Chapter 28:
- General Beauregard returns to Charleston. -- he informs the War Department of the result of his inspection of the works around Savannah. -- dispositions taken with regard to different batteries; for the completion of the boom; for the protection of River obstructions; for negro labor upon works around Charleston. -- letter to Governor Pickens. -- letter to Colonel Chestnut. -- letter to the Hon. W. P. Miles. -- promise of Secretary of War to send guns to General Beauregard. -- his letter to General Cobb. -- instructions to Major Pope. -- War Department withdraws the order for guns. -- General Beauregard's letter to General S. Cooper, explaining conduct of Major Childs. -- telegram from the Secretary of War. -- General Beauregard requests a suspension of decision. -- refusal of the Secretary of War. -- indignation of General Beauregard. -- Governor Pickens Dissuades him from demanding to be relieved. -- Ordnance Department Refuses to pay for banding of guns. -- notice given of probable attack. -- canal Cut through the Wappoo. -- General Beauregard's minute attention to all details. -- instructions to General Cobb. -- enemy's fleet directed towards Cape Lookout. -- General Beauregard's letter to General Whiting. -- enemy Retires to Newbern. -- information given of probable naval attack upon Charleston. -- General Beauregard recalls his troops from North Carolina. -- President Davis Refuses to send 7-inch guns to General Beauregard. -- they are sent to Mobile.
General Beauregard, having accomplished the object of his visit to Savannah, on the 30th of October returned to Charleston, where he found Captain D. B. Harris waiting for him. His pleasure and relief were great indeed, for he knew that this trusted officer would now relieve him of the immediate supervision of the works to be remodelled and constructed in many portions of his extensive command. It cannot be expected that we shall pass in review and comment upon all the official orders emanating from General Beauregard's headquarters, nor that the reader should be made acquainted with every one of his acts from the time he assumed control of that Department until he left it in the spring of 1864. No more can be looked for than a careful summary, in chronological order, of all events of importance that occurred within [36] his jurisdiction, showing the part he took in each, and giving such explanation as the occasion may call forth. 1. On November 1st he officially informed General Cooper of the result of his inspection of the defences of Savannah, and expressed his views and recommendations ‘more,’ he said, ‘as an Engineer officer than as the commanding general of the Department.’1 The preceding chapter and its comprehensive Appendix have already sufficiently apprised the reader of what these views and recommendations were. 2. On November 3d he instructed Major Pope, Chief of Ordnance, to transfer an 18-pounder cannon from White Point Battery, where it was comparatively useless, to one at Church Flats, in the Second Military District, so as to enfilade the John's Island Bridge and Causeway, which were liable to be taken by a sudden coup de main. On the same day he called on Captain Ingraham, C. S. N., commanding the Naval Department in Charleston, to furnish him three hundred pieces of gunboat plating, to be used in completing the boom across the channel between the two main forts of the harbor. He also suggested that the three merchant ships lying off the wharves should be armed with quaker guns, and anchored near the boom, to deceive the enemy. 3. On November 4th he applied to Governor Pickens for the iron plating which protected the old floating battery used, in April, 1861, during the attack on Fort Sumter. He accepted the four regiments of reserves (infantry) offered him by the governor for the defence of the sea-coast of South Carolina. Two of these he immediately ordered to Pocotaligo, in the Third Military District, and the two others to Georgetown, in the Fourth District (a new one), now being organized, which was afterwards placed under the command of Brigadier-General Trapier. Governor Pickens answered in his usual earnest way, granting General Beauregard's request about the iron. He suggested a plan for the proper management of negroes, and the care to be bestowed upon them while working on the defences of the city and coast, and thought they could be organized into a corps of spadesmen and axemen, to be permanently attached to the army. [37] 4. On November 6th General Beauregard wrote an important letter to Brigadier-General Gist, commanding James Island and the Main, acknowledging receipt of his communication of that date alluding to the good condition of the