving here in twenty-four hours, he is determined to take such measures as will let them know he is serious in his determination to remain here.

He has in consequence ordered the blockade of the mouth of the river, up which they derive their supplies, and also given direction to the naval commander at the Brazos, to examine all vessels bound for this place, and capture such as have on board provisions or munitions of war. So that the good people of Matamoras, who are dependent on New Orleans for their flour, will find in a short time there are two parties to this business, and as they have a large force of [58] Mexican troops quartered on them, provisions will very soon be scarce among them.

My own impression is that the information received this morning is authentic, for this reason: we have received New Orleans dates to the 6th instant, and they state that the Mexican Government, having refused to receive Mr. Slidell in the capacity in which he was accredited, he had demanded and received his passports, but that some days had elapsed without his arrival at Vera Cruz, and the inference was that the intelligence by the Cambria (which was so pacific), having reached Mexico in the meantime, either Mr. Slidell had based upon it expectation of being received, or the Mexican Government had sent after him for the purpose of receiving him. Now, when you join the news with what we have received this morning, it looks very much as if the Mexicans had received him and fixed this period (June 1st) for the termination of the negotiations. At any rate, the immediate battle that has been anticipated by a great many in the camp, has passed away, and every one now thinks there will be no immediate collision. This is the impression I have entertained all along, and have written you to that effect, but we have been in a great deal of excitement, and when ‘the peremptory and official summons, authorized by the Government, to leave here in twenty-four hours or war would ensue,’ was received in camp, most of us began to think that talking was at an end and action was to take its place. I, however, had access to the document, and perceived from its tenor, the words being, ‘if you fail (that is, to leave), war is inevitable,’ that the construction might be put upon it, ‘shall report your non-compliance to my Government and the declaration of war on its part is then inevitable.’ I knew that the Mexican Congress was about meeting, and that the President in that country has no more power to declare war than our President has, and that they have told us since the withdrawal of Almonte,²⁷ now eighteen months, that annexation would be a declaration of war on our part, and yet they have done nothing. All these considerations, in addition to a knowledge on their side of the consequences of war to them, has induced me all along to believe that they would not enter into a war as a deliberate act. I did at one time apprehend, and should not now be surprised at such a result, that if they collected on this frontier a larger force than ours (and in a few days [59] they will have seven thousand men to our three thousand), some aspiring and ambitious general might bring on a collision, with the hopes of succeeding, and thus advancing his own interests; but I do not believe it will be the act of the Government, and we are so well prepared for them now, and have shown ourselves so fearless of the consequences, that I am inclined to believe their general will reflect a little before they undertake so hazardous an operation. For, if you understand our position, we are like men who have crossed a river and destroyed the bridges behind them, thus cutting off their own retreat and feeling conscious that every exertion must be made to sustain themselves. This feeling pervades here all ranks of the army, that our only hope either for existence or for reputation (for were we to succumb to ten times our number we would be disgraced forever, after all the contempt that has been heaped upon our enemy), consists in a complete victory on our part; and should the Mexicans be foolhardy enough to advance, I believe their only chance of success would be in our total annihilation; for as long as any of our people remained alive the battle would be carried on. We have placed ourselves in so strong a position, and have such superiority in artillery, that it is impossible for them with any force to drive us from here; in addition to which we have a battery of heavy guns (four eighteen-pounders), erected so as to batter their town, and at the first gun we shall rattle them about their ears in such a manner as will soon silence their fire.

I presume you will get my various laconic epistles all in a bunch. I wrote hurriedly every time I could ascertain anybody was going down to Point Isabel.

I make the sketch underneath, that you may understand the various names I use. From Corpus Christi, or rather Saint Joseph's, down, there is an island called Padre Island, some one hundred and six miles long, and about two miles wide, which forms inside, with the mainland, the Laguna Madre (which you recollect I was sent last winter to explore). At the foot of this island there is a large bay called the Brazos de Santiago, being at the end of the Laguna Madre. Into this bay there is a passage called the Barre de Santiago, where vessels of nine feet draught can pass, and then six feet of water can be taken up to a point of the mainland, called Point Isabel, upon which there is a small village called El Frontone, from which it is twenty-seven miles overland to our camp, opposite Matamoras.

My sketch is very rough, but it will serve to clear away much [60] confusion arising from an ignorance of the position of places, and will serve to illustrate many of the reports you will see in the papers. You perceive our depot is at Point Isabel, where our supplies are landed in vessels from New Orleans; then they have to be brought up twenty-seven miles to our camp. This is our only weak point, because General Taylor's force is so small (at present only twentyfive hundred bayonets), that he is obliged to weaken himself to defend Point Isabel all the time, and in addition has to send an escort each time the train of two hundred wagons goes down to get provisions for men and beasts, and ammunition. Thus you perceive, if the enemy are in large force they can cut off our supplies, and a successful enterprise against Point Isabel, where we have only two hundred men, would be most disastrous to us. Therefore I have been under the impression that, instead of attacking us at this point, if they have a general worth a sixpence he will attack Point Isabel, help himself to our provisions, forage, and money-chest, and then establish himself in our rear and oblige us to cut our way through him to get our pork and beans. But we are pretty well provided against this contingency. We have nearly a month's supply on hand, and each train increases it. In a month, if they should succeed in any such enterprise, we have plenty of men who could make their way to New Orleans, report the fact, and bring back reinforcements sufficient to drive them not only back across the river, but far into the interior of their own country. But they have no such ideas, although they have a larger force now than we have. Instead of offensive operations, they are working night and day putting up defences for their town, as if they expected us to come right over as soon as the first gun was fired, and evidently showing they hold us in very high estimation.

I hope you will not tire with this long military account of matters, but, as I presume we poor devils will be heroes in the papers for some time, I have written it to you that you may be well posted up, as the saying is.

I think I informed you of the report that General Ampudia had been superseded in command by General Arista, and that orders were said to be given not to fire upon us. This report has not been confirmed in any authentic shape, but all accounts agree in saying Arista is to come here, and the last two days we hear Ampudia has [61] actually left Matamoras, probably in disgust at being superseded. This Arista is one of the most powerful men in the Northern Departments of Mexico. He has more at heart the real good and welfare of the people than any other of their leaders, and is in consequence universally beloved, and can command all the resources of the country. Whilst we were at Corpus Christi, he always expressed himself to a correspondent he had there, most favorably disposed towards the United States, and most anxious to avoid a war, and to compromise the difficulties existing between the two countries. On first hearing of his appointment I was inclined to believe it was done to avoid a collision, but the mail of to-night brings the intelligence of the withdrawal of Mr. Slidell from Mexico, and the refusal of the Government to receive him. I now think Arista has been appointed with a view to calling out the rancheros, or national militia, and the object of Paredes in placing him at the head of the army is to unite the people in the impending struggle, which he now sees is inevitable. Arista was in command of the troops on the accession of Paredes, but resigned, in consequence of his opposition to the manner in which Paredes acquired his power; and recently, we understood Arista was preparing to revolutionize the Northern provinces, with a view to creating an independent confederacy. He is also said to be the firm friend of Santa Anna,²⁸ who is preparing to return to Mexico from his exile at the Havana. All these things render it difficult to say what his course will be on his arrival; but I am inclined to believe if he does accept the command, and finds war inevitable, that he will do all he can to unite his countrymen against our further encroachment. I continue in my impression that they will not commence the war, but I now fear, from the withdrawal of Mr. Slidell, and the President's war message, that it is Mr. Polk's²⁹ intention to force Mexico to terms, and that we shall commence the game. Indeed, I look now every mail for a large accession to our force, with orders to commence offensive operations; but upon this point you will be earlier informed than myself.

No open acts of hostility have as yet been committed against us, though one or two things have happened which would give us ample cause to act, were we disposed or instructed to do so. One of them occurred some days ago, but I accidentally omitted to mention it in [62] my last. This was the mysterious disappearance of Colonel Cross, the Quartermaster-General of our little force. About the 15th instant the Colonel went out to ride in the morning, and did not return at night—in fact, has not been heard of since. Immediate search was made for him, and parties sent out in all directions to scour the country and if possible ascertain his fate. Contradictory reports were brought in, but it was generally believed he was taken prisoner by a party of armed Mexicans, who were ascertained to have been on this side the day of his disappearance. Under this impression, General Taylor addressed a letter to General Ampudia, asking him, as an act of humanity, and to relieve the anxiety of his family, to inform him if he knew anything of his fate. General Ampudia replied he knew nothing of him, that had he been taken by any of the soldiers under his command, or any of his authorized agents, he would have been considered a prisoner of war and treated as such, but that he had not been captured, and was not to his knowledge on the other side. The fear now is either that he was assassinated, for the purpose of robbing his person or stealing his horse, or else that he was carried into the interior of Mexico without the knowledge of Ampudia. There are persons who say they saw him crossing the river in charge of a well-known officer of the Mexican Armed Revenue police; others again, that shots were heard just after he was last seen; others, that his horse has been sold in Matamoras; and a thousand contradictory statements have been made concerning him. What gives color to the idea of his murder is the fact that one of the Mexican officers, who brought a letter over to the General when we first arrived, remarked, on seeing several of our officers riding out without arms, that it was very imprudent and unsafe, for the lower orders of population were most villainous fellows, who would cut your throat for the coat on your back, and advised all officers when riding, to go armed. All of us have felt very badly about Colonel Cross, and every effort has been made in vain to ascertain his fate. He was the father of the pretty Miss Cross who used to be in Washington, if you recollect, and two of his sons went to college with Spencer.³⁰ One of them is here now (his father's clerk), and is, as you may well imagine, in a most distressed state of mind. He, however, clings to the hope that his father is still alive on the other side; but the general impression is that his life has been sacrificed, and that the disavowal of any agency in the matter on the part of the authorities on the other side [63] prevents General Taylor from taking any steps other than he has taken. So great, however, was the feeling, that an officer, of the name of Deas,³¹ from South Carolina (whose family resided some years in Philadelphia), a rather eccentric fellow, undertook of his own authority to ascertain the fact, of whether or not he was in Matamoras, and without any permission or authority from General Taylor, or even informing him of the step he was going to take, deliberately swam the river a few nights ago, and went into the town. He was, of course, made prisoner by the first sentinel he came across, and is now detained over there a prisoner of war. The manner in which he left, being entirely voluntary and without permission, prevents General Taylor from demanding his release.

Now I believe you have all the news up to this date. The Mexicans have remained perfectly quiet since their summons, Colonel Cross has disappeared, and Mr. Deas made himself a prisoner, and the impression is general now, that they will not disturb us; but all look anxiously to the United States for an accession of force and instructions to march into the country and take possession of the Northern provinces until Mexico is willing to come to terms, at the same time blockading her coast and battering her towns.

I must confess my sympathy with the unfortunate nation is much diminished by the foolish manner in which she has behaved towards us. Eight months ago she might have compromised the matter, while we were at Corpus Christi; but she delayed and delayed, until finally her refusal to receive our Minister renders active operations on our part more justifiable than they would have been had she adopted a more energetic course from the first.

I have just finished reading your letter of the twenty-fourth, in which you desire answers to several queries which I will take in order. In the first place, I am quite proud you should consider my present position so distinguished as to reconcile you to my absence, and it is a great gratification to me to know that your dear father is also pleased with my position. This affords me great consolation in what is, I assure you, a terrible trial to me, the separation from you and my children; and if it should be my fortune (bachelor-soldiers would call it good fortune) to see actual fighting, I shall be nerved with the recollection of your good opinion, and of the dear boys who will inherit my reputation as well as my name. I regret, in answer to your father's inquiry on the subject of promotion, to say there is [64] but little prospect of that. Out of the thirty-six officers of my corps, there are but three here. Of these only one ranks me; so that, in a battle, were the whole army to be cut off but himself and myself, neither would gain any promotion, and were all to be cut off but myself, I should only advance one on the list of my corps. Promotion, by brevet, as it is called, which is the reward of distinction and gallantry, is open to me; and I trust if I meet the enemy I may have the chance to come back a captain.

Your second inquiry refers to Sargie's learning to read. Upon this point my opinion is decided that he should not be forced against his inclination, and I would have no objection to his delaying it till he was six or seven years of age. In the meantime paying every attention to his physical powers, so that the body may acquire full strength to bear the mental growth. I never knew a precocious boy to be a distinguished man, though doubtless there are individual exceptions to this as to all other rules. But if he is properly taught after he begins to learn, he will learn more in three years than he would have done in six, if he commenced at four. Besides, he will learn to better advantage, the impressions being more durable. My advice therefore is, not to force him, but let him take plenty of exercise in the open air. Keep always cheerful, happy and in good temper, for education is as much dependent on this as nature. Many a fine disposition has been ruined by injuring a poor boy's stomach by too early habits of study, making his life too sedentary and destroying his comfort for life. He can have his little mind as well impressed by your reading to him or telling him proper biblical and historical anecdotes, as it could be by his reading himself, and the inclination will come in time. I would not fail to impress upon him the necessity of learning to read, but do not weary and annoy him so as to give him disgust for the sight of a book.

I should like much to join your French class, and promise myself to study hard when I return. I cannot tell you the mortification I have experienced when I reflect on the opportunity I have lost in yourself and Mr. Merino to acquire Spanish. Every day almost, there are communications, written and verbal, passing between the generals in command, and there are no interpreters but ignorant Mexicans and Texans, who have picked up a little English and Spanish. However, it has been a good lesson which I trust will have its effect. [65]

I must now resume my narrative of events, which, doubtless, you are anxious to hear; and indeed some things of importance have occurred. I think when I last wrote I informed you of the peaceful intelligence that General Arista was to assume command, and hostilities not to commence till the 1st of June. This at the time was a mere report in Matamoras, and as such brought over to us. Much evidence of the same kind has since been given, to prove that Arista is to command, but as to the precise period of hostilities nothing is known. From a careful perusal of the news brought by the steamer Mississippi, with Mr. Slidell, I am led to believe that Mexico has no intention of declaring, or commencing, the war herself. In fact the proclamation of Paredes, after Mr. Slidell's departure, is to that effect. He says he has no power to declare war, that the Congress must do it, but that he will repel invasion. Now, at the time of his proclamation, he had known for weeks of our march, and his not ordering us to be attacked, notwithstanding they consider us as invaders, proves he is most reluctant to begin the war. But I fear that Mr. Polk has no such restraining influences; on the contrary I believe he desires a war with Mexico, for he can then take possession of California, and hold it by right of conquest, without affording England any pretext for interference. But the fact that Mexico has pledged California to England, in payment of bonds given for money loaned, and upon which she does not even pay the interest, will give England a plausible pretext for interfering with the sale of California to us, on the ground that it is mortgaged to her. Hence Mr. Polk would prefer acquiring it by conquest. What would have to be paid for it will cover the expenses of the war, and indeed Mexico may be forced to pay the expenses herself. If some such reason has not influenced the President, why should he insist on Mr. Slidell's being received as a Minister Plenipotentiary, when he was repeatedly assured by the Mexicans they would only receive a Commissioner? If he at heart desired peace, there was nothing undignified in making him a Commissioner. The treaties of Ghent, and that of ‘83 in Paris, were made by Commissioners, and it is usual, upon renewing intercourse, or after wars, to have Commissioners to arrange the preliminaries, and even treaties, and then send your Ministers, for it may happen the Commissioners may not agree, and recourse must again be had to arms. The requiring Mr. Slidell to insist on being received as Minister was a sad blunder of Mr. Polk's, if he desired peace; but my impression is he desires war. The question now is, [66] What will the United States do? I think the Senate will oppose, as also the House, a formal declaration, but will content themselves with blockading the coasts of Mexico, both east and west, and with occupying the whole of the territory we claim. However, upon that point you will be better and earlier informed than myself; but if something is not soon done we shall get up a war here, for in spite of our prudence and forbearance, act after act is being committed which must end in war.

I am sorry to tell you the remains of Colonel Cross have been found, and it is now placed beyond a doubt that he was foully assassinated by a party from the other side who were hovering around our camp, and at the very time General Ampudia replied to General Taylor's letter, denying any knowledge of his disappearance, it is now known he was wearing the watch of the unfortunate victim, and some other officer riding his horse. It appears from all the testimony that can be obtained, that the Colonel was captured while riding alone some three miles from the camp, by a party of rancheros, as they are called (that is, a militia composed of the laborers upon the farms or ranches); but that they had an officer of the regular army with them, and that this officer carried him into the woods and then foully murdered him and stripped him of all his clothes. His body was discovered by a Mexican, and a party sent out to bring in his remains. They will be buried with the honors of war, though his poor son intends taking them to Washington with him. This poor fellow has won the sympathy and affection of the whole army by his manly deportment ever since his father's disappearance. He held on to the last moment in the vain hope that his father was a prisoner on the other side, but now he is satisfied of his murder, and his grief you can well imagine when you recollect his youth, and his position, far away from friends and among strangers. This dastardly act, and the mean lie of the commanding-general on the other side, have inspired us all with a burning desire to avenge the Colonel's murder, and have destroyed all the sympathy that some few did still entertain for a people whom they deemed unjustly treated. These prowling parties have of late become more bold and numerous. They are just like Indians, hiding in the bushes whenever a force comes after them, and seizing upon all single individuals they find on the road. Two young officers³² desirous of distinguishing [67] themselves, one of whom was a son of Commodore Porter, obtained permission to-day from the General to take each ten men and go and lie in wait for these fellows, and capture them. I do not anticipate success on their part, and fear their force is too small, but they are sanguine and have gone. You must not be alarmed about me; I shall take good care not to go out without a proper escort. I am too old a soldier to be caught in such a trap, and have seen Indian warfare before to-day. Before Colonel Cross's death it was usual for the officers to ride in all directions, hunting and for exercise, but I never went more than two miles, always with a party, and always on open ground, where I had a fair view of every thing around me. I do not mention this in a spirit of vain boasting, but to calm any fears you may have of my falling in as inglorious a manner as did Colonel Cross. He was an officer of great distinction, and had just made up his mind to leave the army, owing to an unfortunate question of rank, which has grown up of late years, and which the President had decided against him. A few days more and he would have been on his way to rejoin his family, and as he was a man of property, had expressed his intention of leaving the service, and living at home. Such is the will of God, and such the uncertainty of human plans and projects.

This intelligence as you may imagine has cast a gloom over all.

The plot is thickening. My worst fears with reference to Lieutenant Porter are realized. Some of his men have returned and report he is without doubt cut off. The story, which is very plain, and which has been confirmed by some Mexicans, is as follows: Porter followed the thicket which skirts the bank of the river for some twelve miles, when he suddenly came on the camp of some Mexicans, one of whom snapped his gun at him. Porter discharged his gun at him twice, and his men then fired on the Mexicans, who retreated in disorder, leaving some nine horses, which Porter took charge of. He then mounted his men on the horses, and was about returning to camp, when they were overtaken by a violent shower of rain. The men then desired him to stop, to allow them to protect their arms, but he unfortunately (here was a great error), in his anxiety to return, pushed on, and very soon came to the edge of an open space where he was met by a Mexican, who commenced bowing and scraping until he had seen how many were in his party, when he [68] rushed into the thicket and immediately one hundred men showed themselves and opened a fire on our people. Poor Porter fired both barrels of his gun, and his pistol, and then, finding the guns of his men would not go off, motioned them to retire into the thicket, which they did, scattering and straggling into camp. One of them, however, remained near, to look after Porter, and saw him fall from his horse with appearance of great bleeding from his thigh, and in a few minutes he was motionless. The rascals, as soon as our men retreated, rushed out of the thicket and commenced plundering Porter and one of his men who was killed at the first fire. All the rest of the party, nine in number, got safe into camp, and the Mexicans tell us that Porter killed one man and wounded two so badly they are not expected to live. This is considered a most unfortunate affair, as the effect on these people will be to give them confidence, although they had one hundred to eleven, and our guns unserviceable. It was thought by many most injudicious to allow an officer to go out with so small a party; but it was his own suggestion to go, and his request to have only ten men, as he feared a larger party would frighten them out of his way; and no doubt is entertained that had his guns have been efficient, he would have routed the whole of them; indeed they have acknowledged it was their intention to run in that event. A party of fifty dragoons was immediately sent out to look for him, but they could not find the place, owing to the thicket not admitting of their horses passing. They, however, met the other party, under a Lieutenant Dobbins, and informed them of Porter's disaster and advised them to return; but Dobbins said his pieces were in fine order and he would not abandon the pursuit till he found Porter or the Mexicans; and so cowardly are they known to be, that no apprehension is entertained for Dobbins, as he is known to be extremely prudent and an excellent woodsman. A party of fifty foot, however, leave to-morrow, and as the Mexicans will without doubt retire for a few days, to avoid the search which they know will be made, it is probable this party will reinforce Dobbins before he reaches them, and the two together will give them a sound drubbing.

Poor Porter leaves a young wife and a child. He was a clever fellow, loved by all; and though regretted by all, it is a great consolation to know he met a soldier's fate in so gallant a manner, and made three of his enemies bite the dust before he fell. They must have been great cowards to allow nine of our men to return unpursued to camp; some of them, although only fifteen miles distant, being three [69] days in finding their way through the thicket. Porter's fate is much less deplorable than Colonel Cross's. The body of the latter was brought in to-day, and will be buried to-morrow with the honors of war, and his son will then take the remains to Washington.

Doubtless you will ask if this is not war. Yet it is not so considered. General Taylor informed the authorities on the other side, on his arrival here, that all armed parties found on this side would be captured, and it was in pursuance of this that Porter went out to scour the thicket. If they do not complain on the other side, we shall not; our loss, with the exception of Porter, being only equal to theirs. But such acts as these, if continued, must bring on a general collision. General Taylor is desirous of avoiding this if he can, as he wishes war to be the act of the Government, and not his. But I have no doubt that as soon as the field-work we are constructing is finished, he will take more active measures to punish them than he is able to do now, as all his force is employed in constructing the work. The feeling of exasperation against the Mexicans is most intense, and if we once get to blows we will make them repent their dastardly murders. Last night a boat which had drifted across the river was secured by our guards. An hour afterwards a party was seen approaching the shore in another boat, evidently with the intention of seizing it. They were hailed by the sentinel, and not answering, were fired at, and some six or seven shots were also fired at them by the guard, but with what effect is not known, owing to the darkness. They, however, retired, and the boat is still in our possession. This brings me up to to-day. On the other side they have taken no notice of these things, and we of course let them pass.

Several naval officers arrived in camp this morning from Point Isabel, among them young George Harrison Hare. They are attached to the fleet, which, under General Taylor's orders, has been blockading the mouth of the river; and they came to report to the General that they had warned off two vessels laden with flour for Matamoras. This will make my gentlemen open their eyes when they find their supplies cut off. The only chance for them now is to send to Monterey, some three hundred miles in the interior, which is the nearest agricultural district, and it is extremely doubtful if there is sufficient surplus produce even there to feed so large a force as they have collected opposite, besides provisions for the town.

I wish you would preserve these letters, as they will be of some use to me hereafter in referring to events.

This has been something of an eventful day, inasmuch as we have at length assumed a position with reference to these people which I think will bring them to their senses.

General Taylor received this morning a despatch from General Ampudia, referring to two vessels laden with supplies for his army, which he says, in violation of all usages of civilized nations, have been captured without a formal declaration of war or blockade, and demands their return. He says, ‘it is useless for me to recapitulate the evident justice of my demand, or the inevitable consequences that will result from an unexpected refusal.’ General Taylor has sent him back an answer that I fancy will puzzle him to act on, and has at length assumed a position in which I am sure the country will support him, and for not assuming which earlier many of less prudent judgment have censured him.

He recapitulates to General Ampudia the leading recent occurrences. He says: ‘On breaking up his camp at Corpus Christi, he published an order to his army, informing them the War Department had ordered him to take position on the left bank of the Rio Grande, but to do it in a peaceable manner, and only to exert force when an attempt should be made to stop him. He therefore enjoined on all officers and soldiers the strictest courtesy to be exercised towards all Mexicans peaceably pursuing their avocations; that his object was not war, and that no individual should be disturbed in the exercise of his civil or religious rights; that nothing was to be taken by force, but the highest market price to be paid for every article the people were disposed to sell. This order was translated into Spanish and distributed along the frontier, and to his certain knowledge met the eye of the commander at Matamoras. But, notwithstanding his order, he was met some twenty miles from the Colorado, and at the Colorado, by armed parties who protested against his advance; said they considered it as an act of war, and we could be considered only as enemies. When near Point Isabel he was met by a civil deputation, who said the same thing, and whilst talking to them, the village of Frontone was set on fire, itself an act of war; that on arriving at the banks of the river he sent an officer to explain to the commandinggeneral (then Mejin) that we were simply in the discharge of a duty, which we desired to execute in a peaceful manner, having nothing to do with the responsibility of ordering it, and desiring amicable relations should exist until one of the two Governments should order [71] otherwise; but he was answered that they viewed us as enemies. He, moreover, in a spirit of compromise, told them he would not interfere with their using the Brazos de Santiago, to land their supplies, and they might collect revenue till the question was definitely settled between the two Governments, which offer they indignantly declined. That since that time they have assumed a hostile attitude, in the erection of offensive works, and in sending over to this side armed parties, and at this moment they detain in Matamoras, as a prisoner of war, an individual who, voluntarily, and without arms, went over there. Still,’ says General Taylor, ‘we failed to notice these oft-repeated declarations and acts, until his Excellency, General Ampudia, arrived and formally summoned him to leave here in twenty-four hours, or he was instructed to say by his Government, war would inevitably ensue. Then his forbearance ceased, and not being permitted by his orders to leave here, he adopted the alternative presented, and prepared himself for the consequences. Not deeming it necessary to commence by an overt act the hostilities himself, he yet adopted the mildest measure authorized by the state of war they had so often informed him existed, and ordered the blockade of the river, so far as not to permit vessels to enter. That in pursuance of these orders, two vessels from New Orleans, with flour, had been warned off, and had returned to New Orleans. That no captures had been made, but that, if any attempt was made to force the passage, they would be made. That he had reported this blockade to his Government and should not take it off till it ordered him so to do, unless he, General Ampudia, was disposed to enter into some arrangement by which peace and quiet should be restored here until the two Governments could come to some definite action, either by treaty or a formal declaration of war, in which case he would very willingly withdraw the blockade. That as to the consequences, he begged to assure his Excellency he was ready to meet any that might ensue, and that he was at perfect liberty to take any action he thought proper. That if this should bear heavy on them, they had nobody to blame but themselves, as he had manifested every disposition to execute his duty with as little unfriendly disposition as possible, but they had themselves rejected all his overtures and pursued such a course as rendered forbearance no longer a virtue. In conclusion, he called his Excellency's notice to the tone of his note, which was too exceptional to pass without comment. That hereafter, should he have communications to make they must be couched in language [72] respectful to himself and his country. He could no longer permit him to indulge in insinuations of fraud, deceit, etc., etc., and one thing particularly he desired to tell him, no threats or intimidations would ever prevent him from performing his duty, or cause him to change any line of conduct he deemed fit to adopt.’

This will be a bitter pill for my friend General Ampudia to swallow. He must now either fight or back out of the foolish position he has assumed, keeping up a state of quasi-war, and sending over bombastic letters filled with denunciations and threatening us with the mighty power of the Magnanimous Mexican nation. The boot is on the other leg now, and we are going to try our hand at bullying. The letter has been in his hands half the day now, and no notice has been taken of it, or any action. My impression is that Arista, who is hourly expected, and who is a sensible man, will adopt General Taylor's suggestion, and have an armistice till the action of the two Governments can be had. I do not believe the cowardly rascals will fight unless they attempt some enterprise against our wagon train to get provisions, or attack our depot, in which case I presume we will knock their town about their ears and make it too hot for them to live in.

General Taylor's letter was courteous, straight forward and to the point, and it now rests with them to adopt the alternative, either to fight us, or to behave like rational beings till the moment when our Government or theirs shall see fit to alter things. My hope is, that when all these things become known at Washington, our force will be largely increased, the coasts east and west strictly blockaded, we advanced into the Northern Departments of Mexico, and accompanied by a commissioner, who shall be empowered to arrange the preliminaries of a treaty between the two countries whenever the Mexicans can be brought to their senses. General Scott³³ would be an excellent officer for this duty, and I hope the Government will send him here with some fifteen thousand additional and efficient troops. This will be the shortest way of settling matters, and I believe the only way. These people will palaver without action to the end of time, and nothing but strong and prompt acts on our part will ever bring them to reason.

I do not think you will complain of the length of this letter, or accuse me of omitting interesting matter. Upon deliberation I deem it the best plan to tell you the truth and the whole truth, believing [73] you have firmness and energy to prevent you from indulging in unnecessary alarm, or fretting yourself about fancied dangers. We are not yet in war, and I am reluctant to believe we shall be, except it be by our own action, in which case you will be sooner informed than myself. It must, however, be submitted to if it comes, and true religion teaches us our lives are in the hands of Him who gave them, and not a sparrow falleth to the ground without His knowledge. Let us rely then on His mercy and kindness, and submit with cheerfulness and resignation to His Divine will.

