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The civil history of the Confederate States

brig.-Gen. Clement A. Evans.

[248]

Clement A. Evans

[249]

Chapter 1:

North and South.

The settlement of 1850

South

Confederate States

the political history of the Confederate States of America somewhat distinctly begins in 1850 with ‘the Settlement’ of sectional agitation by the Compromise measures of that year, enacted by the Congress of the United States, approved by the President, confirmed by decisions of the Supreme court, endorsed in resolutions, political platforms and general elections by the people. The ‘Settlement’ thus solemnly ordained by and among the States composing the Union, became equal in moral and political force, to any part of the Constitution of the United States. Its general object was to carry out the preamble to the Constitution, viz.: ‘We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.’ Its avowed special object was to settle forever all the disturbing, sectional agitations concerning slave labor, so as to leave that question where the Constitution had placed it, subject to the operation of humanity, moral law, [250] economic law, natural law and the laws of the States. Its patriotic purpose was to eliminate sectionalism from the politics of the whole country.

Grave questions of sectional nature had arisen during the colonial period on which the colonies North and the colonies South divided by their respective sections. The original division of the British territorial possessions on the American continent into the geographical designations, North and South, occurred historically in the grants made by King James, 1606; the first to the London Company of the territory south of the 38th degree north latitude, and the other to the Plymouth Colony of the territory north of the 41st degree north latitude. Both grants extended westward to an indefinite boundary. The Plymouth Settlement afterward subdued the Dutch possessions lying to the south, thus including that territory in the general term North. The settlements of Delaware and Maryland covered the areas lying north of Virginia and they were embraced in the section termed South. The general line of division, somewhat indistinct, lay between the 38th and the 39th degrees north latitude. The Mason and Dixon line—39° 43′ 26″—was established by subsequent surveys and was designed to settle certain boundary disputes. In the eighteenth century the original partition of King James was changed by various grants and the English possessions were also extended far down the Atlantic coast by grants of the Carolinas and Georgia The original ‘Old South’ extended by all these grants along the Atlantic shore from the south line of Georgia to the north of Delaware, and westward from that wide ocean front certainly to the French possessions on the Mississippi river, including the territory of Virginia in the northwest and embracing a vast area of the best part of America; but by proper construction of these and other original charters which made the western limit ‘the South sea,’ meaning the Pacific ocean, the vast domain of the Old South embraced also [251] all Texas and much of the territory acquired from Mexico.

The rivalry of the colonies included in these two sections in their struggle for population, commerce, wealth and general influence in American affairs, arose early and continued during the century preceding the American Revolution, each section becoming accustomed to a geographical and sectional grouping of colonies and each striving to advance its own local interests. Thus the colonies of both sections grew robustly as separate organizations into the idea of free statehood, but at the same time fostered the dangerous jealousies of sections. The sectional spirit grew alongside the development of colonial statehood. The colonies north became a group of Northern States, and the colonies south a group of Southern States

The conflict with Great Britain, which had been long impending, brought the sections together in a common cause as against the external enemy, but the achievement of the independence of the several colonies was accompanied by the quick return of the old antagonism which had previously divided them into geographic sections. The loose Union, which had been created pending the Revolutionary war, through Articles of Confederation, was found inefficient to control or even to direct the irrepressible conflict of opposing or emulating interests. Hence the Constitution of the United States was substituted for the Articles of Confederation and ‘a more perfect Union’ was ordained, expressly to prevent or at least to modify sectional conflicts by the constitutional pledge to promote domestic tranquillity and provide for the general welfare.

During all these struggles of the colonies among themselves, caused by commercial rivalries, the slavery of any part of the population was not the cause of dangerous disagreement anywhere. The British colonies were all slave-holding. Negroes were bought and sold in Boston [252] and New York as well as in Richmond or Savannah. The Declaration of Independence, written by Jefferson, who was opposed to slavery, and concurred in by the committee of which Adams, Sherman, Livingston and Franklin, all Northern men, were members, made no declaration against slavery and no allusion to it, except to charge the King of Great Britain with the crime of exciting domestic insurrection. In framing the Constitution all sectional differences, including the subject of slavery, were compromised. ‘The compromises on the slavery question inserted in the Constitution were,’ as Mr. Blaine correctly remarks, ‘among the essential conditions upon which the Federal government was organized.’ （Twenty Years, vol. 1, p. 1.)

Sectional conflicts, subsequent to the formation of the Constitution from which the Union resulted, were also mainly caused by similar commercial rivalries and ambitions for political advantage. The maintenance of the political equilibrium between the North and the South occupied at all times the anxious thought of patriotic statesmen. In the contests which threatened this equality slavery was not the only nor at first the main disturbing cause. It was not the question in the war of 1812 upon which the States were divided into sections North and South, nor in the purchase of Louisiana Territory, as the debates show; the real ground of opposition being the fear that this vast territory would transfer political power southward, which was evidenced by Josiah Quincy's vehement declaration of his ‘alarm that six States might grow up beyond the Mississippi.’ Nor was the acquisition of Florida advocated or opposed because of slavery. The tariff issue, out of which the nullification idea arose, was decidedly on a question of just procedure in raising revenue, and not on slavery. The question was made suddenly and lamentably prominent in the application of Missouri to be admitted into the Union, but the agitation which then threatened the peace of the [253] country was quelled by the agreement upon the dividing line of 36° 30′. ‘The Missouri question marked a distinct era in the political thought of the country, and made a profound impression on the minds of patriotic men. Suddenly, without warning, the North and the South found themselves arrayed against each other in violent and absorbing conflict.’ The annexation of Texas was urged because it increased the area of the Union, and was opposed because its addition to the States gave preponderance to the South.

Thus it is seen that the early sectional rivalries had no vital connection with slavery, and it will appear that its extinction will not of itself extinguish the fires that have so long burned between North and South. The great American conflict began through a geographical division of America made by the cupidity of an English king. It was continued for financial, economic, commercial and political reasons. A false idea of duality—a North and South—in the United States has been deeply rooted in the American mind.

To understand the causes which produced the Confederate States of America, all the various incidents which successively agitated the fears of either section that the other would gain an advantage, must be held steadily in view. This sectional ambition to secure and maintain the preponderance of political power operated through various incidents in colonial times, then in those which attended the formation of the Constitution, also in subsequent incidents—such as the location of the capital; the appropriations of money for internal improvements; the war of 1812; the acquisition of Southern territory; the tariff issue and the distribution of government offices and patronage. One after another of these controversies subsiding, a period approached when slavery itself became the main incident of this long-continued sectional rivalry. Slavery, on coming so conspicuously into notice as to be the main ground of contention between North [254] and South, was, therefore, regarded as the chief distraction to be removed by the settlement effected in 1850.

Briefly stating the case in 1850, let it be considered that the old sectional differences on account of commercial rivalry and political supremacy had at length become hostilities, which for the first time seriously threatened the Union of the States. Let it also be understood that the agitation which immediately preceded the settlement of 1850 was caused directly by differences of views as to the proper disposition of the national institution of slavery.

The statesmen of 1850 knew the following facts: The United States had indorsed the existence of slavery and authorized the importation of enslaved Africans; the colonies, separately acting previous to their Union, had established the institution in their labor systems. The European governments which held paramount authority over the colonies had originated it. The chiefs of African tribes enforced it by their wars, and profited by it in the sale of their captives to foreigners. The world at large practiced it in some form. Thus the African kings, the governments of Europe and America, the ship owners, slave traders, speculators and pioneers of the New World conspired to initiate a wrong, from which a retribution at length followed, in which the innocent slave with his last Southern owner suffered more than all the guilty parties who had profited by his bondage.

The hardy and adventurous settlers in the American colonies permitted themselves after occasional protests, such as occurred in Virginia, and afterward in Georgia, to be seduced into the buying of negroes from the artful and avaricious slave traders of England, Holland and New England. The importations, however, were few, because the European possessions in the semi-tropics were the first takers of this species of property. Tidings of the evils of the system in its barbarous stages, and stories all too true of the horrors of the middle passage aboard [255] the ships of the inhuman slave importers, made the colonies reluctant to engage in the traffic. Nevertheless, the colonies experimented with this form of labor, Massachusetts beginning in 1638 and South Carolina thirty three years later, and the conclusion was reached before the close of the eighteenth century that the slavery system of labor could be made useful in some latitudes, but could not be made profitable in all sections of America. Therefore, Massachusetts, following a Canadian precedent, abolished slavery after being a slave holding State over a hundred years, and soon after the American Revolution several States in the higher latitudes, all included in the old North Section of the original Plymouth colony, adopted the same policy.

But it will be observed that generally this Northern abolition was to take effect after lapse of time, and thus notice was given to the owners sufficient to enable them, if so disposed, to sell their property to purchasers living farther South who still found such labor remunerative. Some availed themselves of this privilege and converted their slaves into other more productive property. Some were conscientious or were attached to their negroes and, therefore, cheerfully gave them freedom. Others were philanthropic enough to keep the old and infirm, who on reaching liberation would be cared for by the State, only selling the young and the strong for a good price. Through these sales and the continuance of the slave trade, both foreign and domestic, the people in the Southern States were induced to invest their money largely in negroes, thus greatly increasing the population of that class within the boundaries of those States.

In all these changes of the labor system—this abolishing of slavery in several States—the moral side of the question does not appear to have had the uppermost consideration. The moral question certainly did have influence in Massachusetts and to some extent in other States; but the main reason for this early emancipation [256] was the commercial and social disadvantages of slavery. As the South is said to have been awakened to the immorality and the blighting hindrances of slavery to its prosperity, after emancipation was enforced by armies, so the North saw the same immorality and general hurt to the Union only after proofs of the unprofitableness of the institution to that section. Both sections abolished slavery under duress—one under duress of unprofitableness, the other VI et armis.

The law of profit and loss controlled the origin and extension of slavery; sectional rivalries seized upon it as an incident in the strife for supremacy; political party purpose at length found it to be an available means to partisan successes, and the moral side of it shone forth upon the whole nation only after a bloody war between the old sections. Eyes were opened by the shock of battle. The moral sense stood godfather to ‘military necessity.’

At the organization of the United States, slave-holding was legal everywhere in the Union except in Massachusetts, because at that time it bore some profit everywhere. It is a suggestion of Mr. Greeley in his American Conflict ‘that the importation of Africans in slave ships profited New England;’ the labor of the slaves thus imported at a profit was valuable to their owners who bought them from the slave traders, and also to the manufacturers and sellers of the products of their toil. Trading in human flesh was, therefore, insisted on as a proper business demanding constitutional enforcement for twenty years. The following States voted for the continuance of the slave trade for twenty years until 1808: New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia. The following voted nay: New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware and Virginia.

Slave labor, therefore, must be treated historically as [257] an institution sustained by the Constitution of the United States; the domestic trade in slaves, as a business sanctioned by that august instrument; and the foreign slave trade—to which the chief ignominy of the institution attaches—as a traffic expressly protected against the wishes of the majority of the States holding slaves. Each State was left by the Constitution with full power to dispose of the institution as it might choose, and the territory acquired as common property was open to settlement by slave-holders with their property. The African bondsman was classed as property by United States law. He was property to be acquired, held, sold, delivered on bills of sale which evidenced title. He could be bequeathed, donated, sold as part of an estate, or for debt, like any other property. The Federal and State governments derived revenue from his labor. For over a century the Southern States were encouraged to invest in him and his race as property. Not one government, European, Asian or African, declared against the enslavement of the negro by the United States; and not one State among those which had fought together to gain a common independence of England refused to enter the Union on account of the constitutional recognition and encouragement of the institution. If there be any wrong in all their action, the South was not more responsible for it than their Northern associates in what has been called the great crime of the United States.

The evils of slavery, its wrong of any character, moral or political, were the result of an international cooperative action, and of an agreement among the States of the Union, the original motive of which was the cupidity of powerful African tribes and Caucasian slave dealers with the subsequent motive of profit and loss to the buyer. Such being its historical origin, it will be seen that the subsequent effort to destroy it was not mainly moral but partisan, and that the blow which struck it down fell on the lawful holders of inherited property, and was struck [258] by the people of the Old World and the New, whose ancestors first inflicted the great wrong against humanity.

The labor of the negro being more profitable in the mild climate, and on the more fertile and cheaper land of the South, his transference from the bleaker clime and less generous as well as higher priced soil of New England became commercially inevitable. The negro became unsalable where he was at first enslaved. He brought a good price south of 36° 30′, and hence by the course of interstate commerce many thousands (not all, but thousands) of this class of national property changed owners as well as States, the original masters taking the purchase money to reinvest in land, merchandise, factories, stocks and bonds or other prudent ventures, while the new master invested in the coerced labor which cut down his forests and tilled his soil, holding the laborer ‘bound to service’ under the laws of his State made pursuant to the Constitution of the United States.

The same commercial considerations which induced the enslavement of the unfortunate African caused his sale and removal from those sections of the Union where his enslavement was found to be unprofitable and his presence at least a social inconvenience. Accordingly the steady deportation of the race southward began during the close of the eighteenth century and was accelerated through the early years of the nineteenth century. The slave market was opened in the city of Washington and other Southern cities. Traders bought in Northern markets and sold for profit in the Southern. The domestic slave trade was thus inaugurated to compete with the African slave trade then in full blast and which could not be suppressed by any Southern State until the year 1808. Now and then a Southern State endeavored to hinder the infamous traffic, but the ship owners and slave traders were shielded by the supreme law of the land. The United States government was meanwhile entitled to revenue at the rate of $10 for each imported [259] African. All the powers of the Union were put in operation to induce the people of the Southern States to invest their capital in this species of property. From this review of the slavery evil, it appears that the States in the South cannot be charged with the responsibility of its introduction, nor for the continuance of the slave trade, nor for the extension of it by the increase of negro population in the South, nor for the agitations which on this account disturbed the harmony of the sections, nor for the bloody mode adopted for its extinction.

Jefferson Davis said: ‘War was not necessary to the abolition of slavery. Years before the agitation began at the North and the menacing acts to the institution, there was a growing feeling all over the South for its abolition. But the abolitionists of the North, both by publications and speech, cemented the South and crushed the feeling in favor of emancipation. Slavery could have been blotted out without the sacrifice of brave men and without the strain which revolution always makes upon established forms of government. I see it stated that I uttered the sentiment, or indorsed it, that “slavery is the corner stone of the Confederacy.” That is not my utterance.’ ‘It is not conceivable,’ said General Stephen D. Lee, in 1897, ‘that the statesmen of the Union were incompetent to dispose of slavery without war.’

It will become clear to any who will conservatively reflect on the conditions existing at the beginning of the present century, that if the opposition to slavery had been firmly based on the principle that it was a violation of the first law of human brotherhood, and also on its breach of the economic principle that enforced labor should not compete with the labor of the free citizen—if the appeal for its discontinuance had been made to the public conscience and the private sense of right, and the just claims of honest free labor, the institution would have passed away in less than a generation from the date of the Declaration of Independence. Had all the New [260] England States, with all other Northern slave-holding States, in 1776 (following the course of Massachusetts) abolished slavery without the sale of a single slave; had the slave trade been discontinued as the Southern States (except Georgia and South Carolina) desired; had the views of Virginia, Kentucky and North Carolina been fostered and made effective by Northern hearty cooperation, it is entirely reasonable to believe that the freedom of all the slaves would have been rapidly secured.

An emancipation measure was proposed in the Virginia Legislature as late as 1832 and discussed. The general course of the debate shows a readiness in that day to give freedom to negroes, and was of such strength that a motion to postpone with a view to ascertain the wishes of the people was carried by a vote of 65 to 58. In Delaware, Maryland and Kentucky legislation leading to emancipation had already been under consideration. North Carolina and Tennessee contained large populations of whites averse to slavery, and no doubt exists as to the action of those States at any time during the first years of the century. The Louisiana and Florida purchase and the Texas annexation having not yet taken place, and nearly the entire West and Southwest being a wild, the question of emancipation with moderate com sensation would have easily prevailed through the South. The barrier in the beginning was the profitable sale of the slaves from Northern States, and from the slave trade carried on in the ships of foreign nations and New England, and the commercial advantage of the trade in the products of slave labor.

The interests of all Southern States except South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana, only thirty years prior to the election of Lincoln, lay on the side of emancipation. The first named States were alone dependent for their development on the labor of the slave, and even in those States only their southern areas demanded slave labor. The northern parts of these [261] five States were even then better adapted to free white labor. In the light of the years which close this century, it is seen that no part of the South was dependent on slave labor, and that such supposed dependence was imaginary, not real. Therefore, it may be fairly inferred from the sentiment of the South in the beginning of this century, from the conditions of labor and commerce then existing, from the political considerations then at work, the South, in the first years of this century, would have begun the emancipation of its slaves upon a plan of compensation to the owner, justice to the negro and safety to society, had not the interests of other sections demanded the continuance of the domestic and foreign trade in man.

