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Our forces, as they had arrived in the afternoon of the 5th, at the intersection of the Griersford (Lick Creek) and Ridge roads, from Corinth to Pittsburg, less than two miles from the Shiloh meeting-house, were formed into three lines of battle; the first, under General Hardee, extended from near Owl Creek, on the left, to near Lick Creek, on the right, a distance of less than three miles, and somewhat oblique to the Federal front line of encampments, being separated from it, on the right, by about one and a half miles, and on the left, by about two miles. General Hardee's command not being sufficiently strong to occupy the whole front, it was extended on the right by Gladden's brigade, of General Bragg's corps, and his artillery was formed immediately in his rear, on the main Pittsburg road. His cavalry protected and supported his flanks.
The second line, about five hundred yards in rear of the first, was composed of the rest of General Bragg's troops, arranged in the same order.
General Polk's corps, formed in column of brigades, deployed on the left of the Pittsburg road, between the latter and Owl Creek.
The front of the column was about eight hundred yards in rear of the centre of General Bragg's left wing, and each brigade was followed immediately by its battery.
General Polk's cavalry supported and protected his left flank.
Breckinridge's command occupied a corresponding position behind General Bragg's right wing, between the Pittsburg road and Lick Creek.
His cavalry protected and supported his right flank.
The two latter commands constituted the reserve, and were to support the front lines of battle by being deployed when required on the right and left of the Pittsburg road, or otherwise, according to exigencies.
General Hardee's effective force of infantry and artillery was, then, nine thousand and twenty-four men; General Bragg's, ten thousand seven hundred and thirty-one; General Polk's, nine thousand one hundred and thirty-six; and General Breckinridge's, seven thousand and sixty-two; presenting a total of thirty-five thousand nine hundred and fifty-three, infantry and artillery,1 to
1 It is proper to remark here, that, through the want of experienced commanding officers of artillery and cavalry, and because of the wooded nature of the battle-field, it became necessary to subdivide and distribute those two arms of the service among the different corps, to enable us to obtain even a partial benefit from their presence on the field. The strict rules of military organization for battle, in that and other respects, had to be departed from, under stress of circumstances.
1883. Harper. New York.
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