I am in fine health and good spirits, enjoying myself as well as I can away from you and the dear children.

I hear so much of the beauty of the table-land near Monterey, that I begin to feel great desire to see it, being confident if we start with a proper force nothing will impede our progress there. My time is principally occupied in drawing, and all my spare moments I am on my horse's back, galloping about within the lines of our camp. I find the more I exercise the better I am, and really believe if I could be kept going all the time I should be infinitely improved in health and appearance.

I have a few moments to write you one of my hurried letters. Things have assumed a more serious aspect since the date of my last letter. General Arista has arrived and sent over a letter, informing General Taylor of his arrival, and as hostilities had been commenced (alluding to the blockade and Porter's affair), he had no other course to pursue than by his deeds to vindicate the Nation's honor and cause the United States to respect Mexico. General Taylor has replied to him his object was and is peace; he had hoped from General Arista's high character that, on his arrival, some good understanding could be had between them, but as he insisted upon war, he, General Taylor, should leave to him the responsibility of commencing it, but was fully prepared for the consequences.

Simultaneously with the receipt of Arista's letter, we received authentic information they were crossing the river about twenty-four miles above here, with the supposed intention of attacking our train and depot, but this has been the rumor so often before, that we are all tired of it. Still, so authentic does the General deem it now to be, that he has sent for reinforcements to the interior of Texas, and to New Orleans, and we hope to have them here by the middle of

Sketch showing the position of the army of occupation opposite Matamoras (Fac-Simile of the original. See page 74）

[74] next month. Then we shall be prepared for offensive operations, whereas, now, our force is too small except for defence; but in this respect we are strong, and no Mexican force can make us move from where we are.

I am frank to confess that I believe a collision is not improbable, but, at the same time, there is so little absolutely known of the Mexicans, their views and intentions, that it is impossible to form correct judgment. One consolation is to be derived from the present aspect of affairs, that I really believe a collision will be the best means of accelerating matters; in fact I fear this is the only way the question will ever be settled, for these people have no reason in their conduct. My only regret is the Government did not send a large force in the first instance, and overawe the Mexicans. If we were determined to take the country from them, it should have been done in such a manner as to crush at once all hopes of resistance on the part of the Mexicans. Ten thousand men would have effected this, and judicious economy would have suggested their being sent, for a war will cost a hundred times as much.

We arrived at this place last night, with twenty-two hundred men, our object being to obtain provisions and other supplies, and to relieve this point, which General Taylor understood was threatened by the enemy. We left five hundred and fifty men in the fort we constructed opposite Matamoras, in a position capable of defending themselves. I send you a little sketch of our position in our camp opposite Matamoras; my tent was the last in the line, marked ‘Headquarters.’ Our position was very strong, but the necessity of coming here for provisions obliged the General to leave with his whole force, except the garrison of the fort inasmuch as we had positive information the enemy were in force between us and our depot, and it required a strong escort to protect the train. We, however, came here without seeing a soul, and it is questionable if we shall not return in the same way. But, as I wrote you in my last letter of the 26th ultimo, the war has commenced and cannot now be finished without fighting. We must therefore both make up our minds to resign ourselves to the will of God, and looking cheerfully and with hope on the bright side, trust to His mercy to carry us through the difficulty, as He has done many times before. I think, of course, a great deal of you and my dear children, and feel confident it will not [75] be long now before I rejoin you, and then our happiness will compensate us fully for all the misery we have endured for the last nine months. I believe a war is the speediest means of bringing about a final settlement. Of course I should have preferred a settlement without a war, but it is useless to comment on the past; the future alone must now occupy us. We are yet too weak to act in any other manner than on the defensive, which we are fully prepared to do, and if the enemy seek us, we will give a good account of ourselves, but, until reinforced, we cannot seek them.

I have at length most glorious news, which gives me heartfelt pleasure to communicate to you. In my last letter I sent you a sketch of our position opposite Matamoras, with the fort, or rather field-work which we had constructed, and in which we left the Seventh Regiment of Infantry, with detachments from other corps, amounting in all to some five hundred and fifty men. We left our camp on the 1st instant, to march to the relief of this place, and to procure provisions and ammunitions. We arrived here on the second, finding all safe, and on the morning of the third we distinctly heard here heavy cannonading, supposed to be an attack on our fort by the Mexicans. General Taylor, as you may well imagine, was in great anxiety. He could not leave this point, without increasing its defences and strengthening its garrison; this required time and a diminution of his force. At the same time, the sound of the enemy's guns, and the consciousness that our force was too small in the fort for any purpose than merely to repel assaults, made all anxious to hasten to its relief. He, however, despatched an express by a gallant Texan, by the name of Walker, who being perfectly well acquainted with the country, said he could make his way into the work and bring us back the news. This bold fellow left on the afternoon of the third and had not returned at 8 A. M. to-day. In the meantime one or two others had started out at the same time, for the same purpose, but returned, stating the country was filled with Mexicans, and it was impossible to get through them. Fears were openly expressed for Walker, when about nine this morning he made his appearance, having been in the fort and brought an official report from Major Brown, its commanding officer.

Major Brown reports that at 5 A. M. of the morning of the third, the Mexicans opened all their batteries on the work, and kept up a [76] vigorous and continuous fire during the whole day. He commenced deliberately with the four eighteen-pounders of Lowd's Battery (see my sketch) and regularly dismounted every gun of the Mexicans, that was visible, by the evening, completely silencing their fire, with the exception of one mortar placed in the circular battery of the Mexicans, which was sunk so low beneath the parapet that they could not reach it. With this mortar the Mexicans continued their attack up to the time Walker left (yesterday afternoon) but had effected no damage to our work or people, except killing one Sergeant by the bursting of a shell. Major Brown had expended but a small proportion of his ammunition, and was in high spirits, expressing himself prepared to hold out as long as they had provisions. Walker says in addition, that about one-half hour after he left he heard platoonfiring, or rather small arms, and thinks the works have been assaulted. But from this we entertain no fears; the works cannot be carried by a mere assault, and they cannot erect their batteries, owing to our superior artillery and artillerists, so as to make a breach. Therefore we now feel no concern about the fate of the works, and the good news has so inspirited all of us that we may consider ourselves equal to double the number we were before.

I am sorry I cannot report I had a share in the affair, for every officer who is there will without doubt be promoted for the gallant defence. By-the-by, the engineer of the work, Captain Mansfield, is from Hartford, Connecticut, and has often spoken to me of the Alsops and Dr. Muller. If they recollect him, say he has gained for himself great credit for the design and execution of the work, and still more for his energy and bravery in its defence.

Yesterday a steamer arrived from New Orleans, bringing dates to the 28th ultimo. An officer who came in here states the only intelligence they had received was the assassination of Colonel Cross, and that this had created a tremendous excitement, and when the news of actual war having commenced reaches there he has no doubt five thousand men will be over here in ten days. With this force we shall drive all the Mexicans to the mountains, but in the meantime we are all anxious to give them a sound thrashing before the volunteers arrive, for the reputation of the army; for should we be unable to meet them before they come, and then gain a victory, it would be said the volunteers had done it, and without them we were useless. For our own existence, therefore, we desire to encounter them. The steamer also brings intelligence of the expected departure, soon after [77] she was to sail, of two steamers, one bringing one hundred and eighty recruits, and the other four companies of the First Regiment of Infantry. This will increase our little army some three hundred men, which will render the garrison of this place sufficiently strong to sustain itself against any attack, and leave General Taylor some twentyfour hundred men to march to Matamoras with. Our only inferiority (except in numbers) to the enemy is in cavalry, they having some two thousand and we only about two hundred. But we have two batteries of field artillery (one you have seen in Philadelphia, Major Ringgold's) which are so far superior to anything they have, from their rapidity of manoeuvring and firing, that we fully expect annihilating their cavalry, when they show themselves. We only wait now for the arrival of the steamers from New Orleans, when we shall march for Matamoras.

I should have mentioned your friend Dr. McPhail is in the fort, and it is confidently anticipated that even before this he has composed a piece of poetry commemorative of the event, which will be set to music, and without doubt you will receive an acquisition to your musical library.

We were obliged to leave all our baggage in the fort and in my trunk I left your miniature, bringing with me the daguerreotype. I very much fear some impudent shell has ere this blown you up, and you will have been in action before myself.

I have but little additional intelligence to give you, beyond my letter of the fifth of our operations here. We are assured of the safety of our friends at the fort opposite Matamoras, by hearing at intervals the sound of their guns. About two hundred and fifty men have arrived since my last, and will be left to strengthen this place, and an additional quantity of artillery (ten and twelve pounders) which will make it strong enough to resist any force the Mexicans can bring against it. Under these circumstances General Taylor deems it advisable to move to the support of the fort opposite Matamoras, as it is not impossible it may be getting short of ammunition. The army, in consequence, moves this afternoon at three o'clock, and I shall accompany it. There are various reports of the number and position of the enemy between us and our destination, but there are none to be relied on, except that we have every reason to expect to meet them whenever we move across the country. I fully believed [78] we should meet them coming here, and regretted they did not show themselves, for we had but a small train of wagons, and could have met them unencumbered. But now we take a large train of provisions and ammunition, which, in itself, impedes our movements and makes our loss the greater if we fail. All, however, are in the best of spirits, many believing they will not dare to meet us after the result of the attack upon the fort, and their experience of the superiority of our artillery; but my own impression is that we may expect to meet them every time we go out, though I should not be surprised if we did not see a single Mexican. A few days will tell, and I will write you by the first chance.

Our reinforcements—I mean the militia—are looked for daily, and as soon as we get them Matamoras will be ours. Then we shall command the river and can use it for our boats, instead of this inconvenient twenty-seven miles of road that we have to haul over now, and which is almost impassable in wet weather.

By the time this reaches you the intelligence of the commencement of the war will be in the papers, and probably the action of the Government therein. I trust it will be speedy and energetic. Mexico, to be sure, is an insignificant power, but it is as necessary to teach her her position as if she were more formidable. Besides, I believe she is fully able to cope with us for some time, unless we exert our whole energy in bringing her to terms. There should be on this frontier a well-appointed army of thirty thousand men. With these we can occupy the whole of the Northern Departments, to the foot of the mountains, keeping a strict blockade of her coasts on both sides. She will soon have a revolution in our favor, and the question settled.

Give thanks for my having passed through two hard-fought fields,³⁴ untouched and safe, in both of which we have been signally victorious. The Mexican Army is utterly routed and defeated, and we have made an impression on them that will last for a long time. But I will endeavor to give you a succinct account from my last dates of affairs up to this moment.

I think I wrote you on the seventh, just previous to our departure from the Frontone to relieve our fort opposite Matamoras. I fear [79] my letter was gloomy, as I felt confident the enemy, excited by the booty of our wagon train (three hundred wagons, loaded with provisions and ammunition), would give us battle and test their strength with ours. Of course I could not anticipate the result, and felt it my duty to refer to probabilities.

We encamped on the seventh in the open prairie, about seven miles from the Frontone. On the eighth, about one o'clock, when we were eleven miles from the Frontone, at a pond of water called El Palo Alto, the enemy appeared on our front. General Taylor very coolly allowed all the army to rest and refresh themselves, and had our whole train brought up and parked on the pond. The enemy in the meantime came out of the woods, some two miles beyond our position, and formed in line of battle, less than a mile in front of us. As soon as General Taylor had rested the men, he formed his line and slowly advanced to meet them. They opened their fire from three batteries, each of three guns (some twelve pounders and some six pounders), which was immediately answered by our two batteries of field artillery (six pounders), and from two eighteen pounders which we were carrying to arm the fort with. The cannonading commenced at half-past 2 and continued till after dark (seven P. M.), with the exception of about three-quarters of an hour, when it ceased, owing to the prairie having taken fire, which concealed us from each other. During the cannonading the enemy's cavalry made several ineffectual attempts to charge our lines, and made a demonstration upon our train. Each time they were met by our squares coolly, and repulsed with heavy loss. Unfortunately for us, our train was a complete incubus to us. The General was obliged to make his dispositions to defend it; we had nothing but infantry and artillery (only two hundred cavalry), while the enemy had some twenty-five hundred (regular and irregular) horse. The affair was therefore one of artillery only, as our infantry had to maintain their position around the train, for fear if they advanced the cavalry would attack it, in our rear. Our fellows behaved with the greatest gallantry, never flinching under the heavy fire of the enemy, whose artillery was well served, though, as I had anticipated, the superiority of our batteries was most fully demonstrated. Night closed with our driving the enemy back so far as to place us on the ground they occupied when the action commenced. Many and various were the surmises as to the result. Some supposed the enemy had got the worst of it, but all fully expected to renew the contest the next morning. Both [80] armies encamped in sight of each other, every man just lying on the ground where he stood, and glad to sleep from fatigue. Our force was about two thousand; the enemy's, since ascertained, three thousand regular infantry and artillery, one thousand regular cavalry and two thousand irregular troops, making in all six thousand men. Our loss in killed and wounded about fifty; the enemy's, from information since obtained, many hundreds. I was in the action during the whole time, at the side of General Taylor, and communicating his orders, and I assure you I may justly say I have had my ‘bapteme de feu.’ An officer of the General's staff had his horse shot under him, not two yards from me, and some five horses and men were killed at various times right close to me. Major Ringgold, I regret to say, is seriously wounded, but it is supposed will recover — in fact, is doing very well. Some three other officers were wounded; but you will have the official accounts before long, to which I refer you.

The enemy behaved very badly under our fire, as we ascertain from a prisoner taken this morning that our fire was so galling they deserted by battalions, and were only restrained by their officers shooting them from running en masse; and had we charged them just at the close, we should have routed them in toto. But, unfortunately, the fear of exposing our train, and the smoke from the burning prairie preventing us from seeing the impression our artillery was making, deterred the General from ordering the charge.

This morning at daybreak we arose, expecting to go at it again, but on advancing towards the wood presumed to be occupied by the enemy, we found they had given us the slip during the night. We then examined the battle-field, and found it covered with their poor fellows and horses, with boxes of ammunition and all kinds of plunder left in their hasty retreat; and from some wounded men brought in, we ascertained that General Arista, who commanded in person, was unable to keep his men on the ground after the terrible galling fire our artillery gave them. As soon as General Taylor found they had retreated, he left his train under protection of three hundred drivers, all of whom were armed, and some fifty of our men, with the two eighteen pounders, being confident they could with this force resist any attack of cavalry or infantry (and their artillery they had carried with them), and he then pushed on with the rest, some nineteen hundred men, to force them across the river. From the Palo Alto to the river there is a thicket called in this country Chaparral, which is almost impassable when you are off the road, and which consists of [81] thick thorny bushes, that tear your clothes to pieces in trying to get through them. After passing this, till we came within two miles of the river, a heavy discharge of grape was fired into our advance, showing the enemy still disputed our march. The General ordered up his artillery, threw out his infantry on the right and left, and after several discharges from our batteries, charged their batteries (also in the road) with our cavalry, and charged the bushes with the infantry; the result of which was that, after contesting the ground for some time, they gave way in all directions, and there was a total rout of the Grand Mexican Army that was going to eat us up. We captured seven pieces of artillery, all their pack-mules, several hundred in number, all their ammunition, several hundred stand of arms, and all their baggage. Took one general, two colonels, several captains and subalterns and some one hundred and fifty men, prisoners; and it is supposed it will take all day to-morrow to bring in their dead and wounded off the field, as the ground is said to be literally strewn with them. We pursued them to the river, and had the gratification of seeing our flag waving in triumph over our little field-work, and all the officers in it safe, except its gallant commander, Major Brown, who died from a wound received from the bursting of a shell.

The affair of to-day lasted from one to four o'clock, and proved the superiority of our infantry, as that of yesterday did of our artillery. We have whipped them in the open plain, and we have done so in the bushes, and I now believe the war will soon be ended. We have made a terrible impression on them, routed their army, which they cannot reorganize, all with our own gallant little force, without assistance, and in a few days we shall have reinforcements, which will enable us to advance into their country and dictate terms to them. No troops could have behaved better than have ours both yesterday and to-day. Our loss to-day is four officers killed, many wounded; the number of men I cannot tell, as the returns have not yet come in; indeed, the ground has not yet been searched. I am writing to you from the field of battle, as there is an express to start to-morrow, and I wish to apprise you of my safety, and to ask your thanks may be returned to God for preserving me through all. I only dwell now on the brilliant result of our efforts, and trust they will be appreciated. I cannot write you more. Tell mother of my safety, and let Major Bache see this, if in town. Say also to him that poor Blake, of ours, after having gallantly borne himself through [82] the conflict yesterday, unfortunately shot himself accidentally to-day, just as we marched, and it is feared the wound is mortal. Send in word to Mrs. Craig that the Major is safe and sound, though I saw some few balls spinning about his position. He has written, but for fear his letter might miscarry, I want this message sent.

I have been so much engaged with my duties as to have prevented me from writing anything since my last letter, in which I gave you an account of our great victory.

The scene of yesterday, the day after the battle, was most melancholy, and I spare you the description of it. Suffice it to say, we collected the dead and wounded of both armies, burying the former and doing everything to alleviate the sufferings of the latter, making no distinction between Mexicans and Americans. A survey of the field of action, and of the country between this and the river, proves that the Mexicans were totally and entirely routed, and the defeat could not have been more complete, except we had not the men to pursue the fugitives and make prisoners. We now ascertain that all the energies of the Mexican Government have been concentrated on this movement, and we have broken them up entirely. If, now, we only had the means of crossing the river, Matamoras would be ours; but, alas, General Taylor's repeated demands on the Government, and by it made to Congress, to send us a pontoon train, for bridges, have not been answered up to this date, and the enemy having carefully guarded and taken on their own side all the boats for many miles up and down the river, we are unable to cross! To-be-sure, it is to be said that we would do wrong to cross, were it not certain they would offer no resistance; but so certain are we of the great impression we have made on them, that I feel sure, were our little force to show themselves before the town, it would be immediately abandoned, and we should have nothing to do but to march in.

The beauty of the thing then would be that we had completed the whole thing, with our own force, without assistance, and when we were only expected to take possession of some point and defend it.

However, as it is, we will be in the town in a few days, and, I think, without any resistance.

The enemy's loss is tremendous. Their officers acknowledge losing four hundred killed and wounded, on the eighth, and we already have buried one hundred of their men here, where the affair of the [83] ninth came off, and we have some fifty wounded officers and men. But I must refer you to our official reports, which will show you the number of killed and wounded on both sides, and quantity of property we have taken possession of.

It will make you happy I know to hear of so brilliant an affair, and of your good husband having had a share in it. I assure you it consoles me for all I have suffered during the last nine months, and I can now show my face with something to sustain me when I return to Philadelphia. I want to see Matamoras taken, our steamboats established on the river, and every preparation made for advancing into their country. Then we shall have done more than we came here for.

I have but little time to devote to you, as I am ordered to make a sketch of the field of battle. So I must conclude by telling you I am perfectly well in every respect.

Here we are in our old camp, masters of everything around us, and with the road to our depot perfectly clear. I trust you will receive my previous letters in time to prevent any unnecessary alarm from the thousand wild and extravagant rumors which I see by the papers from New Orleans have been put in circulation. It appears as if only the timid in our camp have deigned to enlighten the press, for they have every place taken, and our condition was represented as truly deplorable.

We all congratulate ourselves heartily in having done everything without any assistance whatever, and we now trust the country will look upon the army in a more favorable light, and be disposed to award to them some little efficiency.

It is now rendered beyond a doubt that the Mexicans had in the affair of the eighth between six and seven thousand men, while we had but two thousand, and on the ninth they had six thousand, we having only one thousand seven hundred. Their rout was total, and nothing saved the destruction of their entire army but the approach of night and the nature of the country, a dense thicket, which enabled them to disperse and reach the river during the night. The Mexican officers acknowledge the loss by killed and wounded to be one thousand two hundred on their side; then some three hundred were drowned in crossing the river, and between one and two thousand have deserted them, thus leaving them with only about four [84] thousand in Matamoras. Could we have crossed the river on the tenth, the town would have been ours without a shot, but the necessity of recruiting our people, and the want of means to cross, prevented us, and it is not improbable that they may have recuperated so far as to induce them to make a stand.

But while their forces are diminishing, ours are daily increasing. Already six hundred regulars and volunteers have arrived, and information has been received that ten thousand volunteers are being raised and will be here in a few weeks, making our force fully twelve thousand efficient men. Now, if two thousand routed seven thousand, how many will twelve thousand rout; you can establish the proportion, and I trust the result will remove from your mind any apprehension of my safety, inasmuch as it is a perfect impossibility that the Mexican Government can raise one-half the number required by the answer.

We shall to-morrow cross the river some few miles above here and invest the town, at the same time summoning them to surrender. In the event of their refusal, we shall open our batteries, consisting of six eighteen-pounders, four twelve-pounders, eight nine-pounders, and twelve six-pounders, and two ten-inch mortars, and if we do not soon make them change their minds, I shall be very much mistaken. At the same time we shall cut off all their supplies from the interior and starve them out.

The town must fall or be knocked to pieces, and I think the inhabitants will compel the soldiers to evacuate it, rather than stand the bombardment. We have now a chance to return the compliments they paid to our fort, called Fort Brown (in honor of its gallant commander, who fell while defending it), in which, during the seven days we were absent, they threw one thousand shells, and, strange to say, they only killed one sergeant and the commander, Major Brown. You will regret to hear poor Ringgold died of his wounds. This makes nine officers killed and eleven wounded so far. Our loss on the eighth and ninth amounts to one hundred and eighty-two killed and wounded, being about one-twelfth of those engaged, said to be large, but most trifling in comparison with that of the Mexicans.

I cannot as yet anticipate the future. The opinion of some is that they cannot recuperate, but I am disposed to believe they will try it again; but as I feel confident the result will be the same, I think then they will be ready to negotiate and compromise matters. Indeed, I do not think the war will now be of many months' duration, [85] and I begin to hope I shall yet be with you by the fall, should it please God to spare me that long.

By-the-by, I saw the other day Harry Ingersoll, who came up to our camp with despatches from Commodore Connor, who heard at Vera Cruz such statements of the preparations of Mexico against General Taylor, that he felt it his duty to bring his squadron to give us the assistance of his men. But, luckily, the game was finished ere he arrived. Ingersoll was quite well.

Our army yesterday crossed the Rio Bravo (or Grande) and took possession of this place, without firing a gun, General Arista, with five thousand men and fourteen pieces of artillery, having precipitately abandoned the town the previous night at twelve o'clock, fearing the consequences of making any resistance. For, notwithstanding he had one well-constructed fort, and has had ample time to throw up intrenchments, and had a town constructed of brick and stone houses, in the solid manner of the Spaniards, which determined men could have held against three times their numbers, the impression we have made upon them is so severe, he dared not, or probably could not, induce his people to try to defend the place.

The last accounts we had of him he was thirty miles from here, in full retreat for Monterey, some two hundred and fifty miles from here, at the foot of the mountains. I do not think they will be able to organize another army to meet us on this frontier, and I fear we shall be obliged to invade their territory to come within reach of them. This will compel us to march some three hundred miles, over a country which does not contain in itself the means of supplying an army, and where we shall have to carry everything with us. Still I have no fears for the result. We shall beat them wherever we meet them, and in whatever numbers. I believe now, if a chance were offered them, they would negotiate and settle all difficulties. Indeed, the day before we crossed the river, General Arista sent an officer to General Taylor, who proposed to deliver up to him all the artillery and munitions of war in the town if he would not cross, and proposing an armistice until Mexico could be communicated with; intimating the Supreme Government would now be willing to compromise. General Taylor replied the time had passed for an armistice; he had offered one a few weeks ago—they had refused it, and had commenced the war—they must now take the consequences. He had [86] the means and the force to take the place, and the place he must have, and he left it to them to decide whether it should be done at the expense of life and property or not. They chose the latter alternative, and retreated, and if we only had a cavalry force, such as we ought to have, we could have pursued and taken the whole of them.

I do not think any plans are yet decided on for our future movements. The General will collect here and organize the large volunteer force sent from Louisiana and Texas, which, when it all gets here, will swell our force to over ten thousand men. By that time, probably, definite instructions will come from Washington by which he will be guided.

We have all been very much disappointed in the appearance of the town; decidedly the most pleasing view of it is from the other side. It is built in the Spanish fashion—low houses with flat roofs —but has evidently been on the decline for many years, as a majority of the houses are decayed and falling to pieces. It is almost entirely abandoned by the better part of the community, and those in it now are the most miserable-looking beings you ever saw; and as to the black-eyed senoras we all longed to see, we find nothing but old hags, worse looking than Indians. So you may rest easy, notwithstanding Master John's insinuations against me.

General Taylor would not occupy the town, but has encamped outside of it, and only allows a certain number of the men to go in at a time. He has a patrol on duty night and day, to pick up any of our people who are disorderly, and as yet not one injury has been committed on person or property.

I have been in the saddle all day, making a reconnoissance of the environs of the town, with a view to select suitable sites for encampments and for the defence of the place. Indeed, I am kept going all the time, and to this activity do I attribute my very good health. The weather is warm, but not so disagreeable as it is in Philadelphia at this season, as we always have a fine breeze.

Congratulate the Major (I mean Bache) for me on his return home. Say to him I wish sincerely he were here. There is a fine field for him, and I feel confident he would have a most eminent position.

I forgot to mention we lost yesterday a fine officer, Lieutenant Stevens, of the Dragoons, who was drowned in swimming his horse across the river.

Your first query is in regard to General Worth. By this time you are doubtless au fait as to his movements, but as reports are so vague, I will concisely state the case, which I should have done before, did I deem you would have taken any interest in it.

By law there are only allowed in the army one major-general, two brigadier-generals, as many colonels as regiments and corps, etc. But there is a fictitious rank, as it were, called brevet rank, by which the President and Senate have power to confer promotion on individuals for gallantry, which rank takes effect, or is available, only under certain circumstances.

General Worth is only a colonel in the infantry (the Eighth Regiment), but in consequence of his meritorious services in Florida he had conferred on him the brevet rank of brigadier-general. Now the question which has agitated the army has been, ‘When does this rank take effect?’ The laws upon the subject are conflicting and obscure. One party, the officers of regiments, or as they are called, of the line, contend it only does so when the President specially assigns an officer to duty with it, as in the case of General Taylor, who, similarly situated to General Worth, is only Colonel of the Sixth Infantry, and brigadier-general by brevet. But the President assigned him to the command of this army as a brigadier-general, and of course he ranks all brigadier-generals of the militia, and all of the army, of junior date to himself. The opposite party contend that it not only takes effect in the above case, but also in all cases where two corps of the army (such for instance as a regiment of artillery and one of infantry) are serving together. Now, Colonel Twiggs, commanding the dragoons, is a senior colonel to Worth, but has no brevet. The question then arose who would command in case of the death of General Taylor, and after much discussion and excitement, numerous petitions were sent to the President and Congress, and finally the President made a decision adverse to the brevet. Now, General Worth asserted that when he came here he was given to understand he should have the command, did anything happen to General Taylor, and the decision of the President, adverse to his claim, without assigning him specially, as he might have done, and thus make him second in command, he construed into an act of personal injustice of so grave a character as to compel him to leave the service. He therefore resigned his commission, and obtained a leave of two months to go to Washington and insist on his resignation [88] being accepted. At the time he did so there was no certainty of war, though great probability, and I believe his real intention was to endeavor at Washington to obtain the special assignment, placing him as a brevet. I think the step he took was most ill-judged and unfortunate. His duty as a soldier should have induced him to remain at his post in any capacity, however inferior, till all prospect of war had passed, and then he could have taken steps to relieve himself from what he deemed an indignity. But you must know that though a most excellent officer in some respects, General Worth has the great misfortune of being most rash and impetuous, and of constantly doing things which cooler reflection causes him to repent. This infirmity, in my opinion, renders him unfit to command, but on the field of battle, under another, his gallantry and bravery are well known and most conspicuous, and any service requiring these qualities, entrusted to him, will most undoubtedly be brilliantly executed. Upon this occasion he soon repented of his false step, and on arriving at Washington and finding affairs changed, he applied to withdraw his resignation, did so, and returned to-day, and is now on the ground, a simple colonel, no better off than when he left here, and having lost two occasions when, if present, he would have had an opportunity of meeting the enemy. I trust, however, the Government, after leaving him in his present position for a reasonable time, will give him his special assignment of brigadier-general, as a large militia force is coming into the field, and we shall require all the rank in the regular service we can raise, in order to keep these gentlemenvolun-teers from taking the command.

