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Chapter 32:
- Position of the armies around Richmond, June 1, 1864.
-- maneuvers for position.
-- battle of Cold Harbour.
-- easy repulse of the enemy.
-- Grant decides to cross the river, and attempt the south side of Richmond.
-- why Gen. Lee did not attempt to attack him in the movement.
-- battles of Petersburg.
-- two attacks of the enemy repulsed.
-- Butler advances his position, and is driven back.
-- Grant turns his attention from the fortifications to the railroads.
-- demonstrations on the Weldon and Danville Roads.
-- defeat of Sheridan's expedition on the railroads North of Richmond.
-- operations west of the Blue Ridge.
-- Hunter's movement.
-- he captures Staunton.
-- he advances upon Lynchburg.
-- he is defeated, and driven into Western Virginia.
-- Gen. John Morgan's expedition into Kentucky.
-- its disastrous conclusion.
-- particulars of the murder of Gen. Morgan in East Tennessee.
-- Early's invasion of Maryland.
-- daring of Gen. Lee.
-- what he proposed by sending Early's column into the North.
-- Grant's preparations against this movement.
-- battle of Monocacy Bridge.
-- defeat of “Lew” Wallace's command.
-- Early advances upon Washington.
-- skirmish in front of Fort Stevens.
-- Early declines to attack the Federal capital and retreats.
-- questions as to the strength of Washington.
-- results of Early's expedition.
-- its effect on the armies operating around Richmond.
-- the mine fiasco at Petersburg.
-- three elements in the plan of attack.
-- description of the mine.
-- the explosion and a “feu d'enfer.”
-- the assaulting column pauses in the crater.
-- terrible scenes of carnage.
-- the miserable failure.
-- commentary of the New York times.
The first of June, 1864, found the position of the two armies around
Richmond as follows:
Grant was between the
Chickahominy and the
Pamunkey, with his left thrown forward to
Mechanicsville, his right withdrawn to
White House, and his reserve massed in rear of his left, and
Richmond somewhat behind his left flank.
Lee was posted from Atlee's Station, extending on his left to
Gaines' Mill, with outposts as far as Coal Harbour.
His position conformed to that of 1862; and, indeed, the whole Confederate line of battle was on ground occupied by both the armies at that time.
On falling back to
Richmond it had been the first concern of
Gen. Lee to secure positions he knew, from the battles of 1862, to be good ones.
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He, accordingly, sent forward to the right
Kershaw's and
Hoke's divisions of
Anderson's corps, with orders to occupy the eminences around
Gaines' Mill and Cold Harbour.
This position had been previously carried by some Federal cavalry.
But on arrival of
Bloke's division, shortly afterwards reinforced by
McLaws', the
Confederates obtained possession of the desired posts.
At the same time
Breckinridge and
Mahone, of
Hill's corps, were equally successful in gaining certain advanced positions.
On the 2d June, as
Grant continued to develop his left flank, the
Confederates were put in motion on a parallel line, while
Early, commanding
Ewell's corps, swung round, late in the afternoon, and took the enemy in flank, drove him from two lines of entrenchments, and inflicted great loss.
Meanwhile
Breckinridge, supported by
Wilcox, proceeded, under orders from
Lee, to attack the advanced Federals, now on the extreme right at
Turkey Hill, and there succeeded in driving them away.
Thus another important position was obtained by
Lee; this hill commanding the approaches from the north and east to the line of the
Chickahominy.
Meanwhile
Grant was getting his troops into position for a decisive action.
Early in the morning of June the 3d, his army, now extending from Totopatomy Creek, across the road from Cold Harbour to the
Chickahominy, advanced in full line of battle, upon the
Confederates.
Battle of Cold Harbour.
The Federal line of battle ran in the following order, from right to left:
Burnside,
Warren,
Smith,
Wright, and
Hancock.
The latter was opposed by
Breckinridge's command on
Lee's extreme right;
Ewell's corps held the extreme left opposite
Burnside; and
Hill's corps was in reserve.
The attack was led by
Hancock, who momentarily carried the position held by
Breckinridge's troops, but was severely repulsed, as this part of the line was reinforced by
Milligan's Florida brigade, and the
Maryland battalion.
This was the only corps of the enemy that came in contact with the
Confederate works.