The period of twenty years granted by the Constitution for the continuance of the slave trade, was occupied actively in the importation of Africans throughout the Atlantic Southern States. During the same period the invention of the cotton gin increased vastly the commercial value of negro labor, not only to the producer, but most of all to the shipper and manufacturer of cotton. As a consequence, ‘the prosperity and commercial importance of a half dozen rising communities, the industrial and social order of a growing empire, the greatest manufacturing interest of manufacturing England, a vast capital, the daily bread of hundreds of thousands of free artisans, rested on American slavery.’ This new condition occurred at the period when the South was protesting against the African slave trade, and was exhibiting an increasing willingness to continue the emancipation movement, which had previously extended southward as far as Delaware, and had induced Virginia to include the anti-slavery clause in its great cession of Northwestern Territory. But the outlook of the cotton trade and the immense business arising from the increased production and manufacture of the staple were so beneficial to vast numbers in England and the United [262] States, that the emancipation sentiment died down under the pressure of commercial considerations not only in the Cotton States, but also in the manufacturing and commercial centers of the world. （Greg's History, 351.) After the year 1808 (cessation of the legalized slave trade) the national increase of the enslaved race exceeded in percentage that of any free people on earth. Freed from care, fed, clothed and sheltered for the sake of their labor, protected from hurtful indulgence and worked with regularity—the physical conditions were all favorable to increase in numbers, stature, longevity and strength. It is clearly just to admit that such an improvement in the race imported from the African wilds undoubtedly proves the humanity with which these captured bondsmen were treated by the people of the United States.

It was this commercial value of the slave to the Southern planters of cane, cotton, rice and tobacco, and to the Northern and European shippers, manufacturers, merchants and operatives—a value caused by the crude, elementary materials of wealth which negro labor produced —a value that grew in great proportions for commerce—a value that began to assume political importance because of the power that it gave the slave-holding States—it was this factor which on the one hand blinded many in all sections to those moral and economic fallacies on which African slavery really rested, and on the other hand finally excited political jealousy and sectional fears of the power which the Southern section might acquire in the control of the Union. [263]

Chapter 2:

Agitation and settlement.

First organized attack

Union

South

the first agitation of the slavery question as a ground of controversy, distinctly separated from all other questions, appears immediately after the settlement of the tariff issue between the State of South Carolina and the administration of President Andrew Jackson. It must be observed that this original agitation was professedly and doubtless really based on the moral and humane, not the political aspects of the question. At least this political aspect affected very limited localities. The first organized movement was by the formation of an anti slavery society in Boston in the year 1832, in which the leader was Mr. William Lloyd Garrison, and of which his newspaper, the Liberator, was the organ. Mr. Garrison must ever be regarded as a sincere extremist whose principal thought regarding slavery was correct, but who was not qualified for leadership in a movement involving such great consequences as the emancipation of millions of slaves. It is sometimes said [264] that he was ahead of his age, but, in fact, he was more than thirty years behind the spirit of an age when a true leader sustained by the States which first abolished slavery would have secured an influential following in nearly every slave-holding State. His doctrine of the immediate and uncompromising abolition of slavery in the precise period of its agitation by the anti-slavery societies, was declared impracticable by the vast majority of his own people in New England, and he suffered no modification of his plan. He had left the South where he should have remained, and made the vain attempt to revolutionize Northern action by the force of moral suasion. His peaceable moral policy and his submission to the authority of a Constitution which he despised, and to a Union which he derided, are creditable to his conscientious feeling, but his blindness to the powerful hold which slavery had on the New England money power and the general Northern politician is apparent. For about six years, from 1833 to 1839, he was able to hold his followers together compactly organized, although few in numbers, but divisions began to take place, fomented by men who saw no practical result in moral suasion, and whose ambition moved them to take the slavery question into the arena of politics. The Liberty party was accordingly formed by seceders from the Garrison following, and the inflammable question now threw its political shadow before the coming events of American history. His own society retained existence as the center of moral agitation. From 1843 to 1865 he was its earnest and honest president, constantly opposing slavery at every turn, and finally going fully into the bloody war against the South.

In the new turn now given to the agitation of slavery, a class of politicians secured seats in Congress who used their privileges in order to transfer the agitation from the platform, the pulpit and the press, to the great legislative body created by the Constitution. The beginning [265] of the political aggression was made under cover of the sacred right of petition, secured by a special clause of the Constitution and regarded by the people as an inalienable right which should not be abridged. With this instrument in hand the agitators placed before Congress and the country their views of slavery in an insulting form, accompanied by hinted threats should their petitions be denied. Such petitions began with the preamble, ‘Whereas, Slavery is an abomination and slave holders accursed before God and man * * * your petitioners respectfully entreat, etc.’ Calhoun declared that such petitions were libels on himself, his State and his country, and demanded that they should be rejected on account of their insulting terms. Jackson agreed with Calhoun. Congress saw the injustice thus attempted through the exercise of the right of petition and passed a series of resolutions virtually condemning the introduction of petitions of that nature. But the agitators seized upon the popular reverence for the ‘right of petition,’ and, denouncing the action of the House as ‘gagging resolutions,’ fired New England afresh in opposition to what was called the arrogance of the Slaveholding Oligarchy.

The agitation of the slavery question under the auspices of the anti-slavery societies and the Liberal party met with little favor throughout the North, although it served an end in producing irritation in the South. In 1848 the Free Soil candidate for the presidency polled less than 7,000 votes, and the purposes of the agitators were very bitterly denounced. The annexation of Texas, advocated by Calhoun, opposed by Clay and hesitatingly objected to by Van Buren, was bitterly assailed by the Free Soilers because the acquisition of the Republic would increase largely the area of the slavehold-ing South. Yet with all the power of this special objection pressed upon the Northern States, the total strength of the fanatics shown in 1844 in thirteen States, all North, was less than 60,000 votes. [266]

The election of Mr. Polk, in 1844, to the presidency, was a decisive verdict of the people in favor of the annexation of Texas, the chief reason of which, as stated by statesmen of the period, probably was that it was wiser to annex Texas and incur war with Mexico than to abandon that rich empire to the control of England. The question of slavery was not so seriously involved as to be the sole reason why the South wanted it, or to override in the North the great considerations of public policy involved in this indispensable addition to the area of the Union.

But, unfortunately, the North began to suspect that all the annexation measures of 1844 were scarcely anything more than a purpose of ‘the slave power’ to acquire territory in order to add more slave States to the Union ‘As soon as this impression or suspicion got abroad, the effect was an anti-slavery revival, which enlisted the feelings and influenced the political action of many who had never sympathized with the Abolitionists, and of many who had steadily opposed them.’ （Blaine, 1, 42.) Leading politicians seized on this suspicion and made the most of it for creating public sentiment North against any extension of the territorial limits of the United States in Southern latitudes. Among these were men of great astuteness, such as John Quincy Adams, Seward, Wade, Giddings, Thaddeus Stevens, Hale, Hamlin and Wentworth. Through their exertions political party lines began to break down in the Northern States. Slavery and anti-slavery wings appeared in the two great political parties, Whig and Democratic.

In fact, Southern statesmen were simply striving to maintain the sectional equilibrium which had so long been the policy. With only three States anticipated from the great Northwest, it was the evident expectation of the Southern men who then (1844) had control of the government, that if war with Mexico should ensue, the result would inevitably be the acquisition of suffident [267] territory to form Slave States south of the line of the Missouri Compromise as rapidly as Free States could be formed north of it, and that in this way ‘the ancient equality of North and South could be maintained.’ （Blaine, vol. I, 46-7.)

As soon as it became evident that new territory additional to Texas would be acquired as the result of the Mexican war, the anti-slavery agitation appeared suddenly, August 8, 1846, in a proviso offered by Wilmot to the bill for appropriation of $2,000,000, designed to be used in concluding a peace with Mexico, that ‘neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall ever exist therein.’ ‘This Wilmot Proviso absorbed the attention of Congress for a longer time than the Missouri Compromise; it produced a wider and deeper excitement in the country and it threatened a more serious danger to the peace and integrity of the Union. The consecration of the territory of the United States to freedom became from that day a rallying cry for every shade of anti-slavery sentiment. If it did not go as far as the Abolitionists, in their extreme and uncompromising faith might demand, it yet took a long step forward and afforded the ground on which the battle of the giants was to be waged and possibly decided.’ Mr. Webster, who voted for the proviso with evident reluctance, said: ‘All I can scan is contention, strife, agitation. The future is full of difficulties and full of dangers. We appear to be rushing on headlong and with our eyes all open.’ After several vicissitudes the Wilmot Proviso was defeated.

In the progress of these sectional discussions in Congress, a noteworthy vote was taken on the motion of Mr. Douglas to insert in the bill to organize a territorial government for Oregon, a clause ‘that the line of 36° 30′, known as the Missouri Compromise line, approved March 6, 1820, be, and the same is hereby, declared to extend to the Pacific ocean.’ Mr. Douglas said significantly that ‘the compromise therein effected is hereby [268] revived and declared to be of full force and binding for the future organization of territories of the United States in the same sense and with the same understanding with which it was originally adopted.’ （Cong. Globe.) This proposition to revive the Missouri Compromise so as to make it effective in settling the disputes on slavery by extending the line from ocean to ocean, was resisted in the Senate by 21 Northern senators and defeated in the House by 114 members, every vote except one against the pacific measure being from the Northern States. The record shows the abandonment of the Missouri Compromise on August 12, 1848. ‘On that day it fell and was buried in the Senate, where it had originated twenty-eight years before, but had never quieted the Abolitionists a day. It fell, too, not by Southern, but by Northern votes. The very State to which it owed its paternity struck the last decisive blow.’ （A. H. Stephens Hist., 1, 173.) The treaty with Mexico was finally made, through which the territory acquired passed to the United States with no specific provisions restrictive of slavery, and was ratified in 1847 by the United States Senate. The brilliant war was concluded with great advantages to the country, fortunately with a temporary check upon the sectional aggressions which had threatened the domestic peace. The presidential canvass of 1848 was conducted upon lines which were drawn to avoid complication with the slavery question. Zachary Taylor became a candidate almost solely on the renown acquired in the recent war and was successful over Cass, who was handicapped by the unfriendliness of Van Buren. For local political reasons solely, the faction of the New York Democracy known as Barnburners, openly revolted and led in an antislavery agitation, which soon involved prominent politicians of all parties. The Barnburners, the anti-slavery Whigs and the old Abolitionists co-operated with apparent harmony under the general name of the Free Soil [269] party. Van Buren was their nominee for the presidency and Charles Francis Adams for the vice-presidency. Seward, Greeley and Thurlow Weed, on account of dislike to Van Buren, the anti-slavery candidate, supported Taylor with such earnestness and skill as to carry New York and thus make Taylor president. Webster took decided ground for Taylor and Clay came also to his support. The contest between Cass and Van Buren finally became in New York, in a very large degree, a struggle between Democratic factions in which the anti-slavery feeling was ‘an instrumentality to be temporarily used and not a principle to be permanently upheld.’ This truth, stated by an eminent New England statesman, may be held in mind as evidence that the issues of 1848 did not honestly involve any principle on the slavery question. No moral, or economic, or social principle prevailed, but almost entirely the conflict occurred in New York State, especially on the lower fields of local politics. Van Buren, the nominee of the anti-slavery party, had no moral convictions on slavery. His record was such as to provoke the distrust of the anti-slavery Whigs. The Democrats of New York sustained him because he was the leader of a State faction in their party. The Barnburners against the Hunkers was the real issue, and the prize contended for was not freedom for the slave, but supremacy of a faction in the politics of a State. Truthful history will hold this to have been the chief object of the struggle with many who vowed allegiance at Buffalo to an anti-slavery creed strong enough to satisfy Joshua R. Giddings and Charles Sumner. With Cass defeated and the Marcy side of the party severely disciplined, the great mass of the Van Buren host of 1848 were ready to disavow their political escapade at Buffalo.

Analysis of the political issues and elections of 1848 clearly discloses the subordination of the great slavery question to the demands of personal antagonisms. Conceding [270] that the question was of the great importance insisted on not two years later and made the basis of a vast political organization scarcely a half decade later, it must appear as singular that it should be so much ignored in this campaign. The suddenness with which this question leaped in several instances into fierce agitation and as suddenly subsided, and the fact that in every instance the excitement arose when a possible advantage in political and commercial power might be gained by the southward side of the Union, betrays the insanity of the agitation and its want of moral and patriotic principle.

The ‘public policy’ outlined by Taylor, the Presidentelect from the South, in the beginning of the administration, March, 1849, indicated the national conservative spirit. In his cabinet were such Southerners as Reverdy Johnson, John M. Clayton, George W. Crawford and William Ballard Preston. Nothing in the general political canvass of 1848 had indicated any certain early dangerous uprising of the old sectional dispute. A great stretch of new territory, spreading from the Gulf of Mexico northward to an undefined boundary and westward to the Pacific ocean, lay open to occupancy, subject to the opera tion of the Constitution and the laws regulating the creation of territorial and State governments. Sectional political ascendency might be sought and determined by the settlements effected within this common property by the Union, but if fairly done there could be no complaint. Even if the line of 36° 30′ with its prohibitory principle should be extended to the Pacific ocean, as Southern congressmen had voted for, there would still remain a great territory that could be included within the old Southern section. Above that line the South then proposed to make no effort to introduce the labor of slaves. Below that line which had been agreed on in the Missouri Compromise, the Southern States thought they had, under a compact, the conceded right to employ slave labor until newly formed States should decide upon its [271] use or disuse. Southern statesmen believed that the prohibition north of 36° ,30′ was extra-constitutional, and agreed to it strictly as a compromise in order to abate agitation, cement the Union and leave slavery to work out its own problem. With these views uppermost in mind the elections of 1848 had progressed in favor of a patriotic adjustment of the question of sectional equilibrium. Upon that idea Taylor's administration began.

But a rush for the gold of California in 1848 precipitated a peculiar population into that territory which poured in from the autumn of that year so rapidly as to acquire immediate civil government. These spirited adventurers, determining on political organization of some sort, convened, organized a State government, prohibited slavery by their constitution and prepared to apply for immediate admission into the Union. President Taylor recommended the admission of the State of California, and the continuance of New Mexico under the existing military government.

In the Congress of 1848-9 were Clay, Webster, Cass, Benton, Calhoun, Houston, Foote, Douglas, Jefferson Davis, Seward, Chase, Bell, Berrien, W. R. King, Hale, Hamlin, Badger, Butler of South Carolina, Mason, Hunter, Soule, Dodge, Fremont, Toombs, Stephens, and other statesmen of experience and ability to whom may be appropriately added Millard Fillmore, President of the Senate.

The question of sectional preponderance came again into hot discussion as suddenly as it had done on former occasions. But the conflict was fiercer and for a time seemed uncontrollable. Slave labor in the new territory was made the main incident of the gigantic battle. Slavery in general soon became the prominent subject of angry debate. The South found itself pressed to defend its hold upon the institution at all points. The line of North and South became again as distinctly apparent as the long and lofty crest of the Alleghany and Blue Ridge [272] mountains. In the contest for speakership, only 20 scattering votes out of 221 in the House of Representatives had indicated the presence of any decided aggressive anti-slavery sentiment in Congress. But now, within a month afterward, the Congress and the country were again arrayed sectionally into Northern and Southern opponents. Henry Clay, as the recognized representative of conservative sentiment—a Southerner from the middle western border State of Kentucky—came forward promptly in January, 1850, to offer terms of settlement. His warmly expressed patriotic purpose was to effect ‘an amicable arrangement of all questions in controversy between the free and slave States growing out of the subject of slavery.’ Moved by this spirit, the great Kentucky statesman presented in January, 1850, a series of resolutions covering the admission of California, territorial government for the territories acquired from Mexico; the Texas boundary—the appropriation of ten millions to Texas for payment of its debt; the abolition of the slave trade in the District of Columbia, and a law for rendition of fugitive slaves.

Mr. Clay's plan of settlement differed from that of Taylor, and his administration actively opposed it. Benton vigorously assailed the scheme. Calhoun at first opposed the plan of Clay and was supported in the opposition by Seward, the leader of the administration. Mr. Calhoun, in the course of an elaborate speech, said: ‘How can the Union be saved? There is but one way by which it can with any certainty, and that is by a full and final settlement on the principle of justice of all the questions at issue between the two sections.’ Mr. Webster made his great Union speech on the 7th of March, 1850, taking ground against Congressional restriction as to slavery in the territories, thereby offending a large portion of his constituency. Mr. Toombs, replying to the charge that the Southern members opposed the admission of California because its constitution [273] prohibited slavery, said: ‘We do not oppose California on account of the anti-slavery clause in her constitution. It was her right, and I am not even prepared to say she acted unwisely in its exercise. That is her business; but I stand upon the great principle that the South has right to an equal participation in the territories. I claim the right for her to enter all with her property and securely to enjoy it. She will divide with you if you wish it, but the right to enter all or divide I shall never surrender.’ Mr. Toombs stated the general Southern idea in the words—‘the right to enter all or divide,’ by which he meant the right of each section to enter with recognized property all the territories, or a division of the territories on the old line of 36° 30′, or any fair and equal partition. Mr. Jefferson Davis and Mr. Douglas worked together to secure a Congressional declaration against Congressional restriction on the local action of territories, and succeeded in securing an agreement to a motion to that effect made by Mr. Norris, of New Hampshire. Mr. Green, of Missouri, proposed the recognition of the old Missouri Compromise line through all the new territory, but his proposition was rejected. Mr. Stanton, of Tennessee, then asked for a law that the admission of no State out of territory south of 36° 30′ should be objected to because its constitution authorized slavery, which was refused by nearly an exclusively sectional vote. At this juncture Mr. Soule, of Louisiana, proposed a test vote by an amendment to Utah Territorial bill simply declaring that Utah shall be received into the Union with or without slavery as its constitution may prescribe at the time of its admission. This raised the question whether under any circumstances, another State authorizing the use of slave labor would be allowed to emerge from the Territorial into State government. It has been said that the fate of the compromise, with all its happy consequences, rested at that hour on one man. That man was the august Senator [274] from Massachusetts—Daniel Webster. Upon his speech, and, as Mr. Stephens says, ‘even on his vote,’ the great issue hung suspended. The great patriot announced his conviction that this simple constitutional proposition should pass, closing his speech with words worthy of being heard still throughout the Union. ‘Sir, my object is peace. My object is reconciliation. My purpose is not to make up a case for the North or to make up a case for the South. My object is not to continue useless and irritating controversies I am against agitators North and South; I .am against local ideas North and South, and against all narrow and local contests. I am an American, and I know no locality in America. That is my country. My heart, my sentiments, my judgment demand of me that I should pursue such a course as shall promote the good and the harmony and the Union of the whole country. This I shall do, God willing, to the end of the chapter.’ The vote was taken, and the amend ment of Soule was adopted in the Senate by a vote representing two-thirds of the States.