I think my last letter was written after the occupation of Matamoras, which was most peaceably effected, General Arista having retired in the night, with his whole force, some four thousand men and fourteen pieces of artillery. All our disposable mounted force-one hundred and fifty dragoons and fifty volunteers — was sent in pursuit of them, to watch their movements and pick up stragglers. It reports that at first Arista's march was most disorderly, but as he receded he was able to organize better the command. It pursued them nearly sixty miles, and overtook the rear guard, which it attacked, killing five or six, and bringing in some twenty-five prisoners; by this time General Arista is in the mountains and out of our reach.

There are rumors in town of the advance of a force of five thousand men, under Bustamente, to reinforce Arista, but I very much fear there is no such good luck in store for us as the reappearance of a [89] Mexican army in this neighborhood, or anywhere this side of the Sierra Madre.

I think if they were foolish enough to undertake such an enterprise, their total defeat would end the war, and we would be spared the long march to Monterey. Another report also current in the town is that the soldiers were so exasperated against Arista for their defeat, accusing him of selling them to General Taylor, that when about fifty miles from here they rose en masse, determined to sacrifice him at the point of the bayonet, but their generals interceded on their knees for him, and his life was spared, but he was carried along as a prisoner. This may or may not be true; certain it is Arista is a ruined man; from being one of the most prominent in this part of Mexico, he is now universally abused. Do you remember I told you on his arrival he would either play into our hands, or throw himself into the arms of the Paredes party, in which latter case we should have war? Well, it has so turned out. Private letters from Paredes to him have been found among his papers, in which Paredes blackguards Almonte, says he sent him to France to get rid of him, and speaks of Santa Anna's party, and his measures to put them down. Now, it is notorious Arista was originally opposed to Paredes, and resigned his command on his accession to power. He must therefore have been bought off, to produce so great a change.

By-the-by, did I tell you I gave my name and address in Philadelphia to General La Vega, captured on the ninth, and told him your father and all your family could speak Spanish, and begged him to go see you if he passed through Philadelphia? You will find him a most gentlemanly man and will be pleased, I am sure, with him.

Four pieces of artillery, a large quantity of ammunition and public stores of all kinds, have been found secreted in the town. General Taylor, understanding that tobacco was a Government monopoly, seized all the tobacco at the Government depots in the town and distributed it among the men. This is the only prize of any kind that officer or man has received, though there was an immense quantity of public and private property taken, after the affair of the ninth.

Nothing additional this morning of much interest. The search of the town is being continued, and all kinds of public stores are being rooted out of wells, of the river, and houses in all parts of the town. The people say Arista and his army are completely used up, [90] and that the Mexicans cannot make any stand this side of the Sierra Madre; so you may make your mind easy for some time to come yet.

To-day General Smith³⁵ arrived from New Orleans with about fifteen hundred men. Among the officers of his staff I found young Trudeau, from New Orleans. I do not know his christian name, but he told me he was of the same family as had lived in Philadelphia. Mason Graham, from Washington, has also come as a captain, and I believe almost everybody is coming—Bailie Peyton as a colonel, and Tom, Dick and Harry as majors, captains and privates. We shall be overrun, and I fear have too many for any practicable purposes; for we have now, and cannot increase it, only a limited supply of transportation, and sending too many men at this moment may have the effect of impeding the movements of all.

I will try to write often, but have so much to do that at night when I come home I am so fatigued that I think of nothing but going to sleep. You may probably ask, ‘What have you to do?’ Well, after the battles I had to make surveys of each field; then I had to reconnoitre the river, eight miles above and five miles below our camp, to select a crossing place; and as soon as we entered Matamoras, instead of squatting down, as the rest have done, for a few days' quiet, I was immediately required to make an exact survey of the town and the adjacent country for one and a half miles. Upon this I am at present engaged.

I have been assiduously engaged in making the survey of the town, and have to-day finished the field work, and shall commence to-morrow the drawing, which will without doubt occupy a week. I rise early in the morning with the dawn, and after breakfasting, start out on foot with a party of five men and trace out the roads leading from the town, each for several miles. In this manner I have been led to stop at many houses, and whenever I find a pretty girl I begin talking Spanish, asking for water, the name of the road, etc., etc. This is purely, I assure you, from a desire to acquire the language, which I find not difficult. I am fully convinced now that if I had only prosecuted my studies under you for a few weeks, and acquired some knowledge of the construction of the language, and of verbs, adjectives, etc., I could speak it in a very short time.

You must not be concerned about the pretty girls, for I will [91] frankly confess as yet I have seen but one sufficiently good looking to stop me, and she evinced no disposition to cultivate my acquaintance.

The volunteers continue to pour in, and I regret to say I do not see it with much satisfaction. They are perfectly ignorant of discipline, and most restive under restraint. They are in consequence a most disorderly mass, who will give us, I fear, more trouble than the enemy. Already are our guard-houses filled daily with drunken officers and men, who go to the town, get drunk and commit outrages on the citizens. Headquarters are unfortunately situated on the bank of the river, just opposite the camp of one of these gallant regiments, but notwithstanding the positive order of General Taylor and of their own officers, that no firing is to be allowed in camp, they come down in crowds to the bank of the river opposite to us and discharge their pieces right across, and the bullets come whizzing by us as thick as in an action, and I really consider spending a day in my tent, uninjured, equivalent to passing through a well-contested action.

There is no use in giving them orders; they will not obey them, and they will in consequence waste more ammunition in a few weeks' idleness at this place than the regulars have wasted since their arrival at Corpus Christi last summer, including both battles. This is the miserable economy of our Government. It will not keep a regular army in proportion to our population and frontier, and equivalent to the wants of the country, for fear of the expense, yet six months of this volunteer force will cost as much as five years for a regular force of equal size.

Had the United States had in service twenty thousand men, instead of five thousand (our present army), it could have sent a force of good, disciplined soldiers, say fifteen thousand, to this country, who would have followed up the results of our victories, and ere this the war would have been finished. As it is, we shall have some twenty or thirty thousand irregulars, whose usefulness may well be doubted, from past experience and present appearances, and at an expense sufficient to have maintained the regular force for many years. However, there is no use in wasting time and paper in arguing a point that must be evident to all rational persons.

The great question is now, What is going to be done? General Taylor, I believe, waits for instructions from Washington, though he is making his arrangements as rapidly as possible to carry out his own plans, in the event of not being instructed. [92]

The papers by the last mail bring us the intelligence of the action of Congress, the President's proclamation, the rumor that thirty thousand men are to be sent here, and some say General Scott to command them. Unfortunately the mail-rider from Point Isabel lost his mail yesterday, and it is said to be the most important mail ever sent to us, as it contains all this information in official documents. Parties have been sent to look for it and I trust it may yet be recovered.

The first thing we have to do is to collect here the means for subsisting a large force, and for transporting their baggage and subsistence into the interior. This will require several steamboats to navigate the river and the purchase of a large number of wagons with mules, and mules to pack.

I send you a little rough sketch of the seat of proposed operations, in order that you may understand what I am writing about.

The various places on the river between this and Mier, namely, Reinosa and Camargo, will have to be occupied and garrisoned. Then from Camargo, or this place, or both, columns can be advanced into the interior and the country occupied to Monterey and Victoria; then an expedition sent to Tampico, and occupying that place, we shall have the whole country to the foot of the Sierra Madre, a chain of mountains beginning at Tampico and extending by Victoria, Monterey, to the Presidio de Rio Grande, a town on the river. This occupation, with a strict blockade of both coasts of Mexico, and the gaining of another victory, will bring Mexico to terms. All this will be done in four months, and then, should it please God to spare me through it, I expect to be on my way home.

I find by your letter of the thirteenth the alarm had reached Philadelphia, and as a matter of course you were in an unhappy state of anxiety. The papers, as I imagined, have been filled with the most false and exaggerated rumors, rendering our position much more precarious than we ever thought it to be, though I frankly acknowledge we had no reason to anticipate such brilliant success as it pleased Heaven to grant to our arms. We knew the Mexicans were in overwhelming force, had no accurate information of their exact numbers, and though we felt all confidence in our means of resistance, yet the boldest heart was obliged to admit the chances of war might be against us. I never entertained any apprehension [93] for Point Isabel. At first I considered General Taylor had made a mistake in ever leaving the place without making its defenses complete; but at that time few really believed the Mexicans intended seriously to fight. After we ascertained their determination, which we did on the arrival of General Arista, and the capture of Thornton, then Point Isabel was so far fortified as to render it in my estimation good against the Mexicans, and since we have met them and know their power, I consider it to have been impregnable. We never were in want of supplies, always having had an abundance. On the 1st instant, when we left our camp to go to Point Isabel, we had in camp ten days supplies for the whole army, which could have been spun out into twenty days, by which time the reinforcements would have arrived.

But General Taylor, as well as the whole army, was anxious to try our strength before the volunteers should come, knowing how much our reputation depended on so doing. Indeed, I see the Texans, who, by-the-by, have shown great backwardness in coming to our supposed relief, give as the reason they had whipped five and three to one, and were confident General Taylor could whip a larger proportion. Had we then avoided a conflict, and after circumstances established the ratio that now exists, three to one, we should have been ruined as an army and very probably disbanded. General Taylor therefore left his camp opposite Matamoras, with his army (leaving a regiment and thirty days provisions for the garrison in the fort), ostensibly for the purpose of bringing back more supplies of ammunition and provisions, but really to give the enemy an opportunity to oppose us if they desired one, and as I wrote you from Point Isabel, on the 3d instant, we were disappointed in not meeting them going down, as we had a small baggage train only and would have been unencumbered in the battle. On our return, when they met us, we had two hundred wagons, which acted as an anchor to us, preventing us from advancing on the field, for fear of leaving the train exposed to attacks in the rear. This it was which compelled us to stand a five hours cannonading, instead of charging and routing them the first day. This, however, I think I have explained to you before in previous letters. Indeed, I think, with my letters and the official reports, you will be able to understand all about our operations.

I am sure you will, like myself, find in the pleasant excitement of victory and safety ample consolation for previous misery. Such is [94] war and its terrible consequences. For my part I have no hesitation in saying I have no stomach for it. I trust I shall always do my duty, from a stern sense of the propriety of assisting in the defense of my country, and giving my services to a Government by which I have been supported when there were no risks to run. But I candidly acknowledge I have no penchant for it; nothing but a sense of duty would keep me in it.

Fighting is the least part of the duty, and the least arduous. Look at our little army here. Ever since last August in the field, exposed to the vicissitudes of a trying climate, without proper protection from the weather, or shelter from the storms, harassed and almost broken down by continued marches over a country almost a desert, without wood or water; and in all this time they have only had eight hours fighting, five one day and three the next. Now what tires the soldier is the previous fatigues and hardships he must endure ere he has an opportunity to repay himself by glory.

Had the Mexicans not attacked us, or had they compromised the question after our arrival, so as to have had no fighting, who would have given us credit for all that you know we have gone through? And how many would have known even that we were here? But a small proportion, I assure you, of those who now are willing to give us credit, and yet in truth I would rather take my chance in four battles than wait a year without any!

Some two thousand volunteers are here already, but they had hardly been on the ground three days before the men began to mutiny at their legitimate duty. Gentlemen from Louisiana, owning plantations and negroes, came here as common soldiers, and then revolt at the idea of drawing their own water and cutting their own wood, and in fact, they expect the regulars, who have to take care of themselves, to play waiters to them.

No, soldiering is no play, and those who undertake it must make up their minds to hard times and hard knocks.

Your letter of the thirteenth I consider a perfect model, and so delighted have I been with the good sense and firmness displayed in it, that I have read it to two or three of my friends in the camp, as showing what a heroine you are, and how rationally you have written, even when your mind was fully alive to all the danger I was in. They all expressed themselves in the most complimentary manner of you, and of your dear father's sound and cool judgment, when all others could see nothing but alarm, perceiving, as it were, with an eagle's [95] eye the cloud of confused reports and vague rumors, and seizing upon the true state of the case, that we were well supplied with provisions, in fortified lines, and not in any more dangerous position than people always are who are so foolish as to meddle with war and its attendant consequences.

By the time this reaches you, you will be wanting more excitement.

I have also a letter from my good friend Israel Pemberton, whom I am glad to see back in Philadelphia. Tell him I was much gratified with his letter, and shall answer it immediately. In the meantime say John is safe and sound, that he was at Point Isabel, attached to Major Munroe's Company, but on our going down on the 1st instant, he had the good fortune to be transferred to one of the marching companies, and was in both actions, and on the second day, the ninth, was in the advance, which first received the fire of the enemy, and which was the whole time in the thickest of the fight. John had a ball pass through his hat, which castor he will doubtless preserve with care in memory of the day. Say he is well and hearty, in tolerable spirits, but his time all taken up in writing, as he says, to his girl, whom he is most desperately anxious to see, a feeling I can readily appreciate and most sincerely sympathize with.

Your friend * * * has been at St. Joseph's Island all the time since we left. Entre nous, his day for field-service is past. He has what the wags call ‘prevaricating veins’ in his legs, which prevent him from riding or walking, and he was left at St. Joseph's in charge of the camp women and baggage. Ramsey is in fine health and fine spirits.

The papers by the last mail tell us General Scott is coming, and the President is going to send thirty thousand men. Heaven only knows what they will do with them, or how they are to be subsisted! It will be fine times for the pork merchants in Cincinnati.

The last accounts from Arista are that he has halted about a hundred miles from here and not yet entered the mountains. This may be a ruse of his to attract us in that direction and then get out of our way, as the road he has taken strikes the mountains between Monterey and Tampico, and is badly supplied with wood and water, and is decidedly disadvantageous for us to operate on. In a few days I presume we shall have force enough, and the means of transportation, to commence our march up the river and occupy Reinosa and the Camargo. This latter place will be made the great depot, and our operations carried on from there. I am anxious to be up [96] there, for the hot season is rapidly approaching, and I believe the higher up you get the healthier it is.

I trust you will keep up your spirits to the last. I really think now that four months will settle the affair with Mexico, unless England sides with her, in which event we shall have a war such as the world has not seen for many years; one of antagonistic principles, in which all the nations of Europe must take a part, and in which every able-bodied man in our country will have to bear his share. If that is coming, the sooner the better, and then it makes but little difference where I am, for I should not be allowed to live quietly with you, and I would just as soon meet British troops on the plains of Tamaulipas as on those of Canada. I trust, however, England has yet too much good sense to enter upon an unnecessary war, one where no point of honor or of vital interest is concerned. She ought to know, however great her temporary success may be, that in the end she must suffer. It is too late in the day to conquer or subdue us. As a people we are rising, and she has arrived at her zenith, and her safest plan is to keep on good terms with us, if she can do so without loss of honor.

Since the date of my last letter but little has occurred worthy of remark. The army still continues quiet in its camp around the town. The volunteers continue to pour in from Louisiana, which State has really exerted herself most handsomely to come to our supposed rescue. I think I mentioned in my last letter that among her Volunteers I had met young Trudeau, the son of the friend of your family. He is the one who was intended by his father for the Navy, at the time of the anticipated French war, and who afterwards studied law in Joseph R. Ingersoll's office. He recollected you perfectly, and seemed quite pleased to meet me. I have met him quite often, and find him very much of a gentleman. Mr. Wise's³⁶ friend, Bailie Peyton, is also here in command of a regiment, but as his force is not stationed at this place, I have had no opportunity of making his acquaintance.

We have recent intelligence to-day from the Mexican army. It was obliged, from fatigue and other causes, to halt at Linares, a small town at the foot of the Sierra Madre, about half-way between [97] Tampico and Monterey. Here an epidemic, in the shape of a typhoid fever, had broken out among them, and one general, a General Garcia, together with a great many men, had died. General Terrejone was said to be dying, and what with disease and desertion the force was reduced from four to one thousand men. It was also reported that, in consequence of the intrigues of Ampudia, Arista had been arrested by the troops and sent to the City of Mexico, upon the charge of having sold them to General Taylor. Another report stated that Arista had arrested Ampudia, on the charge of desertion, on the ninth, and had despatched him to Mexico. We do not know what confidence to place in these reports, but their existence evidently proves the total disorganization of the enemy, and their inability to meet us for some time.

You must not entertain any apprehension for our health, from the reported sickness of the Mexicans. They are but poorly clothed, entirely without protection from the weather, fed only on fresh beef and corn, and marched to death. Such treatment, of course, will break down the hardest troops; and then their surgeons are for the most part quacks, who are unable to give them the treatment their disease requires. The state of affairs with us is quite different. Our men are well fed and clothed, and comparatively protected from the weather. The consequence is that our sick list is quite small, and I trust we shall get through the summer without much disease.

I enclose you the first number of a paper just published in town by a Texan of the name of McLeod, a classmate of mine at West Point, who, on leaving that institution, resigned his commission in the army and went to Texas, where he has figured prominently since as a military man, politician and newspaper editor. I do not know what the general feeling is with regard to his paper in the camp, but for myself, I consider it most pernicious, and were I in General Taylor's place, I would order it stopped. His address to the people will only tend to inflame them against us, and will give an opportunity to Mexico to appeal to foreign nations to rescue her from impending destruction. Now, as his sentiments are simply those of a private individual, unauthorized by the authorities, being written and published and distributed right under the eye of the commanding general, they will be quoted as the opinions of the army and Government of the United States, and used accordingly.

Information has been received of the coming of General Scott, but it is reported he will not be here before September.

I send you the second number of the paper established in Matamoras, since our occupation of the town. I think its general tone meets with the disapprobation of the greater portion of the army, but General Taylor does not think it worth while to interfere in such matters, and it is in consequence suffered to go on.

You will see by it that an advanced movement was made to-day, in the marching of two hundred and fifty infantry, sixty wounded men, and two pieces of artillery, to Reinosa, a little town on the river, about sixty miles from here, and about half-way to Camargo, another river town on this side, which is proposed as the main depot of the army, should we advance into the interior. This movement is made with a view of preparing the way for our steamboats (whenever they should reach here) to ascend the river and to clear the country of General Canales and his band of rancheros, who are said to be in the neighborhood of Reinosa, plundering their own people. A few days ago a deputation of the principal citizens of Reinosa waited on the General to ask his protection, inasmuch as the Mexican Government had deserted them, and they were in fear of the Indians. As soon as they had returned home, Canales seized them and threw them into prison, on the plea of their assisting the enemy. We look forward with some eagerness to the arrival of the one thousand mounted Texans called for, as the General will despatch them after Canales as soon as they arrive.

We have received intelligence of the passage of a bill by Congress increasing the army to fifteen thousand men, and, in consequence, a number of officers have been sent from here to various parts of the country to recruit, so as to fill up the ranks. Some of these will go to Philadelphia, among others young Crittenden, of the Fifth Infantry, a nephew of your father's friend, the Senator. I promised to give him a letter to you, but he left before I had written it. I believe he is an excellent young officer, though my acquaintance with him is quite slight; but I should like you to see an officer who had been in both battles, as he could give you a more minute description than I could do by writing.

As I said before, I do not consider General Taylor a very distinguished general—that is to say, professionally—but his success will make him so in the public eye, and the previous reports of anticipated disaster will only serve to add lustre to his victories. His judgment is much superior to General Worth's. Most of the reports [99] you hear are erroneous. General Taylor did omit to do things which many considered he ought to have done, but which now turn out unnecessary, and I therefore doubt, if the matter had to be gone over, whether any one who pursued a different course would be as successful, for the want of military precautions, for which he is charged, no doubt had their influence in inducing the enemy to meet us in a pitched battle, which of all consummations was the one we most devoutly prayed for. In military matters, as in all things else, success is the grand criterion by which men are judged, and it is evident from the tone of the public press that General Taylor will override all influences brought to bear against him.

I suppose the story of my refusing to be General Worth's Aide arose from my declining to leave the country when he did, and comes from * * *. I can account for it in no other manner, inasmuch as I never was offered the position, and in fact am excluded by ‘regulations,’ which confine the appointment of aides to the subalterns of the line of the army. I had many discussions with * * * while he was here, with reference to General Worth and the step he was taking, and told him I considered it most ill-judged, and that it would require all General Worth's previous reputation for gallantry and good conduct to sustain him in it. It is a notorious fact that up to the moment he determined on leaving, he expressed himself openly as confident of a war; but as soon as he had made up his mind to go, he was willing to take General Taylor's opinion that there would be no fighting; and yet you will be astonished to hear that General Taylor used every argument he could to induce General Worth to remain, and even the night before he left the camp sent him some private information he had received of the movement of the Mexicans, and General Worth, after reading it, replied to the staff officer who carried it to him, ‘Sir, it only confirms me in my previous opinion that your gallant chief is in a most critical situation —more critical than his courageous heart is willing to admit.’ Still he went off, and after getting to Point Isabel and hearing of Ampudia's threat, he wrote to General Taylor to say, ‘if his services were of any use to him, he would return.’ Now, General Taylor, after the course pursued by General Worth, was not going to treat him as a spoiled child, and say one moment, ‘You may go,’ and the next, ‘Oh, you must come back; I cannot get along without you.’ He left it to the man to act for himself, and said: ‘I see no necessity for changing my opinion. You asked to go; as a friend I advised you [100] against the step. You insisted; I then officially gave you permission to retire. I have now nothing further to say, except I see no more necessity for your return than there was for my withholding permission for you to retire.’ That is to say, I thought when I allowed you to go, I could get along without you, and whether you stay or go is a matter you must decide for yourself. The result has proved we have gotten along without him.

You must blame yourself for this infliction. I should have spared you any allusion to this matter of General Worth, had I not have been incensed by the efforts which I see have been made through the public press to influence opinion in General Worth's case. Hardly a paper about the 20th of May but has some paragraph of what General Worth had said or done, and one would suppose from the papers that he was commanding general, and not General Taylor. Many of them, too, utterly false, and many of them erroneous. For instance, ‘planting with his own hands the American flag on the banks of the Rio Grande’ is a misstatement in fact, and willfully made by the person who put it in the papers. The idea is that General Worth was the first man on the river bank, and there planted with his own hands the Star-Spangled Banner, making as it were a coup de theatre of it, giving a hint to some patriotic painter for a picture, or for some dramatist for a scene in a national drama; whereas the facts are well known to me, for if you recollect I wrote you that on that day I was in the advanced guard and came near being taken prisoner with the two dragoons, and in point of fact I was the first on the river bank with the advanced guard, who were followed by General Taylor and his staff, General Worth not coming up till his brigade arrived, some time after the cavalry and Ringgold's battery, under Colonel Twiggs, and the first flag planted was by order of Colonel Belknapp, commanding the Eighth Regiment of Infantry, who stuck in the ground his regimental flag, which is not the national flag, and this operation was effected by a parcel of dirty and dusty soldiers, with spades and axes. And it was not for an hour after our arrival that a pole was found and the national flag raised on it, and you can readily imagine how easy it would be for General Worth to have done it with his own hands when I tell you the pole was over thirty feet long, and required a big hole to be dug ere it could be sunk, and had to be propped by supports, which operation required some dozen men with spades, axes, etc., etc. So much for fact, and not for imagination. But enough of this; you will see from what I have written what my opinion is. [101] There are many points in General Worth's character that I admire exceedingly. He is a gallant and brave soldier, but he wants ordinary judgment; he is irritable and deficient in self-command.

As to General Taylor, my feelings towards him are of a friendly nature, though among his most prominent defects is the entire and utter ignorance of the use to which the staff department can be put, and especially my own corps. Did he have his own way, we should be perfectly useless; not from any unfriendly feeling on his part towards us, but from absolute ignorance of what we can be required to do, and perfect inability to make any use of the information we do obtain. He has, however, with him some few officers upon whose judgment he relies, and they every now and then manage to argue him into employing us. Let one fact illustrate this. We arrived at our camp opposite Matamoras on the 28th of March; we broke it up on the 1st of May, remaining there one whole month. During this time, from the commencement to the end, my individual efforts were repeatedly made, as well as were those of other officers, to induce him to reflect upon the subject of bridges, and in the absence of a pontoon train, which Congress was debating about giving us, to call upon his engineer officers for plans for crossing the river with such materials as were at hand. All of us were ready to give our ideas, and to make the necessary preparations and experiments; but, no, the old gentleman would never listen or give it a moment's attention. The consequence was, when the enemy were routed, and the question asked him, could we get over the river, there were no preparations, and we were detained nine days, sending to Point Isabel after planks to make flats, and even then, had not the enemy retired and allowed us to cross with his own boats, we should have been twice as long getting over as we were. Here is the General's defect. Had he known how to use his engineers the month we were lying in camp, he would have had us at work experimenting, and when any plan proved successful, had a bridge constructed and put in depot, and then on the tenth, in three or four hours, the whole army, artillery and all, could have been crossed, and the Mexican army prevented from retreating with some twelve pieces of artillery.

This is only for yourself, for I am utterly opposed to telling tales out of school; but at the same time, if you wish to know my opinions, I must refer to facts to sustain them.

General Taylor is a gallant, brave old man, who knows not what fear is. Take him for all in all, however, I repeat what I have before [102] said, I consider him the best General I have yet served under, and as good as any I know of at present in our service, unless it be General Scott, whom I hope soon to see here, and that he will have an opportunity of trial.

I commence my letter to-day on a sheet of paper which was captured with the portfolio of his Excellency, General Arista, and was doubtless designed to bear the news of his anticipated victory to his friends in Mexico. It is the only trophy I have of victory, as all the rest of the captured property, and indeed this, was placed under guard by General Taylor, and no one, officer or private, was allowed to appropriate anything to himself. The stationery found with Arista's baggage he distributed among his staff officers, and I make use of my share to continue my correspondence with you.

We of the army had all congratulated ourselves upon the good fortune which enabled us to secure such complete results without assistance, and we had hoped that the vile insinuations and slanders so lavishly poured upon us by a certain portion of both political parties, and the prejudices which existed in the minds of a large mass of the people against us as a class, would be done away with, and that we might look forward now, at least, to having justice done us. Yet what has, been our astonishment and mortification to receive by the last mail information from Washington of the nomination by the President, and confirmation by the Senate, of one whole regiment recently added to the army, in which only one officer is taken from the army. This, in the face of a provision to the bill, from the House, raising the regiment, requiring the President to make all the appointments from the army, which provision was stricken out in the Senate, only by the casting vote of the Vice-President.

We did not expect much better treatment from Colonel Polk, who is known to be prejudiced against West Point and the army, but the Senate has always stood by us, and you may therefore imagine our mortification to hear it confirmed these nominations after the news of our services had reached Washington. To add to the disgust which pervades every bosom among us, is the fact that many of the appointments are of individuals who have been dismissed from the army for gross acts of various kinds, and of others who have been dismissed from West Point for utter inefficiency and incapacity, some having tried and failed twice. [103]

What can a government or country expect of a service that is treated in this manner? Understand me, I have no personal feeling in the matter, for I would not be colonel of the rifles if they offered it to me. But there are many captains who have been twenty years in the service of the Government, doing their duty in all climates and at all times faithfully and promptly, whose claims to simple promotion are thrown aside, and individuals placed over their heads to command them whom, under other circumstances, they would not associate. Now, I do not object to seeing civilians put in the service, and had Mr. Polk appointed the senior grades from the army and the captains, no one would have objected to filling up the subalterns with citizens, and then the regiment might have been expected to be efficient, as the important grades would be filled by individuals supposed to know something of their duties. But as it is, it will take years to make the regiment of any use, as officers as well as men will have to learn their duties. Such is the treatment we receive, and yet we are caviled at if one resigns in disgust.

We have nothing new. All are getting tired of waiting here for boats to send our supplies up the river. There was no preparation made for carrying the war into the enemy's country, and we must wait quietly till it is made. The volunteers have all arrived, except those from Texas, who are coming in daily; but they are not all we want. We must have pork and beans to feed them, and means of carrying the pork and beans and baggage to the points from whence we advance, and from those points into the interior.

Speaking of the conduct of the Administration, and its desire to throw the blame of failure, had it occurred, upon General Taylor, I would observe that General Taylor had not received one line from the War Department from the early part of January, when it sent him orders to advance, up to this date; and the January communication simply required him to advance to the Rio Grande and take up a position there, which he was to hold. It is true, last summer, he was authorized to call upon the Governors of Mississippi and Alabama for troops, if he required them, but in his last communication of January he was confined to Texas in his call. Now you must know General Taylor is opposed, from experience and a knowledge of their inefficiency, to the use of volunteers, and felt confident that until war was absolutely commenced, it would be better not to have them, and knew, after he got on the ground, that they could not be here in time; and facts have proved so, as none arrived for a month [104] after they were required, and at this date, six weeks after they were wanted, Texans, to whom his last instructions confined him, have not yet made their appearance. But General Taylor, independent of his consciousness of the inefficiency of irregular troops, always expressed his confidence in the ability of the regulars under his command to maintain the defensive (all the Government asked of him), if his command was only kept up to the standard allowed by law; and he repeatedly and at various intervals called upon the Government to send him recruits and keep him full; and will you believe, notwithstanding his constantly calling its attention to this point, no recruits arrived till just as we were leaving Frontone, and then, of the nine hundred required to fill his command, it sent him one hundred and twenty-five, while at the same time it was sending them to St. Louis and other points, where their services could easily have been dispensed with. This, then, is the point I make, that through the neglect of the Government to answer the call of General Taylor, made to it almost monthly after his arrival at Corpus Christi, we were on the eighth and ninth deficient eight hundred men—a force ample in itself to have guaranteed our success under any circumstances. This and its failure to communicate with him, and keep him advised of its wishes, are the causes of complaint against the Government, reasonably entertained by General Taylor; but I think I have given you enough of such matters for to-day.