The two corps on the right of
Hancock were repulsed; and
Warren and
Burnside staggered on the line of the rifle-pits.
The fact was that
Grant, in testing the question, whether
Lee's army had or had not been demoralized by its experience from the
Rapidan to the
James, found his own army so incapable, that he was compelled to withdraw it in sheer despair.
He “mounted his horse and rode along the lines to ascertain from the different commanders the actual state of things in their immediate front.
He returned leisurely, absorbed in thought, and it was evident that the attempt would not be renewed.”
Of the results of the day, he wrote: “Our loss was heavy, while that of the enemy, I have reason to believe, was comparatively light.”
The fact was that the report of
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the
adjutant-general at
Washington showed a loss of seven thousand five hundred men in three days operations on the
Chickahominy, the greater portion of which occurred, of course, in the general action of the 3d of June.
For several days after the battle of Cold Harbour there was comparative quiet, and some unimportant skirmishes.
During the night of the 5th
Grant withdrew his right wing about two miles, and placed it behind a swamp, which protected both the flank and front of that portion of his army.
The severe experience of the 3d satisfied him that
Richmond could not be carried by a
coup de main, and could no longer be approached with advantage from the north.
On this side lay a difficult river and five miles of earthworks, stretched to the
Confederate capital.
Here, too, the enemy had to hold the Fredericksburg railroad, a long, vulnerable line, which would exhaust much of his strength to guard, and which would have to be protected to supply his army — a situation which would have left open to the
Confederates all their lines of communication on the south side of the
James.
A full survey of all the ground satisfied
Grant that he could not operate with advantage north and east of
Richmond; he determined to make another movement by
Lee's left flank, throw his army over
James River, and seize
Petersburg, hoping thus to cut off all the
Confederate supplies, except by the canal; while his cavalry could be sent to
Charlottesville and
Gordonsville, to break up the railroad connection between
Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley and
Lynchburg.
On the 12th June,
Grant completed his preparations to abandon the late field of operations about the
Chickahominy, cross the
James River, and occupy the south side towards
Petersburg.
To do this he had to make another movement round
Lee's right, extending as far as Bottom's Bridge, and march down the
Chickahominy as far as the next crossings at Long's and Jones' bridges.
The movement was effected with skill.
On June 13, the advance had reached
Wilcox's landing on the
James, near Charles' City Court-house, and the next day
Grant's whole army was safely transferred to the opposite shore.
Gen. Lee did not attack
Grant on his movement to the
James.
He was probably unable to do so.
Richmond and
Petersburg had both to be guarded, not only against the Army of the Potomac, but also that of
Butler, who had come up the river in heavy force to co-operate with
Grant; while an important detachment of Confederate force, as we shall see, had to be ready to move towards
Lynchburg to meet the advance of a third army in that direction.
It had been the expectation of
Grant to make an easy capture of
Petersburg, which
Butler had previously failed to take, laying the blame of defeat on his subordinate,
Gillmore.
But he found that
Lee had anticipated him in this new plan of operations; that
Petersburg was well able to withstand a siege; that additional fortifications had
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been promptly erected around it and on the banks of the
Appomattox, while
Drewry's Bluff, also, afforded a good and strong point of defence.
Grant found it now necessary to “hammer” at
Petersburg, which, properly regarded, was then a mere outpost of the
Confederate capital, for even if he took the first, or rather the line of works that commanded it, similar works, around
Richmond, twenty miles off, confronted him.
Smith's corps, of
Butler's command, having disembarked at
Bermuda Hundred on the 14th June, moved rapidly upon
Petersburg, and made an assault on the batteries covering the approaches to the town on the northeast.
He got possession of this line of works, but was too timid to push his advantage, and waited the coming up of the Second Corps, under
Hancock, two divisions of which arrived during the night, and relieved a part of
Smith's line in the captured works.
An attack was ordered in the evening of the next day,
Burnside's corps having also come up and gone into position on the left.
Three assaults were made with disastrous result; the
Confederates assuming the aggressive, driving the enemy from his breastworks at Howlett's House, and opening upon him an enfilading fire, in which a large portion of a brigade that had sought shelter in a ravine was captured by a Georgia regiment.
The next day the Fifth Corps was got up, and a third attack was made by the enemy four corps strong.