battery at Mayrant's, near Georgetown. The proposed battery at Frazer's Bluff, though, most desirable, was, he feared, liable to be cut off and seized by the enemy. He desired the construction of a work for two or three 24-pounders, to command the North Santee, at a bluff near Ladson's, in the direction of Hame's Ferry. He also inquired about the condition of the battery of one 32-pounder, commanding the South Santee, and wished to know whether or not the stream could be so obstructed as to allow the removal of that gun to the battery at Ladson's. 5. On the 7th General Mercer was requested to confer with Commodore Tatnall, C. S. N., commanding the Naval Department in Savannah, concerning the fitting out of a small gunboat (not ironclad) with heavy guns, to be placed in a cut near the river obstructions, where the ground was known to be low and soft. General Beauregard suggested the construction of an iron shield on board, arranged to protect the guns, and the throwing up of a levee around the gunboat further to secure its safety. He thought it would be a great saving, both of time and labor. 6. On the 8th of November he wrote the following letter to Governor Pickens:
7. Two days after the foregoing letter was penned the following communication was sent to Colonel James Chestnut, Jr., at that time in command of the State Reserves of South Carolina:
8. The following letter was addressed to the Hon. William P. Miles:
9. On the 17th the gratifying news was received that the Secretary of War had authorized the immediate casting of the 15-inch gun, and that through him Colonel Miles hoped to be able, erelong, to procure other 10-inch guns for Charleston. But the concluding part of the despatch spoke of Mr. Randolph's resignation, just sent in, and deplored it as ‘a great loss to us,’ for he took deep interest in General Beauregard's efforts thoroughly to secure [40] Charleston and its harbor, and would have done his utmost in furtherance of that end. On the same day the condition of General Trapier's Military District was made known to the War Department, and prompt action solicited for his immediate relief. The means at his command were alarmingly small. The battery at Mayrant's Bluff, reported to be in a state of readiness, had no other support than such as could be afforded by mounted troops and field artillery. The regiments of infantry under him (Colonel Cash in command) were State Reserves, called out for ninety days, and had been sent to their post of duty without arms or ammunition. 10. On the 21st General Beauregard, in reply to General Howell Cobb's inquiries as to the precise nature of his duties in Middle Florida,2 wrote the following letter:
[41] 11. Major Pope, Chief of Ordnance, received the following special instructions on the 22d:
1. The 8-inch shell (naval) gun, now on the wharf, will be transported and placed on the new battery at John's Island Ferry. 2. The 32-pounder navy gun, being rifled and banded at Eason's shop, must be sent, when ready for service, to White Point Battery, to be placed in position on the Ashley River, adjoining the position at the salient intended for heavier guns. 3. The 10-inch bronze (old pattern) mortar on wharf will be placed in Battery Wagner, Morris Island. 4. New beds and elevating screws will be supplied, as soon as possible, for three 10-inch mortars in Fort Sumter. 5. If not already done, one rifled and banded 32-pounder will be transferred from Battery Means to Beauregard. 6. If not already done, a 12-pounder rifled piece outside of Fort Pemberton will be sent, with the proper supply of ammunition, to Winyaw Bay. 7. Two 24-pounder guns (on siege carriages) now on the eastern cremaillere lines of James Island will be sent to battery at Willtown Bluff, in Second Military District. 8. The 32-pounder recently ordered to be banded to replace a defective piece in Fort Moultrie, when ready for service, will be sent to Battery Glover, to take place of a 32-pounder to be brought here by commanding officer of First District, to be banded and rifled. ‘9. All guns, when sent or transferred to positions not already sufficiently supplied with ammunition, will be at once furnished with about one hundred rounds of the proper character and proportion.’12. On the same day plans and instructions for placing obstructions, by piling, etc., in the Chattahoochee (Florida) and Flint River (Georgia) were forwarded to Captain F. Moreno, Corps of Provisional Engineers, at Columbus, Ga. And General Finegan, at his own request, was also advised as to obstructing the Appalachicola River below the batteries, with a view to avoiding complication with the State authorities. 13. The effects of the resignation of Mr. Randolph, as Secretary of War, were soon felt in Charleston, as will be seen by the following telegrams:
