Chapter 40:
- General Beauregard assumes command of the Military division of the West. -- the Departments comprised in this division. -- circular addressed to that section of the Confederacy. -- telegrams from Generals Roddy and Forrest. -- General Beauregard establishes a base of operations at Jacksonville. -- Anecdote of a young soldier. -- General Hood resolves to continue the destruction of General Sherman's communications, and to cross the Tennessee River at Guntersville. -- General Beauregard approves the plan, but fears it will not be successfully executed. -- General Hood Persists. -- reluctant assent of General Beauregard. -- Similarity between General Hood's plan of campaign and President Davis's. -- General Beauregard's communication to the War Department, October 24th. -- telegram to General Cooper. -- General Hood moves on October 22d. -- difficulties of making change of base to Tuscumbia. -- General Beauregard leaves on October 24th, to rejoin General Hood. -- General Hood changes his line of march. -- failure to seize Decatur. -- General Hood again alters his plan. -- his army too destitute of provisions to cross into Tennessee. -- General Beauregard's chagrin.—he proposes crossing the River with the troops, and then leaving General Hood in sole command.
On the 17th of October General Beauregard assumed command of his new Department, and published the following order:
The general outlines of the Military Division of the West were given in the preceding chapter, but it is necessary here to specify more minutely its precise limits. These are indicated and explained in the following orders forwarded from the War Department to General Beauregard:
On the day on which General Beauregard assumed command (October 17th) he caused the following proclamation to be issued:
The following despatch was received on the 18th of October from General P. D. Roddy, who was then at Courtland. It was dated on the 17th:
‘No cavalry [enemy's] have passed Decatur. Scouts report but a small garrison at Decatur yesterday, and no force on the north side of the river, [286] from Florence up to Decatur. All other force is believed to be going towards Bridgeport.’Two days later the following telegram was received from General N. B. Forrest, dated Corinth, October 19th:
‘I am moving to meet General Washburn, who is reported crossing five thousand troops at Clifton. If he crosses I will attack. If I can defeat him I can then cross and destroy N. W. Railroad to Nashville, and be in position as desired’ [by General Taylor].These two telegrams are important, as showing the reasons for General Hood's proposed future campaign into Middle Tennessee. After completing all necessary arrangements for the establishment, at Jacksonville, of a good base for General Hood to operate from, General Beauregard, on the 19th of October, started to join the Army of Tennessee at Blue Pond, in a northeasterly direction, six miles beyond Centre, which is itself about thirty miles from Jacksonville. On his arrival there he ascertained from General Wheeler that General Hood and his army had retired to Gadsden, on the Coosa River, some twenty-seven miles to the westward. Wheeler reported Sherman's army not far from his front, and that he had been skirmishing that day with the Federal cavalry, supported by some infantry. General Beauregard was surprised that no intelligence of this retrograde movement had been sent to him. He began to fear that General Hood was disposed to be oblivious of those details which play an important part in the operations of a campaign, and upon which the question of success or failure often hinges. Leaving immediately for Gadsden, General Beauregard arrived there on the 21st, at 11 o'clock A. M. On his way an incident occurred which was of no importance in itself, but which illustrates the tone and spirit animating the Confederate soldier, even at that late hour of our struggle. During the evening of the 20th, while General Beauregard was awaiting, at a cross-road store, the arrival of his staff-wagon, a young lad, wearing the Confederate uniform and carrying a light riflemusket, stepped up to the fireplace to warm himself. General Beauregard was sitting close by, and, observing that the lad's shoes were very much worn, kindly said to him, ‘My young friend, you seem to be badly shod.’ ‘Yes,’ was the reply, ‘we are, many of us, in that condition; [287] but let another fight come on with the Yankees, and we will all have new shoes.’ Smiling at this curiously spirited answer, the General asked him how old he was. ‘Seventeen, sir,’ he answered, ‘and I was at the battle of Manassas.’ Saying which he raised his cap and, showing a scar on the side of his head, added, ‘That's what I got there.’ ‘What regiment do you belong to?’ said the General; ‘and how is it you are so far behind it?’ ‘I belong now to the gallant 30th Louisiana,’ said the young veteran. ‘I had a chill this afternoon, and I lay down under a tree. I fell asleep there, and when I woke up the army had passed on.’ Feeling now quite an interest in the young soldier, General Beauregard remarked, ‘I suppose you must be tired and hungry. I shall have something given you to eat, and take you in my wagon when it gets here.’ ‘No, sir, thank you,’ was the sturdy answer. ‘I have already had something to eat, and will get more when I join my regiment. Good-night, sir.’ And away he went. General Beauregard requested one of his aids to get the lad's name and tell him with whom he had been talking. His name was obtained, and inscribed in the officer's memorandum-book, but the book was lost during the course of the war. At Gadsden, General Beauregard found General Hood more than ever resolved upon continuing the destruction of Sherman's railroad communication beyond the Tennessee River. His reasons for doing so were, that, as he had already caused Sherman, in so short a time to retrograde from Atlanta to Dalton, he believed that by crossing his army at Guntersville north of Gadsden, and continuing to tear up the railroad from Stevenson to Nashville—his cavalry, meanwhile, being sent to destroy the long bridge at Bridgeport—he would compel his adversary to follow him into Middle Tennessee, in order to protect his line of communication and his large supplies at Nashville. The plan was no doubt bold, and likely to lead to great results, if carried