It was repulsed at all parts of the line; and, again assuming the offensive, the
Confederates made an attack on
Burnside's line of advanced rifle-pits, drove the enemy back upon his supports, and remained in possession until day-light, when they retired to their own works.
Meanwhile
Butler, taking advantage of the
Confederates in his front having been withdrawn to
Petersburg, sallied from behind his entrenchments and advanced towards the railroad, intending to tear it up.
Lee promptly prepared for him. The lines necessarily vacated by
Beauregard, when he had to fall back and defend
Petersburg, had already been taken possession of by the
Federals; but directly
Butler made his attempt,
Anderson was despatched with his corps from
Richmond to repulse him. This was done most effectively-
Pickett's division, the heroes of
Gettysburg, again making here an impetuous charge, capturing the breastworks of the enemy.
We may imagine how unfortunate
Butler was in his official announcement of great victories, for on the very day that he despatched that he had destroyed the communication with
Richmond,
Gen. Lee was sending, by the railroad, troops from the capital for the defence of
Petersburg.
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The result of all these engagements, which had cost
Grant, by an official calculation, 9,665 men, was that the
Confederates were still in firm possession of their works covering
Petersburg, and that
Grant was left no other resource than to proceed to envelop the town as far as possible without attacking fortifications.
The immediate operations of his army appear now to have degenerated to an attempt upon the railroads.
On the 22d an attempt was made by two divisions of cavalry to get possession of the Weldon railroad; but when a portion of the command had reached the Jerusalem plank-road,
A. P. Hill's corps and
Anderson's successfully encountered them, and drove them back with severe loss.
Gen. Wilson, however, succeeded in reaching the railroad at Ream's station, below where the combatants were engaged, and tore up some of the track.
Wilson, joined by
Kautz, then struck across to the Southside railroad, doing some damage, and finally came upon the
Danville track, having had a sharp engagement with a small Confederate force near Nottoway Court-house.
Continuing along the Danville railroad to the southwest, they arrived at the covered bridge over the
Staunton river, in the evening of the 24th.
Here a body of
Virginia and North Carolina militia met them, and after a brisk encounter
Wilson and
Kautz had to retire.
This was the limit of their raid.
They returned as rapidly as they could, but at Ream's station one thousand prisoners and all the enemy's artillery and trains were captured by a Confederate force under
Hampton and
Fitzhugh Lee.
Kautz's knowledge of the country enabled him to escape.
He, with his shattered command, reached camp on the 30th June, while
Wilson, with his men in wretched condition, did not arrive till next day.
North of
Richmond,
Grant's designs on the railroads were no more successful, and the expedition of
Sheridan already noticed as sent out to destroy the railroads between
Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley and
Lynchburg, had met with disaster, without accomplishing a single important result.
He had been intercepted at Trevillian station while moving on the
Gordonsville road; and reaching the latter place by a circuit, was twice repulsed by the infantry in the rifle-pits there, and pleading the “want of ammunition” was compelled to withdraw his command across the
North Anna and retreat to the
White House.
The month of June thus closed with
Lee master of the situation around
Richmond and
Petersburg.
In the same month there were other notable successes to strengthen the capital, and public attention was turned to events occurring in other parts of
Virginia, the result of which was to open the Shenandoah Valley, that famous avenue into the territory of the
North, and to afford
Gen. Lee the opportunity of an important diversion.
We shall see, indeed, that this ready and resourceful commander, with
Grant fully occupied in the south of
Virginia, was yet enabled quietly
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and skilfully to send another army of invasion into the
Northern States.
Operations West of the Blue Ridge.
At the last reference to operations west of the
Blue Ridge,
Gen. Hunter--the same who had made himself famous by his
negrophilism in the department of
Beaufort,
South Carolina-had taken command of the
Federal forces there, and was about to enter upon an enlarged campaign.
That campaign was dictated by
Grant.
It indicated the extension of the auxiliary movement against
Richmond to as many points as
Staunton,
Lynchburg,
Charlottesville and
Gordonsville — the general design being to cut the communications of
Richmond, in view of which
Hunter was to move on the point that best invited attack.
West of the
Blue Ridge the
Confederate force was small, disarranged, and altogether unequal to meet these formidable enterprises of the enemy.
It consisted of a few small brigades of inferiour cavalry, about two regiments of infantry, and a small brigade (
Vaughan's) of dismounted troops acting as infantry.
