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Siege and surrender of Vicksburg
Gen. Pemberton had in
Vicksburg eight thousand fresh troops, not demoralized by defeat.
When he arrived in town from the battle-field at Big Black, a general feeling of distrust was expressed in his competency, and the place was regarded as lost.
Every one expected
Grant's army to march into
Vicksburg that night, while there was no means of defence and no spirit in the troops.
Gen. Pemberton set to work, reorganizing the army for the last desperate struggle.
Gen. Baldwin went out to review the line of defences, and imagining that the first assault would be made on the left wing, he petitioned to be assigned to hold that position with his veteran troops, upon whose fidelity and courage he could depend.
The army was placed in position on the lines, and placed in the ditches, with
Gen. Baldwin on the left, and
Gen. Lee on the right.
The centre was held by
Gens. Pemberton,
Smith, and
Forney.
As these dispositions were made, the confidence of the troops was gradually restored; they saw the purpose of defence; and they were entertained with the prospect that their besieged condition would soon be relieved by
Johnston's army.
But such prospect was not a little visionary.
The truth of the situation was that
Pemberton had trapped himself in
Vicksburg, to surrender to famine what could not be won by assault.
Gen. Johnston had come to the Mississippi Department with no army of his own, beyond a few troops, to take charge of
Pemberton's, which he found broken to pieces, and the remnants sheltered in
Vicksburg.
To collect a new army by appeals to the
Richmond authorities, the
Governor of
Mississippi, and other quarters, became his only resource.
With all his efforts only twenty thousand men could be raised, many of them raw troops, without field-guns and proper equipment; while
Grant had been reinforced to eighty thousand men, besides the co-operation of
Porter's fleet.
He had also entrenched himself on every side with a difficult river between himself and
Johnston.
For the latter to have dashed himself against the enemy in such circumstances, might have been esteemed an act of magnificent daring; but it would not have been war. If
Pemberton, instead of crowding superserviceable troops in a fortress to consume its scant supplies, or become the victims of disease or war, had thrown sufficient garrison into
Vicksburg, and kept at large twenty thousand men, he could have so reinforced
Johnston as to have enabled him to act promptly before
Grant had entrenched himself, and thus relieve
Vicksburg from the purpose of his efforts, by giving him occupation outside.
But none of these things were done.
Johnston's resources were utterly inadequate to any good purpose; he could not collect a sufficient force to break the investment of
Vicksburg;