President Taylor's death in July, 1850, at the moment of the controversy's highest heat, simply changed the situation sufficiently, through the influential aid of Fillmore, to permit the passage in separate bills of the compromise measures which Clay desired to group in one act. The policy of Clay was, in fact, carried out with no significant changes from the general plan he had proposed. These measures in general, effect secured to California its right to be a State with a constitutional prohibition of slavery, removed the domestic slave trade from the District of Columbia and rendered the operation of the Missouri compromise line, so often proposed by Southern men as the partition line of the common territory, inconsistent with its avowed principle of non-intervention. In regard to the States, the measures declared their right to regulate their domestic institutions, and as to the use of the territories, the citizens of all States were placed, [275] as they should have been placed, on equality of privilege. To the South was conceded the fugiitve slave law.

The settlement was not wholly satisfactory to the minority North and South. The dissatisfied Northern minority, led by Thaddeus Stevens, Seward, Wade and Greeley, opposed the compromise because it effectually denied the power of Congress to prohibit slavery in the territories, and provided for the return of escaped slaves to their owners in compliance with a plain requirement of the Constitution. Southern opposition showed itself in the rise of a ‘Southern Rights’ party in several States whose platform declared that the North gained every. thing and the South nothing by the compromise. But the opposition was defeated everywhere. In Mississippi General Quitman was compelled to retire from his candidacy for the office of Governor because of his disunion antecedents, and Jefferson Davis, late in the canvass, was required to take his place on account of his conservative position, yet even he was defeated by a small majority. Howell Cobb, Toombs, and Stephens united in support of the compromise. Their state, Georgia, overwhelmingly endorsed the measure, presenting through the convention called by the Legislature a notably patriotic document called the Georgia Platform.

The South heartily agreed to stand by the settlement, even South Carolina refusing to take action against it. Not a State attempted to nullify any of its provisions, not a citizen rebelled against any of its parts. Greeley said the triumph in the South was complete. (American Conflict, 211.)

The South acquiesced fully even where it did not approve. Not all agreed with Mr. Cobb's statement that the measures were ‘wise, liberal and just,’ nor with Mr. Davis in his mild propositions and speeches of 1850. There were ‘fire-eaters,’ so called, who heartily despaired of equality in the Union and urged a convention of Southern States in order to further settle the [276] sectional dispute or to provide for the division of the United States. But the year 1851 saw the thorough acceptance by the vast majority of Southern people of this great ‘Settlement’ as a finality. No State legislation nor any other form of active opposition to any feature of the compromise was tried anywhere South.

It is a pity that this triumph was not as complete at the North. Greeley, editor of the powerful Tribune, denounced the compromise with great violence and upbraided the Northern statesmen who were supporting it as truculent to the slave-holding lords. The embittered leader went so far as to accuse some of these statesmen of duplicity in loudly declaiming that constitutional obligations required the surrender of fugitive slaves while they secretly gave money to aid the runaway in escaping to Canada. In vigorous language he wrote concerning the great Peace measures, ‘The net product was a corrupt monstrosity in legislation and morals which even the great name of Clay should not shield from lasting opprobrium.’ (American Conflict, 1, 21.)

Great leaders with a large and excited following began at once an active and bitter agitation in many Northern States. Seward in New York, Stevens in Penn sylvania, Wade, Fessenden, Giddings and others equally eminent, provoked a popular hostility which displayed itself not in harmless, local mass meetings only, but in positive revolutionary legislation by States. A Massachusetts convention was called to denounce all who were concerned in securing the passage of these compromise bills, and the noble Webster, greatest of New England men of any age, fell under condemnation. A New England republic was so much talked about as to draw out from Caleb Cushing an eloquent appeal on July 4, 1851, for the Union. ‘I have endeavored to picture to myself,’ he said, ‘that republic of New England to the adoption of which the inconsiderateness of many among us, the perverseness of others, and the criminally ambitious [277] vanity of a few are, by their assaults on the Union, endeavoring to bring the people of Massachusetts. We dissolve the Union under the impulse of a blind, bigoted and one-sided zeal in the pursuit of our own opinions.’ But the New England republic which had been talked of for fifty years among the sagacious people of that section was not wholly impracticable. All that was lacking was the co-operation of the great part of New York, with the control of the Hudson, and the accession of Pennsylvania, with the control of the Susquehanna.

The Northern States were inflamed by the leading opponents of the compromise through special denunciations of the fugitive slave law. In the opinion of these agitators, the entire compromise was tainted by the act which prescribed the mode by which an escaped slave might be recovered by his owner. The appeal to the human love of liberty, to natural pity for the distressed, to the laudable admiration of any one who makes a bold break for freedom, was not unavailing. Such discussion of the obnoxious, though most clearly legal, statute of all the compromise bills, led on to an antagonism of the whole settlement, and directly to strong denunciation, not only of the institution of slavery, but of the Southern people themselves, who were supposed to be profiting by ‘the sum of all villainies.’ Thus the wise plans of venerable statesmen, on whose names this generation look with a reverence which no later names inspire, were exposed to the hot fire of Northern as well as Southern assailants, resulting in the South in no hostile acts, but unfortunately followed in Northern States by nullification laws such as they had once denounced.

For practical work against the efficiency of the fugitive slave law an organization was formed to encourage escapes and aid in the flight of negroes, through which relays conveyed the fleeing bondsmen to the land of British freedom in Canada This lawless institution was petted by the name of the Underground Railroad, and [278] was systematically supported through collections taken from benevolent people. It is ‘never wrong to do right’ was a truth shrewdly used to justify actions which the law of the United States called a crime. Resistance through legislatures, courts, societies and popular meetings obstructed the attempt of any owner of the flying negro to recover his property. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin ventured to say in the case of Booth, who was tried for aiding in the rescue of Glover, that the fugitive slave law was unconstitutional, but, after due hearing, the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously affirmed its validity. [279]

Chapter 3:

Attempts to nullify the Compromise.

Political alignment in 1852

Pierce President

Kansas

Grant

while this apparently factious but dangerous opposition to the stability of the compromise settlement was being thus pressed among the Northern States, the political parties were preparing for the Presidential election of 1852.

The Democratic State conventions sent delegates to the national convention at Baltimore June 1, 1852, thoroughly impressed with the view that the settlement was fully agreed to by the people of the United States, and consequently political controversies must be caused by questions not so sectional as that of slavery. Resolutions were passed re-affirming the principles of the compromise and pronouncing against further slavery agitation in Congress.

The Whig party, meeting in national convention the same month, passed strictly State Rights resolutions and also resolved that the compromise was a settlement in principle and substance of the dangerous and exciting questions thus settled. The resolutions pledged the Whig party to ‘discountenance all efforts to continue or [280] renew such agitation, whenever, wherever or however the attempt may be made.’

Unfortunately the national Whig party was rendered powerless by divisions. Greeley condemned the patriotic resolutions as a Southern platform imposed on the convention by the Southern delegates. Mr. Stephens, however, declares it as his memory that ‘the resolutions were prepared by the Northern friends of Mr. Webster at his house, and met with his full concurrence.’ The platform was voted for by 227 yeas against 65 nays. New York, Ohio and Michigan voted against it; Maine divided equally upon it—thus showing that twenty-seven States agreed to it out of the thirty-one represented. Greeley and his faction having condemned the settlement were now agitating the slavery question afresh, and saw no virtue in any movement which separated the sectional question from party politics.

In both of these conventions there were delegates who had shown great hostility to slavery. Some were in the Democratic convention who had earnestly supported Van Buren in 1848 against the nominee of their party. Others had been extremists in their antagonism to the settlement of 1850. But the hitherto contestants were now marshaling again into old party affiliations to renew party contests without the obstruction of sectional questions. Marcy men and Wright men harmonized. In the Whig convention were many men who, being opposed to the compromise measures, united in presenting the name of General Winfield Scott, of Virginia, to the convention as their favorite for the presidency. Scott had himself opposed the settlement and was still regarded as being among the dissatisfied members. He was, however, a Southerner, a Whig, an illustrious soldier, and popular in the Northern States. A class of conservatives led by the Massachusetts delegation offered the great name of Webster, claiming his nomination as due to his abilities, his services and his leadership in pacifying the country. [281] Fillmore was the favorite of the South, which gave its entire vote to him with a single exception. The Northern vote cast on first ballot divided between Fillmore, 16; Webster, 29, and Scott, 130. The final vote ended in the nomination of Scott by defection from the Fillmore ranks, a nomination which proved to be unfortunate, chiefly on account of the suspicion that Scott was not heartily in sympathy with the compromise. Mr. Blaine suggests, with political shrewdness: ‘The people soon perceived that, if there was indeed merit in the compromise measures, it would be wise to entrust them to the keeping of the party that was unreservedly—North and South—in favor of upholding and enforcing them. On this point there was absolutely no division in the Democratic ranks.’ （Blaine, vol. 1, p. 104.)

Scott was defeated by the course of his most prominent supporters. At the outset of the canvass Greeley accepted the candidate, but violently abused the platform. Seward supported him in public speeches which contained the old agitating elements that were now supposed to be eliminated from national politics. Offensively declaring they spat upon the platform of their party, many of these advocates of Scott's election ruined his candidacy.

The Free Soil party, which had at no time discontinued the sectional war, were urging Hale for the presidency, and were drawing their strength from the ultraists of both parties, but generally from the Whigs.

As a consequence of their political folly, the Whig party, the true national antagonist of the national Democratic party, was overwhelmed by defeat in a contest in which they carried the electoral votes of only four States. Twenty-seven States voted for Pierce.

The inexcusable folly of the Whig convention may be regretfully contemplated as one of those strangely recurring political blunders which led at last to the disruption of the Union. Fillmore and Webster were both [282] great leaders in effecting and sustaining the ‘settlement of 1850.’ Their combined strength would have nominated either. By opposition both lost. It is not improbable that either might have been elected, but if defeated the vote would have been close enough to have prevented the disbanding of the great old Whig party which had triumphed in 1840 and 1848. Clay and Webster died with their expiring party. Fillmore's followers rowed away quickly from the sinking ship. Webster's devoted friends, mourning his death and resenting his rejection by the people whom he had served, went sullenly into other affiliations

The ruins of this magnificent party furnished the best material of a new hostile, determined organization. Scott's friends, angered by their stinging defeat; the adherents of Fillmore and Webster, thoroughly disgusted with old party alliance—all were now out of national power and held even their States precariously. They were ready for a new agitation by which power might be regained.

The Whig vote for Scott was 1,386,580; the agitators' vote for Hale was only 155,825; Pierce's vote of 1,601,274 exceeded the Whig poll by only a little more than 200,--000. It will be seen that, while this analysis shows the Whig strength, it also discloses the strength of public sentiment against further sectional agitation. Only a few more than 155,000 votes out of over 2,000,000 declared in 1852 for a continued sectional contest. The popular verdict showed unmistakably that the people designed to let the sectional question of slavery work out its own destiny on the principles of the settlement of 185o. In this contest the South voted unanimously against sectional agitation.

Only one threatening cloud hung in the sky. The Free Soilers, though few in numbers, were a resolute, conscience-stricken brotherhood who were posted in various sections of the North, readers of but one class of [283] literature, and holding themselves above party obligations, still in the main regarded the Constitution as an immoral instrument and the Union as the pernicious machinery invented to promote a great national sin. For these men the attempts made under the rendition law—the so-called fugitive slave law—to recover the absconded negro held to service by statutes of several States, were opportunities which they quickly seized to stir afresh the fires of sectional hate. Disturbances in several localities arising out of arrests and trials under the act referred to, although for the time local, were published by pen and voice with all the exciting additions of appeal to humanity on behalf of the fugitive, and fiery denunciations of the slave catchers who had invaded free States to assert their titles to property in human beings. These exciting causes were only sufficiently numerous to bring into prominent notice throughout the South the nature of the nullifying laws passed by Northern States, and to inform Southern readers of the press concerning the determined hostility toward the institution of slavery. They were also sufficient to furnish the Free Soilers with grounds for hope that agitation on this account would so influence the Northern mind again as to increase the power of that sectional party.

A reference here is both necessary and proper to the singularly popular book called ‘Uncle Tom's Cabin,’ written by Mrs. Harriet Beecher Stowe and published during the campaign of 1852 and pending the growing excitement over the fugitive slave law. The reference is made to that work only to further show the fact that the ‘settlement’ was not allowed to be a ‘finality,’ and to point out one of the methods used to destroy the work of patriotic statesmen, and to intimate the coming of Southern secession. The book was designed to aid and abet the renewed conspiracy against that ‘more perfect Union,’ which now existed by virtue of the compromise of 185o and the national fraternal alliance of the North [284] and South. Its direct aim was to make slavery so odious as to cause any rendition of slaves under the fugitive slave law to be impossible. Its political use was to destroy both the Whig and Democratic parties, so as to erect from their ruins a powerful anti-slavery association, which then meant an anti-Southern party. For all these purposes the story told by Mrs. Stowe was ingeniously constructed, and opportunely given to the Northern public in conditions that secured for it immediate, wide and even astounding success. The story has been justly called by anti-slavery critics ‘a monstrous caricature,’ and it will not escape the condemnation of the future historian as a libel on the Southern people. The intelligence and Christian character of the author, together with the remarkable influence of the book upon the masses in New England and Great Britain, will be fully acknowledged, but the book itself, as to its political and incendiary purpose, its suggestions of infidelity to legal obligations, its unjust and untrue descriptions of Southern society, its inspirations of sectional discord, will in all fairness be consigned to the purgatory of pernicious literature.

The Free Soil leaders made extensive use of ‘Uncle Tom's Cabin’ as a campaign document. Its sale in a few months reached to many thousands, and its readers were perhaps more than double the editions published ‘The storm of anti-slavery demonstration, the tempest of invective, denunciation and menace which swept the North,’ says an English historian, ‘the counter-blast of indignation and resentment provoked in the South, terrified politicians who had inherited from Clay, Calhoun and Webster the traditions of a mightier generation and the task of saving the Union. Now for the first time their object was called in question. That the Union was worth saving was openly denied by thousands; that it could be saved was inwardly doubted by millions.’

All the advantages gained by the Northern section [285] through the measures of 1850, and all the national unity which it was designed to produce, became of no consideration in the minds of many who constituted the centers of ceaseless hostility. These centers of agitation were not like circles of waves growing wider but weaker from the axis of expansion, but they were veritable storm centers, breeders of agitations which grew in intensity as they enlarged their spheres of activity. All respect for the ‘settlement went down as this new agitation of 1852 progressed, and, while the aggression did not gain strength soon enough to defeat Pierce, it entered among the broken hosts of the Whigs and the discordant ranks of the Democrats with force sufficient to inaugurate with new combinations another and a fatal era of the irrepressible conflict.’

Under this state of feeling produced by the agitations immediately following the passage of the compromise measures, and intensified by the mortifications incurred in the campaign of 1852, the administration of Fillmore closed and that of Pierce began. The year 1853 has been likened to the era of good feeling during the first years of Monroe's presidency. But the likeness was not real. Monroe could say of the people of the United States: ‘We are all Democrats! We are all Republicans!’ Of the people of the same country in 1853 no such words of praiseworthy unity could be spoken. The country at large was participating in a great degree of material prosperity. The South was enjoying the repose which followed the political victories in 1851 and 1852 of the Constitutional Union party over the alarmed Southerners who had formed the Southern Rights party. Whigs and Democrats in Southern States had coalesced into one party whose cohesive principle for the time being was acquiescence in and maintenance of the settlement of 1850. That one political feature swept into power and office in the South a controlling body of men devoted to the Union and determined to check all movements [286] that threatened its dissolution. The Southern people elected Union legislatures and sent Union men to Congress. The States of the South where slavery was most firmly set, were as staunchly Union as those which had most vehemently denounced them and their domestic institutions.