Yesterday there arrived from New Orleans, a deputation from the citizens of that place, to congratulate General Taylor upon his victories, and also a committee from the Legislature, to give him the thanks of Louisiana, and present him with a sword. The old General received them very courteously, and having been warned of their approach, he had a cold collation prepared, at which, through the influence of champagne and other spirited things, many patriotic and complimentary speeches were made. To-day a number of the officers of the army, desirous of testifying their sense of the compliment paid them by the Legislature of Louisiana and citizens of New Orleans, got them up a dinner in town, to which all the volunteer officers were invited, and you may be assured it was a most jolly time. A great quantity of wine was imbibed and an infinite amount of patriotism resulted, besides the most gracious compliments of Volunteers to Regulars and Regulars to Volunteers, etc., etc.

To show you I kept sober, I have added these lines after seeing the affair out. The people in the town were rather surly, and did [105] not at all like our cheers and toasts, some of them saying we made a great fuss about nothing; but we asked for the laurel-wreaths the ladies were preparing for Arista and his officers, and the triumphal arches that were to have been erected.

I forgot to mention in yesterday's letter, that Governor Henderson, with about five hundred mounted Texans, reached here and the Governor paid his respects to the General. I was much pleased with his appearance. You know he married in Paris, Miss Coxe, the niece of Dr. Hewson. He had in his cortege Dr. Ashbell Smith, the great Texan diplomat. Among others whom he brought with him, I was much interested in a young German, Count Blucher, the nephew of the old Field Marshall, who was an editor of a paper (radical) in Berlin, but owing to some articles which met with the disapprobation of the King, he was obliged to fly the country, and in his wanderings found his way to Texas, and came here to see the fighting. He is about thirty years of age, of mild and gentle appearance, an excellent French and Spanish scholar, and said to be, by a gentleman who met him in New Orleans last winter, one of the ripest classical scholars he knew. I had some conversation with him about Texas, in which he expressed the greatest enthusiasm for the country and the wild life you lead in it, but the greatest disgust for the people you are obliged to associate with. He describes them as having all the bad traits of the Spanish and Italian banditti, without their amenity of manners and partial refinement. I fancy his account is very nearly true, and they constitute about the very worst specimen of our population.

We continue in the same state of inaction. In a few days a month will have elapsed since we took possession of the town, and yet no advance, owing to the want of means of transportation. There is fault somewhere, but I do not know to whom to attribute the blame. We now have ten thousand men, and could we establish our depot at Camargo, and get our troops up there, we might be in Monterey in six weeks, and if the Mexicans are disposed to meet us, we should have an opportunity to gain one more victory, which I think would settle the matter.

It has been nearly two weeks since I have been able to write to you, but I trust the perfect quiet that prevails here will have been reported to you, and that you will not be uneasy on account of my silence. A few days after the date of my last letter (I think the fifteenth) I was ordered to proceed to Reinosa in one of the steamboats, for the purpose of making an examination of the river between this point and that place. We left here on the nineteenth and returned only a few days ago. The expedition was extremely agreeable. I prevailed upon Trudeau, and a young creole on General Smith's staff, by the name of Touchet, to accompany us, making a little party, and as the boat was a good one, clean and comfortable, we managed, when not engaged with our duties, to amuse ourselves in various ways.

We found the river perfectly navigable all the way to Reinosa, and cultivated for nearly the whole distance, one hundred and eighty miles by water. Indeed, on the Mexican side, it was one vast corn field from here more than three quarters of the distance. Upon the other side the land is cleared, and has been under cultivation, but a large portion has been abandoned owing to the frequent depredations and incursions of the Comanche Indians. The soil upon the river bank is exceedingly rich, said by many to equal in fertility the banks of the Mississippi, and to be capable of producing sugar and cotton equal to the production of that rich valley. It is without doubt the finest part of Texas (if it belong to Texas!) that I have seen and I anticipate its being densely populated, one day, when its resources are made available by the establishment of the means of transporting its products to the sea. It has one advantage over the Mississippi Valley, which is its perfect salubrity. No diseases are known here, but such as are incident to all climates; there are no local diseases, none originating from causes only found here. I have seen several persons who told me they came to the river with the chills and fever; which they had brought with them, recovered here, and have never since been troubled with them. The river does not habitually, each year, overflow its banks—that is to say, it has no permanent and regular rises, as the Arkansas, Missouri, and other of our rivers have. It is nothing but a drain or canal, through which the surplus water of the country, caused by rain, springs, etc., passes off. Its rises, in consequence, are very sudden, but the water runs off equally fast. It was quite an agreeable sight in passing up, to see the banks, which [107] are generally high and firm, covered with fields, extending for miles, with the finest corn I have ever seen, now and then a ranch, or village, in front of which all the inhabitants were collected, staring in stupid wonder at our little boat as she puffed her way up; and when we took off our hats and kissed our hands to the girls, they would all shout and laugh and make themselves most merry.

In Reinosa I was much disappointed. It is a small place, not having at present over six hundred inhabitants, and containing evidences of magnificent designs most meagrely executed. The town is laid out in squares upon a hill of some fifty feet high, consisting of a rotten limestone, which material is used in constructing the houses. These, as in all their towns, are only one story and with square roofs. The walls are made nearly two feet thick, of this spongy limestone, and put together in immense blocks, with a cement of very inferior quality, made from the limestone. About one-half the houses are only half built; of the remainder, a large proportion are tumbling to pieces; so, in fact, though a town of recent date, one would suppose it was a century old from its apparently dilapidated state. Of the people who were in it, we found many agreeable acquaintances. They appeared to be more affably disposed towards us than the population of Matamoras, and the few who called themselves of the better order invited us to their houses and were exceedingly civil. We saw many pretty girls (that is, called pretty here), but with us they would not pass for beauties. But I have been struck with one remarkable fact with regard to the women, and that is the grace and ease of manner they all possess. It is even shown in the way they wear their clothes, always having them nicely made, clean, and gracefully worn. I have often stopped at what is here called a Labor (a farm of three or four acres) and asked for a glass of water, when some really pretty girl, with a reboso gracefully thrown over her shoulder to conceal her dress (which for comfort is ordinarily worn with the body unfastened and thrown off), with her pretty patterned French calico or printed muslin, the only article I have seen the lower orders wear, well made and fitting perfectly, will hand you a cup of water, in a graceful way that would put to blush many of our finely dressed ladies of the upper ten thousand. I have been struck with their taste in the selection of dresses, shawls, etc. Our merchants who have followed the army brought with them an immense quantity of the Lowell prints and notwithstanding they offer them for less than one-third of the price these people are obliged to give for French [108] calicos, they cannot sell them, the answer always being they do not like those patterns.

General Taylor has not received a line from the Department since the battles—indeed, I heard him say he had not received a line from it since last January, when it ordered him to the Rio Grande; not even a simple acknowledgement of the receipt of his official reports, though we see by the papers that are now and then brought by vessels bringing over supplies, that his reports have been received, that he has been made a major-general, and owing to the course of General Scott, is to remain in command of the forces operating against Mexico.

My own opinion is that the Mexicans will never disturb us on the river, our present position, but that they will make a stand at Monterey, should we advance into the interior. They will without doubt fortify that place, and it is understood to be capable of strong defense. Then they have a distance of eighty miles to Saltillo, which is a pass through the mountains, capable of being made impregnable if defended by brave and intrepid men, and which it will be difficult for us to force if they defend it properly. But I do not believe it is in the people to resist us as brave men would do, although every effort will be made to arouse their national prejudices and religious feelings against us. If we only had fifteen thousand regular troops, I believe sincerely we could march to the City of Mexico, but I doubt the practicability of so doing with a force of volunteers; for this reason, the regular troops, being disciplined and under the command of their officers, can be restrained, kept in subjection, and the war made a war against the Army and Government of Mexico, and not against the people, who would be left undisturbed in their peaceful vocations as the army passed on. But already have the volunteers commenced to excite feelings of indignation and hatred in the bosom of the people, by their outrages on them. Every day complaints are made, of this man's cornfield being destroyed by the volunteers' horses put into it, or another man's fences being torn down by them for firewood, or an outrage committed on some inoffensive person by some drunken volunteer, and above all volunteers, those from Texas are the most outrageous, for they come here with the sores and recollections of wrong done, which have been festering in them for ten years, and under the guise of entering the United States service, they cloak a thirst to gratify personal revenge. Now it is impossible for General Taylor to restrain these men; he has neither the moral nor [109] physical force to do it, and my apprehensions are that if we advance with them into the interior, they will exasperate the people against us, causing them to rise en masse, and if so there is no telling when the war will end. But if we can restrain them, and prove to the people our desire to let them alone, and only make war on the soldiery and officeholders, one more victory will terminate the affair.

In the meantime should the Oregon question be adjusted, and all hopes of assistance from England directly or indirectly, by her being at war with us, vanish, they will be disposed to treat without further collision.

No movement has taken place since my last, but the sending of one regiment of infantry to Camargo, a point on the river some forty miles above Reinosa, and about one hundred by land from this place. A movement of the whole army is contemplated now in a few days, as at last we have ten boats on the river by which we can throw up supplies to Camargo, the point from whence it is intended to advance into the interior.

The settlement of the Oregon question, the news of which was brought by the last mail, will have I think a most important influence on the course of Mexico, as in it she must see the destruction of all her fond hopes of assistance from England; and if it is true that the latter power has offered her mediation, as is reported, I believe, unless the United States are too exigeante in their terms, that peace will be made. But I fear this opportunity of acquiring California, either by right of conquest, or in payment of the expenses of the war and of the debts due by Mexico to our citizens, is too good to be lost, and that Mr. Polk will insist upon having upper California, in which event I fear the Mexicans are not sufficiently worsted to induce them to acquiesce. I believe with fifteen thousand regulars, we could go to the City of Mexico, but with thirty thousand volunteers the whole nature and policy of the war will be changed. Already are the injurious influences of their presence perceptible, and you will hear any Mexican in the street descanting on the good conduct of the ‘tropas de ligna,’ as they call us, and the dread of the ‘volontarios.’ And with reason, they (the volunteers) have killed five or six innocent people walking in the streets, for no other object than their own amusement; to-be-sure, they are always drunk, and are in a measure irresponsible for their conduct. They rob and steal the cattle and [110] corn of the poor farmers, and in fact act more like a body of hostile Indians than of civilized whites. Their own officers have no command or control over them, and the General has given up in despair any hope of keeping them in order. The consequence is they are exciting a feeling among the people which will induce them to rise en masse to obstruct our progress, and if, when we reach the mountains, we have to fight the people as well as the soldiers, the game will be up with us. I have some hope, however, that when we leave this place, which has become a mass of grog-shops and gambling-houses, and march to meet the enemy, the absence of liquor, and the fear of the enemy, may induce a little more order among them and bring them to a better state of discipline.

I suppose the good people of the North are much disappointed at our apparent want of energy and failure to prosecute vigorously the war; so with the volunteers, they are in a state of mutiny because they are not marched right off to meet the enemy. But all these wise people forget that soldiers cannot march or fight unless they have something to eat, and when in a country totally devoid of resources, they must carry with them the means of sustaining physical nature, and in consequence must have the means of carrying their provisions and other supplies. Now, on the 10th of May, the day after we routed the Mexicans, General Taylor had the means of transporting the supplies for three thousand men by land, but not expecting to use the river, as he had been commanded not to insist on its navigation, he of course had no boats, but on that day, when the character of his operations underwent an entire change, and from acting simply on the defensive to maintain a position, he assumed the offensive to carry on a war, upon that day he called for more wagons, and for boats to ascend the river, even then only contemplating the employment of five thousand additional men, and simply the occupying and maintaining possession of both banks of the river. The Government, however, increases his force to thirty thousand men, designs an invasion, floods him with men, without sending the means of subsisting them, or of transporting them and their subsistence.

Now these things should have been anticipated at Washington, and it would have been better for them to have turned their energies to forwarding supplies and means of transportation first, and then sent the men, when everything was ready for their use. This was poor General Scott's idea, and is the correct one. He saw the force could not be made available before September, and properly deemed [111] it useless for himself and command to be idling their time here waiting for wagons and pork, and had he confined himself in his letter simply to giving his military reasons for not leaving immediately, at the same time saying he would waive them and leave by the next mail, he would have been right, and would have been sustained. But, unfortunately, he chose to ascribe political reasons to what, I believe, was simply military ignorance on the part of Mr. Polk; and this, with his ‘hasty plate of soup,’ has ruined him forever, for it is much better in this country for a man to commit a gross crime than to make himself ridiculous; the former he may get over, the latter, never.

But now, as I told you before, we have ten boats (after waiting two months for them), and the General will employ them in throwing supplies into Camargo, and will in a few days move the whole army up to that point, except such portions as are necessary to garrison the depots at this and other places.

Camargo is one hundred miles from here, and the roads are very bad, owing to recent rains. It will therefore take to the 1st of August before the army will be concentrated there. Then the means of transporting from that point to Monterey, a distance of one hundred and sixty miles, the supplies for a column of eight or ten thousand men will have to be collected there, and various preparations made, which will consume some weeks, so that I hardly think the advance from Camargo will be made before the latter part of August.

In the meantime I shall probably be occupied in making reconnoissances of the roads and country between Camargo and Monterey, in advance of the army. Since my last letter, Captain Williams, of the corps, has arrived, to act as Chief Topographical Engineer, and a young lieutenant by the name of Pope³⁷ is also ordered here. This will make, with Mr. Wood and myself, four officers, of whom I shall be the second in rank. Four others have been sent, I understand, with Colonel Kearney, from St. Louis to Santa Fe, namely, Emory, Warner, Peck and Abert. This makes eight officers of the corps in the field.

I suppose you are aware a large cavalry force is being collected at San Antonio de Bexar, which is to be under the command of General Wool, and they are to march from San Antonio to Chihuahua, a large town of fourteen thousand inhabitants, on the highroad from [112] the City of Mexico to Santa Fe, so that the occupation of Monterey, Chihuahua and Santa Fe will give us actual possession of the whole of New Mexico.

I have been given to understand at headquarters that there will probably be one or two Topographical Engineers sent to General Wool from this command; in which case I shall certainly be one, for Captain Williams will remain with General Taylor, and I coming next, will have the claim to the independent position, and, if two go, to the command of the assistant who is sent. Of course I would rather be first than second of my corps, and without doubt the expedition to Chihuahua will be agreeable, as it is represented as being one of the finest cities in Northern Mexico; but still I would prefer remaining with General Taylor, as he will see the fighting if any more is to be done. The expedition to Chihuahua will doubtless be effected without opposition from the Mexicans, though General Wool may meet with the Indians.

I shall, however, adopt the course in this instance which I have always taken, of expressing no wish or feeling in the matter, but obeying with alacrity any order that may be given me. They may send officers from Washington to General Wool, which would obviate the necessity of any going from here, or the General may find he has occupation for all of us with him. Time alone will show. As it is we (the Topographical Engineers) are all going to Camargo in a day or two, to commence the exploration of the country between there and Monterey.

I note with pride and pleasure the good opinion of my epistolary powers, which your dear father and others have been pleased to express, and also your request that I should keep a journal, if I have not done so. I have not kept a journal, or any memoranda but my letters to you. What your father says is very true—that war will be a matter of history, and the day may come when the evidence of the most humble participator in it may be of importance in elucidating some disputed point. Still, I do not think I could ever bring myself to the point of writing a book, and should feel something like the old General, who, when he was told a delegation from the Legislature of Louisiana had arrived to deliver to him a sword, observed he would rather go through another battle than make a speech in reply to them. When the occasion came, I assure you the old man was a great deal more excited and embarrassed than at any period of the action. [113]

I cannot express to you how thankful I am you refused John Cadwalader's³⁸ request to publish my letter, and I have mentioned your good sense and prudence with great pride throughout the camp. It is the more appreciated, as many good people similarly situated have not exercised the same discretion, and many letters have been published which their authors would have given a great deal to have revised before meeting the eyes of their brother officers. Instances of individual valor which were never known before the letters came here in the papers, extraordinary feats performed by persons who were never near the reputed scene of action, and all kinds of lies and absurdities have been sent forth, the poor devils writing them supposing they would only be seen by their friends, and these little white lies, induced by their vanity, pass undiscovered. Another set wrote what they believed to be true, but in giving their accounts of the actions have run counter in their impressions to the impressions of others, so as to have raised in the army a number of cliques, each having its individual hero. Now, though I wrote you nothing but the truth, and what I saw myself, yet as it is impossible on a field of battle for any one man to see and know everything, many things escaped me, and had my letter been published and reached here, many who are now my good friends would have abused me for having omitted to mention their extraordinary services. Indeed, of the mass of letters I know of but one which has met with anything like approbation, and I am therefore over-rejoiced at your good sense in withholding mine. If there is anything I do dislike, it is newspaper notoriety. I think it is the curse of our country, and fear it is seriously injuring our little army, whose tone once was utterly opposed to making use of the public press to sustain their cause.

As to my name being mentioned in General Taylor's report, I think your expectations were altogether too high, and you deserved to be disappointed. When you reflect that of nearly two hundred officers only some twenty-five were mentioned, you must certainly acknowledge it a compliment. And the very fact of its being brought to your notice by so many persons proves that it was a compliment of no small value. Now, I did nothing but my duty, which did not require that I should charge batteries, or shoot Mexicans, or place myself in any position where I could display extraordinary personal valor, and I am only mentioned because, being near the person of [114] the General, and having performed my duty, it was only by his mentioning me that the simple fact would be made known.

Still, I consider it a distinguished compliment, quite undeserved on my part; for there were many equally entitled with myself to it who are not known except to their few personal friends as having been in the action; whereas, all over the country and in Europe, wherever I should have an acquaintance, they will know by this report, at least, that I was in both actions, and that appears to be a great deal nowadays, and is indeed a fact of which I do not hesitate to say I am exceedingly proud.

Obstacle after obstacle presents itself to us, so that it is impossible to calculate when we shall even move. At first we had no boats or provisions to throw forward. Now, when the boats have come, the river rises to its maximum height, overflows the whole country above and below, cuts off all communication by land even, from here to Point Isabel, and occupies nearly all the boats in bringing up here the crowds of men sent by the Government, and the provisions necessary to feed them. Just as we are getting boats enough to perform this duty, and take up provisions to Camargo, it rains as if heaven and earth were coming together, and renders the road from here to that point impassable, forcing us to send the troops by water, which will be the work of months, as one boat can only take half a regiment at a time. Add to all this that the Secretary of War sends an order declaring all the troops called out by General Taylor, who enlisted for more than three months (that is to say for six), as illegally enlisted, the law only allowing an enlistment of three months, and requiring them to be disbanded at the expiration of their term of service. Here, then, is the whole force that General Taylor has been relying on for his forward movement—namely, the troops from Louisiana, Texas, St. Louis and Louisville—taken at once from him, and he obliged to delay his movements till the twelve-months' men shall arrive here and be sent to Camargo. So that I do not see how we are to leave Camargo, to advance into the enemy's country, till late in the fall.

Again, I had some hopes from the mediation of England, and trusted the United States would be willing to make peace; but from information received by the last mail, I fear Mr. Polk is not very anxious for peace, and that his demands upon Mexico will be such [115] that she will prefer trying her fortune in battle once more before she yields. I refer to the fact that troops are being sent to California by sea, round Cape Horn, a voyage of six or eight months duration. Now, either Mr. Polk presumes the war will continue that length of time, or he is determined to have California, as one of the terms of peace, and these troops are to take possession of it in case of war, and to garrison it in the event of peace having been made before they reach there.

I do not think Mexico has been led to feel our power sufficiently to induce her to dismember herself, and that we shall have to whip her much more than we have done, before she will consent to yield to terms so hard as these. So that I fear we shall be compelled to advance into the country—and pretty far into it, too—before we can look for anything like a definite termination to this state of things.

Since I last wrote you (on the 16th instant) I have been directed to come here in search of some public property which Captain Williams desired to obtain immediate possession of. I came down the river on a small steamboat, with nine hundred men on board—a regiment of volunteers from Louisiana, who had served their three months, and declined remaining for twelve more, which has been the decision of the Government.

Eight thousand men are in this position, called out by General Gaines for six months, and the Government now decides that volunteers cannot be called out for a greater period than three months, unless by Special Act of Congress, and has directed that this force, at the end of their three months, is to be disbanded, unless it chooses to serve for nine months, making a year. As a matter of course, they all decline, so that we shall have to transport these eight thousand men out of the country, and they have just been here three months, to eat up two hundred and forty thousand rations; and our means of transportation, so necessary for us to throw our troops and supplies up to Camargo, are taken to carry these people to a point where they can get shipping. And this is the way everything is being done, affording every day stronger practical illustration of the utter unfitness of our Government for carrying on a war of invasion.

Indeed, so irregular and undisciplined is the force sent here that I shall be surprised if I ever find myself at Monterey; for I really do not see how General Taylor can carry on operations with a force which [116] he cannot depend upon for doing the slightest thing for itself. A regiment cannot move its camp eight or ten miles, without incurring the risk of starving; for though furnished with wagons and ample means of transportation, they will overload their wagons with baggage and sutler's goods, and leave their provisions, thinking this a clever trick by which they will force the Government officers to send on their provisions by extra transportation. The consequence is they arrive at their new position, and the next day they have nothing to eat, and then complain of the regular officers. Everything, in consequence, connected with these people is one mass of confusion, and I do not believe they ever will be taught to take care of themselves, and of course our operations will be proportionately impeded.

I came down the river with Captain A. Slidell McKenzie, who came here in a vessel of war, direct from Havana, went to see General Taylor, with whom he remained closeted for some hours, and is now on his way to Washington. It is supposed his mission has some connection with Santa Anna, but upon this point he is silent. He, however, makes public the intelligence that California has declared itself independent of Mexico, and thrown herself upon the protection of the United States. This is but the first move in the game I have long since anticipated. We learn, moreover, that a regiment of infantry is to go out in the ‘North Carolina’ (74) to California, other troops having preceded them. We are then to have California at all hazards, and Mexico, I am sure, will never yield this point until she is forced so to do. I look, then, for a long war—at least for no speedy adjustment of our difficulties, unless England should advise Mexico to yield to our requirements.

By the blessing of God I continue in excellent health, and trust this will be continued. The army is in excellent health, considering its exposure and the nature of the climate. I do not think the number of sick is greater than it would be were we encamped at the North.

I returned to this place yesterday, very glad, I assure you, to get away from the immense crowd of volunteers, that was overcrowding everything and everybody at the mouth of the river. I was truly delighted to find on my arrival your letters from the 2d to the 14th of July. At length you have received some of my letters, and appear in better spirits. [117]

I regret I have nothing new to tell you. Most of the regulars have gone up to Camargo, and the General proposes to start in two or three days. I shall accompany him. I suppose we will be detained some time at Camargo, organizing the army and making preparations for our march into the enemy's country. At the last accounts they had no reinforcements at Monterey, and only had the wreck of the army they had there, which was assiduously engaged fortifying the place. I am in hopes Paredes will be able to raise an army and reach Monterey before we do, and let us have our fight there, instead of farther in the interior. I think the war will not end till we give them another drubbing, and if we succeed in doing that, then they will probably come to their senses and make terms. This appears to be the opinion of the most intelligent Mexicans here, that Paredes will make a great effort to raise a large army to meet us, and in the event of his being defeated, he will lose his power, and some of his rivals will come into power, who will make terms with us. Should this prove true, the sooner the battle takes place the better.

Two French painters have arrived from New Orleans to collect materials for painting the battle of the ninth. They have been taking the likenesses of all the principal individuals in the action, and as one of General Taylor's staff, they took mine, that is a simple pencil sketch. I could not recognize it myself, nor do I suppose any one else could, as it put me in mind of the ‘Herald's’ wood-cut of the Prince de Joinville. However, I suppose it is a great honor to be put in a picture in any way, and perhaps one of these days, when you see it, you will see on the directing card: ‘No. 15, Lieut. Meade, Top'l Eng's.’ They propose making a large picture and hope to sell it to Congress or some public institution.

The General has determined to go up to Camargo by water, and starts on the first boat; but Captain Williams, preferring to go by land, has obtained his permission to accompany a command that leaves to-morrow, consisting of four companies of infantry and a battery of artillery. Of course I go with Captain Williams, and shall therefore leave to-morrow morning before sunrise. I should have preferred myself going by water, as I would avoid riding in the hot sun, but in other respects the land journey will be the most pleasant, as the boats are dirty and uncomfortable and all filled with troops.

We have no news. You will have doubtless seen before this [118] reaches you, the intelligence brought by the ‘Princeton,’ which brings our dates up to the 10th inst., at the City of Mexico. The Congress had authorized Paredes to prosecute vigorously the war, but furnished him with no means, nor had they taken any steps to raise any means for him. He on his part was afraid to leave the City of Mexico. No troops had been raised, and there was difficulty in getting generals to lead them, after the treatment Arista had received. This is confirmed by our advices from Monterey, which state there are only two thousand five hundred men there, and no certain intelligence of any approaching. From this it is not improbable they may allow us to occupy Monterey without opposition, but I cannot think the war will be ended without more fighting, and I therefore dislike to see it put off.

We arrived here to-day on our March to Camargo, and I seize the opportunity afforded by a few hours' halt to send you some account of my movements.

We left Matamoras on the 5th inst., but in consequence of the state of the roads near the river, we had to make a long detour to reach this place, making a march of over ninety miles, when the straight road is not more than sixty. As is always the case, this march has improved me very much. I was beginning to feel the effects of lying idle at Matamoras, but now I am as well as possible, notwithstanding our first two days march was through the rain, and the last in the burning sun, with often a space of sixteen miles without water.

The country we came over was rather monotonous, the early part being a level prairie; but the last day we came over a rolling limestone country that was exceedingly agreeable to our eyes, seeing the first undulating country I had seen since I left the United States.

We leave this afternoon for Camargo, and expect to reach it in three days.

We arrived here early this morning, after having marched nearly one hundred and twenty miles in eight days, which, when you consider the climate and the season of the year, is doing pretty well. The last few days the heat was so intense in the middle of the day, that we were obliged to get up at twelve o'clock at night, and finish our day's march before eight o'clock in the morning. As we had a [119] moon, this was readily effected, and I presume will be the plan adopted hereafter in marching to Monterey, for we find this upper country very much hotter than it was at Matamoras. The sun, if anything, is more powerful, owing to a great quantity of limestone, which reflects the heat, and then we are without the delightful breeze which kept us comfortable below.

Camargo is a small place, but little larger than Reinosa, containing, I should suppose, some three thousand inhabitants. It is situated on the river San Juan, some three miles from its junction with the Rio Grande. Though placed on very high ground, so great are the freshets that the San Juan is subject to that a few months ago nearly one-third of Camargo was destroyed by a rise in the river. The people are, in consequence, in a great state of destitution, most of them living in the open air and almost starving. Our arrival, therefore, has been a perfect windfall to them, as, what with washing, selling milk, and other eatables, cutting grass for our horses, and a thousand other things, they manage to pick up a great deal of money, and are thus reconciled to our presence. Indeed, the authorities express themselves delighted, and hope we will retain possession of the country. They have promptly supplied all our requisitions for mules, cattle for beef, etc., etc., and have with equal promptitude refused the requisitions of their own Government for similar articles, and for men.

We do not hear as much at this place from Monterey as we did at Matamoras, from all I can learn. They appear to have been unable to reinforce the regular troops at Monterey, but they have made extraordinary exertions in turning out the militia, and it is said they have collected seven thousand men of this description of force. The more they have of these fellows, the better for us, for it is well known they will run at the first shot, and will prove no obstacle to our advance. They have only two thousand five hundred regulars, the remains of Arista's army. They are said to be fortifying the place, but I have no apprehensions of their engineers; they proved themselves of no account at Matamoras, where their work was of the most miserable description. As for ourselves, we have now collected here three thousand regulars, and about two thousand volunteers; the latter are arriving in numbers daily from below. A reconnoitering party has gone out to examine the roads, and upon its return I understand it is General Taylor's intention to commence the advance movement by throwing forward a brigade of regulars to some point [120] about one-third the distance, where it is proposed to establish a depot for the supply of the main army on the march.