out fearlessly and, above all, judiciously. But General Beauregard was apprehensive that General Hood might not be able to execute it as designed. According to his observation General Hood had already evinced want of experience as a [288] commander, though he had ever been a gallant and resolute subordinate officer. General Beauregard, therefore, expressed his solicitude as to the execution of the operation. Among other objections he urged the lack of time in which to prepare a new base of operations, either at Tuscumbia—near which the Memphis and Charleston Railroad was said to be in good condition— or at some point on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, north of Corinth, should our army be forced to cross the Tennessee, at Clifton or Savannah, to escape pursuit by. Sherman with greatly superior forces. General Hood argued that the two roads were in fair condition, and, if necessary, could be materially improved before he was likely to have need of them; that he would find ample supplies in Middle Tennessee, and, besides, would get those of the enemy. He said he would take his pontoon-train with him, and thus be enabled to cross the Tennessee at any point he thought advantageous, should he be compelled to retire his forces; and that, by means of the Beauregard torpedoes, protected by rifle guns behind strong parapets, he could always hold at bay the enemy's few ‘tinclad’ gunboats long enough to allow him to recross the river, in case of emergency. These details were minutely and earnestly discussed by the two generals during their long conference, which lasted far into the night. General Beauregard was not thoroughly convinced; but knowing that President Davis did not intend that he should supersede General Hood in the command of the Army of Tennessee, and that he would neither approve nor support his course if he should do so, he thought it wiser to yield and let General Hood have his own way. The plan was a good one in itself, but success depended upon the manner in which it should be carried out. Another reason—which was not without weight with General Beauregard—for not opposing General Hood's idea was the assertion by the latter that his proposed movement, as now amended, had the sanction of General Bragg, at that time the President's military adviser. In reality—and though different in many minor details—the movement now about to be made closely resembled, and almost formed part of, the system of operations and general plan of campaign devised by President Davis himself, when he visited [289] General Hood in the latter part of September. On page 565, vol. II., of Mr. Davis's work we read as follows:
‘With a view to judge better the situation, and then determine, after personal inspection, the course which should seem best to pursue, I visited General Hood's headquarters at Palmetto. The crisis was grave. It was not to be expected that General Sherman would remain long inactive. * * * To rescue Georgia, save the Gulf States, and retain possession of the lines of communication upon which we depended for the supplies of our armies in the field, an effort to arrest the further progress of the enemy was necessary; and to this end the railroads in his rear must be effectually torn up, the great railroad bridge over the Tennessee River at Bridgeport destroyed, and the communication between Atlanta, Chattanooga, and Nashville completely cut off. Could this be accomplished, all the fruits of Sherman's successful campaign in Georgia would be blighted, his capture of Atlanta would become a barren victory, and he would probably be compelled to make a retreat towards Tennessee, at every mile of which he might be harassed by our army.’Mr. Davis had, of course, said all this to General Hood, and had, in substance, repeated every word of it to General Beauregard. In thus insisting upon carrying out his new movement General Hood knew that he was putting into execution part of Mr. Davis's own plan; and, in not opposing that plan, General Beauregard knew that he was in nowise disregarding Mr. Davis's views, still less disobeying his general instructions. Three days after this second modification of General Hood's movement General Beauregard made it a point to send a communication on the subject to the War Department. He had followed the same course, about twelve days before, with reference to the alteration General Hood had made in his plan, on the 9th of October, previous to General Beauregard's meeting him at Cave Spring. Thus apprised in season, the War Department could have objected, or proposed any change it deemed advisable; and General Beauregard's main object was to afford this opportunity to the Administration at Richmond. Following is the communication alluded to:
Before this was written and forwarded the following telegram was sent to Richmond:
It must be borne in mind that, when General Hood left General Beauregard at Gadsden, it was understood that he would cross the Tennessee River at Guntersville, or its immediate vicinity, to continue the destruction of Sherman's railroad communications; and that Hood's cavalry was also to destroy the bridge on the Chattanooga road, at Bridgeport. No sooner had General Beauregard yielded his assent to the plan, so exhaustively explained in the foregoing document, than General Hood completed his arrangements to move his army. It began marching on the morning of the 22d. General Beauregard, who had instructed Lieut.-General Taylor and the chiefs of the quartermaster's and commissary's departments to meet him at Gadsden, remained there to confer about the necessary preparations to carry out the new change of base to Tuscumbia. The pontoon-bridge across the Coosa, forgotten in the hurry of departure, was, by order of General Beauregard, removed, and sent at once to General Hood. [292] General Beauregard was not long in discovering that this change of base was more difficult to make than the change from Jonesboroa to Jacksonville had been; for the Mobile and Ohio road, from Okalona to Corinth, contrary to General Hood's statement, was in a very dilapidated condition. So was the road from Corinth to Cherokee, near Tuscumbia. For a long period it had been but little used, and meantime it had been greatly injured by both armies. On the 22d General Beauregard instructed Lieut.