[42] General Beauregard remonstrated, but without avail. In a telegram to General Cooper he said:
‘I learn with regret from Colonel Rhett that the two 7-inch rifled guns have been turned over to the navy for Mobile. The necessity for a much larger number of the heaviest guns here is increased, as the boom is likely to prove a failure.’14. A very unpleasant misunderstanding now occurred between the Commanding General of the Department and Major Childs, ordnance officer in charge of the Charleston Arsenal. A clear and comprehensive explanation of it is given in the following letter:
It is proper here to state that, before the foregoing letter had had time to reach General Cooper—for, as it was shown, circumstances prevented it from being forwarded until several days after it was written—a telegram from Richmond, dated December 1st, was received by General Beauregard. It read as follows:
In vain was the War Department asked to suspend its decision until the matter could be further examined into. The order was reiterated and insisted upon, as appeals by this telegram, dated Richmond, December 2d, 1862:
General Beauregard thought he had been sufficiently clear in his explanation to the War Department. He would have nothing further to do with the matter; and the order was executed. Thus was the querulous freak of a subordinate officer openly upheld by the authorities at Richmond, regardless of the pernicious example set by such a precedent, and of the mortification it would bring upon a commanding general, whose only motive was to hurry up his arrangements to meet the threatened assault of the enemy, and who knew what prompt and vigorous action the emergency required. Governor Pickens happening to be in Charleston at that time, General Beauregard called on him and explained the unwarrantable interference of the Government. The general's indignation was so great that he declared his intention to apply at once to be relieved from the command of his Department and ordered ‘to the field;’ and, should this request be denied, then—as the only alternative left him—to resign his commission. But Governor Pickens, while acknowledging the unfairness of the [46] Administration, vehemently protested against the adoption of such a course. He appealed to General Beauregard—first as a friend, then as the Governor of South Carolina—and entreated him to remain at his post. He declared that he had faith in no other commander for the safety of Charleston at this juncture, and that South Carolina would willingly defray the expenses of banding and rifling all the guns needed, should Congress fail to pass a special bill to that effect. He was so earnest, and spoke so feelingly on the subject, that General Beauregard determined to overlook this new affront, and continue his efforts to save Charleston, despite the annoyances and obstacles thrown in his way. It may be added, before dismissing this subject, that General Beauregard was hardly through with the work of banding and rifling his heavy guns when, in April, 1863, the attack of the Federal fleet was made. That event will be discussed hereafter. It is historically true, however, that the repulse of that attack was due, not only to the intrepidity of the troops in forts Sumter and Moultrie, and in the other defensive works in and around the harbor, but also—and in no small degree—to the heavy banded and rifled guns prepared for, and so effectually used on, that memorable occasion. And yet when, several months afterwards, the Ordnance Department was called upon to pay for the important work thus performed for the safety of Charleston and of the Confederate cause, it peremptorily declined to do so. The matter was brought before Mr. Seddon, the successor of Mr. Randolph as Secretary of War, but he would have nothing to do with it, because, as he said, ‘the Ordnance regulations had to be obeyed and carried out.’ It was only when Colonel William Porcher Miles, Chairman of the Military Committee in the House, expressed his intention to lay the question before Congress, and demand a special appropriation for that purpose, that Mr. Seddon finally issued the order, and had the bill paid by the Ordnance Department.3 15. On the 29th of November General Beauregard received information from his Signal Corps that the enemy's ordinary fleet had left Hilton Head, either for an expedition to some point on the coast or for the North. If the latter, the movement related [47] to Burnside's operations; if not, the intention of the enemy was yet to be discovered. General Beauregard lost no time in apprising the War Department of the facts, and, by special despatches, warned Generals Whiting, at Wilmington; Mercer, at Savannah; and Hagood, Walker, and Trapier, commanders of the Second, Third, and Fourth Military Districts of South Carolina. He also wrote the following letter to General Ripley:
