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even to question his infallibility of selection was an offence not to be condoned.
Gen. Grant, having effected a junction with the gunboats below Vicksburg, next determined to turn the works at Grand Gulf, which defended the mouth of the Big Black River, by landing at a point lower down the river.
Accordingly he marched by its right flank, crossed opposite Bruinsburg, and on the 30th April landed on the left bank, and immediately pushed forward towards Port Gibson, a small town near the mouth of the Big Black River.
Gen. Pemberton, who appeared to have been at last aroused to a sense of the danger of his position, telegraphed the news of Grant's movement to Gen. Johnston, nominally commanding the Western armies, and then at Tullahona with Bragg.
He received orders to attack at once.
Gen. Johnston despatched: “If Grant crosses the river, unite all your troops to beat him. Success will give back what was abandoned to win it.”
It was the critical opportunity of the campaign.
Grant had landed with about 50,000 men. By drawing all his forces from different posts, leaving only enough in Vicksburg to answer Porter's chronic bombardment, Gen. Pemberton could have concentrated nearly 40,000 troops, and these, with the advantage of a difficult country, and with slight field-works, might at all events have delayed Grant until Vicksburg was provisioned, and Johnston had arrived with reinforcements.
But we shall see that the bewildered commander, without the resolution to risk a decisive battle, committed the unpardonable errour of allowing his army to be cut up in detail by an enemy with massed forces.
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