To supply the place of
Breckinridge, who had gone to the
Richmond arid
Petersburg lines,
McCausland's little force, from
Dublin, was sent to the front of
Staunton, and
Gen. William E. Jones was ordered to take all the troops he could move from
Southwestern Virginia to the same position in the lower valley.
Accordingly,
Gen. Jones not only got together all the infantry west of the
New River, but having dismounted
Vaughan's brigade of cavalry also, took all to
Staunton, leaving nothing in the extreme southwest but a few disjointed bodies of cavalry and
Morgan's command to meet
Burbridge, coming in from
Kentucky.
Gen. Hunter, having received his instructions from
Grant, immediately took up the offensive, and moving up the Shenandoah Valley, met
Jones' little command, on the 5th June, at
Piedmont.
Here the
Confederates were overpowered with the loss of more than one thousand prisoners, and of their commander, who, with hat in hand, was cheering his men when he fell, pierced through his head by a minie ball.
On the 8th,
Hunter formed a junction with
Crook and
Averill at
Staunton, from which place he moved, by way of
Lexington, direct on
Lynchburg.
He reached this place on the 16th June.
It now became necessary for
Gen. Lee to detach a considerable portion of his force to meet this distant demonstration of the enemy, and to select a commander, the decision, energy and rapidity of whose movements might overthrow
Hunter, and possibly make an opportunity to pass a column, however small, through the
Valley of Virginia to threaten the
Federal capital.
For this work
Gen. Early was selected.
He had latterly commanded
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Ewell's corps, and with the great portion of this, he moved rapidly iy the Orange and Alexandria railroad to
Lynchburg.
On the 18th June
Hunter made an attack on the south side of
Lynchburg, which was easily repulsed.
The next day the
Confederates attacked, drove him in confusion, took thirteen of his guns, pursued him to
Salem, and forced him to a line of retreat into the mountains of
Western Virginia.
Gen. Grant wrote: “Had
Gen. Hunter moved by way of
Charlottesville, instead of
Lexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would leave been in a position to have covered the Shenandoah Valley against the enemy, should the force he met have seemed to endanger it. If it did not, he would have been within easy distance of the
James River canal, on the main line of communication between
Lynchburg and the forces sent for its defence.”
As it was, no sooner did
Gen. Early ascertain that
Hunter was retreating by the way of the
Kanawha River, thus laying the Shenandoah Valley open for an expedition into
Maryland and
Pennsylvania, than he returned northward and moved down that valley.
While the Shenandoah Valley was thus opened,
Gen. John Morgan had done his part in breaking up the enemy's combination in
Western Virginia.
This adventurous cavalier — who had escaped from the
Ohio Penitentiary, and returned to active service — was operating in
Southwestern Virginia, when
Gen. Jones, commanding there, was ordered, with all the troops he could transport, to
Staunton, at the very time that
Southwestern Virginia was about to be invaded by
Burbridge.
Having no force to meet
Burbridge in front, it was resolved by
Morgan to dash boldly into the heart of
Kentucky, and thus draw the
Federal commander away.
This plan succeeded, but at the cost of the defeat of
Morgan's command.
With a force of little more than two thousand cavalry,
Gen. Morgan entered the
State of Kentucky through
Pound Gap.
On the 11th June he attacked and captured
Cynthiana, with its entire garrison.
On the 12th he was overtaken by
Burbridge, with a largely superiour force, and his command effectually dispersed, and finally driven front the
State.
This was the last important expedition ever commanded by
John Morgan; and we may add here some account of the tragical circumstances which suddenly and unexpectedly brought to a close the career of this extraordinary man, and which constitute a case of atrocious
murder, unparalleled in the records of any events which assume the title of civilized war. Driven from
Kentucky,
Gen. Morgan attempted a smaller scale of operations in
East Tennessee, and was next heard of near
Greenville.
He was here on the 3d September; the place lying on the great line of railroad from
Virginia to
Georgia by the way of
Knoxville, and nineteen miles distant from
Bull's Gap, where
Gen. Gillem was encamped with a brigade of Federal cavalry.
What now occurred, it is necessary to state with more particularity of detail than we have usually bestowed on the
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relation of single events, as the manner of
Gen. Morgan's death has been variously questioned, the enemy claiming that lie was killed in honourable combat.