The note referred to as addressed to General Trapier was in these terms:
On the 30th General Walker telegraphed that he had nothing further to report about the enemy's fleet, and that all was quiet in his locality. General Mercer, in his despatch of the same day, said: ‘Nothing seen of the enemy's fleet in this district. Cars collected ordered to be discharged.’ 16. The idea of utilizing the gunboat-rams in other localities than the Charleston Harbor, without passing outside the bar, had occupied General Beauregard's mind for some time. On the 2d of December he issued an order to Major Harris, Chief-engineer, to cut a channel, twenty-five feet wide and thirteen feet deep at [48] high water, in the Wappoo Cut, from the Ashley to the Stono, so that the gunboat-rams might operate in either river, and retake and hold Cole's Island, at the mouth of the Stono, which would enable us to reduce the force on James Island to a minimum. Major Harris's instructions were to do the work ‘as quietly as possible, in order not to awaken the suspicions of the enemy's gunboats in the Stono, and afford us the opportunity of taking them, and of re-opening our inland water communications with Port Royal,’ or of obtaining ‘stronger engines for our iron gunboats and rams in Charleston.’ 17. On the following day General Cooper was telegraphed that the enemy's fleet had returned to Port Royal; and Major Pope was ordered to furnish certain guns, implements, and ammunition to Colonel Colcock, at Ocean Landing, and to General Walker, in the Third Military District. 18. The boom across the channel gave no satisfaction. General Beauregard determined to give up all work on it, and resort only to a rope obstruction, to be placed in its front. Major Cheves was instructed accordingly, and was also ordered to turn over to Captain Echols all materials collected for the boom, but to remain in charge of the torpedo constructions for the entrance of the harbor. He was thanked for the zeal and energy displayed by him in the discharge of his duties, in the face of so many difficulties. 19. An important order was also given to Major Harris in relation to General Raines's submarine batteries. The Engineers' Department was told to locate them below Simon Bluff, in the Wadmalaw; below Grimball's, in the Dawhee; and in the South Edisto, opposite Aiken's Mills; or at some proper place in the Pon Pon River. Major Harris was also instructed to construct a magazine at Summerville for the safe-keeping of ordnance stores in an emergency. 20. General Ripley was directed to attend to the armament of the two redoubts in rear of Fort Pemberton, and to transfer thither as soon as possible one 24-pounder on siege-carriage from the cremaillere line, and one 24-pounder in barbette from Fort Moultrie or Castle Pinckney. 21. The battery at Church Flats was also ordered to be converted at once into a small enclosed work, to hold two 12-pounder smooth-bore guns, an 18-pounder, and two 6-pounder light pieces, [49] to be taken from different works indicated and placed in position on the land-front. The foregoing synopsis is presented to the reader to show that General Beauregard's attention was turned to the minutest details of the service—details which he knew to be of great importance in all military operations; and it is a fact worthy of note that all orders given and executed in relation to any portion of his vast command emanated, directly or indirectly, from him alone. The epithet of ‘felix,’ so often applied to him during the war, and alluded to by Mr. Pollard, in ‘The Lost Cause,’ can be explained in no other way. It was due, not to his having been in reality more favored by chance—some would say ‘luck’—than any other commander, but mainly, if not altogether, because of his incessant toil and vigilance. ‘Experrectus,’ it is suggested, would have been more appropriate than ‘felix.’ 22. The following communication, forwarded to the War Department by General Beauregard, is now submitted. It shows how well-founded was his complaint of the slowness of Major Childs's work at the Charleston Arsenal:
23. Turning his thoughts towards the defence of that part of Florida included in his command, General Beauregard caused the following instructions to be written to General Cobb:
