Some allusions having been made to the annexed paper, both in the public prints and in public speeches, and some misapprehensions of its character having thereby got abroad, we have obtained a copy of it for publication, in order that our readers may see what it is. They will find in it a fresh evidence of the veteran general's devotion to his country as a citizen, and of his forecast as a soldier.
Views suggested by the imminent danger (October 29, 1860) of a disruption of the Union by the secession of one or more of the Southern States.
To save time the right of secession may be conceded, and instantly balanced by the correlative right, on the part of the
Federal Government, against an
interior State or States, to reestablish by force, if necessary, its former continuity of territory.--[Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy, last chapter.]
But break this glorious Union by whatever line or lines that political madness may contrive, and there would be no hope of reuniting the fragments except by the laceration and despotism of the sword.
To effect such result the intestine wars of our
Mexican neighbors would, in comparison with ours, sink into mere child's play.
A smaller evil would be to allow the fragments of the great Republic to form themselves into new Confederacies, probably four.
All the lines of demarcation between the new Unions cannot be accurately drawn in advance, but many of them approximately may. Thus, looking to natural boundaries and commercial affinities, some of the following frontiers, after many waverings and conflicts, might perhaps become acknowledged and fixed:
1. The
Potomac river and the
Chesapeake Bay to the
Atlantic.
2. From
Maryland, along the crest of the
Alleghany (perhaps the
Blue Ridge) range of mountains, to some point in the coast of
Florida. 3.
The line from say the head of the
Potomac to the west or northwest, which it will be most difficult to settle.
4. The crest of the
Rocky Mountains.
The Southeast Confederacy would, in all human probability, in less than five years after the rupture, find itself bounded by the first and second lines indicated above, the
Atlantic and the
Gulf of Mexico, with its capital at say
Columbia, South Carolina.
The country between the second, third, and fourth of those lines would, beyond a doubt, in about the same time, constitute another Confederacy, with its capital at probably
Alton or
Quincy, Illinois.
The boundaries of the
Pacific Union are the most definite of all, and the remaining States would constitute the
Northeast Confederacy, with its capital at
Albany.
It, at the first thought, will be considered strange that seven Slaveholding States and parts of
Virginia and
Florida should be placed (above) in a new Confederacy with
Ohio,
Indiana,
Illinois, &c; but when the overwhelming weight of the great Northwest is taken in connection with the laws of trade, contiguity of territory, and the comparative indifference to freesoil doctrines on the part of
Western Virginia,
Kentucky,
Tennessee, and
Missouri, it is evident that but little if any coercion, beyond moral force, would be needed to embrace them; and I have omitted the temptation of the unwasted public lands which would fall entire to this Confederacy — an appanage (well husbanded) sufficient for many generations.
As to
Missouri,
Arkansas, and
Mississippi, they would not stand out a month.
Louisiana would coalesce without much solicitation, and
Alabama, with
West Florida, would be conquered the first winter from the absolute need of
Pensacola for a naval depot.
If I might presume to address the
South, and particularly dear
Virginia — being “native here and to the manor born” --I would affectionately ask, will not your slaves be less secure, and their labor less profitable under the new order of things than under the old?
Could you employ profitably two hundred slaves in all
Nebraska, or five hundred in all
New Mexico?
The right, then, to take them thither would be a barren right.
And is it not wise to
Rather bear the ills we have
Than fly to others that we know not of!
The
Declaration of Independence proclaims and consecrates the same maxim: i “Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes.”
And
Paley, too, lays down as a fundamental maxim of statesmanship, “never to pursue national
honor as distinct from national
interest;” but adds: “This rule acknowledges that it is often necessary to assert the honor of a nation for the sake of its interests.”
The excitement that threatens secession is caused by the near prospect of a Republican's election to the Presidency.
From a sense of