The General established his headquarters at the house of
a Mrs. Williams, in the town of
Greenville.
His own brigade was sent on the road leading to
Rodgersville, for the purpose of getting forage, and a detachment of
Tennessee cavalry, six hundred strong, was ordered under
Col. Brad ford, to encamp on the road leading to
Bull's Gap, and to picket the road leading towards the enemy.
The country between
Greenville and the
Gap is hilly, and wild, and very poor.
Gen. Morgan's betrayal was at land from a quarter he had least expected.
lie had no sooner retired to rest than a woman, the daughter-in-law of
Mrs. Williams, mounted a horse, and, unnoticed, rode to the
Federal commander, and informed him of the prize within his reach.
Gillem immediately moved his command in the direction of
Greenville; when about five miles from town he halted and sent a detachment through the woods, and succeeded in getting on the flank of
Bradford's command, and driving him back from the road, leaving it open to
Greenville.
A detachment of four companies of the 13th Tennessee Cavalry was then sent forward to charge the town.
They met with no resistance.
The square on which
Mrs. W.'s house was situated was surrounded immediately.
The officers of
Morgan's staff being aroused by the couriers, of whom there were three or four at the front gate, rushed out and were captured one by one.
Gen. Morgan attempted to escape through the garden ; finding exit in that direction cut off, lie concealed himself among some grape vines.
He had no weapon at all,
Captain Rogers having one of his pistols, and one of his clerks the other.
While the officers of his staff and couriers were together under guard within twenty yards of his concealment, he necessarily heard the questions asked them and the threats made against them.
Seeing that there was no hope of successful concealment, lie came out and surrendered to
Capt. Wilcox, of the 13th Tennessee Cavalry, who had already both of
Morgan's pistols in his possession.
This captain sat on his horse and conversed with the
General for some time, and then rode off. A few minutes after lie left, a man named
Andrew Campbell, belonging to the
Federal cavalry referred to, rode up and presented his gun at
Gen. Morgan The General said: “For God's sake don't shoot me — I am a prisoner.”
The gun was fired and the
General fell.
The muzzle of the gun, a
Colt's army rifle, was within two feet of
Gen. Morgan's breast when it was discharged ; his clothing and his body were blackened with powder.
His murderer then dismounted and threw the
General's body across ]his horse, in front of the saddle, and rode about town shouting, “Here's your horse thief.”
When permission was given to sonic of
Gen. Morgan's officers to take possession of the body, they found it lying in the road.
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about one mile from the place where he had been shot.
It was so covered with mud that they could scarcely recognize it. The ball struck the centre of the breast, about three or four inches below its junction with the neck, and came out behind the hip bone.
The brave commander met his death as he met his foes a thousand times before; there was no shrinking — not a quiver of a nerve-though he saw murder in the brawny felon's eye. He fell, leaving to his countrymen a testimony of
Kentucky chivalry-the record of a gallant, dashing life and a fearless death.
Early's invasion of Maryland.
We left the situation in
Virginia with
Lee covering
Richmond and
Petersburg, and meditating a menace upon the
Federal capital.
No sooner was the defeat of
Hunter known, than the rapidity of a new movement became imperative, and not a moment was lost in pushing
Early's column towards
Maryland.
In spite of the prostrating heat, the troops made twenty miles a day, and the rumour of this determined advance came to the
Federal authorities, at the time when
Grant was supposed to be carrying everything before him. It was another illustration of
Gen. Lee's wonderful enterprise, and showed this commander to be one of the most daring as well as the most skilful
Generals of the age. That popular opinion which regarded
Lee as a good slow, prudent commander without
dash is one of the lowest and most imperfect estimates of his character.
We see now that when
Grant was hoping to suffocate him with numbers, he dared to detach a considerable portion of his army to threaten the capital of the enemy.
He was left at
Petersburg with only the corps of
A. P. Hill, two divisions of
Ewell's corps, and one division of
Longstreet's. But
Lee had rightly calculated that the diversion towards
Washington, coupled with the panic it would occasion, would weaken
Grant to a greater extent than himself, besides impressing him and the
Northern public with the extent and activity of his resources, and obtaining an important moral
It became necessary for
Grant at once to find troops to meet the new movement.
For this purpose the Sixth Corps was taken from the armies operating against
Richmond and sent up the
Chesapeake Bay to man the fortifications around
Washington, while orders were sent to hurry forward the forces of
Gen. Hunter from the
Ohio.