-General Taylor to order General Forrest's division and Roddy's brigade of cavalry to report to General Hood, between Guntersville and Decatur.3 Forrest was then about Jackson, Tenn., and Roddy at or about Tuscaloosa, guarding the Tennessee River from Eastport, on the left, to the eastward beyond Guntersville. On the 23d he addressed a communication to Lieut.-General Taylor, relative to the new change of base to Tuscumbia, and what he desired him to do in that connection.4 Having now completed all his orders and instructions, General Beauregard, on the 24th, started to rejoin General Hood's army, which he supposed to be then crossing the Tennessee River, at or near Guntersville. On his way thither he stopped at the home of the young heroine Miss Emma Sanson, who within that year had intrepidly piloted General Forrest during his pursuit of General Grierson's raiding expedition through North Alabama. This young woman had received a unanimous vote of thanks and a grant of public lands from the General Assembly of the State of Alabama. She was absent at the time of General Beauregard's visit, and he missed seeing her. When he had gone nearly two-thirds of the distance to Guntersville, to his surprise and disappointment, he was informed that General Hood had turned off to the left, on the road to Decatur, some fifty miles westward, again neglecting to report the important change in his programme, despite General Beauregard's impressive remarks to him at Gadsden, on the occasion of his former omission of a like nature. When he finally joined General Hood, on the 27th, at Decatur, which was then being invested by the Army of Tennessee, General Beauregard cautioned him anew, in a more pointed manner, against the irregularity of his official [293] proceedings, and openly expressed his regret that Hood had gone so far down the river to effect a crossing — a movement which would increase the distance to Stevenson by nearly one hundred miles, and give Sherman more time to oppose the march in force. General Hood said that he had understood, when half-way to Guntersville, that the crossing at that point was strongly guarded by the Federals, and that there was no crossing-point below nearer than Decatur, which he thought he could take without serious loss. General Beauregard was of opinion that the capture of Decatur should have been accomplished by a coup de main at daybreak, for the enemy, now aware of General Hood's presence and intention, would be prepared to meet and resist him. The reconnoissances that day showed that the place was too strong and too well garrisoned to be assaulted; and, again changing his plan, General Hood now resolved to attempt a crossing below Decatur, half-way to Courtland, where, he had been informed, he would find a favorable point of passage. On the afternoon of the 28th the Engineers reported no favorable point nearer than Courtland, some twenty miles to the west. The army, therefore, left, on the 29th, for that town, which was about seventy miles distant from Guntersville. Already four or five days had been lost. Upon arriving there the Engineers, who had been sent on ahead of the troops, reported that a crossing could be effected, but not without difficulty. At this moment, when General Beauregard hoped that the longexpected movement would at last be begun, General Hood informed him that he feared he had not provisions enough left to go into Middle Tennessee with; that many of his men were again shoeless, or nearly so, and that it would be very imprudent to commence a new campaign in that lame condition. He said he would, therefore, prefer going on to Tuscumbia, twenty miles farther west, where, from all reports, there was a good crossing-place, only ten or twelve miles from Cherokee, the terminus of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Over that railroad he could get all necessary supplies in a few days. It would be impossible to express General Beauregard's chagrin at such an outlook. He began to fear that the army would never reach Middle Tennessee, and so informed General Hood, who could no longer conceal the fact that he also looked at his enterprise rather despondingly. At Tuscumbia the army would be about ninety miles from [294] Guntersville, a distance which it would be necessary to double in order to get back to that point, making it, in all, one hundred and eighty miles. It was now too late to change General Hood's plan, and the wisest policy was to make the best of it. General Beauregard, therefore, offered no opposition, but strongly advised that everything should be hurried forward with the greatest expedition; and that, instead of marching to the eastward after crossing the river, the army should begin a campaign in Middle Tennessee, there to capture or destroy the scattered detached forces of the enemy, while most of our cavalry should be sent to tear up the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, commencing at Bridgeport, or as near that place as practicable; that meanwhile General Hood with his army should endeavor to reach Nashville with the least possible delay, and capture its garrison, under General Thomas, with the large supplies there collected for his forces and those of General Sherman. Such an active campaign, if commenced at once, would compel the latter to return immediately into Middle Tennessee to defend his line of communication. General Hood readily concurred in those views, and expressed his conviction that he could carry them out successfully.5 Fortunately, before leaving Gadsden, on the 24th, General Beauregard had given all necessary orders for the repairing of the Mobile and Ohio and the Memphis and Charleston railroads, and had directed that all available railroad stock should be transferred to them. General Taylor had promised to give the matter his special attention, and to turn in that direction all the supplies then moving towards Jacksonville, Ala. Thus, General Beauregard hoped to see the Army of Tennessee resupplied and in a fair way to carry out the campaign planned for it. He proposed crossing the river with the troops, and then leaving General Hood in sole command, for he remembered the words of Napoleon when the Directory, in 1796, offered to send him a general of greater experience, to assist him in the campaign of Italy: ‘One bad head in command of an army in the field is always better than two good ones.’