The inaugural of President Pierce pleased all Conservatives throughout the Union, and sectional agitation being now removed from Congress, the administration concerned itself with affairs entirely national. But the agitation ceasing in Congress, was pressed locally to influence elections in the States. Congressional candidates were required to avow their positions on slavery. Legislatures were elected hostile to the fugitive slave law. Personal liberty bills were enacted and enforced. Municipal governments were constituted with reference to the slavery question. A social and religious horror was excited concerning the arrest now and then of an unfortunate bondsman. Mr. Greeley names only twenty-eight cases of slaves sent back into servitude, although he says in the ‘American Conflict’ that the arrests were more in one year after the passage of the Compromise Acts that in all the previous sixty years. In explanation it may be stated that though the escapes had been many, the arrests for sixty years had been few, and they were not surprisingly increased even after the passage of the fugitive slave law.

Two malign stars came into conjunction when the nullification of the fugitive slave act by the personal liberty bills of States, and intervention by congressional action with the institutions of Kansas, united in steadily increasing disunion influences from 1853 to the sequence of the Confederacy.

Kansas and Nebraska were a part of the immense Louisiana purchase from France. It contained in 1853 a small white population, whose plea for territorial government was the necessary protection from the adjacent [287] Indians of these white settlers, who had been moving into the territory for several years. After the Settlement of 1850 it was considered that the prohibition line of 36° 30′ was no longer operative, and consequently men from Missouri and Kentucky, owners of slaves, or favoring the institution of slavery, entered the southern part of the fertile territory. This Southern movement to share the lands of Kansas was met promptly and energetically by a well organized counter movement to secure a majority of anti-slavery territorial voters. It was fair rivalry at first, notwithstanding the advantages which the Northern section had on account of its superiority in emigrative population, and it might have been reasonably conjectured that if the question had been left to the simple operations of the Settlement of 1850, the non-slave-holding interest would have secured a bloodless victory. The opportunity was, however, seen by the politician as well as by the enthusiast, to make the local contest a national issue over remote and obscure Kansas, distant though it was from the East and the South.

Early in 1854 emigrant aid societies were chartered in several Northern States, whose agents actively canvassed their section, and producing great feeling, raised large sums of money for use in paying the expenses of the anti-slavery emigrant. Their agitation was met by resolute action in Missouri, and the Kansas war began.

These troubles being often referred to as the stimulating cause of disunion, it is pertinent to ask whether those Southern States, which subsequently created the Confederate States, initiated the unhappy conditions in Kansas? The answer from all records appears that not one of these States embroiled itself in the Kansas war. Few, indeed, of their people either went to Kansas or desired to go. The Kansas war was almost wholly a conflict between the people of the Northern States, and a part of the people of the border slave-holding States. The Southern Atlantic States looked directly westward [288] for expansion through Alabama, Tennessee and Mississippi to the vast territory southwest beyond the Mississippi river, caring little for Kansas, although its southern half was invitingly fertile. The political situation in these States did not at any time require the expedient of agitation over the wealth or the woes of Kansas. The Democratic party in those States, thoroughly Union, and led by Mason, Toombs, Stephens, Cobb, Jefferson Davis and the like, was content to have the policy of the three successive Northern presidents, Fillmore, Pierce and Buchanan, the views of Webster and Clay, and the doctrine of the ‘Settlement’ carried out. The situation in 1854 does not make it reasonable for the historian to record that these States or their leaders desired any sectional conflict over Kansas, much less that they desired disunion. But the political situation in the States North was somewhat different.

Whig leaders North, unnecessarily disheartened by the defeat of 1852, and suffering from the inroads made by the Free Soil faction, threw overboard the great economic questions, on which they might have gained the victory in 1856, and many surrendered to the spirit of sectionalism. Northern Democratic leaders, being hard pressed with charges that they were the vassals of the slave power, fell here and there out of the ranks, or else adopted a line of argument as to Kansas and other territories, designed to show that there could not be any further extension of slavery. The agitation thus became strictly a feature in Northern politics, distressful to the administration of Pierce, and fatal to that of Buchanan.

Evidently the Southern States had no power to arrest these political developments. They could not stop either the Kansas war nor prevent the organization of the elements at that time opposing the administration which had come into power on the popularity of the Compromise of 1850. The question of the time as it appeared to [289] the Southern mind, was simply that a constitutional right existed for their benefit. It may be a barren abstraction so far as Kansas was concerned, but to yield it was to invite aggression that would be effectively destructive of a vast investment the Southern people had made under the encouragement of the Union. So far as ‘the Kansas imbroglio’ was concerned, they had expressed willingness to accept the line of 36° 30′ extended to the Pacific ocean, or to repeal it altogether; and as they were divided on the views of Mr. Douglas and Mr. Buchanan in regard to the meaning of intervention, they could have been induced to adopt either view, had the great leaders at the North agreed upon a settlement of the Kansas question.

Under these circumstances the new agitation began to assume definite form in a political party of opposition composed of all the Free Soilers, and ‘Old Guard,’ as Mr. Giddings called the Abolitionists; scattered Whigs; the anti-slavery Democrats and the anti-Pierce men generally. Fusing without a distinct party name as yet and fighting under the one rallying cry of free Kansas, without any regard to old party principles of a national character, the new combination swept over the North in 1854, while anarchy reigned in Kansas.

Sectionalism thus became successful. The speaker of the Thirty-fourth Congress was, for the first time in the history of the government, elected by a strictly sectional vote. ‘It was,’ says an eminent authority of New England, ‘a distinctive victory of the Free States over the consolidated power of the Slave States. It marked an epoch.’ And so it did. It made it clear that the ‘fixed geographical majority’ had been nearly obtained. It indicated the possibility that a Southern Confederacy and a Northern United States might be the necessitated remedy for the irrepressible antagonism that had so long existed between ‘the Old North and the Old South’ created by King James. The Southern States, however, [290] closely united in support of their views, were powerless in the Union whenever the questions were sectional which Congress must determine. It was this startling fact which gave such serious interest to the approaching election in 1856 for the presidency. Should the same spirit prevail in the national election for the office of the chief executive which had secured the speakership (the next highest office), the South would have reason to fear that its peculiar interests would not be respected. [291]

Chapter 4:

The New anti-national movement.

Sectional convention of 1856

Union

South

Union

The controversy over the Settlement of 1850 which had begun with limited popularity, persisted through the defeats of five years, until now, under the political conditions of parties North and with the opportunity furnished by the Kansas question, it suddenly enlarged into such proportions as to create among its leaders the sanguine hope of political success through a party under a new and attractive name taken from the early days of the republic.

The exciting debates in Congress on questions relating to geographical supremacy, the eager discussions among the people, the election of Congressmen opposed to the administration, the increasing control of State governments in the North, encouraged a combination powerful enough to confront aggressively the national party, whose leaders then controlled the government. The grounds [292] of the new party affiliation were: resistance to the fugitive slave law, the non-extension of the Missouri Compromise line, with opposition to its repeal, rescue of Kansas from the slave power, and the general overthrow of the haughty domination of the South. The movement could not include any specific national policy, was necessarily sectional, and its promoters looked only to the Northern people for support. No Southern State could join it; none was expected to do so—and none did. By a cool calculation of political influences and resources, it was considered that the more numerous and richer North could attain a settled ascendancy, if the proposed combination could be secured. Good practical politicians like Giddings, Seward, Chase, Hale, Sumner, Banks, Weed —all men of eminent abilities, long used to political strategy—saw an opportunity to regain the governmental influence which they had lost since 1850. They were warned by Northern leaders that this movement portended disunion, and by the alarmed South that it predestinated secession, but they felt no fright, and at least would risk the issue.

Committees appointed by eight Northern States issued in 1855 a call for a general convention, which assembled at Pittsburg, February 22, 1856, and erected a party plat form in which aggressive war was declared against the general policy of Pierce, and definitely in favor of all measures that would confine slavery within the limits of the slave-holding States. Upon this basis of agreement the convention ordered an election of delegates from the States to a party convention to assemble at Philadelphia, June 17, 1856. The convention thus called assembled, nominated Fremont, of California, for the presidency, and Dayton, of Ohio, for the vice-presidency— both from the North, thus violating the custom unbroken to this time to divide these offices between the North and the South. The single avowed purpose of the new association was to aim at and look for the extinction of what [293] the platform offensively called ‘the twin relics of barbarism—polygamy and slavery.’ The inventors of this sharp-pointed and irritating thrust at the South did not consider that these twins were both the progeny of Northern loins. It is therefore fair to make the historic note that one of these odious twins was conceived in the iniquity of the African slave trade, in whose generating the South did not share, and that the other offspring of barbarism was born in social conditions—certainly not common in the North—but existing wholly outside the Southern States. The platform thus justly condemned the men who originated the twin evils, and if it had denounced the slave trade itself together with polygamy, the applause of the South would have followed. Slavery was the unfortunate relict of the horrible trade in human flesh which, for the sake of gain, deprived the helpless African of his freedom. (American Conflict, p. 255.)

The American party, composed largely of patriotic Whigs who would not yield to the sectional spirit nor ally themselves with their old Democratic antagonist, nominated Fillmore. In the ballot Fillmore was supported by 886,000 voters, of whom about 500,000 were from the South, and one Southern State—Maryland— honored him with its electoral vote, and 114 electoral votes from eleven States. Buchanan was elected by 1,851,000 popular votes, 174 electoral votes, and the suffrage of nineteen States. The result astonished the Democrats, dissolved the American party, encouraged the sectional movement, and dismayed the South. Ten States which Pierce had carried in 1852 were lost. New York and Ohio voted for Fremont, while Pennsylvania was barely saved. ‘All New England was consolidated.’ More than a million and a quarter of Northern citizens had cast their votes deliberately for the sectional candidates of a sectional party on a sectional issue, and against a Northern statesman of exalted character, the nominee of a national party on a national platform. The Southern [294] vote was cast unanimously for the two Northern men, Fillmore and Buchanan, both representing the cause of the Union, the Constitution and the Compromise of 1850.

The political situation was evident. ‘The distinct and avowed marshaling of a solid North against a solid South had begun,’ says Senator Blaine, ‘and the result of the Presidential election of 1856 settled nothing except that a mightier struggle was in the future.’ These words of the great Senator from Maine, written nearly thirty years after this election, express the conclusion which at once heightened the fever of Southern anxiety.

Buchanan—inaugurated March 4, 1857—sincerely hoped that his administration would allay the agitation which had sprung up fiercely three years before. His election was regarded by the country as another significant endorsement of ‘the finality’ of 1850, and he officially declared his desire that such action should be taken in the management of the territories as would avoid all national controversy between ‘North’ and ‘South.’ In this desire he clearly had the sincere sympathy of all political parties in the South. The feeble resistance first made in parts of the South to the compromise was fully overcome in 1851, and it ceased to be a question. The practical danger to Buchanan's election had come in 1856 alone from Fillmore men whose platform agreed with his own views on the sectional question. Their party dis solved like a mist immediately after Fillmore's defeat, and its members in the South, though a half million strong, had no grounds of contest except such as might be found on local issues. Their leader, Mr. Fillmore, had written a remarkable letter in July, 1856—the protest of a patriot against sectional partyism—concerning which Mr. Greeley commented that it plainly declared the success of the Republicans would ‘not only incite, but justly cause a rebellion of the Southern States.’ (American Conflict, 248.) Heeding the words of these great Northerners, the Southern Americans stood together in [295] support of any measures that would secure the cessation of further dangerous agitation.

The Buchanan administration inherited the Kansas trouble and was plagued in the beginning with unexpected developments. The settlers in Kansas had become stimulated into actual war, and there seemed to be no desire among these squatter sovereigns to come to a square and peaceful vote. But even these internal difficulties could have been settled if the partisan pressure from without had been withdrawn. Successful party effort to overthrow the administration plainly required that Kansas should not be quieted on any plan that permitted the toleration of the slave-holding influence. But even these animosities of the settlers, and these partisan maneuvers, would not have destroyed the peace of the Union, if the perilous disagreement had not occurred between the two great Northern leaders, one being the President, and the other the eminent Senator from the West, Mr. Douglas. These two statesmen, each possessing commanding influence North and South, combatted alike the sectional position taken by their common adversary, and in this they were sustained by the Fillmore men as well as by their own party. But they chose to differ irreconcilably on the construction of the doctrine of non-intervention by Congress as to the local institutions of a territory. The exact point of their difference at the time was the application of the principle of nonintervention by Congress as to slavery in Kansas and Nebraska. Mr. Douglas held that the voters in the territory had power over that question through their territorial legislature; Mr. Buchanan's view was that the power to exclude slave property by the people of a territory could be exercised constitutionally only through their legally framed State constitution. The Republicans held that Congress could prohibit slavery in the territory with or without the consent of the inhabitants. With this trident of political opinions the South was [296] thrust through its vitals, seeing nothing good coming to itself out of Kansas, but everything important, in view of the national and constitutional principles involved.

The Southern idea of Statehood raised the political character of the State far above that which could be lawfully assumed by the people of a territory. It was clear to Southern men that any State constitution legally adopted could authoritatively prohibit or abolish slavery. The people of any State whose laws provided for the existence and protection of ownership in the labor of the negro could at any time abolish the institution through a constitutional convention. There was a vast difference, however, between territorial government and State government. Territorial government was the creature of Congress—merely a servant of the congressional servants belonging to the brotherhood of States; but State governments were ordained by the people in whom reposed the last analysis of sovereignty, viz., the makers of the Union and the masters of its Congress. No powers under the Constitution were reserved to the territories, but to the States respectively. No sovereign powers were reserved to the people of territories as such, but to the people of the United States. The Southerner felt that he was a defender of the State against the usurpations of the settlers in a territory, when he objected to a final decision as to the greatest of property rights recognized by the Constitution being made absolute by a territorial legislature. Upon these and similar principles Southern statesmen and jurists generally held that the time when the allowance or disallowance of slave labor should be determined, was at the making of a State constitution by the bona fide resident voters of a territory through their legally elected representatives, assembled lawfully in a convention, called for that purpose, under the authority of tile United States. The compromise measures of 1850 in their opinion contained that doctrine, and with them many Northern statesmen and jurists agreed. [297]

The ill-starred excitement over Kansas arose out of political circumstances, from which the Southern States, which subsequently seceded, were free. ‘The controversy in its early stages was pressed upon the South.’ Northern leaders, contending with each other, disturbed the Southern repose more than the Old Guard of sincere and impotent Abolitionists; and the fighting factions springing out of the dismemberment of old parties brought on the bedlam in national policies from which the South was directed to see finally no escape, except by the way of a Southern Confederacy.

If the Kansas bill, including the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, was a fire-brand as alleged—that brand was not cast by a Southern, but by a Northern statesman, and it is no compliment to Northern leaders to explain that they were subjects of magnetic Southern influence. If the attempts of Southern citizens in the border States to occupy land in a near territory and to cultivate it by uniting their own labor with that of their bondsmen was an injury to the Free State neighbor who had no negroes, it was just such an injury as could be peacefully removed by the majority vote when the territory became a State. These Southern settlers were not border ruffians and should not have been stigmatized as such. If the fugitive slave law was an outrage, the makers of the Constitution, Northern as well as Southern patriots of the Revolution, are responsible for creating the obligation of Congress to pass it, as well as the duty of the States not to nullify it. Admitting slavery was a sin, the South caught it by contagion, and reproaches came with evil grace from those who imported the virus that tainted the blood of a nation. In the very midst of this heated controversy the Dred Scott case was brought to final decision by the Supreme court of the United States, March 7, 1857, in which it was determined by the judiciary department of the government that Congress had no power to prohibit slavery in any territory belonging [298] to the Union, and hence the restrictive section of the Missouri Compromise was void. (19 Howard, 393. See American Conflict, 253, 256.) The executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the Union were brought into perfect accord upon the one constitutional view always held by the South, and almost if not quite equally held by the conservatives of the North, that the power to exclude slavery from the common territories had not been granted to Congress in the Constitution. The decision was made by able lawyers after principles strictly legal. The bar of the Union, by great majority at least, agreed with the court so far as that particular dictum was concerned.

But the decision of the Supreme court was directly in the way of agitation and hence it was at once assailed with a violence never before shown against any opinion of that august body. (American Conflict, 251; Stephens, 200.)

Coincident with the troubles in Kansas, occurred the great contest between Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Douglas for the Senatorship of Illinois. Mr. Douglas had dulled the ax of Republican resentment by his opposition to the admission of Kansas with a pro-slavery constitution, which he regarded as irregular; but his views did not accord with theirs in regard to Congressional intervention, and besides he had declared in public speech that he ‘cared not whether slavery was voted up or voted down.’ They were, therefore, not inclined to allow his return to the Senate if he could be successfully opposed. Abraham Lincoln was persuaded to meet him in a contest for the Senatorial responsibility, and the warm discussion between these well matched debaters soon drew not only great crowds in Illinois, but, through the public press, the whole Union was included in the audience and involved in the heat of the strife.