Opinions are again becoming contradictory as to the reception we are to meet with at Monterey, many thinking they will make a desperate stand then, others that we shall occupy the place without a shot. My own opinion is, that they will make a stand at some point of our march, and that point will be fixed by their ability to reinforce their people at Monterey. If Paredes can throw into Monterey a large force of regulars before we reach it, they will fight there; if not, those that are now there will retire before us, till they meet the army from the interior, and give us battle at some favorable point, after they have effected a junction. I do not join in the general opinion of their carrying on a desperate guerilla war. Though descended from the Spaniards, they are a very different race from the hardy mountaineers of Spain. Their mixture with the Indian and negro race, and the effect of climate enervating them, render them a listless race, destitute of the energy necessary for a war which is solely one of enterprise. Then again, the people in the interior are ignorant, utterly so, of the use of arms, the Government having prohibited their keeping them, from the fear of their being used against it. Indeed, it is universally conceded that their most warlike provinces are these we are now occupying, where the necessity of defending themselves against the Indians, and latterly the Texans, has compelled the Government to allow them arms, the use of which they have acquired; and yet, when we lay opposite Matamoras for a month, and they had, besides their regular force, some two thousand rancheros, they never even attempted any enterprise against us, though we afforded them all the opportunities it was possible to give them. From hence I infer that in the interior we shall meet with no such determined resistance from the people; and as to their regular soldiers, they are no better fitted for guerilla fighting than are ours. My only apprehensions as to success arise from the constitution of our own force. I fear our volunteers will not only prove inefficient themselves, but will prove a serious obstacle to our efficiency, by impeding our progress. I fear the glory we have acquired at the Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma will be somewhat dimmed by our apparently tardy operations succeeding them. People who are accustomed to read of campaigns in Europe and elsewhere, where armies march over thickly settled countries, producing all that is required for the subsistence of the army, and where towns are daily occupied for [121] quarters for the troops, and hospitals for the sick, are unable to comprehend the obstacles to be surmounted by an army obliged to march three hundred miles over a country which, as far as supplies are concerned, is a perfect desert, forcing it to carry everything with it, in the shape of supplies, ammunition, medical stores, quarters, hospitals, and even the food for the animals, necessary to transport these things. Then reflect that after these two battles (now three months since), not the slightest preparation had been made in anticipation of offensive operations, that boats had to be sent for to New Orleans, six hundred miles distant, that these boats, mere shells made to run on rivers, had to be brought six hundred miles over a tempestuous sea, that all the provisions had to be purchased in New Orleans, that wagons had to be made in Ohio, because they were not to be found in New Orleans, that mules had to be purchased from the enemy; and while all this was being done, some twenty thousand men were rushing into the country, who not only consumed supplies as fast as they arrived, but had to be taken care of, as you would so many children. Already have they in almost every volunteer regiment reported one-third their number sick, and in many cases onehalf the whole regiment, and I fear the mortality will be terrible among them, from their utter ignorance of the proper mode of taking care of themselves. This large number of sick is a dead weight upon us, taking away so many men as hospital attendants, requiring quarters, etc.; and if taken sick on the march, requiring transportation in wagons or on litters; all these things tell in the long run, and I mention them to vindicate General Taylor from the charges I see the Union is bringing against him, of want of energy, and not pursuing properly his victories.

He has been and is most anxious to move, but the credit he has already acquired renders him the more determined to move in an efficient manner, and not in such a way as to render his movements of no avail. Loud complaints are being made against him here also, by the Texans and other volunteers, vociferously demanding to be led forward, and criticising his slow movements, calling them scientific, saying it is all nonsense to take such a quantity of supplies, we ought to live on fresh beef, of which the country is full, as they, the Texans, always did, they never carried wagons and such things. True enough, but what was the result? Why, when they met the enemy, one hour's fight exhausted all their ammunition, and they had to retire, and when they retired, they abandoned their sick and [122] wounded on the field. And, if a man was taken sick on a march he was left, to join them if he could get well, if not, to die alone in the midst of the prairie; and if the enemy, as they often did, previously drove the cattle away, then, after starving for some days, they had to come back, because there were no cattle in the country; and after they took a place, they had to abandon it in a few days, because they had no means of holding it. In fact, their war, was simply a series of badly designed and worse executed forays, gaining no point, and causing them, with all their boasted valor and skill, to leave for ten years the whole of this frontier in the hands of the Mexicans. This is not our plan. When we advance it is for some object, and we shall have the means of holding every advantage we gain, of taking care of our people en route and in depots, and being enabled to fight several battles before our ammunition gives out. But to do this, preparations must be made, and preparations require time in every country, but most particularly in this. The Government is to blame for not making the preparations before it sent the troops, and what General Scott told it is now fully verified, ‘that nothing could be done before September.’

The Commanche Indians, the other day, made a descent upon Mier, a town some thirty miles above here, butchered the women and children, carried off young girls, and committed all sorts of depredations. A command was immediately sent after them, but did not overtake them. The command, unfortunately, were Texans, the only mounted force then here, and would you believe it, these fellows sustained the Indians, and said they were our allies and we were wrong in endeavoring to punish them for their conduct towards our enemies, even though it did outrage all the laws of civilized warfare, and from what had recently transpired, it is feared that the Indians have been incited to this act by people bearing the title of American citizens! They have recently (the Indians) made a treaty of peace with us, and it is rumored that at that treaty they were informed of the war with Mexico, and that Mexicans were our enemies; then hearing of the two battles, and knowing of the defeat of the Mexican troops, they had come here to plunder and murder, thinking we would uphold them in it. But the General is determined to punish them if he can get hold of them, and to give them to understand they must keep in their territory. The effect upon the Mexicans would be most injurious of the toleration of such acts, as it would arouse in them a feeling of indignation at our employing Indians; but if, on [123] the contrary, we chastise them, the effect will be most beneficial, as it will prove the Indians are not our allies, and that we can protect the Mexicans from them, which their own Government had never been able to do.

I have been this morning ordered to accompany General Worth, who leaves to-morrow with the advance of the army, to establish a depot at Seralvo, a small town about half-way between this and Monterey. I am, of course, very much gratified at again being in the advance, always considered the most honorable position.

You might think from what I have written of General Worth, that being on his staff would not be so agreeable as remaining with General Taylor, and such indeed is the case; but the arrival of Captain Williams precludes my having the same position with General Taylor as before, since he occupies it, and I am quite gratified to change it for a position on General Worth's staff, where, as far as my own corps is concerned, I shall be the head.

We leave to-morrow. Seralvo is some sixty miles distant, and is said to be, by those who recently visited it on a reconnoitering party, delightfully situated, in a rolling country, with delicious cold water running from the hillsides, and abundance of fruit of all kinds. I have to leave here all my baggage except my little valise and my bed —I even go without my tent—for our only means of transportation are pack-mules, and we have to reduce everything to the minimum.

Of course the army will be concentrated before we reach Monterey. We are only a detachment (about one thousand) sent in advance, to take possession of this point, to which provisions, etc., will be sent for the supply of after columns.

I sincerely trust that our advance movement will be but the beginning of the end, and that we shall soon have an opportunity of showing these people our determination to push this war, and hence induce them to come to terms.

I see, by Sir Robert Peel's speech, that England did offer her mediation, and therefore presume it has been declined by Mr. Polk.

As to the contemplated attack on the castle of San Juan de Ulloa, I very much fear it will be a failure, if the Mexicans make a stout resistance. I never believed in the ability of fleets to take fortifications, though the navy always expressed its confidence of success, until it became necessary for it to attempt it. I think now it would [124] be more prudent, as far as success is concerned, to have a combined attack by land and water. I understand there is a hill just back of Vera Cruz, which commands the castle, and is only three-quarters of a mile distant. A battery of heavy guns placed here would render most effectual assistance in subduing the place.

We arrived here two days ago, after a very pleasant march of some six days from Camargo. We neither saw nor heard anything of the enemy, though we are now sixty miles in the interior, and about half-way to Monterey.

This place is situated just at the foot of the first range of mountains, and is prettily placed in the valley of a mountain stream, which, as it is pure, cool water, we esteem a great luxury. The people have received us most kindly—indeed, the authorities, after General Worth had given them an official letter, informing them of his intention to occupy the town, as part of a conquered country, and in consequence should expect from them supplies of various kinds, for all of which prompt payment in cash, at fair prices, would be made, and the whole town turned out and brought us grass, wood, corn, flour, and everything that was asked for, cheerfully.

We found here, in the possession of the Alcalde, a paper from the City of Mexico of the 6th of August, making known that the revolution, which had broken out two months previously at Guadalajara, had extended to the city itself, and on that day the troops of the garrison had declared for Santa Anna, and Paredes was no longer in power. Santa Anna will, of course, return now, but what his course will be is as yet in doubt. My impression is that either he will at once propose terms and make peace, or he will set himself energetically to work to prosecute the war; and as he is the master-spirit of this country, far beyond all others in talent and resources, should he adopt the latter course, we may look for a long and severely contested war.

I trust, however, he will have the good sense to see the inutility of his country struggling against the United States, and as he will find it in a state of distraction, requiring all his ability to put it in such a condition as to make certain his power, he will yield to the influence of England and propose such terms as Mr. Polk will consider acceptable.

We have now here some nine hundred men, with a battery of artillery. Fifteen miles from us is another detachment of six [125] hundred, with another battery, and in rear of them, at various intervals, are stationed brigades, on the road to Camargo; so that in a day we might concentrate a force of several thousand here, which number is sufficient for a defensive attitude, in the event of our hearing of the advance of the enemy.

Our latest intelligence (three days from Monterey) is to the effect they have received no accession of force, though it was reported Ampudia, with three thousand men, was marching from San Luis Potosi, and would be in Monterey in the course of four or five days. Should this prove true, it would give them at that point a regular force of between five and six thousand men, and a large irregular force, and with the works they have erected around the town, they may be induced to offer resistance.

I have been agreeably disappointed in my service with General Worth, having been treated with all possible courtesy and kindness, and I hope I shall remain with him so long as he is in the advance.

As to hostilities, our latest intelligence would lead us to believe we may expect to meet with resistance at Monterey. We have undoubted information (indeed I have seen a paper from the City of Mexico announcing the fact) that on the 6th of August a revolution of the soldiery took place in the city, dispossessing Paredes of the Government, and recalling Santa Anna. This individual, it is said, made his appearance at Vera Cruz on the 17th ultimo, and is now at the head of affairs, with the avowed intention of prosecuting vigorously the war against us. From Monterey we learn that, four days ago, Ampudia (placed in command by Santa Anna) had arrived, with two thousand men and four pieces of artillery, and that large reinforcements were daily expected, and they expressed their determination to meet us before we reached the town, in order to spare it. All this is report, except the arrival of reinforcements, which we know to be a fact. It has always been my opinion that they would make a stand at Monterey, if they obtained reinforcements, and I therefore expect we shall have to take the place by force of arms; but I do not anticipate its being a very difficult affair, from all I can learn of their preparations. As to their coming out to meet us, I cannot believe them so foolhardy; it would be too much good fortune for us, as our success would be beyond a doubt.

On our own part our movements continue as tardy as ever. [126] General Taylor has determined to march on Monterey with between six and seven thousand men, all his regulars and some picked volunteers. The remainder of the volunteers are to be left at Camargo, under General Patterson,³⁹ and are to be sent for as soon as we reach any part of the country where an increased force can be subsisted. The movement has commenced from Camargo, and we are daily expecting the arrival of the next division of regulars, when we will be pushed on in advance.

Unfortunately for us we have had some very heavy rains in the last few days, which have so swollen some of the streams on the road as to delay the march of the troops till they subside, and I fear it will be some weeks before we shall be at Monterey. I say, I fear, not that I am over-anxious to have any more fighting, for, God knows, I have seen enough, and am perfectly willing to forego any additional glory; but if we have the thing to do, the sooner it is over the better for all hands. And if Santa Anna has returned with the intention of prosecuting the war, we may make up our minds to having to whip them severely before they come to terms, and having this to do, my wish is that as little time as possible should intervene, and as little distance as possible be marched over before this consummation is brought about.

We are all in fine spirits and most anxious to move on.

We have now collected at this point the army intended to operate against Monterey. It consists of—

Eight regiments of regular infantry	2500	men.
Four regiments of volunteer infantry	2000	men.
Four batteries of light artillery	280	men.	each four 6-pounders.
One battery of heavy artillery	100	men.	Two 24-pounders, Howitzers and one heavy mortar
Two squadrons of regular cavalry	200	men.
One squadron of volunteer cavalry	150	men.
Two regiments of volunteer cavalry	1000	men.
	———
Total	6230	men

[127]

In addition, there are between four and five hundred men attached in various ways, such as teamsters, hospital attendants and others, most of whom are armed, and will swell our force at a pinch to seven thousand men, in round numbers.

I have just returned from a reconnoissance of the road in advance of this place. I proceeded thirty miles, when we came within a mile of a cavalry force of the enemy, amounting to eight hundred. It was in the middle of the night, we having ridden very hard to endeavor to surprise them; but upon reaching this point, we found, from the peasantry, that two couriers had passed in advance of us, who knew of all our movements, and even stated our number, eighty strong. Finding them prepared for us, we drove in their pickets, and awaited their pursuit; but the cowardly rascals were afraid to come after us, and not being strong enough ourselves to attempt to attack them, we returned to camp unmolested. To-morrow I go forward in advance of the army with a strong working party and escort, to repair the road previously examined. The army will commence their march the next day, and in ten days from now we shall know whether Monterey is ours, by hard knocks or not. I understand General Taylor thinks there will be no fighting, and he probably has sources of information beyond mine. At any rate, above you have my opinion, which is condensed, that the question turns, first, on the necessity Santa Anna may find himself under to continue the war; upon this turns the question of war or peace; and, secondly, in case of war, his ability to collect a force to resist us, upon which will depend the point where we may expect to fight. Under any circumstances, a few months must now decide the matter. We are in motion with six thousand five hundred men. At Camargo, on the river, some one hundred and forty miles in rear of Monterey, we leave a reserve of eight or ten thousand men. We have all the means of transportation we can expect to get, and there is no obstacle to our onward progress, but such as the enemy will present. Should we defeat them, as I feel confident we will, I think one battle will induce them to yield, as it will take them some time to reassemble another army, during which time we shall be advancing towards their capital. Our people are in fine condition and spirits, and I think will give a good account of themselves should the enemy be kind enough to give us the opportunity. Still, the impression of the majority is there will be no fight, and odds are offered on this. You may probably have heard of peace when this reaches you, in which event, of course you will have all your anxiety removed. [128]

And now as to the subject of brevets mentioned in your last letter, in which you appear mortified at my having been passed over. You doubtless remember I told you I expected nothing of the kind, and consequently am not disappointed. I understand General Taylor did me the honor to name me for promotion on his long list, the one considered too large to send to the Senate; but I was always aware that the nomination of the commanding general was one thing, and the nomination by the ‘President’ another, the one requiring hard service, the other political influence, the curse of our country. If I had strong Locofoco friends at Washington, to back the nomination of General Taylor, I might have hoped to have been rewarded; but on its absence, my claims will meet with no attention. But, in truth, I have but little claim as far as the two battles are concerned. On those days I did my duty, and my duty simply. Opportunities were wanting—and, in fact, seldom occur to staff officers—to perform brilliant feats, such as ensure promotion; but if most faithful attention to those duties for nearly a year preceding, and activity and energy such as (though I say it myself) have attracted attention from various officers, entitle me to the advancement of one grade, an empty honor which brings neither rank nor profit with it, then I can safely appeal to my brother-officers for my credentials in this case.

I write this to you to whom, without incurring the charge of vanity, I can speak of my own services. I can safely say I am pretty much the only officer of my own corps who has done anything, and that, by the blessing of God enabling me to keep in good health, I have been actively employed ever since my arrival at Corpus Christi, this time last year. Therefore, on the ground of meritorious services, I have some claim, and this added to my position on the eighth and ninth (it being customary to promote the staff of a successful general, when they have anything in them to deserve it), would have prepared me not to be surprised, had they thought proper to advance me one grade; but as I said before, knowing how these things are done, I was fully prepared for my not being noticed.

I suppose you know I am simply a Second Lieutenant, and one grade would only have made me a First Lieutenant, bringing no additional consideration or emolument; but it would give me the opportunity, in case of further active service, to reach the next grade, of Captain, which would be of essential importance to me; and besides, it is a public testimonial of your merits, at all times grateful to yourself and friends.

There is much heart-burning in the army at the list confirmed, [129] and the advancement of some officers, two grades, is considered as most unjust; but I think the list confirmed is most remarkably just, and am surprised, knowing the difficulty of selection, that so few mistakes were made.

I have had no opportunity to write to you since the date of my last (I think on the eleventh), for we have been ever since marching, and only halt at this point to give time to the rear to close up. You will doubtless see in the papers all about our march and the dispositions made.

On the twelfth the pioneers, about ninety strong, with one hundred cavalry and twenty-five Rangers, constituting what was called the Pioneer Advance, left Seralvo, to proceed in advance and make such repairs to the road as might be required for the heavy trains to pass over. It was with this little detachment that I was ordered to go.

It was followed on the thirteenth by the First Division, and on each consecutive day by the other divisions. We kept a day's march in advance of the First Division for two days, but on the fourteenth our scouts, or rangers, came upon a party of the enemy's cavalry, and pursued them into a rancho, when they joined a body supposed to be some four or five hundred. This night we encamped at a place called Papa-Gallos, and being fifteen miles in advance of the army, and having but little over two hundred men, the enemy having three times our number, we expected, as a matter of course, he would attempt some enterprise against us, but he left us undisturbed.

On the fifteenth our little advance again pushed on, the enemy retiring, but in passing through a village, our Texas boys made a rush at them and delivered a fire, by which they tumbled two out of their saddles and got their lances and carbines. The Mexicans returned the fire without effect, and continued retiring. As they appeared to be increasing in force, General Taylor ordered us to halt until the First Division came up, so that we should be just in front of it, and we preserved this order of march up to our arrival at this place, Marin.

This little town, of some two thousand inhabitants, we found entirely deserted but by a few men, from whom we understood that the cavalry we had seen were under the command of General Towejon, who had a thousand at Marin, and some five hundred advanced near [130] Papa-Gallos, where we first saw them, and that they were a corps of observation, and also were driving the people before them and out of the way. In Marin they ordered every one out of the town, and those who were unable to move their property, they turned the soldiers into the houses and robbed them of everything. The poor people (after we had possession of the place for an hour, you could see the bushes and hills all around covered with women and children who had fled from the place, and were coming back as soon as they knew we were in quiet possession) were loud in their denunciations of their own soldiers, and expressed great gratification we had driven them out of the place.

Well, here we are within twenty-five miles of Monterey, one day's forced march, and two easy ones, and really we know no more of the nature of the reception they will give us, or of their defenses, or of the number of troops they have, than we did when at Matamoras, three hundred miles distant. I have taken every pains to find out the truth, and have heard a thousand contradictory stories, but have pretty much made up my mind they will not fight, and upon this ground, my last letter, if you recollect, said the point of meeting between the contending armies would depend upon the time the reinforcements from the interior should reach Monterey. It is now believed the force at Monterey consists of the debris of Arista's army, with inconsiderable reinforcements not over two thousand, making their regular force not over four thousand men, the number of their irregulars not known, and we do not care for them. Now, if they have only four thousand, they will never stand our seven thousand; then, if they are going to retire, they must do it before we reach there, or else all their artillery and public stores will fall into our hands; therefore I believe they are evacuating the town at this moment, and we shall march in without firing a gun—that is to say, provided our information proves correct, that they have no larger reinforcements. However, conte qui conte, or as old Rough and Ready says, ‘Nolus volus,’ we have to go in on the 20th instant.

We wait to-day for General Butler,⁴⁰ with the Volunteer Division, to come up, and to-morrow we move en masse upon the town. It will, I presume, take us two days to reach its vicinity, and on the third we will try their mettle. But I believe sincerely, as I told you before, that they will not resist our entrance, unless it be some skirmishing between our advance and their rear. And should we take [131] Monterey quietly, and Saltillo, peace may be made before the two armies can meet again.

By our last mail, just received, an officer, whose wife is in Pensacola, wrote to him that Santa Anna had not only entered Vera Cruz with the cognizance of Commodore Connor, but they had a long and confidential interview together. I should judge from this Santa Anna was favorable to adjusting the difficulty, and will do all in his power. I believe now I have told you all the news, which is the general impression we shall soon get into good quarters without much hard fighting.

Be on your guard against newspaper reports, as a general rule false. Even in the army, in the rear divisions, they had us of the advance all cut to pieces, and were quite glad to see us alive when they came up.

My last letter will tell you all about the brevets. You have, however, done injustice to Bliss'⁴¹ merits. He was not only in the battle, but had his horse struck twice, and is one of the most meritorious officers in the army. His position as Adjutant General placed him very near General Taylor, and all the despatches, correspondence, etc., have been written by him, and indeed nearly all the credit General Taylor has received is, in fact, due to Bliss' advice and counsel. Bliss is a good friend of mine, and, as I told you before, I was recommended for promotion. This was all General Taylor could do, for which I am really grateful to him.

I wish you were in this beautiful country, for here it is magnificent, the air balmy and pure, all the tropical fruits growing and we are just entering a level table-land, which leads to the mountains, twentyfive miles off, but so high we can see them towering away above the clouds, a most magnificent sight. Indeed, were I single, I should be tempted to spend my days in this lovely climate. On our march from Seralvo I never had a covering over my head, nor anything but my old india-rubber cloak spread on the ground for a bed. I slept soundly, and have no colds or rheumatism or any of the penalties I should pay, did I do this at home.

But I have not time to describe scenery to you, for I am of course much hurried, and in a marching army all is confusion and excitement.

Give my best love to dear mother and let her consider this letter as addressed to herself as well as you, you, who both and alone, with my dear children, fill my whole heart. Be patient and resigned; let [132] us await God's good will, being confident He will protect us, and at the proper moment permit us to be reunited. My warmest prayers are for His blessings to be showered on you and our dear children.

Again return thanks to God for my providential escape from danger. Our little army appeared before this place on the 20th instant, finding it strongly fortified and garrisoned by about ten thousand men. We have been pretty much ever since engaged in fighting, and have suffered some terrible losses, but by skill and perseverance we brought the enemy to terms this afternoon, and a capitulation has been entered into by which a cessation of hostilities for two months is agreed upon, they guaranteeing peace, and they evacuate to-morrow, the town, leaving us masters of it, with all the public property.

I am writing this in a gun-carriage, and have only five minutes to assure you of my perfect safety. I will soon write again. Write to mother. Love to all, and you may look soon now, I think, for me.

I wrote you a few hasty lines on the twenty-fourth (misdated twenty-fifth) communicating to you our having taken this place, and promising soon to give you the particulars. I have been much occupied since, and, indeed, I believe no mail has since left. At any rate I assured you of my safety, and now proceed to give you particulars.

We arrived before Monterey on the 19th instant. I was in the advance with General Taylor, who was seeking a suitable camping ground for the army, beyond the range of the enemy's guns. We advanced within a mile of their works, but could see no sign of their occupation, and began to believe reports received en route, that they had deserted. Some of our bold fellows, however, who pushed nearer, found a cavalry force, with which they exchanged shots. The General, having selected a fit place for camp, ordered up the mounted Texans, one thousand in number, when the enemy finding we were not going to push into town and be caught in a trap, opened their batteries on us, and fired several times without doing any injury, though one ball, I assure you, came closer to me than I desire it to do again, just passing about two feet on one side of my knee. Finding we were in range of their guns, the General withdrew the Texans, and selected a camp some two and a half miles from the town. The [133] remainder of this day was spent by the engineer officers in reconnoitering the positions of the enemy, a duty, I assure you, sufficiently hazardous, as they were obliged to go with small parties and far from the camp, giving an enterprising enemy ample opportunity to cut them off. No such accident, however, occurred, and by night the reports were all in. It was found the town was most strongly fortified in the direction of Marin, and weak in that of Saltillo. In consequence, on the morning of the twentieth, while I was engaged in making a survey in front of the enemy's batteries, of the different positions, I received orders to report to General Worth, who, with his division (consisting of one regiment of Texas Rangers, four regiments of regular infantry, and two batteries of light artillery, in all about two thousand men), was ordered to advance upon the town in the direction of the Saltillo road. I immediately repaired to him, found the column ready to move, and in a few minutes marched with it.

We made a long detour, to avoid the batteries, and reached a rancho, where the command was halted, while the General and myself, with his staff, rode forward to reconnoitre the ground. Our advance was covered by about fifty Texans, and we proceeded along the road for two miles, till we came into the gorge through which the Saltillo road runs (see sketch), where the enemy were reported in large force in our front. Having seen all we wanted, we were about retiring, when they opened a fire upon us from a fence alongside of the road, where some of the rascals had sneaked up to cut us off, but it was promptly returned by the Texans, and we came quietly back to camp.

The next morning, the twenty-first, we started early to place ourselves in position on the Saltillo road, by which we should cut off the retreat of the enemy, and have an eye to the advance of his reinforcements, said to be daily expected. As we were turning the corner of the road entering the valley, the enemy showed himself with a large cavalry force, some two thousand, with some five hundred infantry, evidently intending to dispute our passage. I should, however, observe that on the afternoon previous, as well as this morning, in passing along the road we had been subjected to a plunging fire from two pieces on the top of ‘Independence Hill’ (see sketch), from which, however, we sustained no damage. Finding the enemy in front, General Worth sent forward the Texans, who immediately engaged them, supported by two companies of infantry, acting as skirmishers. The Mexican cavalry charged on our people most gallantly, but were received with so warm a fire as to throw them into

Sketch showing the position of the army of occupation at the battle of Monterey (Fac-Simile of the original)

[134] confusion, and just as they were preparing for another charge, Colonel Duncan's battery opened on them, and at the first discharge strewed the ground with the dead, and they precipitately fled.

This little affair was very brilliant, and served to raise the spirits of all. The enemy's loss has been since ascertained to be one hundred killed and wounded, among the killed one colonel, one captain, and two subalterns, several officers wounded; we had but three wounded. The infantry and a portion of the cavalry retired towards the town, but twelve hundred of the cavalry went in the direction of Saltillo, and have not been heard from since. Finding an appearance, on the part of those who went towards the town, of renewing the contest, the light batteries opened on them from a hill on the north side of the gorge, which quickly dispersed them. At the same time a plunging fire from a piece on the top of Federation Hill was opened on us, obliging us to retire out of range of the shot, from whence commenced our operations on the town. Our only loss from this fire was Captain McKavett, Eighth Infantry, who was killed, and two men wounded.

You will now perceive from the sketch we were on the Saltillo road beyond the gorge through which it passes into town, and that this gorge was defended by artillery on the tops of these hills, and by a strong work around the Bishop's Palace, on one hill, and a redoubt opposite, on the other. It now became necessary to take these heights before we could advance upon the town. Accordingly, a command, consisting of two hundred Texans and four hundred regulars, was ordered to storm the summit of Federation Hill. This was handsomely done, though the hill was nearly a thousand feet high and very steep, defended by artillery and five hundred infantry. But so gallant was the attack, the enemy were driven from the summit without having time to carry their artillery, which was taken from them and turned upon their redoubt on the same hill, which in a short time was stormed and carried also, so that by night we had taken two of the four positions, and encamped in the gorge, as was designed in the morning. So much for our operations.

I regret to say those on the opposite side, though successful, were attended with more disastrous results. In order to divert the attention of the enemy from our operations, General Taylor directed Colonel Garland's brigade of regulars to advance on the eastern part of the town and cover an engineer officer, reconnoitering. In doing this they were obliged to pass through the cross-fire of all the [135] batteries in that direction, in which they suffered very much, but were able to pass through and get into the suburbs of the town. Finding no troops here, they thought they could go through the town, and thus take some of the batteries in the rear. But while in the town, ignorant of the streets and positions, they suddenly found where the streets were raked by four or five guns, and the first thing they knew, nearly one-half their men were lying on the ground, dead and wounded. The slaughter here was terrific; ten of our gallant officers fell to rise no more, and some ten others were wounded, some beyond the hope of recovery. The two regiments constituting the brigade were literally cut to pieces, and they were obliged to retire, leaving the dead and wounded on the ground. Among the officers who fell was Captain Williams, of my corps, who was leading the advance. This disastrous result was retrieved partially by a portion of the Third Division of Volunteers, which General Taylor, hearing firing, had despatched to reinforce the first command. This brigade, consisting of the Tennessee and Mississippi regiments, not knowing where our people were, advanced right in the face of one battery (marked C), when finding themselves so near, they gallantly charged and took it, driving the enemy from the guns, and retaining possession of the place. Thus terminated the 21st of September.

In which you will see that on our side, we had defeated the enemy, having superior force, in open fight, under their batteries, and taken from them two pieces of artillery; that on the other side, though suffering a repulse with great loss, yet we took from him a fort with four guns. The loss on our side was about twenty killed and wounded, one captain killed, and two officers wounded; on General Taylor's side, some three hundred killed and wounded, some twelve officers killed and eight wounded. The loss of the enemy is supposed to be about two hundred in killed and wounded; but the moral effect was great. With us they saw judgment and energy quietly but surely advancing; on the other side, impetuosity and fearless courage, that showed a determination at all sacrifice to carry everything before them.

