Alfred Roman, The military operations of General Beauregard in the war between the states, 1861 to 1865

[88] by my telegram of the 13th instant. It is now my place to reply by mail at some length.

I am advised in the letter in question that “Northern papers report the reduction of Hunter's forces by sending troops to the Gulf” —in which event I am instructed to proceed to Mobile, “with such force as I can properly withdraw from my defensive line, to resist an attack, if one should be designed on that place;” but if the purpose of the enemy be to send his reinforcements to the Mississippi, I am to go on and “co-operate with General Johnston in that quarter.”

While I shall be glad to contribute my mite to the defence of any part of the Confederate States, and assuredly must be solicitous for the defence of Mobile and the Mississippi Valley, yet, with my view of the situation in this quarter, repeatedly expressed, I cannot now properly withdraw, without a direct order, more than a regiment of cavalry from this Department.

The troops left in this Department at this time (see Field Return of 13th inst.) are 19,863—that is, 6488 nominal infantry, 7329 heavy and light artillery, and 6046 cavalry. This force is stationed as follows: for the garrisons of the works in Charleston Harbor and the defensive lines commanding the immediate approaches to the city, 2606 infantry—of which some four or six companies are actually necessarily doing heavy artillery service in batteries on Sullivan's Island and elsewhere—3767 heavy and light artillery, and 1171 cavalry.

In the works and lines around Savannah are 1888 nominal infantry, 2295 heavy and light artillery, and 1738 cavalry, leaving 984 infantry, 847 light artillery, and 2244 cavalry to hold the line of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad; and 1010 infantry, 420 light artillery, and 893 cavalry in Florida— now so important for its supplies of subsistence.

Thus, it will be seen, the force in the Department is already at the minimum necessary to hold the works around Charleston and Savannah, constantly menaced by the proximity of the enemy's ironclads. The garrison of no work in the harbor can be withdrawn or diminished, as they are all necessary links in the chain of defence. Reduce the command on James Island, and the enemy may readily penetrate, by such a coup de main as was attempted last year, at the weakened point. James Island would then fall, and, despite our harbor defenses, the City of Charleston would be thrown open to bombardment. It is not safe to leave less than a regiment of infantry on Morris Island, which, if once carried by the enemy, would expose Fort Sumter to be taken in reverse and demolished.

The defective lines of defence adopted and constructed on James Island, after the unfortunate abandonment, last year, of Cole's Island, have made a force of about 11,000 men essential to guard and hold that island against a serious land attack; whereas, had Cole's Island (at the mouth of the Stono) been held, 2500 men would not only have defended James Island, but the enemy would have been excluded from the Stono, and unable to occupy and fortify Folly Island and threaten Morris Island, as is now the case.

Late Northern papers say Admiral Dupont has been relieved in command of the fleet on this coast by Admiral Foote, an officer whose operations in the West evinced much activity and an enterprising spirit. And, even were