Mr. Lincoln was then and continued to be the ablest politician produced by the anti-slavery agitation. More prudent than Garrison or Giddings, wiser than Hale or [299] even Seward, ‘Honest Abe’ was not always consistent, not always logical; often used political expedients, but was always true to his party and its main ideas. His characteristic traits, as they were in time revealed to the country, won for him something akin to general national affection felt by the Southern as well as Northern people. In his discussion with Mr. Douglas, Mr. Lincoln made slavery the issue, and with terse, striking and popular remarks pressed his antagonist hard. One series of sentences, which he persisted in uttering against the advice of his friends, became the subject of uneasy comment through the South. He said: ‘I believe this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free I do not expect the Union to be dissolved, I do not expect the house to fall, but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of absolute extinction, or its advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new, North as well as South.’ Southern men were astounded by these sentences. The possibility of encroaching upon the Free States with the slavery institution had never been under discussion, from the day that the receding of the slavery line southward had begun in Massachusetts. They had contemplated the abolition of slavery by Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, North Carolina and its flow South and West. They had in the early days discussed favorably its gradual extinction and the return of the negroes to Africa. But the wildest fire-eaters had not ventured the suggestion of forcing slavery northward on any States. These sententious statements of Mr. Lincoln sounded in their ears like the blasts of the bugle sounding an advance on all the Southern States, and Mr. Blaine thought in 1884 that this was the meaning which [300] Mr. Lincoln attached to his own words. Mr. Douglas charged that utterances of this character made Mr. Lincoln ‘an enemy of the Union and an advocate of an internecine conflict in which the Free States and the Slave States should wrestle in deadly encounter.’ The general impression on the Northern mind made by these sayings of Mr. Lincoln was that slavery must be destroyed. The Southern impression was that it would be the policy of the new sectional party to remove by law or by force the obstruction to harmonious Union which slavery presented. There was another distinct impression that unless slavery could be prevented in all the territories, and then abolished in all the States, the Union must be divided into halves by some movement. If the new party fail to destroy slavery, then the States without slaves must separate from the States with slaves. If it should come into power to carry out its platform, secession by the Southern States might be attempted. The Union ‘cannot endure permanently half slave and half free.’ Mr. Douglas insisted with great force that this declaration meant disunion.

Following this turgid current to its debouch in disunion, we see a new move in 1859 designed to make sectional agitation effective in the approaching political battle of 1860.

A small book, called by some ‘a document’ prepared by a former citizen of North Carolina, Hinton Rowan Helper, which contained an arraignment of the class of Southern slave owners then living in the United States in coarse and slanderous language, was published. The South was threatened in the document with ‘confiscation, servile insurrections, invasion and maneuver.’ The inhuman book has long since gone to its own place justly consigned to everlasting shame and contempt, but when it appeared in this excited period of frenzied partyism it met an astounding welcome from many of the most eminent and virtuous people of the North. It was taken in hand as a [301] political document, and sent broadcast over the North indorsed by Speaker Colfax, sixty-four distinguished members of Senate and House, as well as by the leaders generally of the Republican party. The book was well adapted to incense the South, but its special purpose was to inflame the Northern mind. It was a long stride beyond Uncle Tom's Cabin in its incendiary aim. It proscribed the slave owner as ineligible for any office. It declared against all patronage of slave-holding merchants, lawyers, physicians, editors or hotels, and denounced all political and religious communion with the whole class. This incendiary work of a malicious enthusiast was reduced into convenient form, printed and circulated as a campaign document by the hundred thousand at a time, when the slavery struggle had actually ceased in Kansas, and the South was presenting no scheme of slavery extension. The ill-timed production was designated by the pompous superscription—‘A Manifesto,’ and its title, ‘The Impending Crisis.’

There was no crisis impending of which the Southern people had any knowledge. The records of the winter of 1858 and the spring of 1859 entirely failed to disclose a disposition of the South to engage in any agitation in which the North might not freely and fraternally participate. There was a lull in crisis-producing causes. Minnesota had just come, May, 1858, into the sisterhood of States with an anti-slavery constitution. Oregon was admitted also as a Free State, February, 1859. The first cable had been recently stretched across the Atlantic, over which the Queen of England talked with President Buchanan. The only impending crisis was the trouble with the other twin relict of barbarism, the polygamous Mormons, which General Albert Sidney Johnston was adjusting. There was, however, a crisis impending of which the South had no suspicion. Across the Potomac lurked one of the Kansas fighters who had become notorious there as Ossawatomie Brown, the [302] leader of a bloody night attack on a Southern force. John Brown having fled from Kansas, conceived a plan which he secretly but not fully divulged in a meeting of a few fanatics like himself. (American Conflict, 287.) In pursuance of his scheme to excite an insurrection of slaves in one State of the South, and to place himself at the head to organize a general uprising, he chose Virginia as the location of his first blow. He conceived the bold plan of attacking Harper's Ferry, and to prepare for the surprise, he rented a small farm in Maryland, July, 1858, under an assumed name, and collected a small amount of fire arms and ammunition, besides 1,000 pikes. A few followers, part of them his sons, gathered at his residence and were secreted until the hour came to strike his blow which captured Harper's Ferry, October, 1859. Brown held his captured garrison for a day and night, put out pickets, distributed arms for the use of negroes and for the short while terrified the citizens. He was, however, soon attacked and driven into an engine house. Part of his small force of twenty men were killed, including his two sons. Some others escaped and he himself was wounded, but he continued his defiant resistance until overpowered by a force of United States marines sent from Washington. He and six of his companions were lawfully tried, condemned and hung the following December.

This small affair had no significance apart from the general agitation which had pervaded a large part of the Union for several years. It was merely an awkward but fierce single bolt hurtling from a political sky charged with explosives by other men who had method in their madness. (American Conflict, 278-287.) Had the event been treated as the act of a fanatic, whose madness no more exempted him from death than the fanaticism of Booth could shield him from an assassin's fate, there would have been no serious fears felt in the South. Insurrections—very few in number—had been attempted [303] and foiled before. There was scarcely any apprehension in the South of a negro uprising, and none of servile war. The act of a wretched rowdy, imbued with the spirit of hate which had been intensified in bloody Kansas, was turned into political account. It is scarcely credible, although true, that public meetings, composed of good patriotic citizens, were held, speeches made and resolutions passed in approval of the purpose, or at least the motive, of John Brown. Wendell Phillips, speaking in Mr. Beecher's church, eulogized what he called the glorious deed. Clergymen compared the gallows of Brown with the Cross of Christ. A great audience crowded Tremont Temple on the day of the hanging in order to express a public sympathy. Meetings of like import were held in many other places and bells were tolled at the hour of execution. There was, in truth, no general indorsement by the people or the statesmen of the North of the insurrectionary designs of John Brown. There was no common Northern sentiment justifying the murderous act. His deeds were characterized as indefensible even by many who avowed their pity, but there were expressions, sufficiently strong and exasperating, to provoke the people of the South. The secret methods of the invader of Virginia reminded them of the covert proceedings of the emissaries who had occasionally in former times sought to distribute incendiary literature among the negroes. The manner of the attack, with weapons and ammunition sufficient for a thousand slaves, pointed out the bloody purpose of the assailant. Helper's book, ‘The Impending Crisis,’ recently pamphleted and indorsed by sixty-seven prominent Congressmen and scattered broadly over the land, had commended just such an act of war. The alarm in the South was certainly real, because it was based on the declared doctrines of the anti-slavery sectionalists, who were apparently growing in power and increasing in aggression. Their political fears were not allayed by any statement [304] that this powerful organization did not intend to oppose slavery anywhere except in the territories, for one of their leaders had declared the issue to be an irrepressible conflict; another, the greatest among them, had said not a year before John Brown's invasion, that ‘the Union could not exist half slave and half free;’ great Senators had commended the Manifesto of Helper, and in all views it was evident that there was no practical difference between the creed of Seward and the creed of Gerrit Smith. They justly charged that the insurrection was the legitimate result of continued and recent fierce antislavery agitation. If the raid of Brown had occurred in 1851, during the administration of Fillmore and in that era of fraternity and peace, it would have provoked no political disturbances, for there was then no mighty political organization confronting the South, and no counter organization forming in the South to meet the North. The course of politics had been running four or five years threateningly toward a catastrophe, from which the Southern people shrank, and this ‘episode,’ as it has been flippantly termed, seemed to the South as the beginning of horrors. No political ends whatever could be served with advantage in the South itself by overestimating the dangers which this event portended. It must be apparent to intelligent men that the South needed no strengthening of its political adherence to the principles it had avowed. On certain questions the South was practically solid. The Northern mind had been sedulously trained in thoughts of the Southern people as a fireeating class, ready to commit the act of disunion and constantly seeking to create a quarrel. Politicians, fiction writers, lecturers and excellent clergymen persisted in portraying the worst side of Southern character. Northern opinion was formed in part by teachers unworthy of a hearing, but unfortunately the error was ‘stimulated and developed for political ends by many [305] whose intelligence should have led them to more enlightened views.’ （Blaine, 157.)

While John Brown was plotting his invasion of Virginia, and the Helper Manifesto was rekindling the subsiding Kansas local animosity into the wider aggression on the slavery institution everywhere, the dissension in the ranks of the controlling men who had hitherto balked the progress of disunion causes, now more seriously and vividly portrayed the coming Confederation of seceded Southern States. The increasing Southern alarm caused several prominent statesmen of the South to declare their despair of the Union, and to announce themselves in favor of secession. Among them was Mr. Iverson, senator from Georgia, who predicted in 1859 that a sectional President would be inaugurated in 1861, which he affirmed would be such a declaration of war as to justify an independent Southern Confederacy, but his extreme ideas caused his defeat by the Georgia legislature for the Senate. His views were opposed by Mr. Stephens, who regarded the differences North and South constitutionally settled, and uttered his hope that an institution, ‘National and State, may long continue to bless millions yet unborn as they have blessed us.’ Mr. Toombs, of the same State, made also in 1859 a conservative speech advising against all extreme action, and especially opposing the particular demand by his party for national protection of slavery in the territories. Mr. Jefferson Davis was uttering the same hopeful opinions in Mississippi, and the Southern members of Buchanan's cabinet were advising against dissensions on the sectional question. There was no ‘Southern Rights’ party. Broken down in 1851, it had no existence in 1859. [306]

Chapter 5:

The Conflict over the Constitution

The agitators of sectionalism Combine in 1859

Unionists

South

Mr. Davis

South

Mr. Lincoln

The Thirty-fifth Congress met in 1859, and it soon appeared that aggressive anti-slavery agitation was now moving its line forward toward a more commanding position. Kansas had been relegated to the care of the people of the territory, who had made an antislavery constitution, and secured control of the territorial government. In due time it would surely be marshaled into the columns of the Northern States. Agitation in that center could now no longer produce political results. There was a broader field of operations inviting the renewal of aggression. The control of the national government secured by ‘a fixed sectional majority,’ which would make the nation strong, centralized and supreme in its sovereignty over all States, was the crown to be placed on the political association that had grown from a handful of despised Abolitionists to a multitude —a million and a half strong—in one-half the States, whose concentrated vote would be so used as to carry enough States of the North in a solid body to control the electoral college. The antagonists of this combination for sectional power were so divided as to inspire the [307] aggressive agitators with confidence in their ability to cause their certain overthrow. Douglas and Buchanan were expected to fight each other to the bitter end, and so they did. The great Presidential contest of 1860 was now at hand, to be waged almost exclusively on issues and principles which were regarded as vital to the Union. The position of the South is thus stated by an eminent statesman whose views have generally been adverse to those held by Southern leaders: ‘The Southern delegates (to the Charleston convention of 1860) demanded a platform which should embody the constitutional rights of the slave-holder, and they would not qualify or conceal their requirements. If the North would sustain those rights all would be well. If the North would not sustain them, it was of infinite moment to the South to be promptly and definitely advised of the fact. The Southern delegates were not presenting a particular man as a candidate. On that point they would be liberal and conciliatory. But they were fighting for a principle, and would not surrender it or compromise it.’ （Blaine, p. 158.)

Mr. Jefferson Davis offered a series of seven resolutions in the Senate, February, 1860, in order to define the position of his associates, on which the division of opinion among Senators, as shown by the vote on the first of the series, was wider than the slavery question. That resolution prescribed the principles which had early separated the Federalists and the old ‘Constitutional Republican party’ led by Jefferson. The resolution re-affirmed the doctrine that the Union resulted from a Constitution ratified by States as independent sovereignties equal in all rights, and that no States could intermeddle with the domestic institutions of other States. They expressly asserted that the Union existed by a constitutional compact, which the Senate of the United States was specially charged with preserving. Upon taking the vote this first resolution was affirmed by the solid vote of the [308] Southern States joined by California, Indiana, Minnesota, Oregon and Pennsylvania. It was as solemnly denied by ten Northern States in solid array, with Ohio and New Jersey divided, and with Delaware and Illinois not voting.

Conservatives divided on the fourth resolution, which denied the power of the people of a territory to abolish slavery except in framing a State constitution, but there was no portion of the seven resolutions which in any degree prepared the way for any further action through which disunion could be effected. The passage of the resolutions was a political movement, simply designed to draw the lines strictly between the States upon that issue, although it incidentally at that period, in the course of the long-continued controversy between the two ideas of our confederate Union, closed in around the question of the interference with slave property by the general government. Upon that issue the Democratic party fully expected at that time to make another successful canvass in 1860 for the Presidency, as had been done in 1856, when Buchanan was elected. The resolutions were voted for by many who remained supporters of the Union through the entire Confederate war. Five Northern States gave them their full votes. Three border States which did not secede voted for them. Mr. Douglas would have voted for the first resolution which contained the main issue if he had been present. There could have been no revolutionary intent in the minds of the Senators North and South, who were so earnestly advocating principles on which they hoped to achieve success before the people and pacify the country. The vote, in fact, was not strictly a party vote, although designed especially to favor one particular party organization. Crittenden, Pearce and Kennedy, Old Line Whigs, supported the first resolution with as much heartiness as any Senators. That there were individual disunionists who were favorable to disunion per se, there can be no [309] doubt. New England had contained many of that class, and fully as many could be found in the South. But disunion as the remedy for agitation was not then declared by any influential body of Southern people, and certainly it does not appear in any sense concealed or patent in this action of the United States Senate. Mr. Davis, the mover of the resolutions, was a Union man. The Northern people did not then and have not since understood Mr. Davis' position, because their judgment has not been fully allowed that fair play which will eventually set him in clear light before young men, as Mr. Lincoln has long since been made known to the South. Mr. Stephens, whose just judgment no man can question and whose political relations to Mr. Davis were not of such an intimate and cordial character as to place him under suspicion of speaking from undue partiality, says of Mr. Davis, as he viewed him at the date of this action of the Senate and since: ‘I always regarded him as a strong Union man in sentiment so long as the Union was maintained on the principles upon which it was founded. He was without doubt a thorough State rights, State sovereignty man. He believed in the right of secession, but what I mean to say is, that in my opinion he was an ardent supporter of the Union on principles as he understood them, upon which and for which the Union was formed. There were, as I have said, many public men among us who, after these resolutions passed the Senate, and after the Presidential canvass was opened upon them, and the various issues presented in the party platforms of the day, were openly for secession in case Mr. Lincoln should be elected upon the principles upon which he was nominated. But Mr. Davis, so far as I know or believe, did not belong even to this class. If he was in favor of secession upon the grounds of Mr. Lincoln's election, I am not aware of it. He certainly made no speeches or wrote any letter for the public during that canvass that indicated such views or purposes, [310] I never saw a word from him recommending secession as the proper remedy against threatening dangers until he joined in the general letter of the Southern senators and representatives in Congress to their States advising them to take that course.’ （Stephens' War Between the States, vol. 2, p. 416.) Mr. Davis, in his short history of the Confederate States, mentions a fact bearing directly on his general political reputation as a Union man. Referring to the pending gubernatorial election in Mississippi, 1851, he recalls the fact that when an attempt was made to fix on the Democracy the reputation of a purpose of disunion, General Quitman withdrew from the race on account of his unpopular disunion antecedents, and he himself was induced to take his place because of his more pronounced advocacy of the Union. His own language is as follows: ‘My own devotion to the Union of our fathers had been so often and so fully declared, my services to the Union, civil and military, were so extended and well known, that it was believed my nomination would remove the danger of defeat which the candidacy of a less pronounced advocate of the Union might provoke. Then, as afterward, I regarded the separation of the States as a great, though not the greatest, evil.’

At this critical period—the spring of 1860—there were notable men in the South who favored disunion. But they were not in power. They were men of commanding intellect, exalted patriotism, and noble character, worthy of any station. Among them Mr. Yancey, who could not control Alabama for secession; Mr. Quitman, who was set aside by Mississippi; Mr. Iverson, defeated in Georgia, and Mr. Rhett, whom South Carolina had not followed. All of these were favorites in their States, but so far as they advocated secession they were subjected to defeat. There was not one disunionist governor in the South—not one secession legislature—not one disunion judge—not a disunionist in the cabinet, or as far as was known, not one in any service of the government. [311] The political control in the South was in the hands of men who had safely guided the ‘Southern Rights’ movement of 1851 into the paths of acquiescence and satisfaction with the Settlement of 1850. Southern sentiment for the Union, the Constitution, the star spangled banner, the traditions and the glory of the country, prevailed with a strength, unanimity and unselfishness never appreciated. This sentiment was well enough understood by one leader, Mr. Greeley, whose facilities for gathering information were so peculiarly great as to authorize him to say that ‘the South cannot be kicked out of the Union.’ Without designing to speak offensively he thus flatly ridiculed the warnings of 1860 uttered by Northern conservative statesmen.