Early on the morning of the twenty-second a party of some five hundred regulars and Texans were sent from our division to storm the height of Independence Hill. By daylight they were at the summit, driving the enemy from the position into the Bishop's Palace, from whence they kept up an incessant fire of musketry upon our people, with but little effect. Finding the Bishop's Palace too strong [136] to be carried by infantry, a piece of artillery was taken to pieces and carried up by hand to the summit, which piece with great skill threw shrapnel shells (shells filled with musket balls) right into the palace and the open work in front. This made the place so untenable that the enemy undertook to drive us from the summit, and made a charge of cavalry and infantry up the hill. In this they were defeated, and, on retiring, were so vigorously pursued by our people, that they continued beyond the Bishop's Palace, leaving this work, with four pieces of artillery, in our hands, and they retired into the town. Thus, for to-day's work, we had the other two points, giving us four of the enemy's positions, with six of his guns, and the free entrance to the city by the Saltillo road. Our loss to-day was only one officer of the Texas Rangers, mortally wounded, and some five killed and half a dozen wounded; the loss of the enemy much more considerable.

At the eastern end of the town, so crippled were they the previous day, they contented themselves with keeping up from the redoubt they had taken a vigorous fire upon the other works of the enemy (marked D. E. T. G. H.).

On the 23d instant we opened a fire on the town, with the enemy's guns at the Bishop's Palace, and moved the gun taken in the redoubt on Federation Hill farther on the hill, to the point marked P. This fire was kept up vigorously all the morning. In the meantime the General sent me forward on a reconnoissance, to ascertain what batteries the enemy had in our direction. In doing this I ascertained the enemy had abandoned all that portion of the town in our direction, and had retired to the central plaza of the town, where they were barricaded, and all the houses occupied by their infantry. General Worth immediately advanced on the town and took possession, without resistance, of the plaza of La Purissima, where we found a cemetery and church, which our infantry occupied, and where we placed an eight-inch mortar in excellent range to play into the plaza, which was now the enemy's last stronghold.

After occupying the plaza of La Purissima, we threw forward our infantry to that portion of the town occupied by the enemy. They had occupied the main plaza and some two squares around it in each direction; they had erected across the streets solid masonry walls, with embrasures for guns to fire grape, sweeping the street; then all the houses in the neighborhood were occupied by their infantry, loopholes being made to enable them to fire in any direction. Had we [137] attempted to advance up the streets, as our poor fellows had done previously, all would have been cut to pieces; but we were more skillfully directed. As soon as we came near their position, we broke into the adjoining houses, and sent our sharpshooters on their tops, where, sheltered by the parapets, they could look over and pick off all Mexicans who showed their heads above the houses in front. Having thus driven the enemy from the houses in front, the engineer officers were engaged with picks and crowbars in making holes from house to house, through which our people advanced, and in this manner, by nightfall, we were enabled to reach within one square of the plaza, and rendered certain our coming to close quarters the next day. Our troops remained in the houses, where they ceased firing and were prepared to commence anew at daylight next day.

On General Taylor's side, to-day, it was found, early in the morning, the fire from our fort had been so warm, the enemy had deserted all their other batteries, carrying their guns into the plaza. These were immediately occupied by our troops, and they commenced an advance upon the town, in the same cautious manner we had done, and reached by nightfall a position as near the plaza as we had done, so that by night we had driven the enemy from all his exterior works, taken eleven guns, and had approached him in the town itself, within one square on each side of his stronghold. He still had his citadel, but we were screened from its fire by the town itself. During the night our mortar threw shells every half an hour into the plaza, so accurately as to make many fall within a few feet of the church, their main magazine, and almost every one killed from six to ten soldiers. You see, they were so crowded in the space they occupied, that if the shell fell with any accuracy, its execution was terrible. So ended the twenty-third. I should mention the enemy endeavored to return our compliments, and threw shells from the citadel into the cemetery occupied by our mortar battery, but without any effect.

On the morning of the twenty-fourth, as we were commencing to renew the assault, confident the night would give us the town, a white flag came from General Ampudia, asking of General Taylor permission to evacuate the town, as he now saw resistance was no longer available. General Taylor had an interview with him, in which Ampudia begged hard for easy terms, saying he was still strong, having yet five thousand men and twenty-eight pieces of artillery; but, understanding our Government had offered peace to Mexico, he was willing to make an honorable compromise between [138] the armies, which would open the door to negotiations between the Governments, as, should things be carried to extremities, the defeated party would not listen to terms.

There being something reasonable in this, and much blood having been shed, and there being many private persons who would suffer in person and property if things were carried farther, General Taylor gave as his ultimatum the following terms: The Mexican Army to evacuate the place in seven days, and retire beyond the Rinconada, forty miles from here, to which point we were at liberty to advance. The infantry and cavalry to take their arms; the artillery, six pieces of light-artillery; all the rest of the public property and munitions of war to be ours, and the town to be given up to our exclusive possession. One hour was given Ampudia to answer. At the termination of thirty minutes he accepted, and immediately three commissioners on each side were appointed, who drew up the terms of capitulation, which were signed by ten o'clock that night. This result has been caviled at by many, as it is said we had them completely in our power, and one more day's operations would have given us the town, or an unconditional surrender, and that letting these people off, we should only have to meet them again at Saltillo. But, for my part, I approve General Taylor's course. They were still very strong in the town, having three thousand men and twenty pieces of artillery, costing an immense sacrifice to subdue them. Then their strongest work, the citadel, with a garrison of two thousand five hundred men and eight pieces of artillery, was untouched, and would have required still greater loss to reduce, though I am confident both town and citadel would have been in our hands in a few more days. But our volunteer force, which had shared in the disastrous losses of the eastern side, were beginning to be disorganized, and already regiments were holding back, and individuals refusing to advance, and they could not be longer depended on. The regulars were crippled almost to inefficiency, and in addition, the enemy were in hourly expectation of reinforcements. Apart from these considerations, we knew Santa Anna was willing to compromise this question if he could. Should we act with forbearance towards the army, and give it honorable terms, it was probable we might have its voice in favor of peace, as the national pride, so sensitive, might not be aroused by an honorable capitulation. Again, it was doubtful if we should have gained more by pushing matters, as it was in the power of the enemy to run off in the night, carrying all with them which we allowed them [139] to carry, except the six pieces of artillery (a trifle), and destroying much valuable property, now ours. Besides, there can be no doubt of the condition to which we had brought them, for the facts speak for themselves. Here was an army of six thousand men giving up to us a town with twenty-two pieces of artillery and a vast amount of the munitions of war, and retiring eighty miles to the interior and leaving us in a place they had attempted to defend. No army that was not badly whipped would have done this, and as to fighting us again, if they had all been made prisoners of war, we could not keep them, we should have been obliged to let them go, and all would have taken arms again, in spite of agreements and paroles; so we gained all we could, did away with any chance of failure, and made them believe they, as well as ourselves, were great people.

It is now ascertained they had at the commencement nine thousand men and thirty-eight pieces of artillery, with strong works, and only the defence to make. We, with six thousand, and no heavy artillery for a siege-train, one hundred and thirty miles from all our depots and supplies, and obliged to attack in the face of all this artillery, brought them to these terms. So ended the siege of Monterey, an affair, I deem, most honorable to our arms.

There was some little disposition on the part of Ampudia to jockey. There is no doubt the Mexicans were in a state of disorganization and mutiny, and that he would have been forced to accept almost any terms General Taylor had offered to him, but our old General was desirous of playing a liberal and generous part by them, and thought it impolitic to push them too hard.

For my part, you may rest assured, I was exceedingly rejoiced; many of our brave fellows slept in a nameless grave, for the bodies of some were never recovered; and any one who for four days and nights is in constant state of exposure to fire-arms of all descriptions will be very well satisfied to terminate so disagreeable an occupation.

All the amateurs accompanying the army, and we have a goodly number, are now satisfied, and are now going home. Among them was Bailie Peyton, who was an attache to General Worth. Owing to this I saw a great deal of him, and have been much pleased with his wit and humor under the most trying circumstances. We would often express to each other what enjoyment Mr. Wise⁴² would have here, and you can write to Mr. Wise and tell him we all, and Colonel [140] Campbell also, of Tennessee (a very handsome fellow, who was the first to enter the enemy's batteries) thought of him. He was in Congress at the same time with Mr. Wise and Peyton.

You will doubtless see the official reports, and the newspapers will be filled with anecdotes of the various attacks. I hope the people of the country will appreciate what we have done, and for myself individually, if I get the approbation of those in whose hearts I wish to live, it is all that I ask.

I do not think I mentioned in the terms of capitulation, that an armistice had been agreed upon for two months, unless either or both Governments should be sooner heard from. This time, it is presumed, will be ample for both Governments to settle the terms of a treaty, or at least determine the question of peace or a continuance of the war. We, however, have reports through New Orleans and Vera Cruz that a counter-revolution against Santa Anna commenced at San Luis Potosi; but here they say it was a trifling affair and soon put down. But the rumor from the interior is, that the people of the City of Mexico have declared against Santa Anna, rendering doubtful his being able to maintain himself in power; all these, however, are rumors. I think that if Santa Anna remains in power he will make peace, because I believe the army that left here is desirous of it, and it will impress the remainder of the army, which controls public opinion in this country. If he is overthrown, there is no telling what will be the result. It will also greatly depend on the demands of our Government. If not too exigent, I am inclined to believe the great expenditure of money, and the recent loss of life, will induce it to be more liberal than otherwise. If we had had a commissioner with us, he could by this time have been near the City of Mexico.

I have again, through the misfortunes of others, been placed in the agreeable position of head of my corps, and as long as I remain so, my desire to leave is greatly diminished.

Major Craig is well and safe. What part he took in the recent events, I cannot say, as he was at the eastern end of the town. John Pemberton I saw a great deal of; he is aide to General Worth. Of course, being on the same staff, we were together all the time. He discharged his duties with great credit to himself, and was fortunate to receive no wound. I do not think you know any of the killed or wounded officers. Richard Graham, the son of Mrs. Graham in Washington, is very badly wounded, but hopes are entertained he [141] will get over it. James Ricketts, Mrs. Robert Meade's⁴³ brother, is safe. I saw him at various times during the actions, as his regiment was under General Worth's command.

Now for a few private lines, in which I wish to express to you my heartfelt gratitude that it has pleased God once more to pass me through untold dangers, and to allow me still to cling to the hope of once more being reunited to you. God knows what joy it brings to my heart to anticipate the happiness we shall have together, and the deep anxiety I have to behold again my blessed little children, whose images are as fresh in my heart as the day I left them. Tell the boys I will give them a long story about it all, when I get back.

After your good father has read this letter, I wish you would communicate its contents to dear mother, Major Bache and Pemberton.

My sketch is exceedingly rough, but will serve to illustrate the narrative.

I have but little information to give you. The Mexican army has all gone to Saltillo, where Ampudia has published a flourishing proclamation, assigning as a reason for his evacuating this place that his ammunition and provisions were exhausted; whereas we captured ammunition to last us two more fights and provisions enough to supply us some weeks. He also states he repelled all our assaults, and that we left on the ground some fifteen hundred killed and wounded. In fact, his whole proclamation is a tissue of the grossest falsehoods, which, of course, we expected him to make to his own people, to save himself. But I very much fear the thing will go further, and that the capitulation of Monterey will, like the convention of Cintra, prove most unpopular.

It is now rendered beyond a doubt that the Mexicans were entirely and completely in our power. A few hours more fighting would have brought about a surrender, at discretion, of the whole army.

General Taylor was actuated by the highest motives in allowing them the terms he did, hoping, upon the representations of Ampudia, it would be the means of negotiating a peace; but from all we can now understand, Ampudia's whole conversation and all his statements prove to be false, made through fear, and with the hope (justly realized) of getting out of a bad scrape.

The general impression now is that we will not obtain peace. If [142] so, we have missed the opportunity of making some seven thousand men prisoners. Ampudia distinctly stated to General Taylor that he had received information from the City of Mexico that morning (the 24th), that an American Minister was to be received; whereas Santa Anna's reply to Mr. Buchanan,⁴⁴ published in the Mexican journals, (and in Ampudia's possession), states distinctly that he cannot take upon himself the responsibility of making peace; it must be referred to the Mexican Congress, which does not meet till December. How then could a Minister be received before the answer of Congress? This proves he knew he was uttering false statements. Indeed, no reliance is to be placed on anything these people say. The highest among them know not what honor and veracity are; and it is useless to expect anything from any influence brought to bear upon them, except fear, and our whole course must be changed ere we can expect to bring them to terms. Here is a third victory without result, everything to be done over again, and our obstacles increasing as we advance.

If the Government of Mexico now refuse peace, upon such terms as the United States are ready to offer, and they are such as the world will not condemn, it will be necessary for our country to make up its mind to a long war of sacrifice, on our part, which will be the longer, the less energetically it is pursued. In the first place, this line of operations we are now on must be abandoned after we reach Saltillo (seventy miles from here), for, from that point, it is two hundred and fifty miles to San Luis Potosi, over a barren country, with no permanent supplies of water, only tanks and reservoirs for rain-water, which they can easily destroy as we approach; and when we get to San Luis, we are some six hundred miles from the City of Mexico.⁴⁵

Should the Government determine upon continuing on this route, we must take Tampico, and then, when we reach San Luis, we can open our communications with Tampico, some three hundred miles off, as far as Vera Cruz is from the city itself.

Vera Cruz must be taken, and an attack made on the city from that direction. It is well to have it in conjunction with this, if the Government chooses, but the main attack must be on the line of Vera Cruz. An army of twenty-five thousand men at least, well [143] supplied with artillery and all the munitions of war, should be landed at Alvarado, and advance from thence on Vera Cruz, and in conjunction with the navy take that place, from whence they should advance into the interior. At the same time twenty-five hundred men should advance from San Luis Potosi towards the same point, and some twenty-five hundred men are required to hold the country and occupy it, from Tampico to the Californias.

It is only by doing things on this scale, vigorously, and at every cost of blood and money, that ‘an honorable peace will ever be conquered.’ Neither the Government of Mexico nor her people care about the occupation of the country we are now in. It is a positive benefit to the people; we are spending here a large portion of the revenues of the United States, and making money more plenty than it ever was before. If the Government is determined on operating on this long line, it should take full possession of every Department as it conquers it, overthrow all Mexican jurisdiction, proclaim it to the world as part of the United States, appoint all the necessary officers for a Territorial Government, and extend our laws over it, sequestrating the property of all those who left the country or refused to take the oath of allegiance. Then Mexico would look with some anxiety upon our approach, as she saw Department after Department lopped off, and she would be obliged to make vigorous efforts to defend her soil, which, if we overcome, would be arguments in our favor.

But, as it is, a small band is pushed into the interior of the country, where it is obliged to advance under every disadvantage, and whose success is followed by no material advantage, the country in our rear being as fully in the possession of Mexico as if we had not passed over it. We may go on in this way for five years, and not conquer peace. The loss of a few soldiers, and the temporary occupation of her frontier towns, is no embarrassment to Mexico; her capital and her vital parts must be touched. Once occupy these (and we can do it as readily as we operate here, if we have the proportionate means), and she will be brought to terms.

I have written a long dissertation on the plans proper to be adopted in the event of the prosecution of the war, which now seems to be looked upon as certain among the best informed persons in our army, and among the Mexicans at this place. [144]

As to my personal interests, I presume, of course, that I am to remain here till it is all over, unless I make an application to be relieved, which I cannot bring my mind to do. They have a joke among the officers, that it is bad business for any officer to be sent here to command me, for he will be sure to be killed; and it is strange. Of the three superior officers who have been sent here at various times, the first (Captain Cram) had to leave the country soon after his arrival, on account of ill-health; the second (poor Blake) shot himself; and the third (Captain Williams) fell in the recent operations against Monterey; leaving me each time the senior officer of Topographical Engineers. General Worth, with whom I served during the recent operations, has been pleased to speak well of me in his report, and when I thanked him for it, he observed ‘that he trusted the thing would not end there, and I might rest assured his best efforts would be exerted in my behalf.’

I have nothing new to tell you this morning. There is a report that General Canaliso has been placed in command of the Mexican forces; that he has arrived at San Luis, with a large army, and ordered Ampudia to fall back from Saltillo to that place. It is hard to tell what inference is to be drawn from this. It is a proper measure in the event of peace, and equally so in case the war continues, for it forces us to march some four hundred miles before we can get to them, which will take us, with our movements, over a month; and as the armistice lasts two months, they will have three to fortify and prepare to make their stand at a point three hundred miles nearer the capital than Saltillo is, so that no deduction can be made from this move, and it is only a report, of which there are a thousand in circulation each day, all contradicted the succeeding days.

Last night's mail brings orders for Captain Linnard of our corps to repair here, so that my enjoyment of seniority will last but a short time, as I suppose Captain Linnard will be here in the course of a week or two.

The news from Saltillo to-day is to the effect that the people of that place have positively refused to allow their town to be fortified, pointing to Monterey, which is naturally much stronger, and saying that if the Mexicans could not defend that place, with all its strength, it is useless to try at Saltillo. What effect this argument will have [145] upon their army is unknown, but rumor says they are retiring to San Luis, and have abandoned the pass of Las Muertas, on the road from here to Saltillo, which they had commenced to fortify.

It appears that Canaliso, who was reported to have assumed the head of the army, is in Madrid, but papers from the City of Mexico, as late as the 14th ultimo, contain a proclamation of Santa Anna's, in which he modestly declines the supreme power, in order to place himself at the head of the army, to conquer or die. This is easily understood. Some individual named Salis, or Salisar, is temporarily placed at the head of affairs, a puppet of Santa Anna's, to bear the brunt of disaster, should things turn out badly, he taking all the credit as director, should the result be fortunate. It is supposed that whoever makes peace will be overthrown, and we know that whoever continues the war, and is unsuccessful, will have to yield to the popular will. Santa Anna, by throwing the responsibility of the Government on Salis, and of the army on some general (for nobody supposes he is coming to try his fortune), endeavors to trim his sails to the breeze of public opinion, and save himself by sacrificing his creatures.

Poor Richard Graham died to-day, making the fifteenth officer killed in the attack on Monterey. This will be a sad blow to his poor mother.

Great indignation now prevails in the army at orders recently received from Washington, directing General Taylor to send General Patterson to Tampico with a large portion of his (General Taylor's) force, to take that place. This is considered an outrage upon all military propriety, cutting up a commanding general's force, without reference to him, or the circumstances in which he may find himself.

I regret to tell you my boasted good health has been slightly disturbed. Soon after writing my last letter to you, I was taken with chills and fever, a disease very prevalent at this moment in the army, and attributed to the reaction from the active and exciting life we have been leading, and to the injudicious use of the fruits of the country. To the latter cause I attribute my attack, for I indulged without any discretion in the use of oranges and [146] pomegranates, not dreaming they could be of any injury. The disease, however, is of a very mild character. I broke mine after the second attack, and have now been six days without a return, and hope with care to avoid it in future. Nearly one-third the army is down with it, and many of the poor wounded fellows have been attacked. It is said to be a very common disease at this place, though for what reason I cannot tell, for this appears the garden spot of the earth, the air purity itself, and no source of malaria visible. I wish you could be here to enjoy the delicious climate, to see the exquisite landscapes presented by the towering mountains, and the rich and fertile valley at their feet.

I believe I told you I had been living in town since the capitulation. At first I lived in a house with General Worth, who has shown the most uniform kindness to me; but not wishing to trespass too far upon his civility, and the death of Captain Williams making me senior, and thus detaching me from General Worth's staff and reattaching me to headquarters, I left General Worth's house, and have taken possession of one left in his charge by the proprietor, General Ortega, of the Mexican Army. This is considered one of the handsomest houses in town, and is furnished in a style considered in this country magnificent. The custom of the country is to furnish most plainly. Generally a table and a few chairs constitute the furniture of the parlors, and a bed, with a few chairs, that of the bedroom. But General Ortega, who is a man of wealth, and has been Governor of this Department (Nuevo Leon), a traveled man withal, has gone to great expense in furnishing his mansion, and I am now deriving the benefit of his liberality. The house has six rooms in it, as the subjoined sketch shows. The parlor, a long room, about the size, I should suppose, of the two in Fourth Street, is furnished with two mahogany pier-tables (French), with large mirrors over them. In each of the four corners are corner-pieces (tables), with vases filled with beautiful wax flowers, covered with glass. There are two mahogany centre-tables, cane-bottom and painted chairs, a mahogany sofa at one end, with a strip of ingrain carpet in front — a great luxury, and the only carpet I have seen in the town. The windows, uniformly open to the air, here have glass doors (of very large panes) to keep out the air when cold; the doors are all glass doors. A very splendid French clock, with ormolu ornaments, is on a table at the foot of the parlors, and the walls are hung all around with beautiful colored engravings (French), illustrating historical events in Spanish [147] history. Then with curtains (narrow strips) of red and yellow, hung from gilt arrows, you have the parlor, the tout ensemble of which, I assure you, is exceedingly refreshing to one who has seen nothing like civilization for fifteen months. The bed-rooms have French bedsteads. There is no house linen, or any other furniture but such as stands in the rooms. My messmates are Lieutenant Scarret, of the Corps of Engineers, with whom I lived at Matamoras, and a Lieutenant Pope, of my own corps. We each of us have our own servants, one of whom is cook, the other hostler, and the third plays waiter; so that we are quite comfortable, and, from our luxurious quarters, the envy of the army. Unfortunately we have no mess furniture but our old tin camp equipage; but we manage to get along with this in preference to paying the enormous sum it would require to fit us out with more suitable apparatus. Besides, our stay being uncertain, it would be absurd to purchase articles perfectly useless to us when we leave.

General Taylor, as usual, is in camp three miles from town, and has with him two-thirds of the army. General Worth, with his division, all regulars, occupies the town and keeps it in order. In consequence of this arrangement, good order has hitherto prevailed; no liquor is permitted to be sold to the soldiers, and no person allowed to reside in the town who cannot give a satisfactory account of himself. By these means it is hoped to exclude the gambling shops and groggeries that disgraced Corpus Christi and Matamoras, and which were the fertile sources of murder and robbery, together with every other crime. It is also hoped that the quiet and security thus given to life and property will induce the inhabitants, all of whom have left the place, to return, when we hope to have some gayety and amusement. This place is said to contain many wealthy and agreeable families; but the fears of the assault caused them all to fly to Saltillo and other places in the neighborhood of the city. None have as yet returned, for the volunteers have made themselves so terrible by their previous outrages as to have inspired the Mexicans with a perfect horror of them, and until they are assured of their security they will not return from their hiding places.

I have but little to add to my surmises (in the shape of intelligence) in former letters. It is now rendered beyond a doubt that Santa Anna is at San Luis, with eight thousand regulars, has drawn in there Ampudia with his eight thousand, and is busily engaged reorganizing and putting in order these sixteen thousand men, at the same time [148] that he is making the most vigorous efforts to raise thirty thousand volunteers. He will not advance, it is said, beyond San Luis, but ascertaining our news from the mail captured from us (which had despatches directing General Taylor's attention to Tampico), it is said he has sent a large force to Tampico (the rest he keeps at San Luis), and will hold himself in readiness with a reserve to go to either point threatened. This shows him a good soldier, and should the war continue, I have no doubt my anticipations of his energy will all be realized.

General Taylor told me, a few days ago, he had written to Washington, dissuading the Government against continuing operations any farther on this line, it being too long; and requiring, in case it insists upon his advancing in this direction, that he be furnished with twenty thousand well disciplined men for the marching army, and five thousand to cover his rear and line of communications. At the same time he insists upon having more wagons and means of transportation furnished him. At the same time he advises the Government to allow him to take Tampico, and to hold the line of the Sierra Madre from Tampico to this place. Then, with General Wool at Monclova and Chihuahua, and General Kearney at Santa Fe and in California, we shall hold military possession of five of Mexico's provinces. Then let her come and take them from us, and we await her action.

This plan of an armed occupation, I, individually, am opposed to, upon the ground of its never having any end; for Mexico, though she will hardly undertake to drive us out, will nevertheless be always talking about it, and making preparations, which will compel us to be always prepared by having a large army on this frontier. Then, again, the expense will be enormous of maintaining such an army as it will be absolutely necessary we should have, besides the opposition there would be on the part of the North to see such immense increase of Southern territory. I hope these reasons will induce the Government, even should it accede to his ‘armed occupation,’ to continue active operations against Mexico by sending an army to Vera Cruz, and advancing on the capital, and compelling them at every sacrifice, by force of arms, to sue for peace. In the first place, I think it due to our national honor, after all the bluster we have made, to show them we could do what we said we would; and then, after offering [149] them peace, and they rejecting it, we should at least make an effort to compel them. We hear nothing from Santa Anna at San Luis.

A sad accident happened yesterday, which has thrown a gloom over the camp, and by which the army is likely to lose one of its most gallant officers. Captain Randolph Ridgely, of the Light Artillery, was yesterday thrown from his horse, while riding in the street, and falling on his head, received some injury in the brain, which it is feared will terminate his life. This young officer is the one who, in my opinion, most distinguished himself in the affairs of the 8th and 9th of May. He commanded Ringgold's battery on the 9th, and gallantly drove it up within two hundred yards of the Mexican artillery, unlimbered his pieces, and returned their fire, all in the face of their eight pieces of artillery. In our recent operations he was equally distinguished for his cool and undaunted bravery, and it seems hard, after passing with so much credit through these three affairs, he should finally die the inglorious death that threatens him. He is a son of General Ridgely, of Baltimore; very handsome, and distinguished for his fine manners and courteous affability. He was the young man who brought Rebecca McLane to mother's party, given to you as a bride in Washington. He is universally looked upon as the preux chevalier of the army.

I have entirely recovered from my chills and fever—in fact, having been well ever since I broke them, having had only two attacks. Almost every one has had them, even the poor wounded fellows in hospital, and many have died in consequence. The medical officers say that this climate is unfavorable to the healing of wounds, and that they have lost many who were only slightly wounded, and would, without doubt, have recovered, had they been in the United States.

By the time this reaches you the official reports will have been published. General Taylor has again (much to the dissatisfaction of the army) made a wholesale business of mentioning names, and has made no distinctions as to individuals; so, when he recommends promotions, he will follow the same plan, and begin at the highest and name all his commanding officers, from generals down to colonels (he having an awful respect for rank), whether they do anything or not. Thus, at the Resaca de la Palma, the action was fought entirely by the platoon officers, the younger members of the army, and yet only two received promotion, all the rewards being given to the old men of rank, some of whom were not in the action; but General [150] Taylor mentioned them all, because they were in command of regiments.

We are all very anxious to see the papers from the United States, for we, on the ground, never know who are the heroes of the affairs until we see the papers giving an account of the battle. I think General Worth will be the great hero, and will without doubt be made a major general. His success here will do away with all the bad consequences of his folly opposite Matamoras, which, I believe, he now most sincerely regrets himself.

You tell me in your last letter that the children were all well. God grant, in His mercy, they may continue so, as well as yourself, for whose safety and happiness I ever pray. It pains me to be unable to give you any definite idea of my return; I am as much in the dark as yourself. If there is a cessation of active operations, and an armed occupation goes into effect, I shall endeavor to get away. If active operations are continued, and there is a prospect of again meeting the enemy, I must remain and take my chance.

I heard of the arrival last night at the camp of Major James Graham, as bearer of despatches to General Taylor, and an orderly has just handed me a letter from Edward Ingraham,⁴⁶ of the 13th October, written at Washington, and telling me they had received the intelligence of the affair of Monterey. Major Graham I must go out to the camp immediately to see. I understand the purport of his despatches is a disapproval of the armistice, and orders for General Taylor to prosecute the war with vigor and continue his advance. So there is an end to all peace, and God knows now when we shall have it.

What we are going to do no one can tell. It seems the prevalent opinion that the march to San Luis is impracticable, from want of water and supplies; so Tampico will, without doubt, be the next point of attack. We shall find the Mexicans prepared, in large force, well fortified, and with plenty of artillery, so that we may anticipate warm work.

Another week has passed, and mail day again arrived, but with it the destruction of all hopes of peace, at least for the present. Since [151] my last I have received your letters of the 6th and 9th ultimo, the latter bearing evident traces of the excitement you were in, owing to the uncertainty of affairs here.

Of course, with the intelligence of our victory, you were informed of its barrenness, the Government having despatched Major Graham to have the armistice immediately annuled. It does not disapprove of General Taylor's terms of capitulation, but it is pretty well understood it only desisted because it wished to feel the public pulse, before it committed itself.