24. On the 12th of December, General Beauregard informed the War Department, by telegram, that General Banks's fleet had left, suddenly, two days before, with about ten thousand men, diverging from its southern course and making directly for Cape Lookout. The information, General Beauregard said, could be relied upon. The enemy had been making preparations for some time past for a descent along the Southern Atlantic coast, and all General Beauregard's disposable troops were held in readiness to move at once to any threatened point of his Department. To hold his own within its limits was all that he could reasonably hope to do. But, whatever may have been his expectations, he certainly had no idea that troops would be taken from him to reinforce neighboring commands. Such was the case, however, as will appear by the following telegram:
This telegram was far from explicit, and left upon General Beauregard the responsibility of following or not following its instructions. He determined, however, to give Generals Whiting and Smith all the assistance in his power, even at the risk of the enemy breaking through his coast-line, by a sudden coup de main [52] —an eventuality not altogether unlikely, owing to the great resources in men and means of transportation at the disposal of the Federals. Immediate orders were issued to the district and subdistrict commanders of the Department, and all possible diligence used to hurry on the transfer of the troops.6 On the 14th this letter was written to General Whiting:
On the next day the following despatch was forwarded to the War Department:
The force of the enemy was greatly exaggerated, though it might with truth have been put down at twenty thousand men. His object was never well understood, nor was it at any time very well defined. He certainly failed to accomplish what his movements seemed to indicate as his purpose. General Beauregard's direct co-operation was desired by Generals Whiting and Smith. The latter was of opinion that, should Banks's forces unite with Foster's, as reported, more troops would be needed from General Beauregard, and that he could come over with them, as ‘all geographical lines’ should then be considered as no longer existing. But General Smith's apprehensions were not realized. On the 18th, from Goldsboroa, whither he thought the Carolina and Georgia troops should be sent, he forwarded this despatch:
[53] And on the same day he also telegraphed as follows:
The reason for such ‘great haste’ on the part of the enemy was not perceptible, as General Smith's forces did not exceed six thousand men, without cavalry, and exclusive of the troops sent by General Beauregard, which, owing to unavoidable delays from Wilmington, had not reached their destination in time. On the other hand, the danger apparently threatening General Whiting's Department was not a serious one; and this expedition, from which so much was expected at the North, proved to be a complete failure. Less than three days after these events General Beauregard was informed, through Colonel Clinch, commanding in Southeast Georgia, that the enemy's gunboats had left St. Simon's Bay, on their way to Charleston, which, it was reported, would soon be attacked, by land and water. This news was in some degree confirmed by the following telegram from the Secretary of War:
The substance of the foregoing despatch being repeated the next day, General Beauregard began to prepare for the emergency. As might have been expected, his first step was to recall his troops from North Carolina. He telegraphed General Whiting to that effect, and at the same time authorized him to select either a 42-pounder rifled gun or a 10-inch columbiad, which would be sent him from Richmond to Charleston, and to use it for the defence of Wilmington. General Whiting, in a letter dated December 31st, thanked General Beauregard for his readiness to assist him, and took occasion to say, in his characteristic [54] manner, that, having served under him at the opening of the war, he would ask nothing better than to continue doing so until the very end. Meanwhile, on the 27th, General Beauregard received the following telegram from Colonel William Porcher Miles:
‘Have appealed to President in vain for the two 7-inch guns. Says they belong to navy, and must go to Mobile, for floating-battery just finished and waiting for guns. Secretary of War did all he could for us.’General Beauregard was astonished, for the President knew— or believed, which amounted to the same thing—that Charleston was on the eve of an attack. On the other hand, he should have been aware that no real danger threatened Mobile at that time; and yet, in spite of repeated entreaties, he preferred acceding to the request of General Forney, as though (even admitting that both cities were equally menaced) Charleston were not of more importance than Mobile to the safety of the Confederacy.