Another event which familiarized yet more the public mind with the idea of division of the States was the disruption of the Democratic national convention, which met in Charleston, S. C., April 11, 1860. There were present at this convention complete delegations from all the States, South as well as North, representing the nationality of the great party then in power, and harmonious on all questions, except on the application of the doctrine of non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the territories. The power to legislate against slave property by the territorial legislature was affirmed by a close majority vote in somewhat evasive language, thus endorsing the doctrine of Mr. Douglas as against the position of the administration. Debate, dissension and further conventions followed, resulting in the antagonism of two Democratic candidates for the Presidency— Mr. Douglas and Mr. Breckinridge.

The Republican party convention met in Chicago in May, 1860, actually representing only seventeen States, all Northern. Three others were nominally represented, but in fact there was no representation of any Southern State. Thus, seventeen of the thirty-three States with drawing from party affiliation with the unrepresented [312] sixteen again distinctly familiarized the public mind with the idea of secession. The convention was composed of mixed and apparently incongruous political elements. The Democratic party was agreed on all points except one, while the Republican party disagreed on all policies except the one which they made the polar purpose of the campaign. The ultras of several parties, and of no party, were present in force. The spirit of control was necessarily sectional and against nationalism. The resolutions as read for discussion named the organization the National Republican Party, but Jesup, of Pennsylvania, objected to the word ‘national,’ and it was stricken, thus emphasizing the feeling that for this campaign at least the party should be sectional. The Union was riven by a convention aspiring to its control into two parts, and the sole reliance for victory was placed on the Northern part. Thus the idea developed still clearer that ‘the Union could not exist half free and half slave.’ A distinguished jurist of New York said—August, 1860—that this political action ‘is a conspiracy under the forms but in violation of the Constitution of the United States.’ Its success assured the control of the government, not by the will of the majority of the people, nor by a majority of the States located in all sections, but by the power of a unified geographical area whose strength in combination could seize and use the powers of the government. The United States are governed by party. If the party in power be sectional, the use of the powers of the Union and the distribution of its benefits will be mainly sectional. The country generally and the South uneasily understood this to be the result when the government passed out of the hands of national statesmen.

The salient statements in the platform were against the ‘peculiar Southern institution,’ as slavery was unfairly called, for it was not instituted by the South but was most properly a trust cast upon its care by the authors of it. On the third ballot Mr. Lincoln, of Illi. [313] nois, was nominated for the Presidency, and immediately afterward Mr. Hamlin, of Maine, was named for the second office.

A patriotic attempt was made, chiefly by the Whigs and Americans, to make a fight for the Union under the name of the Constitutional Union Party, whose brief platform merely committed their candidates to ‘the Constitution, the Union, and the enforcement of the laws.’ The nominees of this body of conservative men were John Bell, of Tennessee, and Edward Everett, of Massachusetts. Their party and its platform were fully and fairly national.

Thus it appears that all national conservatives were scattered among divided parties, while the threatening opposition was made by one compacted organization. The canvass following these nominations differed in the South from the canvass in the North in the one circumstance, that there were no electoral tickets for Mr. Lincoln. The Southern vote was divided among Bell and Everett, Southern and Northern Whigs; Douglas and Johnson, Northern and Southern Democrats; Breckinridge and Lane, Southern and Northern Democrats. These nominees represented the East, West, North and Middle States by four candidates, and the South by two. The opposition represented the North and West alone. No platform nor speaker advocated disunion as the desire of his party, notwithstanding the prominence of that question in the general canvass. There were more avowed disunionists personally supporting Breckinridge, but, as the course of events showed, Douglas men and Bell men became secessionists as soon as ‘coercion’ was declared. The resentment of the attempt to gain the Presidency by the calculated strength of combined contiguous States, through appeals to sectional feeling, was warmly felt and boldly declared throughout the North by the advocates of Bell, Douglas and Breckinridge, but at the South this resentment was far stronger, because all [314] the influence and interest of that section were felt to be involved.

The great campaign speech of Mr. Seward, August 14, 1860, designed to be representative of the policy of the new party, excited the fears of the Southern people, and, as the information reached them through the Northern papers of the progress of the canvass, their despair of the election increased. Mr. Toombs, in repeating the idea that we may have to give up constitutional safeguards in order to save the government, declared that ‘Our greatest danger today is that the Union will survive the Constitution.’ Mr. Davis and Mr. Stephens reiterated the warnings which were being given by Northern statesmen that sectional success portended the separation of North and South. Mr. Banks in answer had said, ‘Let the Union slide’; Mr. Greeley, that ‘the South cannot be kicked out’; while public speakers favoring the new party made a jest of the so-called threat of disunion. During the whole term of this contest Mr. Lincoln's personality was not in issue. His character was above reproach, and, while his course had been partisan and free soil, it was never vindictive. The South would have chosen him in a personal contest against Seward, Giddings, Banks, Hale, Stevens, and a hundred others. It was not Mr. Lincoln's election, but the domination of one area in the Union over all the Union, that the South regarded as a just cause for seeking a division of the United States.

In October it became apparent that the divided conservatives would be beaten. Attempts made too late to organize a fusion unfortunately failed, and the spirit of secession advanced rapidly throughout the South. It was at first vague, somewhat irresolute, and always conditional. But the signs of its presence became clear enough before the election in November to produce uneasiness throughout the North—yet nothing more. General Scott, being in chief command of the army and looking at the question from the military point of view, [315] began in October to counsel the administration of Buchanan in writing to make certain dispositions of the armies which would prevent secession. (Life of Buchanan, 1866.) A communication October 31st from Colonel Craig, ordnance officer, to Secretary Floyd, that the officer in charge of Fort Sumter desired a few small arms to be given the workmen in the fort for protection of government property, and asking authority to issue forty muskets, was approved by Floyd and the order issued. (Rebellion Rec., vol. 2, p. 100.) A meeting of a few prominent politicians at the home of Senator Hammond in South Carolina, October 25, 1860, to discuss secession, has been often named as one of the preliminaries of that event. In the meantime the fight was made most aggressively by Northern leaders. （Sherman's Recollections, vol. 2, pp. 199-203.) The States of Pennsylvania, Indiana, New Jersey and Delaware were considered doubtful, and in them the contest was warm even to violence. The strong denunciations of Southern arrogance and open criticisms of Buchanan's administration as ‘broken down, corrupt and demoralized,’ with never ceasing appeals to the anti-slavery feeling by public speakers, were reproduced in hundreds of Northern newspapers, which were circulated among Southern subscribers. The South saw itself already set aside so far as the Presidential race was concerned. It was cut off from practical participation in the election where the issue was sectional, for whether it would or would not vote could make no difference. A solid electoral Southern vote could be only its protest in the Union under the Constitution. The actual severance of the inter-state comity which made North and South one country had already so far happened that the executive and legislative policies of the United States were dependent upon the result of the conflict raging in the Northern States. It was evident that the North was about to decide the important question whether the whole country composed of all the States shall be ruled by a part of the States. [316]

Chapter VI

The crisis produced by sectionalism.

The effect produced by the Presidential contest of 1860

Northern Extremlsts

Buchanan

South

Mr. Lincoln was elected to the Presidency by a majority of the electoral votes of the States exclusively North, but his electoral vote represented only about one-third of the individual voters of the Union. He received 1,857,610 votes out of a few less than 5,000,000 total cast. The section which had gained a ‘fixed majority’ of the electoral votes by States, put a President and Vice-President in office against the protesting votes of nearly three millions of the voting people of the United States, and it should be observed that even a united vote of the anti-Lincoln electors would not have changed the result. A minority of States and of people placed a new administration in power. The election was legal according to the letter of the law, but this singular subjection of majority to minority with its coincident paralysis of the voting power of the States in the South, occurred through the divisions of the national conservative voters. The official count of the votes was made in due time according to established usage, whereupon Vice-President Breckinridge made the announcement of Mr. Lincoln's election amid [317] the profound silence of assembled Congress, nor was the proclamation saluted by a single cheer from the multitude present in the capital at the time. More than regret was felt at the result of this election in quite every part of the United States. The feeling that a wrong had occurred in the Republic under legal procedure at the ballot box prevailed North as well as South. The national sense of propriety, of fairness, of generosity was wounded. Northern States had banded together to use the power of the State electoral vote under constitutional forms in order to acquire political ascendency; giving only the one reason for this movement, that the Southern States possessed property under the same Constitution which ought not to be recognized. Regret was quickly followed by anxiety for the consequences. The North became excited with apprehensions of danger to the Union, and public meetings were held in Northern cities to express the sentiments of the people. （Lunt, 382.) The imports of specie, always sensitive, began to decrease. Orders from America to Europe countermanded the orders previously sent, and foreign trade fell off. Southern buyers of Northern goods, and Northern sellers were in mutual distress. The tremblings of general intersectional trade manifested the dangers into which the peculiar system of interstate commerce had been precipitated. The prices of securities fell and government credit went down. All business became depressed. The mails bore tons of letters and circulars from manufacturers and merchants deprecating disunion, and presenting in strong terms the damage that would follow sectional divisions. Business men publicly stated the great value of the South to the Union and to the trade of the North. ‘The North derives from forty to fifty millions revenue annually from Southern consumption through the tariff. The aggregate trade of the South in Northern markets was estimated at $400,000,000 every year.’ One statement was made that the North [318] enjoyed a profit of $200,000,000 per annum out of its Southern business.

Within five weeks after the election Northern efforts were strenuously put forth to avert secession. （Blaine.) Chief Justice Shaw, lately of the Supreme court of Massachusetts, united with about thirty eminent citizens of his State in an address, strong in declarations of existing perils, and urging State action to soften the blow which had fallen. A great mass meeting was held in Philadelphia to assure the South that the impending dangers would be averted. Jere Black, of Pennsylvania, denounced ‘the success of the Republican party as a portent of direst evil,’ pronouncing the fears of the South natural, and their serious protest to be justifiable. （Blaine, 231.) The elections in December in many places showed a decrease of Republican strength. This meager summary imperfectly shows the apprehensions of civil trouble which now startled the thoughtful nonpartisan Northern population.

But in these thirty critical days, following the presidential election, the disunion spirit both North and South countervailed the conciliatory efforts of patriots everywhere. There was a strong sentiment for separation existing in the North as well as the South. Its presence was evinced by the declarations of leaders like Senator Wade, who said in public speech to his people: ‘You have no Union today worthy of the name. I am here a conservative man, knowing as I do that the only salvation to your Union is that you divest it entirely of the taint of slavery. If we cannot have that, then I go for no Union at all, but I go for a fight.’ Mr. Chase advised that ‘the South is not worth fighting for.’ Andrew Johnson declared that Mr. Sumner wanted to break up the government. Mr. Beecher pronounced the Constitution as the foundation of the troubles because it attempted to hold together two opposing principles which will not agree. The Tribune, while ridiculing the Southern [319] people as ‘misguided, excited brethren,’ announced that ‘if they choose to form an independent nation they have a moral right to do so.’

The recoil, however, from the commercial results of sectional ascendency, and the manifestations of angry willingness in the North to have the Union relieved of the South and its institutions, were by no means universal. Exasperating expressions uttered by the rallying supporters of the new policy still more counteracted the sincere endeavors of many great leaders North and South to allay the engendered feeling. The spirit of coercion, if that should become necessary, very quickly answered the fears expressed that the valuable South might be lost. (American Conflict, 356, 397.) Politics of a party character began to work. （Blaine, 274.) The radical press ridiculed the address of Judge Shaw and his distinguished associates, and the great war Governor of Massachusetts recommended in his message no concessions to the rebellious South, intimating that if the South seceded it would suffer the bloody fate of St. Domingo. ‘The sentiment of nine-tenths of the Free States,’ said another leader, ‘is opposed to compromise of principle. These men want no compromise with slave labor, no unfair competition between their adventurous toil and the investments of Southern capital.’ Mr. Sherman, who was decidedly the most intellectual statesman of his party, and a strong partisan as he states for himself, submitted to the Philadelphia meeting his opinion that the Union of all the States must be maintained ‘under all circumstances against all enemies at home or abroad. Disunion is war! God knows I do not threaten it, for I will seek to prevent it in every way possible.’ （Sherman's Recollections, p. 208.) A horrible suggestion was made by others in order to show how powerless the South was, that when the United States made war upon seceded States servile insurrections would secure a speedy subjugation. But this suggestion was promptly [320] rebuked by such men as Edward Everett, who pronounced the reliance on butchery of Southerners by negroes as monstrous. Even this abated discussion of any supposed rising of the Southern slaves shows the inflamed condition of public sentiment, while it also disclosed the general ignorance of the relations existing between master and slave in the South. The waiting of the negroes for war to end, while remaining faithful to the close, surprised the North and evoked the generous spirit of the South.

It must be borne in mind that there was no universal hostility existing between the people at large of the two sections. The angry fires burned at first in the hearts of the few, who in sheer partisanship or in some degree of fanaticism, regarded the issues North and South as an irrepressible conflict indeed.

But there were many strong ties binding the citizenry of the two sections in friendly unity. Business relations may be mentioned first as extending into every Southern town whose merchants traded in the Northern cities. Social ties, formed among families, who by the thousands had mingled in the summer months especially. There were also strong political affinities of Southern and Northern politicians. College attachments began in many Northern colleges where the Southern youths were sent to be educated. Army and navy comradeship existed among the officers. Intermarriages were numerous. Northern born men who had come South left behind them great numbers of kindred.

Turning from consideration of the public apprehensions existing in the North, and surveying the South, we discover equal evidences of alarm. The South saw that it was a loser whether it remained in the Union or separated from it. An uneasy feeling pervaded the masses and extended among the commercial men in Southern towns. Capital became alarmed. All classes of business felt the shock of the apprehension of evil. Trade [321] was disturbed, investments ceased and general commerce was restrained. Money was hoarded and a cloud of financial distress began to rise. The banks of the South, being in close correspondence with those of the North, gathered in their resources and looked forward to necessitated suspension.. The South had cherished an idea that Lincoln could not be elected. The possibility was at first contemplated, and urged as a ground of opposition to him, by all lovers of fraternal Union throughout the United States. His party was regarded awhile by all political bodies South as their common enemy. But divisions having taken place, and the sectional hostility developing more and more, the possibility grew rapidly during the canvass into a saddening probability, ending at last in a despairing certainty. The extreme Southern States especially were shocked by the news of the disastrous defeat of all conservative candidates by the one sectional candidate. Indignation and fears expressed by individuals, were taken up by the crowds which met in the streets of towns and cities. Public meetings were called to consider the situation. Legislatures in session at the time took up the dreadful question. Governors of States either sent special messages to the assembled legislators, or in States where the legislature was not in session, the governors took other official notice of the event. Governor Brown, of Georgia, advised a restraining course of legislation against such States in the North as had enacted laws hostile to the South, and also a discrimination against the manufactures or other products of such States. The election of Lincoln was held even by Union men in the South to be a violation of national comity that should be submitted to only temporarily. The election was conceded to be constitutional, although effected by scarcely more than one-third of the popular vote, and hence could not be resisted on the plea of illegality. They agreed, that inasmuch as the whole South was not united on secession, [322] it would be wise to wait long enough to secure cooperation. It was also hoped that the delay of a few months would increase sympathy on behalf of the South, and the North would have time to do justice. The South was not prepared to go to war and in the opinion of many ‘Secession meant war and war only.’ Some thought that sufficient efforts for reconciliation had not been made and urged the exhaustion of every remedy prior to secession. ‘It is our duty,’ said these earnest men, ‘to preserve our government for the sake of its example to all people desiring the benefit of our free institutions.’ Their plan was to call State conventions with the purpose of sending authorized delegates to a general convention of Southern States, which would make the Southern demand for a fraternal settlement. If such a settlement be refused then the whole South should withdraw together and form a separate government.

‘The time has come,’ said these Southern Union men, ‘for the settlement finally of sectional questions upon an enduring and unequivocal basis,’ and they proposed to entrust to a general conference of Southern States the duty of declaring what that basis should be. Mr. Toombs, in a letter to citizens of Virginia early in December, recommended delay of separate State secession until after the fourth of March, the day of Mr. Lincoln's inauguration, and also that some immediate action be taken by Northern States favoring new constitutional guarantees, and other evidences of their purpose to cease sectional hostility. Within the four months yet before the inaugural, the South could be made contented to remain in the Union, even under a sectional administration, but if no such action be taken, if this test should fail to show Northern fraternal spirit, then the time for action would be brought on. Mr. Toombs also thought at that time, early in December, that this much of delay was due the hopeful men who believed redress could be obtained without disunion. [323]

These views in the South concerning co-operation of Southern States in common policy were exceedingly popular during November and December, 1860. Their popularity, however, was decreased by the open opposition to any compromise by the controlling radical element in the victorious new party. The conciliatory voice of the commercial interests, and the pathetic pleadings of such men as those who had assembled in various Northern cities to allay the unseemly strife, were drowned by the cry that the party which had won the fight must dictate the policy of its administration. It was further answered that the action of a convention of States to secede together, would be a combination violating the expressed prohibitions of the Constitution, and that there was, according to the judgment of jurists, no legal secession except by separate State ordinance. Disunion by separate secession, therefore, grew rapidly in the favor of several States before the date of Carolina's ordinance of secession.