That we had the Mexicans completely in our power, and could have slaughtered the greater part of them before they could have made their escape, was well known to the whole army. It was no military necessity that induced General Taylor to grant such liberal terms, but a higher and nobler motive. First, to grant an opportunity to the two Governments to negotiate for peace, knowing, as he did, that should he destroy the Mexican army, the Government would never listen to overtures of peace under the disgrace. Secondly, to stop the unnecessary effusion of blood, not only of soldiers, but of old and infirm women and children, whom necessity kept in the city, and who were crowded with the troops in the small space they had retired to, and were surrounded by our troops, from whom every shot told. Thirdly, as a tribute of respect to the gallantry of the Mexicans, who had defended their place as long as it was in their power.

As to the armistice, it was nothing, no loss of time, for we are not prepared now, and could not have been in less time, to advance. As to the army, we might have secured their arms, but what to do with seven thousand prisoners! We could not send them to the United States, nor could we guard them here; we should have been obliged to release them upon some kind of engagement not to serve again, and this they would have violated upon the first opportunity.

But it was the hope of peace resulting from it, which outweighed all other considerations with the commanding general; it was the hope of inducing the Mexican Government, by not pressing too hard its army, and granting it easy terms, by soothing their mortified vanity, to listen to the offers of our Government for negotiation. It has resulted unsuccessfully, and of course, as in all military movements, want of success damns it; but had peace followed, the gratitude of the Government and laudations of the people would have been without bounds. [152]

The old gentleman appears quite satisfied, says he has done his duty, and his conscience is easy. He expresses himself ready to leave the field whenever the Government desire it, and I really believe he would be quite satisfied to be recalled; for he finds himself called upon to perform impossible things, and has not even the control of his own forces. The cabinet at Washington, profiting by the history of the Aulic Council, is manoeuvering his troops for him, and at Washington, entirely independent of his wishes and views, organizing expeditions for Tampico, even going so far as to designate the troops and their commanders. To-be-sure, it is well understood how this is done, by the mighty engine of political influence, that curse of our country, which forces party politics into everything.

General Patterson and others are good Democrats; they are indignant that General Taylor should have left them in the rear when he carried more troops than he could feed. They complain at Washington, and forthwith General Patterson and Co. are directed to proceed against Tampico, and General Patterson informed before his commanding general knows anything about it. Well may we be grateful that we are at war with Mexico! Were it any other power, our gross follies would have been punished severely before now.

General Taylor, of course, has to succumb, and the Tampico expedition is to be immediately prosecuted. General Patterson goes from Camargo, in command of about one thousand regular troops, and some two or three thousand volunteers, all now on the Rio Grande. He marches direct to Tampico. General Taylor, however, does not design that he shall have it in his power, from ignorance or other causes, to fail; therefore he will leave here with a column of some two thousand men and artillery, light and heavy, and will join General Patterson before he reaches Tampico, when both columns united, and under General Taylor's command, will operate against the town, in conjunction with the navy, if the latter have it in its power to do anything.

In the meantime General Worth, with three regiments of infantry and one light battery of artillery, leaves day after to-morrow for Saltillo, which place he will occupy for the present. He will, in the course of a few weeks, be reinforced by General Wool and his command, whose expedition to Chihuahua (another affair of the Aulic Councils) has proved an utter failure, as he finds he cannot get to Chihuahua without first going to Saltillo, and then has some six hundred miles to go back to reach Chihuahua, and no enemy but [153] distance to encounter. So General Taylor, who has abstained from any interference with him up to this moment (though under his command), wishing the views of the Aulic Council to have full swing, now that General Wool reports that he cannot get to his destination without advancing beyond General Taylor's command, and consuming his provisions and supplies, and that then he must go back again, as far as he came almost. General Taylor, I understand, directs him to halt at Saltillo, which will make at that point a force of between four and five thousand men under Generals Wool and Worth.

Major General Butler will remain here with some twenty-five hundred men, volunteers and regulars. At this place there will be a large depot of supplies of all kinds. General Taylor will himself go to Saltillo, with General Worth's column, and after looking around and having the country reconnoitered in the direction of San Luis Potosi, he will return here, and go down to Tampico (by the road of Linares and Victoria), in time to meet General Patterson.

I shall accompany General Taylor to Saltillo, and return with him, and accompany him to Tampico, unless Captain Linnard should in the meantime arrive, and he is daily expected, when some other disposition not now anticipated may be made of me.

So much for our movements, considered by some injudicious, because our force is scattered over an immense extent of country, taking time to concentrate it, and giving the Mexican general, if he has any enterprise, the opportunity of directing his masses against a portion of it, and overwhelming it before it can be reinforced, after the plan of Napoleon.

On the other side, it is urged that the Mexicans have proved themselves utterly destitute of enterprise, and could not be brought to act in this vigorous way, and that if they did, the forces at these places, with slight defenses, are sufficiently strong to keep off the whole nation. In my own judgment both parties err, the one attributing too much, and the other too little, to the Mexicans.

I presume that General Taylor's idea is to hold this country to Saltillo, and keep his troops ready to carry out the orders of the Government, to which he has communicated the impracticability of moving on San Luis from Saltillo, owing to the length of the road, without provisions and without water. At the same time he will take Tampico, and then we shall have full possession of the country on this side of the Sierra Madre. If the Government directs him, in spite of all obstacles, to advance on San Luis, he will have his force [154] at Saltillo ready to do it. Should it turn its attention to Vera Cruz, as it is to be hoped it will, he will have a force at Tampico, ready to take shipping to that place.

As to the intelligence from the interior, it is contradictory. An Englishman of some shrewdness arrived a few days ago, who says Santa Anna is making every effort to raise an army of forty thousand men, but progresses very slowly; that at present he has only some twelve thousand, and they almost disorganized; that they want money, arms, clothing, and almost everything; that Santa Anna has determined to diminish his line of operations, so as to force us to encounter all the disadvantages of distance; that he has recalled his troops from Tampico, not wishing to hazard a defeat there; that fortifications are being made at San Luis, Zacatecas, and other places along his line; and that they expect the next affair to be at San Luis, supposing we will immediately advance on that point. All this looks plausible enough, but I place no confidence in any Mexican news I hear, and I can hardly believe they will abandon Tampico, at least before we make a demonstration on it.

No one now talks of peace, but all conversation is directed to the movements in advance and the anticipations incident thereto. There are still some few stubborn spirits left, who say they will not give up all hope of peace until they see the action of the Mexican Congress, about to meet; that they trust the Congress will have the good sense to force the generals and the army to make peace. But for myself, I have no such hope; I fear the Mexican character for overweening vanity is of such a nature that the more you whip them, the less disposed they will be to arrange matters, and that we have before us a long and tedious war, involving consequences to us not now anticipated. God in His mercy grant I may be wrong, and that the good sense of both nations may bring about the accommodation of a dispute, the continuance of which injures both, while neither can possibly derive any benefit. For myself, individually, you know my sentiments; opposed, at first, to this war, brought on by our injustice to a neighbor, and uncalled — for aggression, she, in her stupidity and folly, giving our rulers plausible excuses for their conduct; but when once in it, I should and have desired to see it conducted in a vigorous manner, and brought to a speedy conclusion by its being carried on with energy well directed. But such has not been the case, nor will it ever be so, as long as generals are made in the counting-house and soldiers on farms. [155]

As to dear Sargie's education, it is impossible for me to advise you, ignorant as I am of his disposition and character. I would not force him; I would rather he grew up ignorant than have his temper destroyed by unnecessary exertions at his early age. As to what any other child does is a matter for its parents, and not us; I would never bring up a child on any model, for children are as different from each other as is the sun from the moon, and what may be very proper for one is the ruin of another.

I forgot to mention that Major Graham was sent by General Taylor to communicate the termination of the armistice to the Mexican army. It was hoped he would have advanced beyond Saltillo, and thus had an opportunity of reconnoitering the road, but I understand he returned last night, having found persons at Saltillo, waiting for him, who received his despatches.

I take advantage of the return of Major Graham to give you intelligence of my movements and of our affairs here. General Taylor was to have gone day before yesterday to Saltillo, and I to accompany him, as I told you in my last letter; but the day previous an express came direct from Matamoras, across the country, with a note from Robert McLane, saying he had arrived at Matamoras, bearer of despatches to the General, which radically modified those sent by Major Graham, that, it not being deemed prudent for him to cross the country, he sent the note to advise the General, and would himself come by the usual route up the river to Camargo. The General postponed all movements till after his arrival, and we were in a state of great excitement for two days. Major Graham's despatches ordered an immediate advance into the enemy's country, and a radical modification was presumed by many to be a peaceable measure; others, again, thought it was a change of direction to Vera Cruz; and many were the surmises, the hopes, and the fears, upon the occasion. Yesterday Master Bob made his appearance, and all that has transpired is the reordering of the movements upon Saltillo.

General Worth left this morning with three regiments of regulars and one field battery of artillery (about one thousand men). General Taylor will go in a few hours, escorted by about two hundred and fifty dragoons, and I shall accompany him.

Captain Linnard arrived day before yesterday, but is very sick with a congestive fever, and unable to attend to any duty. [156]

The General, I understand, simply proposes to go to Saltillo to see the place; probably I shall be sent to make a reconnoissance in advance of it, in the direction of San Luis, and then he will return here, and I suppose go to Tampico. Before the arrival of Captain Linnard he said he should require my services at Tampico, but now I do not know my destination, and as General Worth, who is to be left at Saltillo, is all the time applying for me, I should not be surprised were I left with him.

The purport of McLane's despatches is not known, but from all I can gather, the modification consists in orders to desist operating on the line of San Luis farther than Saltillo, then to take Tampico, after which, my notion is, we shall go to Vera Cruz. However, before Tampico is reduced, both the Mexican and American Congress will have met, and things may be changed.

I have met a great loss in my friend Lieutenant Scarritt, Corps of Engineers, who is obliged to leave the country on account of ill health. We have been associated together for a long time, and fought together on the 8th and 9th of May, and here. He is a good soldier and a fine gentleman, and I shall feel much the loss of his society. I have told him, should he go to the North, to find you out in Philadelphia, and that you would know all about him.

My last letter was dated on the 13th instant, and was written just on the eve of my departure for Saltillo. Major Graham promised to take it with him, so I presume it will reach you in safety. Also Robert McLane, who said he was going direct to Philadelphia, promised to call and see you on his arrival, and tell you all about me. You, therefore, will be in better luck than myself, for I suppose you will receive all my letters, and have verbal accounts of me, whereas I find on my return no mails have arrived in my absence, and to-night, letters for others, as late as the 31st of October, without any for me, my last date being the 9th of October. I know, of course, you have written, and attribute my misfortune to the negligence of the postmasters between here and Matamoras, who seem to do just as they please about forwarding the letters of officers. Some kind friend on the route has imagined I have gone to Tampico, or that I am killed perhaps, and that there is no necessity to send my letters forward; there must be some such reason as this, the fact being I receive no letters, and know I ought to get them. [157]

We had a very pleasant trip to Saltillo, making it in four marches. The road passes through a valley for nearly the whole distance, having an average breadth of some six miles. This valley is without water, and very barren, the mountains rising on each side to the height of some two thousand feet, forming a grand, though gloomy picture. About half-way, some thirty miles from here, we came to the famous pass of the Rinconada, so much talked of previous to our march to Monterey, and where we were to have another Thermopylae. We found the pass naturally very strong; but the works the Mexicans had commenced were so injudiciously placed that we could, I think, have carried them without much difficulty. Then the pass could have been turned on both sides, and by turning it, we could have cut off the supply of water from the troops occupying it, as the nearest water is six miles in rear of the pass. The Mexicans, therefore, very wisely abandoned it, and, indeed, this bugbear, like all preceding it, turns out to be a trifling affair, after all.

We found Saltillo a very pretty place, though not so beautifully situated as Monterey. It is built on the side of a hill, or piece of table-land, which traverses the valley at this point. The top of the table-land is an extensive plain, rocky and barren. The town is laid out in squares, after the fashion of all Mexican towns, with a grand plaza, having on one side the Cathedral. This building is very fine, having attached to it five chapels, all with magnificent altar-pieces. The Catholic Churches of Mexico are entirely different from those of Europe. The altar-pieces, as they are called, consist of the most elaborate wood-work, gilded, which occupies the whole wall of the church (against which is placed the altar), from the floor to the ceiling. It looks, to one accustomed to more chaste ornaments, like gingerbread work; but when you see a wall, some forty or fifty feet high, covered with this mass of gold (apparently), worked into columns, pilasters, etc., having niches in which are placed figures the size of life, representing our Saviour, the apostles, saints and others, the evening sun shining on it has an effect you cannot but consider grand, even though a studied criticism would pronounce it gaudy.

In the Cathedral of Saltillo we saw a great number of wax figures, the size of life, used upon various occasions, such as the dead Christ, our Lady of Guadalupe, the patron saint of Mexico; our Lady of Grief, whose assistance is always invoked in time of affliction. Some of these are well executed, but the greater part look like big waxdolls, causing no sensation but that of ridicule. Then there is a [158] great deal of bad taste displayed in painting curtains on the walls, instead of having rich drapery, in wooden candelabra, gaudily painted, such as you see at a circus, hanging alongside of magnificent silver ones; and all such things as these, constant steps from the sublime to the ridiculous. Still, upon the whole, the imagination is affected on entering one of these large buildings (the proportions of which are generally good), when it is filled with a crowd of devotees, male and female, the grand altar crowded with priests and assistants, the organ pealing forth the music of the Church, and all seemingly in sincere devotion.

Besides the Cathedral, there are four other chapels, attached to monasteries. These I did not see, not having time, for the General sent me on a reconnoissance the day after our arrival, and I was absent on it three days, going about twenty-five miles in front of Saltillo, keeping up my reputation of always being among those who penetrate farthest into the country. I went to examine some mountain passes where, we were given to understand, we should all be cut up; but I found them simple affairs, no obstacles whatever, as, even should the enemy attempt to hold them, they could be turned in various directions.

Upon my return from the reconnoissance, the General returned to this place, so that I had but little time to examine Saltillo. We found the town very full of people, none having left it but the government employees, who were ordered to do so. In consequence of this we found many of the better class of Mexicans whom we had not hitherto seen. Generally their deportment was not so humble as at Monterey, and they attempted to extort exorbitant prices for the supplies the General demanded of them; but the old gentleman treated them without ceremony, and he ordered to be seized all the supplies that were in the town, ascertained their owners, and then offered them the market prices previous to our arrival, or nothing at all. They very wisely determined to take his prices, and there the affair ended.

While here he received a reply from Santa Anna to his communication announcing the cessation of the armistice. It is a very diplomatic note, in which he tells the General that, ‘whether the terms of the capitulation were founded upon the necessity of the case, or upon the noble motive (as the General says they were) of opening the door for negotiations, he can assure him it is needless to think of peace while an armed North American treads the soil of Mexico, or an armed [159] vessel threatens her coast; however, that the National Congress will meet in a few weeks, and upon that august body will devolve the responsibility of arranging this question.’ This is evidently for ‘Bunkum,’ about the armed North Americans, for Santa Anna knows well enough that no government in the world would withdraw its troops in time of war, to await negotiations, and his reference to the Congress evidently indicates, to my mind, that he is acting in good faith, and is himself desirous of peace.

My views of Santa Anna are the same now as expressed to you from Seralvo, when I first heard of his return. If he can, he will make peace; but he must first establish himself firmly in power, and it is idle for those in Washington to have expected him to make peace and barter away the territory of the nation the moment he set his foot upon the soil, and because he did not do so, accuse him of treachery, through the public journals. We have undoubted information of his having already collected some thirty-five thousand men at San Luis, while they are busy fortifying. But I doubt if he will advance from there, and my impression is that this large army is intended more for his own purposes, and against his own people than against us.

An extraordinary express being about to start for Camargo, I take advantage of it to send you a few lines, giving you intelligence of my movements up to the latest date.

General Taylor has received official communication from Commodore Perry, announcing the occupation of Tampico, on the 14th instant, by a portion of the squadron under his command, and asking that a garrison from the army may be sent to relieve the seamen and mariners now occupying the place. Some fifteen hundred or two thousand men, with a large supply of heavy and light artillery, were immediately despatched from Matamoras, and we may now consider ourselves in full possession of the line of the Sierra Madre. What change this will make in our operations is not yet known. Of course, there is no necessity for General Taylor to go to Tampico with so large a column as he had intended taking when resistance was expected, but I am under the impression now that he will go as far as Victoria, a town on the road from here to Tampico, and about two hundred and fifty miles from this place, and one hundred from Tampico. In going down this road he will take possession of the towns of Caideretta, Linares and others, examine the passes through the [160] mountains, of which there are said to be several, though only mulepaths, and ascertain in person the truth of a report recently brought to us, that General Urrea is at Victoria with a considerable force, constituting an army of observation.

The abandonment of Tampico is a sign of weakness on the part of the enemy, though it is good policy, if Santa Anna was doubtful of his power to hold it. His position, his life, all, depend on his first effort, whether offensive or defensive, being successful, and he had better abandon half the country to us than attempt resistance and be defeated, for this would be his ruin.

Our latest intelligence from San Luis was brought by some Texan prisoners, taken on our march from Camargo here, and released by Santa Anna, on the application of General Taylor, who released four commissioned officers and one hundred men, taken during the affair here, without exchanges and without pledges.

These prisoners say Santa Anna has some twenty-seven thousand men at San Luis, that they are fortifying the place, but the rumor is that he will give us battle in an open plain some fifteen miles this side, and in case of defeat, not presumed by them within the range of possibility, he will retire upon the town. The great idea is to cut us up with masses of cavalry. Such good luck as meeting them in the open plain is, I fear, not in store for us. As to their cavalry, they know too well the capacity of our light artillery to attempt anything of that kind; indeed, we have the most perfectly secure feelings, as far as their cavalry is concerned; but I fear the want of water on the road will prevent our advance on San Luis, the more to be regretted because I firmly believe that could we get there now, and take the place, as I am sure we would, the road would be open to the City of Mexico.

The journals in the United States do not seem to appreciate the value of the victory of Monterey. By the battles of the Palo Alto and Resaca, the enemy were forced to retire to the Sierra Madre, some two hundred miles from the Rio Grande, but by the defeat at Monterey they have been compelled to retire to San Luis, distant four hundred miles, leaving open to us more than one-half the whole Republic, and I am certain that could we defeat them at San Luis, three hundred miles from the capital, our road would be open to it.

It is probably for the best as it is, for the delay will give time for the Mexican Congress to meet, and it is not impossible that it may have the good sense to accept the offers of peace of the United States.

I did not write by the last mail, being very much occupied in making some drawings for General Taylor, which he desired to send by the mail; but I wrote you a day or two before, by a private opportunity.

The volunteers have been creating disturbances, which have at last aroused the old General so much that he has ordered one regiment, the First Kentucky foot, to march to the rear, as they have disgraced themselves and their State.

The amount of the story is this: Some few days ago, a party of volunteers, to what regiment attached unknown, went into a house in the suburbs of the town, and after forcibly driving out the husband, committed outrages on the wife. A day or two afterwards, a Kentucky volunteer was found in the morning with his throat cut, supposed to have been done by the outraged husband as an act of retaliation. The same day two Mexicans were shot while working in a corn-field, said to have been done by Kentucky volunteers, in revenge. The next day another Kentuckian was brought into camp with his throat cut, and several more Mexicans were shot. The General in the meantime had brought the thing to the notice of all the volunteer regiments, giving strict orders that no man should be allowed to go out with arms, and impressed upon the officers the necessity of controlling the men and putting a stop to these outrages, which would inevitably end in the massacre of many innocent persons.

It came to his notice, however, that the Kentucky regiment, notwithstanding his orders, had left its camp, in squads of twenty and thirty, all armed, and avowing their intention of killing Mexicans, to revenge their murdered comrades, and the same day one man, a Mexican, was shot within a hundred yards of the camp, and a little boy of twelve years of age, who was cutting cornstalks to bring to the camp for sale, was shot in the field and his leg broken. This poor little fellow, all bleeding and crying, was brought by his relatives and laid down in front of the General's tent, and he called out to look at him. Of course, the General was much excited, and as he could only ascertain that armed parties of Kentuckians had gone out, he told the colonel of the regiment that he held him and his officers responsible, and ordered them to the rear in disgrace. Afterwards, however, intercession was made, and on their making promises to endeavor to find out the guilty individuals, and promising to prevent such things [162] in future, the old man countermanded the order. The giving of it, however, had the effect of completely stopping the outrages for the present; but the well-wishers of our cause would have been glad to see him disband the whole regiment and send them home as a disgrace to the army and their State. It would have had a most beneficial effect upon the volunteers.

You know I am not one of those regular soldiers who have all their lives gotten up and gone to bed at the sound of the drum, and who are filled with all the prejudices of an exclusive class, and look upon all but regular troops with contempt, and never see any good in volunteers. I am more of a juste milieu man; being a regular, but having at the same time mixed much with civilians, and knowing the impracticability of ever having regulars only, I am desirous of seeing all the good I can in volunteers, and, if possible, so modifying the system as to make what we must have useful.

The volunteers have in this war, on the whole, behaved better than I had believed they would, and infinitely better than they did in the Florida war, under my own eye. Still, without a modification of the manner in which they are officered, they are almost useless in an offensive war. They are sufficiently well-drilled for practical purposes, and are, I believe, brave, and will fight as gallantly as any men, but they are a set of Goths and Vandals, without discipline, laying waste the country wherever we go, making us a terror to innocent people, and if there is any spirit or energy in the Mexicans, will finally rouse the people against us, who now are perfectly neutral. In addition to which, they add immensely to the expenses of the war. They cannot take any care of themselves; the hospitals are crowded with them, they die like sheep; they waste their provisions, requiring twice as much to supply them as regulars do. They plunder the poor inhabitants of everything they can lay their hands on, and shoot them when they remonstrate, and if one of their number happens to get into a drunken brawl and is killed, they run over the country, killing all the poor innocent people they find in their way, to avenge, as they say, the murder of their brother.

This is a true picture, and the cause is the utter incapacity of their officers to control them or command respect. The officers (many of whom are gentlemen and clever fellows) have no command over their men. They know they are in service for only twelve months; at the end of that time they will return to their homes, when these men will be their equals and their companions, as they [163] had been before, and in consequence they dare not attempt to exercise any control over them. Then, for the most part, they are as ignorant of their duties as the men, and conscious of their ignorance, they feel they cannot have the command over their people that the regular officers do over their soldiers.

Now, the remedy I would propose would be to attach to every regiment of volunteers a colonel, lieutenant colonel, ten captains and twenty sergeants, with two hundred men, from the regular army. Let these officers have the brevet rank of their respective grades, so as to keep them in the army. Let the colonel be taken from the lieutenant colonels, and the captains from the lieutenants. The army can well spare these officers, for it is organized for such a purpose. Then in each regiment you would have enough practical knowledge to give a tone to it, and the volunteer regiments would soon be as efficient as regular troops. But, as it is, the generals know no more than the privates, and it is only by attaching regular officers, as staff officers, that they get along at all.

But I am afraid you will be tired of this digression about volunteers, a subject that must be uninteresting to you, but not so to us, whose lives and reputations are dependent upon their actions. I have been led to make it from my seeing by the papers that a war is about being waged between the volunteers and regulars as to their respective efficiency, and that the volunteers have begun by accusing the regulars of showing the white feather on the 21st at the northeast end of the town.

The truth is, that the regulars, by their attack, caused the enemy to evacuate the battery taken on that day by the Mississippians and Tennesseeans, though, no doubt, their movements were accelerated by seeing the column of volunteers advancing from the front. An unfortunate error, as afterwards was ascertained, occurred in the regulars going to the right, instead of to the left, and after entering the town, owing to an ignorance of the locality, and finding the enemy strong in their front and right, they attempted, as it is called, to outflank them, or turn their right, but soon found they had an insurmountable obstacle in their front, in a stream that could only be crossed by two bridges that were strongly fortified, and after sustaining a terrible fire, they retired. A portion, however, under Captain Backus, First Infantry, went to the left, and in so doing got on top of a house, from whence they could fire into the rear of the battery, and did fire into the rear, killing a great many Mexicans, [164] and annoying them so that they evacuated the work as soon as they saw the volunteers in front, and long before they (the volunteers) reached the work. Now, had the whole attacking force (regular) turned to the left, they would have taken the work before the volunteers had reached the scene of action. As it is, the fall of the battery is due to the action of both, but chiefly to the regulars; for had no attack been made by them, the volunteers could never have taken the battery from the front, for they would have been cut to pieces in attempting it. But had the volunteers not attacked it in front, the regulars, who had ascertained their error, would soon have taken it in reverse, or from the rear. Do you understand me? If so, I should like you to show this part of my letter to Major Bache, who will doubtless see the contest going on in the papers among the letter-writers.

Already has the colonel of the Tennessee regiment (Colonel Campbell), in whose favor, by-the-by, I was very much prepossessed from his appearance, written a letter, in which he says he ‘was ordered to sustain the regulars, but on reaching the ground saw no regulars, and could not ascertain where they were, but understood they were behind stone walls and houses, protecting themselves; and he, being subjected to a heavy cross-fire from batteries (which he understood the regulars were to take and he sustain them in it), he, without waiting for the regulars, dashed ahead, and took the battery himself.’ Now this seems very plausible, but when he does not know where the regulars were, I can tell him they were in the town, subjected to the fire of two additional batteries and many thousand muskets, which they were returning with good effect, and that a portion of them were killing the men in the battery which he took, as fast as they could load their muskets; and had they not been there, he would never have taken the work, for the enemy would have stood to their guns till he reached them, and in the two hundred yards he went over without being fired at would have been a terrible fire of grape and cannister, besides musketry, that would, or at least might have annihilated his force or made it turn back.

The credit is due to both. The regulars had driven the enemy's infantry from a large space on the left of the battery, which would have been otherwise occupied, to the annoyance of the volunteers coming from the front, and before the volunteers reached within charging distance, the regulars had commenced killing the men in the work, and would eventually have caused them to evacuate it, [165] but they, seeing the volunteers forming in front, took a few shots at them and then ran. This is the true secret of the taking of that battery.

The volunteers behaved most gallantly, but it is folly for them to take the whole credit to themselves, and still greater folly to attempt to insinuate that the regulars did not do their duty. The list of killed and wounded conclusively demonstrates who were in the hottest fire, and the poor regulars did but little in their efforts to protect themselves, when we see that at that attack some fifteen officers were killed and wounded, and some two hundred and fifty men, out of a force of not much over six hundred. Colonel Campbell's letter had induced me to say this much about the affair, that you may fully understand it.

I regret to say the letter-writers have created a great ferment in the camp. The fact is that there never were such ridiculous and absurd letters written as have emanated from this great army since the battles. All that I have read have been a tissue of nonsense and falsehoods, so palpably absurd as to make me laugh, though others are greatly annoyed. For instance, I see one Captain——and Lieutenant——did wonders in the way of killing Mexicans, whereas it is well known that Captain——behaved in a most equivocal manner, having been found in a quarry-hole, with his whole company, fifty men, guarding one poor Mexican prisoner, and harsh words had to be used to him before he could be gotten out of the hole, which was way in the rear of the fighting, but where he was protected from the artillery sweeping the plain.

As to Lieutenant——, he was not in the fight at all, having been left at camp to guard the baggage. This is a fair specimen of the accuracy of most of the letter-writers.

All you see about Generals Taylor and Butler is humbug; no difficulty ever occurred between them, and General Butler behaved most handsomely. After he was wounded and brought back to camp, he became a little nervous at reports of the approach of the enemy's cavalry, and in consequence made some barricades out of the wagons, tents and baggage. They were considered a little absurd and unnecessary, and particularly annoying to those who, after having gone through the day's hard work, found, on getting to camp, their tents all taken up and piled up with their baggage to make a defense against cavalry, and this, too, in a thick wood, on a dark night, when it would be hard for cavalry to get through quietly. [166] Still, this was a precautionary measure he deemed proper to take, and though we may criticise his judgment, his courage is beyond dispute. Besides, General Taylor never censured anything he did, nor did any act of his require it.

So also it is altogether wrong, that General Quitman brought on the attack on the morning of the twenty-third, to the disgust of General Taylor. On the contrary, General Taylor gave him full power to do whatever he thought proper, and after he had commenced the attack, immediately sustained him with his whole force.

I regret also to state that Lieutenant Pope, of my corps, did not discover a battery one day, and lead the column of attack the next, and ‘that, if his gallantry was the theme of admiration to the whole army,’ the army never knew it till after the letter so stating the fact came back in the papers. Lieutenant Pope behaved very well, and did his duty, but nothing more than all the rest of the army did. All this, however, is strictly entre nous. I thank heaven you never published any of my letters, and I trust your discretion will ever continue, for there are so many cliques, factions, and parties, among regulars and volunteers, that it is almost impossible to write without giving offence to some. And as my letters are simply intended for your information, I wish to be perfectly free to say just what I think, without reference to others.