To the Sixth Corps was added the Nineteenth, which was under orders to proceed from the Gulf Department to the lines of
Virginia, and which was already debarking in
Hampton Roads.
The garrisons of
Baltimore and
Washington were at this time made up of heavy artillery regiments, hundred-days' men, and detachments
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from the invalid corps; and the rapidity of reinforcements was the important and critical concern.
On the 3d July,
Gen. Early approached
Martinsburg, accompanied by a cavalry force under
Ransom.
Gen. Sigel, who was in command of the
Federal forces there, retreated across the
Potomac at Shephardstown; and
Gen. Weber, commanding at
Harper's Ferry, crossed the river, and occupied
Hagerstown, moving a strong column towards Frederick City.
Meanwhile
Gen. “
Lew.”
Wallace, a commander much akin in character to “Beast”
Butler, and who had distinguished himself in
Baltimore by a cowardly ferocity and an easy prowess in the arrest and persecution of citizens, pushed out from that city with
Ricketts' division and his own command, and took a position at Monocacy Bridge.
Battle of Monocacy Bridge.
Gen. Early had pressed on, crossed the
Potomac, and, advancing to Frederick City, found it evacuated by the
Federal troops, and that the enemy had concentrated his forces at Monocacy Bridge, four miles distant. The Federals held the east bank of the river, which runs due north and south, and were drawn up along the railroad.
Early, having crossed the river south of the bridge, sent forward
Evans' brigade across an open field to develop the strength of the enemy.
It moved steadily under a heavy fire of musketry until within fifty yards of the enemy's position, when another body of Federals emerged from the woods on its right, and took it in flank.
The other forces of
Early were rapidly moved to the critical point; a simultaneous charge was made; and the enemy broke in shameful confusion, leaving the railroad and national pike, and retreating in the direction of
Gettysburg.
His losses were more than a thousand killed and wounded, and seven hundred prisoners.
From
Monocacy Gen. Early moved on
Washington, his cavalry advance reaching.
Rockville on the evening of the 10th July.
He was now within sight of
Washington, and the fire of the skirmishers was heard at the “
White House,” and in the department buildings of the capital.
The enormous march, however, had diminished his army.
The five hundred miles of incessant advance, at twenty miles a day, left him only eight thousand infantry, about forty field pieces and two thousand cavalry with which to assault the works around
Washington.
The most important of these works was
Fort Stevens.
On the 12th a severe skirmish, resulting from a reconnoissance, occurred in front of this fort; but
Gen. Early declined to follow it up, and, by a decisive blow, attempt the capture of
Washington.
Reflecting that he was in the heart of the enemy's country, and not knowing what force defended the capital,
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he abandoned his design upon it, and in the night of the 12th commenced his retreat.
There has been much question as to the extent of the danger to which
Washington was at this time exposed, and as to the merit of
Early's declination of attack.
Northern writers declare that if
Early had made a vigorous attack when he first came up, and not lost a day in a fruitless reconnoissance, it would have resulted in the capture of the city, so feebly was it then defended.
Fortunately we have some distinct evidence on this point.
Gen. Grant has testified that two divisions of the Sixth Corps, and the advance of the Nineteenth Corps had reached
Washington before
Early got there.
Whether it would have been prudent for
Early to match this force, while
Hunter was hastening from the
West to strike his rear, and cut him off from his only avenue of retreat across the
Potomac, is a question for the military critic to decide.
Gen. Early, having broke up his camp before
Washington, retreated, and with little molestation recrossed the
Potomac, and finally stood at bay on the
Opequon to protect the Shenandoah Valley.
The results of the expedition fell below public expectation at the
South, where again had been indulged the fond imagination of the capture of
Washington.
But the movement was, on the whole, a success;
Early brought off fire thousand horses and twenty-five hundred beef cattle; and the primary object of the march had been accomplished when he retreated and posted himself in the Shenandoah Valley--a standing threat to repeat the enterprise upon
Washington --for we shall see that it was no longer a mere detached column that opposed him, but an army of forty or fifty thousand men. To that extent
Gen. Grant had been weakened, and the heavy weight upon
Gen. Lee's shoulders lightened.