The month of November was crowded with significant events, which may be mentioned in brief terms: In accordance with its own law the legislature of South Carolina met November 5th to choose its presidential electors, but the absorbing question was the course the State should pursue. Resolutions were offered in the Senate proposing secession by co-operation with other States which were supported by a few members. (Am. Conflict, 333, 335.) Meanwhile an inspection of the forts was going on by orders of Mr. Floyd, secretary of war, who was known to be opposed to secession. (Records, II, 70, 74, 76.) The United States officers in Forts Moultrie and Sumter displayed unusual activity in work upon their respective positions. The Georgia legislature met on the 8th and the message of its governor foreshadowed to South Carolina the co-operation of his State. Mr. Stephens threw all his influence against secession in a speech of remarkable power, and opened an [324] unsatisfactory correspondence with Mr. Lincoln in regard to his policy. The Louisiana legislature, after discussion, proposed a convention to be held at once. Greeley so severely attacked the South as to draw out replies from Governor Seymour and others. The reports made daily by the Southern press of proceedings at the North, and the unsatisfactory course of the Buchanan administration, only deepened the convictions of South Carolina, and amidst the conditions of public sentiment no other course except that of a call for a convention of the State could have been taken. By the mere accident that under the old usage of this State its legislature met at the time of the presidential election, the responsibility of leading in secession fell upon South Carolina, and hence on the 12th of November the legislature passed the bill to call a convention, but placed the time of its assembling December 17th, more than six weeks from the presidential election, giving ample time in the emergency for a full vote of its people.

The legislatures of Georgia, North Carolina, Mississippi and Alabama met during November, and were followed by other States in the call for separate State conventions. Thus early, and in ample time for initiating an adjustment, the administration of Buchanan was summoned to the high duty of making the Union secure, and the interests of all sections safe, even under the rule of the geographical party by which it had been defeated. [325]

Chapter VII

Opportunity to stay secession lost.

Yet four months of power

there were yet four months of the Buchanan administration, from November 3, 1860, to March 4, 1861, during which time the majority of the people favorable to the peaceful settlement of all issues between themselves and the South had control of the government and power to define its policy. The folly of division among those who had supported national parties was now clearly seen, and early in November the temper of the North was conciliatory, and the sentiment in the South, except South Carolina, was stronger for the Union than against it. President Buchanan had already suffered by the breach in his party, and now had sufficient cause to fear that a broken Union would pass from his hands into the direction of the triumphant Republicans. Unfortunately, he seems to have despaired at once of any arrest of the progress of secession, and only hoped to cast the responsibility of making war upon his successor. In this condition the South was without power over the Northern States and without substantial influence in the general government. Although its friends were victorious in the general ballot, they were [326] beaten in the electoral vote, and now the South was in a fixed minority, utterly unable to pass any resolutions in Congress, or direct any act of the President.

It has been unjustly said of President Buchanan that ‘not a step was taken by his administration before the meeting of Congress in December to arrest the progress of secession.’ It is true that the President manifested irresolution as to the methods he should adopt to stay the movement of the South, but there is no proof that he was influenced to consent to the withdrawal of any State. His apparent vacillations were those of a man whose purpose was fixed, but whose mind failed to comprehend the means that should be used. Hence he threaded his way painfully through an ever-thickening maze of difficulties, until he wearily dragged himself to the mark where his official responsibility ceased. His cabinet, with a controlling majority composed of anti-secessionists, had consulted often on the policy of the government in the one absorbing question. Even in October Gen. Scott's plans to make secession impossible, were respectfully considered and rejected because they were impracticable. Such a movement of the United States troops, as proposed by Gen. Scott, toward the forts and garrisons in the South, making plain the purpose ‘to pin the South to the Union by bayonets,’ would have precipitated war before the election, and resulted in the capture of the entire regular army in detail. It was therefore declined, and the attention of the administration was turned toward the abandonment of South Carolina to its secession purposes, in the hope of confining the movement to that one State. The resignations of Federal judicial officers in South Carolina occurred in November, but so far as other functions of government could be performed they were still executed as if no discontent prevailed, and in the meantime Mr. Floyd, secretary of war, ordered Col. Porter, November 6th, to inspect troops and fortifications in Charleston Harbor, who made the inspection and returned [327] a full report on the following week. The work on the several forts was increased through the energies of Captain Foster and Major Robert Anderson. Major Anderson, under instructions from Secretary Floyd, reported the improved condition of the forts, made further suggestions as to the best means of making any attack from Charleston futile, and said significantly, ‘There is not so much feverish excitement as there was last week, but that there is a settled determination to leave the Union and to obtain possession of this work (Fort Moultrie) is apparent to all... I do, therefore, most earnestly entreat that a reinforcement be immediately sent to this garrison, and that at least two companies be sent at the same time to Fort Sumter and Castle Pinckney—half a company under a judicious commander sufficing, I think, for the latter work. I feel the full responsibility of making the above suggestions, because I firmly believe that as soon as the people of South Carolina learn that I have demanded reinforcements and that they have been ordered, they will occupy Castle Pinckney and attack this fort. It is, therefore, of vital importance that the troops embarked, say in war steamers, shall be designated for other duty.’ (Records, I, 75.)

Thus early the administration was brought to consider the question of reinforcement as an act of war. Maj. Anderson advised the reinforcement secretly by the strategy of designating in public orders the expedition for other duty, but in reality to relieve and strengthen the forts in Charleston Harbor. Captain Foster advised that ‘in case the department does not consider it expedient to send troops’ there should be a corps of employes armed to be effective as soldiers in an emergency. The administration adopted Foster's suggestion at once and took that of Maj. Anderson into the consideration which its gravity demanded. (Records, I, 77.)

It thus appears that during two months before the withdrawal of South Carolina, the administration, through [328] the energetic action of the general-in-chief and its military officers in South Carolina, did whatever was in its power short of an open act of hostility to make the secession ineffective. What it did, however, was irritating to the people since all the proceedings of the government were well understood in Charleston and all exhibited the purpose of Mr. Buchanan to hold the forts if possible against any attempt of South Carolina to occupy them. It is just to say that the administration of Buchanan did enough in November toward strengthening the harbor defenses in its possession, to justify the apprehensions of the people of Charleston that their city might be cut off from the world, and be made defenseless in the event that South Carolina seceded. (Life of Buchanan.)

President Buchanan fortified his policy by asking very early in November the official opinion of Attorney General Black, which was delivered on the 20th of the month. According to that opinion the President had only the duty of executing the laws of the Union, without resorting to military force against a State declaring its withdrawal from the Union. He said, ‘If it be true that war cannot be de. dared nor a system of general hostilities carried on by the General Government against a State, then it seems to follow that an attempt to do so would be ipso facto an expulsion of such State from the Union. Being treated as an alien and an enemy she would be compelled to act accordingly; and if Congress shall break up the present Union by unconstitutionally putting strife and enmity and armed hostility between different sections of the country instead of the “ domestic tranquillity ” which the Constitution was meant to insure, will not all the States be absolved from their Federal obligations? Is any portion of the people bound to contribute their money or their blood to carry on a contest like that?’ Upon the legal opinion of this great constitutional lawyer from Pennsylvania and on the judgment of his cabinet, composed [329] of Cass of Michigan, Floyd of Virginia, Toucey of Connecticut, Cobb of Georgia, Holt of Kentucky, Thompson of Mississippi, and Black of Pennsylvania, none of whom were disunionists, unless Mr. Cobb of Georgia be so considered, the President held to his declared policy until the assembling of Congress.

In addition to these efforts to preserve the status quo, President Buchanan called to Washington from various sections of the Union a number of patriotic and eminent men to get their counsel on the grave situation. This was done also in November, previous to the assembly of Congress, and among the number thus summoned was Mr. Jefferson Davis, senator from Mississippi. Mr. Davis, in speaking of events preceding hostilities and of the prominent civil actors remarked, ‘Mr. Buchanan was an able man but a timid one. If he had had the nerve to deal with the situation as its gravity demanded, I doubt exceedingly whether any other State South would have followed South Carolina into secession. Had he withdrawn the troops from Sumter, it would have been such a conspicuous act of conciliation that the States would not, I believe, have called conventions to consider the act of secession, or if they had, the ordinances would not have passed. I was not one of those who believed that there could be a peaceable separation of the States but could not convince our people of it.’

The United States Congress met December 3rd, 1860, all States being represented in the House, and all in the Senate except South Carolina, whose senators did not occupy their seats. The message of President Buchanan, after describing the great prosperity of the United States, asks the question, ‘Why is it then that discontent now so extensively prevails?’ And the true answer is given that ‘the long continued and intemperate interference of the Northern people with the question of slavery in the Southern States has at last produced its natural effects. The different sections of the Union are [330] now arrayed against each other and the time arrived so much dreaded by the “Father of his country” when hostile geographical parties have been formed.’ The message discussed with clearness the just complaint made by the Southern people against the sectional and meddlesome legislation of Northern States and on this the language of this Northern-born President is as strong in its presentation of Southern views as can be found in any speech made by such representative leaders as Mr. Crittenden, Mr. Stephens, Mr. Mason and Mr. Jefferson Davis. Referring to the ease with which the disturbing cause could be removed and peace restored to the distracted country, the venerable President said, ‘How easy would it be for the American people to settle the slavery question forever and to restore peace and harmony to this distracted country! They, and they alone can do it. All that is necessary to accomplish the object and all for which the slave States have ever contended is to be let alone and permitted to manage their domestic institutions in their own way. As sovereign States, they, and they alone are responsible before God and the world for the slavery existing among them.’ The message censured the nullification laws of several Northern States called Personal Liberty bills and declared that the other States had the right to demand their repeal as an act of justice. ‘Should this be refused, then the Constitution to which all the States are parties will have been willfully violated by one portion of them in a provision essential to the domestic security and happiness of the remainder. In that event the injured States, after having used all peaceful and constitutional means to obtain redress, would be justified in revolutionary resistance to the government of the Union.’ The position taken in the message that secession was unconstitutional but coercion was equally so, subjected the President to severe criticism. He was accused of evading the duty devolved on him of settling the dispute by a vigorous resistance to [331] the spirit of secession, or by the acquiescence of the United States in an act which was deemed deplorable but nevertheless constitutional. The South rested its case on the justification of resistance and not on the form of resistance. If revolutionary resistance was justifiable, the justification of secession was proved, since in its worst aspect secession by States can only be revolution by their people.

These official declarations of the President were regarded as of somewhat doubtful interpretation and therefore did not give satisfaction. Yet the general effect of the message throughout the South was to induce further effort in the direction indicated by the Virginia speech of Mr. Toombs to secure protection against sectional aggression by the new administration before the final step of revolution or secession should be taken. It strengthened the hope of the Union men in the South, that speedy action might be taken in accordance with the plan of the President, to make such constitutional amendments and such State legislation as would secure the Southern States against external assaults upon their property, leaving them to deal with the troublesome problem in their own way.

The message was referred to the House committee of thirty-three, one from each State appointed by the speaker, but this committee was regarded by many members as being unfortunately or ominously constructed, since there were sixteen members taken from the supporters of Mr. Lincoln who represented a little more than one-third of the voters in the United States, and also because ‘there was not a single representative of the National Democratic party on the committee from the sixteen free States.’ Mr. McClernand, of Illinois, denounced the manner in which the committee had been constituted by Speaker Corwin as an offensive discrimination against the Northern Democracy. （Cong. Globe.)

When the Senate received the message, an intensely [332] interesting discussion occurred at once. Mr. Clingman, of North Carolina, said that ‘the general tone of the message is eminently patriotic, but it falls short of stating the case now before the country. It is not merely that a dangerous man has been elected to the Presidency of the United States. We know that under our complicated system that might very well occur by accident and he be powerless; but I assert that the President-elect has been elected because he was known to be a dangerous man. He avows the principle of the “Irrepressible conflict;” he declares that it is the purpose of the North to make war upon my section until its social system has been destroyed and for that he was taken up and elected. That declaration of war is dangerous because it has been endorsed by a majority of the votes of the free States in the late election. It is this great, remarkable and dangerous fact that has filled my section with alarm and dread for the future.’ Mr. Lane, of Oregon, said, ‘It is the principles upon which the late election has taken place that have given rise to the trouble. Never in any previous presidential election has the issue been so fully put, so directly made as in the late one.’ Mr. Brown, of Mississippi, asked, ‘Do you mean to say that we shall neither have peace in the Union, nor be allowed the poor boon of seeking it out of the Union?’ Mr. Douglas declared that he was ‘willing to act with any party, with any individual of any party who will come to this question with an eye single to the preservation of the Constitution and the Union.’ Mr. Jefferson Davis, following Mr. Douglas, stated that he did not intend to enter into a statement of grievances. ‘I do not here intend to renew the war of crimination which for years past has disturbed the country and in which I have taken a part perhaps more zealous than useful; but I call upon all men who have in their hearts a love of the Union, and whose service is not merely that of the lip, to look the question calmly but fully in the face that they may see the true [333] cause of our danger, which from my examination I believe to be that a sectional hostility has been substituted for a general fraternity and thus the government rendered powerless for the ends for which it is constituted. Then, where is the remedy? the question may be asked. In the hearts of the people, is the ready reply; and therefore it is that I turn to the other side of this chamber, to the majority section, to the section in which have been committed the acts that now threaten the dissolution of the Union. I call on you, the representatives of that section, here and now to say so if your people are not hostile, if they have the fraternity with which their fathers came to form the Union; if they are prepared to do justice; to abandon their opposition to the Constitution and the laws of the Union; to recognize, and to maintain, and to defend all the rights and benefits the Union was designed to promote and to secure. Give us that declaration; give us that evidence of the will of your constituency to restore us to our original position when mutual kindness was the animating motive and then we may hopefully look for remedies which may suffice;—not by organizing armies, not so much by enacting laws, as by repressing the spirit of hostility and lawlessness, and seeking to live up to the obligations of good neighbors and friendly States united for the common welfare.’

Pending the general discussion a resolution was offered to appoint the Senate committee of thirteen to consider and report on the present agitated and distracted condition of the country, which was at length adopted. The committee was appointed December 20th, composed of Powell, Hunter, Crittenden, Seward, Toombs, Douglas, Collamer, Jefferson Davis, Wade, Bigler, Rice, Doolittle and Grimes. Mr. Crittenden also offered his celebrated resolutions, upon which the eminently patriotic senior senator hoped that peaceful agreement might be reached. These resolutions provided that certain amendments to the Constitution prohibiting slavery in all territories [334] north of 360° 30′ and allowing its existence in territories south of that line, but requiring admission of States with or without slavery as the constitution of new States may provide. Also forbidding Congress to abolish slavery in any place within the limits of the slave States, or in the District of Columbia as long as it exists in Maryland or Virginia. The resolutions also provided for payment to the owner of a fugitive slave the value of his property where the restoration was prevented, and expressly reaffirmed that Congress had no power to interfere with slavery in the States. [335]

Chapter VIII

Secession made inevitable.

Vigorous work to strengthen Fort Sumter

Suspending attention to the action of Congress during December, it will be observed that events were thickening the political sky of the Union, of which a mere summary is all that need be given December 1st, Maj. Anderson informs Adjutant-General Cooper that South Carolina regards the landing of stores at the forts, and the proposed vigorous work to put them in a state of defense as acts of aggression and advises the government to determine at once its course in the event of the secession of the State. Mr. Floyd, secretary of war, instructs Anderson, December 11th, to avoid every act which would provoke aggression, but to hold possession of the forts and if attacked to defend them to the last extremity. The South Carolina State government resolves to permit no assault by any unorganized body of men on the forts and to await the assembling of the convention. Mr. Cobb, secretary of the treasury, resigns, assigning as his reason that his duty to Georgia demanded it, and the vacancy was supplied by the appointment of Mr. Philip [336] F. Thomas. Mr. Cass, soon afterward, December 12th, resigned the portfolio of state on account of his disagreement with the administration on the question of reinforcement of Anderson at Charleston Harbor, and Attorney-General Black assumed his place. Mr. Stanton enters the cabinet as attorney-general. Public discussions take place in many Southern States and elections are held for delegates to State conventions. A public meeting was held in Baltimore to hear the speech of a commissioner from Mississippi. The State of South Carolina secedes December 20th, and appoints Barnwell, Adams and Orr commissioners to proceed to Washington to treat for the possession of the United States property within the limits of that State. A public meeting held in New York City, December 22d, was addressed by Mr. Seward, in which he expressed the opinion that the example of South Carolina would not be followed by many other States and that for every State that will go out there will be two to take its place glad to come in. ‘You will see Canada and all the Mexican States rushing in to fill up the vacancy.’ Pronouncing secession a humbug and a delusion, he avowed that no State should be allowed to secede, advised coolness and kindness, with the prediction that the suns of sixty days will give a brighter atmosphere. (Ency. Am. of 1861, p. 530.) During this eventful month the President-elect, Mr. Lincoln, was in active correspondence with the leaders of his party in which he early gave the advice, ‘prevent as far as possible any of our friends from demoralizing themselves and our cause by entertaining propositions for compromise of any sort on slavery extension. There is no possible compromise upon it but which puts us under again and all our work to do over again.’ (Reminiscences, p. 30.)

