[131] commander, Maj.-Gen. B. F. Butler, for his decision that the fort was impregnable; but we have the authoritative opinion of the Confederate commander, Col. Wm. Lamb, that this decision was absolutely necessary, and that the reason of the success of Maj.-Gen. A. H. Terry's second attack lay in the much more formidable character of the naval bombardment which preceded it, from seventy-five vessels instead of forty-one. Colonel Lamb emphatically said that ‘Admiral Porter was as much to blame as General Butler for the repulse.’1 The second and successful attack is vividly described by a Massachusetts officer, Capt. (now admiral) T. O. Selfridge, Jr., in the Century War Book, and it was one in which Massachusetts naval officers and sailors took an active part. ‘For the first time in the history of sieges,’ says Colonel Lamb, ‘the land defences of the works were destroyed, not by any act of the besieging army, but by the concentrated fire, direct and enfilading, of an immense fleet poured upon them without intermission, until torpedo wires were cut, palisades breached so that they actually afforded cover for assailants, and the slopes of the work were rendered practicable for assault.’2
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[131] commander, Maj.-Gen. B. F. Butler, for his decision that the fort was impregnable; but we have the authoritative opinion of the Confederate commander, Col. Wm. Lamb, that this decision was absolutely necessary, and that the reason of the success of Maj.-Gen. A. H. Terry's second attack lay in the much more formidable character of the naval bombardment which preceded it, from seventy-five vessels instead of forty-one. Colonel Lamb emphatically said that ‘Admiral Porter was as much to blame as General Butler for the repulse.’1 The second and successful attack is vividly described by a Massachusetts officer, Capt. (now admiral) T. O. Selfridge, Jr., in the Century War Book, and it was one in which Massachusetts naval officers and sailors took an active part. ‘For the first time in the history of sieges,’ says Colonel Lamb, ‘the land defences of the works were destroyed, not by any act of the besieging army, but by the concentrated fire, direct and enfilading, of an immense fleet poured upon them without intermission, until torpedo wires were cut, palisades breached so that they actually afforded cover for assailants, and the slopes of the work were rendered practicable for assault.’2
1 Century War Book, IV, 646. Colonel Lamb repeated this statement to the writer even more emphatically, at Saratoga, in September, 1895, and also emphasized the assertion made in the above narrative, namely, that General Butler had himself to blame for this unjust reproach, on account of an unduly boastful and premature letter sent by him to Admiral Porter, which Lamb calls ‘a piece of romance.’ Compare Gordon's War Diary, pp. 366, 370, which gives a graphic account, but which is undoubtedly unjust to General Butler. For some of the criticisms of naval men, see Ammen's The Old Navy and the New, p. 405 For General Sherman's remark that General Butler ‘crawfished off,’ see Cowley's Leaves from a Lawyer's Journal, p. 150. The stigma was unjust, according to Colonel Lamb's testimony. For many documents, see Official War Records, 87, pp. 963-1026. The latest English naval critic, after careful review of the dispute, says ‘It must be doubtful whether an assault would have succeeded at this date.’ Wilson's Ironclads in Action, I, 140.
2 Century War Book, IV, 654.
Boston, Wright & Potter, 1895-96.
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