While
Early was detached from
Lee's lines,
Gen. Grant made what may be described as his last attempt to take
Petersburg by a
coup de main. There were three parts of the enterprise: an assault on the
Federal position on
Burnside's front; the explosion of a mine under an angle of the
Confederate works, to open the way to the attack; and a feint of operations on the north side of the
James, to deceive
Lee into sending away a portion of his troops.
In June a plan had been suggested by one of
Burnside's officers to excavate a tunnel under an angle of the
Confederate works that was covered by a six-gun battery.
On the 25th July the work was completed.
Its length was about five hundred feet, and at the end of the tunnel the mine was formed, running parallel with and directly under the fort that was to
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be destroyed.
On the 27th, the enormous quantity of 12,000 lbs. of powder was placed in the mine, fuses were constructed and connected with the magazine, and everything was in readiness for the grand explosion.
The mine was exploded between four and five o'clock in the morning of the 30th July.
An immense mass of dull, red earth was thrown two hundred feet in the air; human forms, gun-carriages, and small arms were mingled in what appeared to be a bank of clouds blazing with lightning; a great shock smote the ear, and the ground trembled as if by an appalling convulsion of nature.
Instantly, before the rumble of the explosion had died away, every piece of siege artillery on the enemy's line, and all the field artillery that could be brought into position opened as with the grand chorus of death.
With such an infernal display to strike terrour into the
Confederates and to demoralize men suddenly awakened from sleep, the Ninth Corps, fifteen thousand strong, marched out to attack, and complete what was thought to be an easy and certain victory.
But
Lee's soldiers were not men who could be fought after the Chinese fashion of assailing the ears with terrible sounds.
They were quickly prepared to meet the enemy.
The assaulting column, on reaching the scene of explosion, found that there had been opened here a huge crater, one hundred and fifty feet long, sixty feet wide, and from twenty-five to thirty deep.
It did not advance beyond it; instead of rushing forward and crowning the crest, the assailants made the most shameful exhibition of timidity; they huddled into the crater, they sought shelter there, and no commands or persuasions could move them further.
A division of negro troops was thrown into the crater-this maw of death; and for two hours the mingled mass of
white and
black troops, utterly demoralized, unable to pluck up courage to make a determined charge upon the crest, swayed to and fro in the hollow of the exploded earthworks, while the
Confederates were rapidly bringing up their artillery on the right and left of the crater to destroy the enemy before he could extricate himself from the disgraceful coil.
Once a feeble charge, in which the black troops were put in advance was made towards the crest.
It was encountered by
Mahone's brigade.
His men were ordered not to fire until they could see the whites of the negroes' eyes.
At the first volley delivered at this distance, the blacks broke; they were panic-stricken and past control; they rushed through the troops in the crater back to the original lines, while into this slaughter-pen the
Confederates now poured an incessant storm of bombs and shells.
Retreat across the open space in rear of it was to run the gauntlet of death.
The ground all around was dotted with the fallen; while the sides and bottom of the crater were literally lined with dead, the bodies lying in every conceivable position.
Some had evidently been killed with the butts of muskets, as their crushed skulls and badly smashed faces too plainly indicated; while the greater portion were shot, great pools of blood having
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flowed from their wounds and stained the ground.
In a few short hours of morning the enemy had lost between four and five thousand men, and had accomplished nothing.
“This miserable affair,” as
Gen. Grant himself was forced to entitle it appears to have been sufficient to satisfy him that he could not hope for the capture of
Petersburg from expedients, partial efforts and
coups de main, and that the task was one of magnitude far beyond his original comprehension.
His last spasmodic effort went far to persuade the
Northern public that his whole campaign was a failure, and that they had miscalculated the importance of his mere vicinity to the
Confederate capital, when
Gen. Lee had been able to hold
Petersburg against an attack combining so many elements of success, and that too after he had detached an important column into the valley of
Virginia, and sent five of his divisions to the north side of the
James.
The commentary of the New York
Times was logical and significant.
It said: “Under the most favourable circumstances, with the rebel force reduced by two great detachments, we failed to carry their lines.
Will they not conclude that the twenty-five thousand men that held
Grant in check are sufficient to garrison the works of Petersburg Will they not conclude that, if they were able thus to hold their own with the force of from eighteen to twenty thousand men sent to the north side of the
James River neutralized, this force is available for active operations elsewhere”