I was exceedingly unfortunate in never paying any attention to the well-known correspondents of different newspapers, many of whom accompanied General Worth's column. For this reason my extraordinary performances have not reached your ear through the public prints. I think, however, the Dear Public will be sadly puzzled to reconcile the thousand conflicting statements, and will finally have to throw themselves on the official reports, where alone is accuracy, divested of bombast and falsehood, to be found. They are doubtless before you by this time, and I trust you will be satisfied with the mention that is made of me in them. I assure you I am. To have it said that I have done my duty is all I ask, and I have no hesitation in saying, without mock modesty, that General Worth has been pleased to say of me more than I really deserved.

Our affairs remain pretty much in statu quo. An express was to-day received from General Worth at Saltillo, forwarding a letter from Santa Anna. This was a reply to General Taylor's [167] communication from Saltillo. ‘He agrees with General Taylor on our construction of the terms of the armistice, repeats his opinion that there can be no peace as long as our army occupies the territory of Mexico, but again says that the Congress will meet on the first of this month, and will act as best suits the high interests of the country.’ General Worth writes that he had sent a confidential agent to San Luis, a Mexican, who had returned, having had a private interview with Santa Anna, in which Santa Anna told him he would do all in his power to bring about a peace. This may or may not be his intention. Many think it is, and that the Congress will make peace, if it can do so with anything like honor, but I regret to say I am skeptical. The Mexicans are so little guided by their true interests, are so vain and arrogant, learn so little from the past, and are so sanguine of the future, that I fear such happy times as peace would bring are yet far off. Still, there is a hope, and so anxious am I for the result, that as long as there is a hope, I will indulge in the delusion that a few weeks may prove vain.

I fear that before we have peace, we must be a little more courteous and civil to Great Britain, through whose mediation I look for it; and we must be less exacting in our demands upon Mexico, which will hardly be brought, by anything we have yet done, to despoil herself of nearly one-third of her vast domain.

Since writing my last letter I have been made happy by the receipt of your letters from the 1st to the 7th of November, by which time my long letter giving an account of the battle had reached you. I feel very much complimented by your kind notice of my narrative; you would make some allowances, if you only knew how I was situated when I wrote it. It was at General Worth's table, where there must have been some eight or ten officers talking, and others constantly coming in and going out, and I was so often interrupted, I had to sit up till two o'clock to finish it. The sketch was most miserable, but I knew it was better than nothing, to illustrate the various positions; and without something, you could hardly get a clear idea of the affair. At the time, too, I had not had an opportunity of conversing fully with officers engaged on General Taylor's side of the town, and I may have been led into errors, which the official reports will correct.

The correspondent of the ‘Spirit of the Times,’ G. de L., is

Sketch of the seat of the War in Mexico showing the line proposed to be occupied by the American forces under General Taylor (Fac-Simile of the original. See page 168）

[168] Captain Henry, of the Third Infantry, a classmate of mine at West Point, a very good fellow, and I notice his recent productions since our march from Camargo have been quite spirited. His account of the battle has not yet reached here, and I cannot therefore vouch for its accuracy. He was one of the individuals who wagered with me on a fight, and I had the good fortune to win a forage-cup from him, as I did a box of cigars from another, and one of wine from a third. This, I suppose, you will say was very bad in me, but in war times soldiers will be bad fellows, and you must pardon me on the score of my confession.

I enclose you a rough sketch which will give you some idea of the relative positions of various places about to be occupied and garrisoned by our forces, and will enable you better, and particularly your dear father, to understand what is going on. I have only put down the principal towns and roads; there are an immense number of ranchos, as they are called, and numerous trails and mule-paths joining them, but the only good wagon roads, or the lines on which it is practicable to move with wagons and artillery, I have put down.

The troops as now stationed are as follows: General Wool, with two thousand five hundred men (one thousand five hundred foot and one thousand horse) and eight pieces of artillery, is now at Parras, having been ordered there from Monclova, at which place he was stopped by General Taylor, on account of the armistice. General Worth is at Saltillo, where he will soon have a force of about two thousand five hundred men and eight pieces of artillery. Major General Butler will remain here, with about one thousand five hundred men and a large quantity of artillery. This will make about six thousand men and over sixteen pieces of artillery that could be united at Saltillo, under General Butler, in the event of Santa Anna's advancing in this direction. This force is ample to hold him in check. The only danger to be apprehended is his not giving them time to concentrate.

One thousand men have been sent and are by this time at Tampico, with twenty pieces of artillery of various calibre. Among these one thousand are five hundred regulars, of the artillery, under the command of Colonel Belton.

General Taylor will move from here in a few days, with about two thousand five hundred men and eight pieces of artillery, to go by Morelos and Linares to Victoria. He will pick up on the route the Second Infantry, now at Morelos, numbering five hundred men, [169] and at Victoria he will be joined by General Patterson, from Matamoras, with over two thousand men. General Taylor's object is to examine the various mountain passes between this and Victoria, to garrison the principal points, leaving a large garrison at Victoria, which, with the one at Tampico, will make a force to meet Santa Anna, should he advance from San Luis in that direction. But he can only carry infantry and cavalry by that route, as there is no practicable road for artillery through the mountains from San Luis but the one to Saltillo.

I have above disposed of twelve thousand men; there remain some two thousand besides, who garrison the depots in the rear, namely, Seralvo, Camargo and Matamoras, and after the occupation of Victoria, Soto Marina will also be made a depot, as there is a pretty good harbor, where small vessels can enter.

I see the ‘Union’ states that General Taylor has twenty thousand men. We here cannot make out over fourteen thousand, a small number to hold a line of over five hundred miles against an enemy with thirty thousand men.

You will observe that San Luis is a central point, from whence, had Santa Anna only roads over which he could carry artillery, he might annoy us very much, but I doubt his advancing beyond San Luis, unless he thinks he can get a chance to catch one of our detachments by itself, when the hope of success may lead him on. All his forces are at present at San Luis said to amount to thirty thousand. He has an advance of two thousand at Matejuala, on the lookout for our approach. I only wish there was water on the road sufficient for the army, and that we could march with fifteen thousand men. I would then be satisfied of our perfect success at San Luis, and on its falling, the road to the City of Mexico would be open to us, and we should march to that place without opposition. As it is, we have not ten thousand men to march with, and there is no water on the road. Under these circumstances this line from Parras to Tampico will be occupied, and if the Mexican Congress refuse peace, it will be permanently annexed to the United States, and Mexico told to come and take it. Then, if further offensive operations are deemed necessary, Vera Cruz will have to be attacked and taken.

What is thought of the naval attack on Tobasco? I have not seen the official account, but it appears to be the impression that they did not do as much as they might have done. If they cannot take a town with only three hundred soldiers in it, and no artillery, what are they going to do against San Juan de Ulloa? [170]

General Taylor will leave in a few days for Victoria, and I shall go with him. I will write you again before I leave.

We left Monterey on the 15th instant, and after a pleasant march of three days reached this place yesterday afternoon. The command consisted of about one thousand two hundred regulars, under General Twiggs, and two thousand volunteer infantry, under General Quitman, of Mississippi. General Taylor and all his staff accompanied the command, and it was General Taylor's plan to go down to Victoria, examine all the mountain passes and the communications to the sea; then, after leaving the volunteers at Victoria, he was to return to Saltillo. We all were anticipating a pleasant excursion of six weeks, and looking forward with some interest to the Mexican Congress, hoping for peace, but last night an express reached here, informing us that Santa Anna was advancing on Saltillo, understanding that General Taylor was going to Victoria, and hoping by rapid marches to surprise Worth, and then attack Wool, and after using both up in detail, to advance on Monterey.

General Taylor, though loth to believe the intelligence, still deemed it his duty to act as if it were true, and in consequence left this morning with all the regulars, except one battery of artillery, which goes to Victoria with General Quitman. At Victoria, General Quitman will be joined by General Patterson, with one thousand five hundred men, who will take command of the line from Victoria to Tampico. General Taylor will push on to Saltillo, where he expects to find Worth and Wool united, which, with his force, will make over five thousand men, with twenty pieces of artillery; and if Santa Anna is so bold as to make the attempt, he will most assuredly meet with a signal defeat, I do not care what force he brings.

General Taylor, being very anxious to know the nature of the mountain passes, has detached me to go with General Quitman to Victoria, where, upon meeting General Patterson, I shall be furnished with an escort of cavalry, and will then reconnoitre the whole country in front of the line of Tampico and this place.

I cannot tell you with how sad a heart I saw all my old associates and companions march away this morning, for I am left here with only five regular officers, and of the two thousand volunteers, I do not know a dozen. Then, to think that they are hurrying on with the expectation of having another battle, at which I shall not be present! Little as I like fighting, it is still a great disappointment. [171]

But there are great advantages in my position. I shall be the senior and only officer of my corps with General Patterson; the duty I am charged with is most important and honorable, and had I returned with General Taylor, when we united with the troops at Saltillo, there would be seven Topographical Engineers, among whom I would have ranked fourth, making a great difference in my position. Then, again, we are not without hopes of active service here, for it is said there are five thousand Mexicans at Tula, under General Urrea, he having concentrated his army of observation there; and when he finds there are only three thousand volunteers at Victoria, he may try his luck with us, which I sincerely trust he will, for we shall give him a sound thrashing if he makes the attempt.

I must confess the advantages outweigh the disadvantages. Still I feel very much the separation from General Taylor and all the regulars. The old man was very kind to me on parting, and said he would recollect, if anything turned up in the way of peace, that I was the first to join him, and had been with him ever since.

If Santa Anna's advance be true, it must be based on the refusal of the Mexican Congress to negotiate, and we may therefore look for a long war; but I still hope it is a mere feint to occupy the attention of his own people, who are loudly complaining of his having abandoned Tampico, and of his want of energy in not advancing on us. Indeed, his position is very critical, and almost desperate. If he advance, he is sure to be defeated, when he will be ruined forever; and if he delay, he will be overthrown by his enemies, who are only awaiting a plausible pretext to declare against him; a few weeks will show.

The country we have passed over has been quite beautiful. We pass along the foot of the high mountains (as the sketch in my last letter indicated to you), over a rich plain, well cultivated and thickly settled. We expect to reach Linares, in two days marching, tomorrow, and it will then take us some eight days to go to Victoria. From Victoria I may go down to Soto la Marina and to Tampico. There is one bad thing about it; Heaven only knows when I shall get your letters. But I will write to you by every chance.

We reached this place yesterday, after a pleasant and agreeable march of some seventeen days. I wrote to you on the 18th instant from Montemorelos, advising you of my having been detached with [172] General Quitman, to come and examine the mountain passes, and that General Taylor, with the main body, had gone to Saltillo to meet Santa Anna, who was said to be advancing.

We had quite a peaceable march, till within three days of this place, when we heard that troops had reached Victoria from Tula, in advance of us, and we should meet with resistance. As usual, in similar cases, their numbers were greatly exaggerated. The enemy were reported to be some seven thousand strong, with six pieces of artillery. We had but two thousand, with four pieces, and they all volunteers.

Of General Patterson, whom we expected to meet with fifteen hundred men, nothing could be heard, and for a while things looked blue; but, much to our gratification, the advance guard of the enemy retired before us, and when within a few miles of Victoria, intelligence reached us that they had all retired to the mountains. It turned out that they only had fifteen hundred cavalry in the place, which were the advance of the army they intended to bring against us; but finding it impracticable to get their artillery over the mountains, they withdrew their advance, and now they say they will not fight this side of the mountains.

We have no intelligence from Saltillo. It is generally understood that Santa Anna sent his army forward upon Saltillo, but nothing further is known, and we are looking with interest for the result.

I do not think there will be any fighting here, unless we advance on Tula, when we will meet with resistance; but I will explain this more fully hereafter.

General Patterson is said to be within fifty miles of this place; he has lost all the honor of the taking of Victoria by being behind.

I am in perfect health, and thought much of you and our dear children on Christmas Day; nor have I forgotten that to-morrow is our wedding day, and that I have been happy for six years.

A few days after our arrival, General Quitman sent me to reconnoitre the road to Tula, as far as a little place called Las Minas, and where the enemy were said to have their advance. I went with only twenty men, mounted on sorry ponies, as we had no cavalry of any kind; but, meeting a Mexican on the way, who told us the enemy had retired beyond the mountains, I advanced in perfect [173] security as far as Las Minas, and had the men been provided with rations, would have gone beyond. It was well I did not, for on my return I found the rascally Mexican had deceived me, and that I was within six miles of one hundred and fifty Mexicans. The object of my expedition was, however, fully accomplished—the examination of the road—and I satisfied myself that the road was impracticable for wagons or artillery. The next day, the enemy being reported in our vicinity in another direction, I went out with my small party to examine, and ascertained it was a false report.

Three days ago, much to our astonishment, General Taylor made his appearance with Twiggs's division of two thousand regulars, and at the same time General Patterson reached here with sixteen hundred men from Matamoras, making our force here nearly six thousand men.

General Taylor, on reaching Monterey, found the report of Santa Anna's advance was false, and he turned right around with his whole force and came here. For what object, no one knows, is so large a force assembled at this point. To be sure, the enemy occupy Tula in strong force, but there is no practicable road for our artillery and wagons to Tula, and if we do take Tula, we still have to take San Luis, some eighty miles distant from Tula, before we can penetrate into the interior; whereas from Saltillo we have a good road for heavy artillery to San Luis, and when we take that, Tula will fall without a blow.

It is reported that General Scott is in the country, and is to organize an expedition against Vera Cruz, and it may be that the force here, or a part of it, is destined for that place. A few days will show.

Generals Worth and Wool have concentrated at Saltillo, and all the volunteers from the Rio Grande have been brought up, so that there is at present under General Butler's command at that place some six thousand men and eighteen pieces of artillery, ready to receive Santa Anna, should he advance, which I hardly think he will.

From Mexico we have but little news. The Congress is occupied in the election of a President, and has not yet acted on the proposition of peace. I have seen papers to the 19th of December from the City of Mexico. Their tone is war to the last, but at the same time despondent; and instead of driving us across the Sabine,⁴⁷ they talk of their capacity to defend themselves at San Luis and Tula. I understand that the provisional President, Salus, in his message to [174] the Congress, says that the Government is for prosecuting the war vigorously, but it is for Congress to say whether or not they shall treat for peace; that if the war is continued, extraordinary means must be resorted to, to raise the necessary funds, for that now the Treasury is bankrupt, and the troops without pay, clothing, or subsistence. Under these circumstances, I do not see how they can long continue the war, and one or two efficient blows on our part may bring them to their senses. Their blindness is incomprehensible, and what they expect by continuing the war is more than I can imagine.

General Patterson brought with him the President's (ours) message, by which I see he proposes to keep the country we have conquered, as a remuneration for the expenses of the war. This will do more to bring about a peace than many battles.

General Taylor's column brought a mail with it, in which came your letter of the 14th of November, at which time you had received mine on the subject of my promotion. General Worth has recommended me for a brevet, but it was in a letter to General Scott, written in the early part of December, and I fear did not reach Washington till after General Scott's departure. As soon as he is called on, however, to do so officially, he will do it again, for, unrequested on my part, he told me he should use all possible exertion to secure my promotion.

I also received the notice of the meeting of the good citizens of Philadelphia, proposing to present swords to those officers from Philadelphia who had distinguished themselves on the 8th and 9th of May. If I should be included in this category, I should deem it a high honor.

You will be somewhat surprised, probably, to hear of my being in this place, as doubtless the newspapers will give you the information of the return of General Taylor to Monterey, and you will expect me to have gone with him. I last wrote you from Victoria, where I had gone with General Quitman's command, and where we were joined by General Taylor, with Twiggs's division of regulars.

General Taylor, after waiting for some days for communications from General Scott, who, he was informed, was in the country somewhere, determined to take his force down to Tampico for supplies, and await General Scott's orders at that point. Accordingly, on the 15th instant, General Twiggs's command left Victoria, and I was [175] assigned to it, as it was in the advance. The second day's march we were overtaken by an express from General Taylor, informing us that communications had been received after our departure from General Scott, that he called for all the regular troops and one-half the volunteers of General Taylor's command; that General Taylor, thus stripped, was to return to Monterey and Saltillo, to defend that line, and General Scott was to operate on the Mexican coast, or, in other words, attack Vera Cruz. In the orders communicating this intelligence I was ordered to report to Major General Patterson, on reaching Tampico, who was to be in command till General Scott's arrival.

At first I deemed, as I suppose you will, this a piece of ill-luck; but when I ascertained that the whole regular army was coming here, that the affair against Vera Cruz was to be the great effort of the whole war, and that General Taylor was merely to remain quiet and on the defensive—that I was the only officer of his staff detached, though all applied to come here—I felt reconciled, though I must confess I regretted exceedingly parting with the old man.

He has been most outrageously treated by the Administration, which hopes to play off General Scott against him, and by depriving him of all his command, and leaving him in an exposed position, with one-third of the force which he had before, and which he deemed necessary, to break him down and destroy his popularity. I trust that it will signally fail, and from having the plaudits of the people for bravery and skill, he will now have their sympathy for the injustice of the course pursued towards him.

We arrived here last night. I find the place much larger than I expected, and really quite delightful. There is a large foreign population of merchants, and in consequence the town has all such comforts as good restaurants, excellent shops, where everything can be purchased, and is in fact quite as much of a place as New Orleans. It is inaccessible, owing to a bar, having only eight feet of water, and as this is the season of ‘Northers,’ already many wrecks have taken place.

General Scott is still at the Brazos de Santiago, having with him, I hear, six officers of my corps, four of whom rank me; so that I shall have to play fifth-fiddle, unless I can manage to keep with General Patterson, which I shall try to do.

I can give you but little Mexican news. There is a report that the Mexican Congress has decided by a vote of three hundred to two [176] hundred and fifty against the overtures of the United States: but this is a mere report. Santa Anna is elected President; one step towards his doing as he pleases; and sensible people among the Mexicans believe he is desirous of making terms and will bring about a compromise as soon as he can. My opinion is that the war will not last very much longer, for both parties are heartily tired of it, and Mexico is without resources of any kind to carry it on.

Excuse the brevity of my letter, but I am much occupied to-day, as to-morrow I go upon a reconnoissance to select a healthy position for a camp in the neighborhood of this place. I am quite well and strong. The place is perfectly healthy, and I anticipate no serious disease among the troops, here or at Vera Cruz, before June, and long before that time there will either be peace or we shall have Jalapa.

I have been so much occupied in making reconnoissances since I last wrote you, that I have allowed a mail to go off without a letter from me. General Patterson has kept me running around the country, hunting a position to encamp the troops. I have, however, now been in every direction, and presume I shall have a little quiet to myself.

I suppose, of course, that when you heard of my arrival at this place you made up your mind to my being present at the attack on Vera Cruz, but from reports to-day I think it quite problematical.

It appears that General Worth has reached the Brazos, with a force of some three thousand regular troops, and already several of the newly raised volunteer regiments have arrived there. Information, it is said, has been taken to General Scott (also at the Brazos) of the defenseless state of the town, and the small garrison, not over two thousand five hundred, that it and the castle have. Now, it is said, if you strike immediately, the place is yours, and in pursuance of this view, as he at present only has transportation for a limited number of troops, he has sent those from the Brazos, which troops, with the navy, will take the place at once. If he waits to concentrate all his forces, he will give them time to send reinforcements, as it is said ten thousand men will be there in two weeks. So much for the report of the day. For my part I do not believe it; I believe General Scott will wait till he can get his whole force together, and that his best policy is to whip a large force there, in preference to an [177] easy success; that is, as far as peace is concerned. If we defeat fifteen thousand men in the town and castle, break them up, or make them prisoners, we shall be much nearer a peace than if they gave it up to us without a fight.

My only fear is that we shall leave it so late that the scourge of the country, vomito, will make its appearance, in which case we shall have to evacuate the place at once; but if we are quick about the matter, we can take the town and march to Jalapa before the end of April, and I have no fears before the month of May. Indeed, the disease does not take the form of an epidemic before July and August; but considering the exposures of a camp and our northern constitutions, I shall look for it in May, if we are not off the seacoast. I cannot conceive anything to prevent our being out of danger by that time, and I therefore give myself no uneasiness upon this subject, and trust you will follow my example.

General Scott is at the Brazos, and has with him Major Turnbull and four other Topographical Engineers. Captain McClelland arrived here yesterday, and reported to General Patterson, thus putting my nose out of joint. He brought me three pairs of spectacles, sent by you, for which I thank you very much, for I was on my last pair, and have had some terrible frights lately when I thought I had lost them.

We are in a complete state of ignorance here as to what is to be done. Some say that we are going by land, some by water, others that we are to wait here till Worth and Scott take Vera Cruz, and then go there. All are surmises, nothing is known. My own impression is that General Scott is waiting for his transports; that as soon as they arrive we shall all be shipped to some place of rendezvous, such as Anton Lizardo or Sacrificios, and then landed to operate against Vera Cruz; that the whole force will go there, and go by water. A few days will give us more information, as General Scott is expected here daily.

Tampico is a delightful place, having fine cafes, and all the luxuries of a somewhat civilized town. A few evenings since a party was given by the lady of one of the foreign consuls. Only about fifteen officers attended. I was not among the number, being an entire stranger to all concerned, but I understand it was quite an elegant affair, and that there were many beautiful Mexican girls among the guests.

I trust that when we take Vera Cruz the foolish Mexicans will [178] come to terms. Some say negotiations are pending now, and we had a report yesterday that commissioners had gone to Washington; but all these are humbugs, I know. I do not believe they will make peace till we have given them one or two terrible thrashings, and follow up our success by marching directly on their capital. When they see us advancing and breaking down all opposition, they may be induced to come to terms.

I have not much hews to give you, though there are many rumors afloat. General Scott is still at the Brazos, with some four thousand men. We have here, under Generals Patterson and Twiggs, some five thousand, and there are several vessels which have passed here, destined for the Island of Lobos (a point on the coast about forty miles south), where the new levies from the States are to rendezvous.

The prevailing impression is that General Scott is only waiting for the ships and steamers from the United States, to transport the whole force by water to Vera Cruz, where a landing will be made, and the town and castle taken.

It is estimated that he will have an efficient force of twelve thousand men (five thousand regulars), with a full supply of heavy artillery —in fact, a completely equipped expedition—and that it will not take us many days to reduce both castle and town. If we are only lucky in securing a good landing for our troops and supplies, I have no fear of the result. Once on terra firma, with plenty of ammunition and provisions, I am confident we can overcome any resistance the Mexicans can make, but every day's delay now is most fatal to us, for the healthiness of the place cannot be depended on after March, and should the fever break out before we succeed in taking the place, the expedition will be a complete and utter failure. Then, again, in transporting so many troops upon this dangerous and stormy coast, we must expect embarrassments from the elements, for one ‘Norther’ will scatter the fleet of transports to all parts of the Gulf, and it may take weeks to reassemble. Why did not the Government, on the 13th of October, when it determined to annul General Taylor's armistice, at once decide on attacking Vera Cruz, and make its preparations, call out troops, and have us before Vera Cruz in December, with the whole winter and spring before us, and not, as it has done, dilly-dally and waste precious time in inaction, till it has now made success exceedingly questionable, from the danger of the climate, [179] more to be dreaded than the enemy? It has a heavy responsibility to answer for, but I trust in God we may have good fortune, which will put off the day of reckoning.

We had yesterday an arrival from the Brazos; no transports yet arrived. In the meantime rumor says the Mexicans are reinforcing and strengthening Vera Cruz, and that we shall meet an army of some twenty thousand men there. The latter part of this I hope is true. As I told you before we went to Monterey, the more we meet the better; for if we succeed, not only do we acquire a greater glory, but the enemy are broken up and suffer in proportion. There will be no capitulation at Vera Cruz; a complete victory must be had on one side or the other, and if we gain the day, the Mexican army will be our prisoners, as there is no escape for them; and as I am sure we shall conquer, the more we overcome, the fewer will we have to meet at other points, and the greater the chance of peace. Rumor also says that Santa Anna is advancing on General Taylor at Monterey, in hopes of succeeding against his diminished force (he having only four thousand volunteers), but I believe, if he is making a move, it is in the hopes of drawing us back there, that the precious time between now and the vomito season may be wasted by us in useless march, and thus the expedition to Vera Cruz be put off till the fall. But in this he will be mistaken. General Taylor's force, though small, is large enough, with the natural advantages of Monterey, to keep off the whole army of Mexico, so long as he has supplies, and I trust he is well off in that particular; and we only wait for ships to carry us, when Vera Cruz will be attacked and taken.

One of the ships, having on board two hundred Louisiana volunteers, under Colonel DeRussy, was wrecked a few days ago on its way to Lobos Island, a point about forty miles below here, and the same distance from Tuspan, where there is a Mexican force stationed. General Cos, the officer in command at Tuspan, hearing of the wreck, started off with a thousand men and two pieces of artillery, to capture two hundred poor wrecked fellows, one-half of whom had lost their arms. On approaching the spot, he sent a polite letter to Colonel DeRussy, asking him to surrender, and offering to send him to Vera Cruz or the United States, on his parole. The message was received a little before sunset, and the colonel asked till the next morning at nine to deliberate. As soon as night set in he commenced retreating up the beach, and soon met one hundred regulars, who had been sent to escort a train of mules, with provisions for him, we [180] knowing here of his being wrecked, but not knowing of his being menaced by the enemy. With this reinforcement he made good his retreat, and at the last accounts had halted to give the Mexicans a fight, should they dare to advance on him. Many of us here think a respectable force should have been immediately sent to cut off Mr. Cos; but General Patterson doubtless thinks he is not authorized to enter into any expedition that would be likely to have out of the way any portion of the command when the transports, hourly expected, should arrive.

We also have information of the reoccupation of Victoria by a large Mexican force, which is employed in maltreating and robbing all those who were civil to us during our stay there. This I consider cruel treatment on the part of our Government, to send troops to occupy a place, hoist our flag, give appearances of protection to all, threatening those who are unwilling to serve you, thus making and forcing them to perform acts for which they are punished by their own armies, on our evacuating the place. Either let the people alone, or when you once have taken a place, hold it and protect those who compromise themselves by serving you. When is the Government of the United States going to awake from its lethargy and send into Mexico a force sufficient to prosecute the war vigorously? Does it expect our good fortune, and want of energy on the part of our enemies, hitherto attending our operations, is to last forever? If so, it is wofully mistaken, and it will find it so before long, to its cost. The war will never be ended so long as it is carried on on the small scale we have hitherto done. We must threaten Mexico in such a manner, and with such a force, as will at once prove to her the inutility of resistance, and then we may begin to hope for peace; but as it is now she clings to the expectation, that by opposing to us treble our numbers with defensive works, she will be able to check us, and the first disaster attending us, she expects a pronunciamento on the part of the Whigs and Northern Democrats, forcing the Government to withdraw the troops and propose more lenient terms. In this idea she is supported by the fact of the mere handful of men we have in the field, to hold possession of a territory almost as large as our whole country, and at the same time invade the heart of a populous country, defended by the most formidable natural barriers, and with a people who, however low be their spirit, may at least be expected to defend their homes, their families and their religion. She is still more fortified in this idea by the speeches in Congress of some of the Whigs, and the tone [181] of many newspapers of the Whig press. She believes the war unpopular, and she fancies that by holding on she will tire us out, and dollars and cents will conquer us, if not arms.

Do not think this idea absurd; it is true. There have been received here Mexican journals, with large quotations from Mr. Webster's⁴⁸ speech at Philadelphia, and from the columns of the ‘National Intelligencer,’ proving the unpopularity of the war. They cite the recent elections to prove that Mr. Polk is not sustained, and they say, ‘Let us hold on and suffer, and in a short time the Government of the United States will be forced to respect Mexico and to withdraw all its exorbitant demands.’

Now, while I give you this as the tone of public feeling in Mexico, I neither endorse it nor consider it fair; but at the same time I consider the course of the ‘Intelligencer,’ and of Mr. Webster and others, most injudicious and tending more to continue the war than any other cause. To force Mexico to terms is a most difficult affair, and never to be accomplished, unless we display to her and the world our determination to do it at every sacrifice, and that in this determination we are united to a man. Let us show a bold and united front, forget party for an instant; now that we are in the war, prosecute it with all possible vigor, not in talk but in acts; treble our ships upon her coasts, and blockade them in reality, and not nominally, as is now done for want of vessels; threaten her from Saltillo and Vera Cruz with armies, each of twenty-five thousand men; let her see we are determined to carry everything before us; and you may rest assured that if she is ever going to make peace, she will do it then, and not till then.

The sentiments of Mr. Crittenden⁴⁹ and those of Joseph R. Ingersoll⁵⁰ are those that we, the workers and sufferers, applaud. Finish the war, and then give it to the Administration; but do not protract the war by embarrassing it, and leading our enemies to suppose we are distracted in council, and by consequence weak in moral and physical force.