The secession of South Carolina from the United States was effected by the ordinance of a convention elected by qualified voters of the State under the provisions of the act of its legislature. The act of the convention [337] is properly called an ordinance because of its supremely important character, and it is noticeable that all measures were adopted which would give dignity to this extraordinary assertion of the sovereignty residing in the people of the State. It was by the accident of its legislature being assembled according to the usage of South Carolina to choose presidential electors, that this State gained its distinctive precedence in the procession of States into the Confederacy. In the report of one of the committees of the convention the belief is expressed that ‘the sister States of the South will correctly interpret our action in taking the initiative as arising by no means from any presumptuous arrogance, but from the advanced position which circumstances have given to this State in the line of procedure for the great design, the rights, the security and the very existence of the slaveholding South.’

The South Carolina legislature being in session on the presidential election day directed the vote of the State to be cast for Breckinridge and proceeded on the next day to consider the grave situation created by the success of the sectional party. An act carefully worded was passed calling for a convention of the State to meet at Columbia, December 17th, and providing for the election of delegates. The retiring governor, Gist, in his final message expressed his trust that ‘by the 28th of December, no flag but the Palmetto will float over any part of South Carolina,’ and his successor, Governor Pickens, in his inaugural condemned ‘the great overt act of the people in the Northern States at the ballot box in the exercise of their sovereign power at the polls from which there is no higher appeal recognized under our system of government in its ordinary operations.’ After passing the convention bill and a few other measures called for by the proposed secession the legislature took a recess until the 17th day of December, which had been designated as the day on which the convention was to assemble. [338]

Immediately after the adjournment of the convention the people of the State nominated candidates and proceeded with the election according to the law of the State. The most eminent and conservative citizens were selected as delegates and when the convention assembled at noon, December 17th, 1861, it was found to be composed of the most intelligent members of the commonwealth. Mr. David Jamison was selected as president and the convention adjourned to meet at Charleston the next day. On assembling in Charleston a committee to draft an ordinance of secession was appointed composed of Inglis, Rhett, Chestnut, Orr, Maxcy Gregg, Dunkin and Hudson. In addition to this committee others were appointed on relations with the Southern States, on foreign relations, on the State constitution and one to prepare an address to the people of the South.

After two days the first committee appointed to draft an ordinance of secession made their formal report, submitting with it for the consideration of the convention the following measure:

An ordinance to dissolve the Union between the State of South Carolina and other States united with her under the compact entitled, “The Constitution of the United States of America.”
We, the people of the State of South Carolina, in convention assembled, do declare and ordain and it is hereby declared and ordained that the ordinance adopted by us in convention on the twenty-third day of May in the year of our Lord One Thousand Seven Hundred and Eighty-eight, whereby the Constitution of the United States was ratified, and also all acts and all parts of acts of the General Assembly of the State ratifying amendments of the said Constitution, are hereby repealed, and the Union now subsisting between South Carolina and other States under the name of the United States of America is hereby dissolved.

[339]

The convention was fully prepared to vote and the ordinance was passed unanimously. Thus South Carolina was placed in political relations where the State stood on the date of the Declaration of Independence, July 4th, 1776. The passage of the act was followed by a ceremonial signing, which was done in the presence of the governor and both branches of the legislature, after which President Jamison announced, ‘The Ordinance of Secession has been signed and ratified, and I proclaim the State of South Carolina an independent commonwealth.’ On the 24th Governor Pickens issued his formal proclamation, announcing the same event and declaring to the world that South Carolina ‘is, as she has a right to be, a separate, sovereign, free and independent State.’

The ‘Address of the convention to the Southern States’ and the ‘Declaration of the causes which justify the secession of South Carolina from the Union’ were read and adopted after full debate. The committee on relations with Southern States advised the appointment of a commissioner to each State convention as the bearer of our invitation to unite in forming a Southern Confederacy under a Constitution similar to that of the United States. The convention passed provisional regulations for continuing commerce and administering State government in all departments, thus securing the people against anarchy.

The distinguished commissioners to the United States appointed by the convention—Mr. Barnwell, Mr. Adams and Mr. Orr, reached Washington on the 26th, and on the 28th sent in their credentials with a letter to the President. By the untimely and unadvised maneuvre of Maj. Anderson at this juncture, December 27th, in removing his command from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter, spiking the guns, burning the carriages and cutting down the flag staff, the situation was suddenly and fatally changed. This warlike strategic movement [340] caused the South Carolina military to occupy Fort Moultrie and Castle Pinckney, producing a movement of troops under arms and placing them at once in hostile attitude. This movement was made by the gallant Anderson under a rumor that he was about to be attacked. He acted under a mistake but nevertheless his maneuvre was an act of military hostility. It was doubly unfortunate because it violated the understanding between the President and the South Carolina authorities, and now broke off the negotiations between the commissioners and the President. Mr. Buchanan stated that Maj. Anderson acted upon his own responsibility and without instructions and that his first promptings were to command him to return to his former position, but now he accepted the act and declared he would defend Fort Sumter.

It is probable that verbal interviews with Maj. Anderson were more extensive than appears in the written memorandum, and that this officer had been impressed with the fact that the responsibility would be laid upon him as the military commander in order that the civil authorities might escape without reproach. It is inferred from the last clause of the instructions to Anderson that the pledge not to change the military status of the forts should be broken whenever he deemed it prudent to evacuate one or more forts in order to concentrate upon another.

South Carolina, however, was relying upon no reinforcement being attempted and no changes taking place in the military status. The Federal administration was therefore compelled to defend itself against the charge that the pledge had been secretly disregarded and was now openly broken. Buchanan assured the commissioners that when he learned that Anderson had left Fort Moultrie for Sumter his first promptings were to command him to return, but excused his neglect to pursue this wise course on the plea that this could only have been done [341] with any degree of safety to the command by the concurrence of the South Carolina authorities. He does not state that he knew of this movement on the morning of the 27th and that he could have sent instructions to Anderson by telegram within an hour. His hesitation throughout the days of the 27th and the 28th and even to the 31st, which is the date of his reply, to take the step dictated by the promptings of his best judgment, put him and his government in the wrong, and justified Carolina in the general belief that the plighted faith of the United States had been violated. On the 27th the South Carolina flag was raised over Pinckney and on the night of the 27th South Carolina troops occupied, without firing a gun, the abandoned Moultrie. The State was at that time claiming to be an independent republic entitled to occupy all the forts within its territory. It was peacefully waiting for them to be evacuated. It had kept its plighted word to the United States government. There appeared to be no other course to pursue except the occupation of the deserted fort. Buchanan complains that the State without waiting for or asking for any explanations and doubtless believing that the officer had acted not only without but against the President's orders, on the very next day after the night when the removal was made, seized by a military force two of the three Federal forts in the harbor of Charleston and covered them under their own flag instead of that of the United States. The State of South Carolina and the South generally construed this movement of Maj. Anderson as an act of war, a hostile maneuvre, authorized by his own understanding of the real intentions of his government. Anderson desired to avoid bloodshed by an act in itself hostile but which would deter the Carolinians from making an attack. He gave up two forts to make himself strong in the third and by doing so committed the act of war. The citizens of a peaceful town can be so invested by guns as to force a surrender without bloodshed and [342] without the firing of a gun by either party. The investment would nevertheless be an act of war. The movement of troops to take a better position in view of hostilities would be war. The order to move would be the first act of war. The official inauguration of war may be made by one party, and the first gun may be fired and the first blood may be drawn by the other. An assault with intent to murder may precede any blow. The defense by the assailed party may be the first blow struck. The justification is that the blow was struck against one who manifestly intended to kill. Anderson expressed the wish that “South Carolina will not attempt to take the forts by force but will resort to diplomacy to secure them.” (Records I, 76.) He also asked for special instructions, ‘As my position here is rather a politico-military than a military one.’ The conclusion from all these occurrences is, that the State intended to secede peaceably, and ‘that the United States intended to make secession impossible.’

The commissioners of South Carolina, having wholly failed in the negotiations with which they were intrusted, reported the entire correspondence between themselves and the United States executive, and the convention having concluded its work adjourned the 5th of January, 1861.

It is a noteworthy incident of the times that on the 21st of December, the day after the secession of South Carolina, and nearly a week before the occupation of any fort by South Carolina, Mr. Lincoln wrote the following letter to Mr. E. B. Washburne, marked ‘Confidential’ but given to the public in 1885:

Springfield, Dec. 21, 1860.
Hon. E. B. Washburne,

My Dear Sir:—Last night I received your letter giving an account of your interview with Gen. Scott, for which I thank you. Please present my respects to the General and tell him confidentially I shall be obliged to [343] him to be as well prepared as he can to either hold or retake the forts as the case may require at and after the inauguration.

Yours, as ever,

A. Lincoln.

On the next day, December 22d, 1860, Mr. Lincoln wrote to Mr. Stephens, of Georgia, a letter marked ‘For your eye only,’ in which he asks, ‘Do the people of the South entertain fears that a Republican administration would directly or indirectly interfere with the slaves, or with them about their slaves? If they do I wish to assure you as once a friend and still I hope not an enemy, that there is no cause for fears.’ (War between the States I, 267.)

Taking up agan the proceedings of Congress for brief review, the severe charge made against it by President Buchanan may be recalled that it ‘deliberately refused throughout the entire session to pass any act or resolution either to preserve the Union by peaceful measures or to furnish the President or his successor with a military force to repel any attack which might be made by the Cotton States.’ In his opinion the opposing parties instead of presenting the peaceful aspect becoming the representatives of a great confederacy assembled to promote the various interests of their constituency, breathed nothing but mutual defiance. Severe as this indictment is, it was evidently made upon the evidence furnished by speeches and ballots influenced rather by ambitious dreams of party supremacy, than by patriotism. Northern statesmen either did not appreciate the danger or were willing to hazard everything on the chances of war. Yet the charge is too generally sweeping to be accepted as history. Resolutions were offered, other forms of legislation were attempted and there were occasions when the change of a few votes would have stayed secession and restored the Union.

The most prominent of these opportunities were furnished [344] by the resolutions offered in the Senate and also to the committee of thirteen by the venerable Crittenden. This Senate committee of thirteen unfortunately met late in December, not assembling until action had been taken by South Carolina. In fact not only the preceding three weeks of the congressional session, but months of irritating canvass for the presidency, had been employed more in facilitating the disruption, than in efforts to restore the distracted country to a state of harmony. The President next waited for Congress, and Congress on assembling threw the responsibility upon the Northern States, without considering that these States had already acted and could not now be brought to consider a compromise early enough to arrest the movement of secession which was necessarily swift.

The Senate committee of thirteen was composed of five Republicans from the North, three Northern Democrats and five senators from the South, eight members of the committee being from the North, three from the border States of Kentucky and Virginia and the other two from the Cotton States, Georgia and Mississippi. Only three of the committee were from the States which united in the Confederacy. Thus it may be seen that the committee as appointed by Breckinridge was constituted to prevent secession. Upon assembling the committee agreed that the sanction of at least a majority of five Republican committeemen was absolutely required to any report. It was therefore ‘resolved that no proposition shall be reported as adopted unless sustained by a majority of each of the classes of the committee.’ This resolution placed the responsibility together with the power of controlling the action of the committee on only three Republican supporters of the President-elect.

Mr. Crittenden submitted to the committee the same joint resolution which he had presented to the Senate, and which is known in the history of the times as the Crittenden Compromise. The resolutions ‘proposed [345] that the South should surrender their adjudged right to take slaves in all our territories, provided the North would recognize this right in the territories south of the old Missouri Compromise line.’ This amendment offered terms to the North far less favorable to the South than their existing rights under the decision of the Supreme Court, and ‘yielded everything to the North except a mere abstraction.’ （Buchanan.) Mr. Crittenden said: ‘Peace and Harmony and Union in a great nation were never purchased at so cheap a rate as we now have it in our power to do’ In legal effect the Crittenden Compromise proposed to restore and make constitutional the old Missouri Compromise, and in practical operation it turned ‘over all the vast territories of the United States to perpetual freedom with the single exception of New Mexico.’ （Buchanan.) The pitiable treatment in committee and Congress of the pacific propositions of the senior senator demonstrated the irrepressibility of the conflict, and made the existence of the Confederate States an inevitable event. The five Republican senators on the committee without exception voted down the Compromise. Mr. Toombs and Mr. Davis, from the Cotton States, voted with these five Republican senators because of the rule established by the committee requiring a majority of these five to vote in favor of any proposition to have it embodied in the report. Under this rule the vote of these five would alone have defeated any action of the committee, without the vote either way of the two senators from the extreme South. Mr. Douglas said, ‘In the committee of thirteen every member from the South, including those from the Cotton States, Messrs. Toombs and Davis, expressed their readiness to accept any proposition of my venerable friend from Kentucky as a final settlement of the controversy if tendered and sustained by the Republican members. Hence the sole responsibility of our disagreement and the only difficulty in the way of an amicable adjustment [346] are with the Republican party.’ （Douglas in appendix to Cong. Globe, p. 41.) The speeches and votes of these two Southern senators confirmed the statement made by the distinguished Illinois senator and justified the declaration made by Senator Pugh, of Ohio, and other Northern statesmen that ‘if the Crittenden Compromise had been passed early in the session it would have saved all the States except South Carolina.’

A dark hour befell the country on the reading in the Senate December 31, 1860, of the following report of the Committee: ‘The Committee of Thirteen appointed by the order of the Senate on the 20th inst. have agreed on the following resolution and report the same to the Senate: Resolved, That the committee have not been able to agree upon any general plan of adjustment and report that fact to the Senate together with the journal of the Committee.’

It is unnecessary to follow the action of Congress on the renewed efforts made to pass the Crittenden Compromise in any form, it being enough to record in advance that on the 16th of January, 1861, three days before the secession of Georgia, the whole question was dealt with in cruel frivolity by a strict party vote on a motion to strike out the entire preamble and resolution of Mr. Crittenden and insert as a substitute a preamble and resolutions of a directly opposite character and in accordance with the Chicago platform on which Mr. Lincoln had been elected. (Con. Globe, 409.) It was the spirit and purpose of such action as this which forced further secession and the consequent confederation of seceded States. [347]

Chapter 9:

Coercion and its consequence.

Policy foreshadowed in December. 8600

the last weeks of the year 1860 produced no event which betokened a peaceful solution of the controversy between North and South. On the contrary, nearly all events combined to increase the discontent and make secession and a Southern Confederacy certain. For nearly a decade the causes had been accumulating with convergent tendency to the result now near at hand. The Union was the resultant force of compromises ordained in the Constitution. Disunion was the effect produced by unpatriotic breach of these unifying principles. The Union was made possible in its beginning by the superintending presence of non-partisan patriotism. Disunion was decreed in 1860 by the necessities of party policy. There was good practical politics in the earnest charge, December, 1860, of the President-elect, Mr. Lincoln, to Senator Washburne, to prevent all compromise which would demoralize the party. The advice meant that there should be no settlement except on the terms of the late party platform,—a political manifesto made by a bare majority of States, all Northern, assembled in [348] a party convention, and voted down by nearly two-thirds of the people of the Union. The platform must now be taken as the condition of agreement and accepted as the policy of the general government. It must be insisted on as the substitute for the Crittenden Compromise; and it was thus presented as appears by the vote on the Clark amendment. The Buchanan cabinet had been first discordant, then disintegrated and afterward unified upon the policy finally adopted by the President. General Scott, the head of the army, had actively urged his proposition to relieve the President, Secretary of War and Congress from political responsibility by a movement on his own official account to strengthen the garrison at Fort Sumter. On the 30th of December, he wrote to the President for permission ‘without reference to the war department and otherwise as secretly as possible to send two hundred and fifty recruits from New York harbor to reinforce Fort Sumter, together with some extra muskets, rifles, ammunition and subsistence stores,’ and next day, the 31st, he sent an order to the commanding officer at Fort Monroe ‘to put on the sloop of war, Brooklyn, four companies of at least four hundred men with twenty-five extra stands of arms complete, destined to reinforce Fort Sumter,’ adding, ‘manage everything as secretly and confidentially as possible.’ It is presumable that his suggestions of the day before had been agreed to.

The policy of coercion by sea having clearly been foreshadowed by the course of the administration, the secretary of war, Mr. Floyd, sent in his resignation, and the position was filled at once by Mr. Holt, who favored the President's plans. Thus the year 1860 closed with a hostile order from the general commanding and a change in the head of the war department, which produced excitement and fears throughout the South. Mr. Wigfall telegraphed at once from Washington, ‘Holt succeeds Floyd. It means war. Cut off supplies of Anderson and take Sumter as soon as possible.’ [349]

Reinforcement of Fort Sumter being determined and the policy officially declared by Cabinet vote, January 2, 1861, the warlike preparations were at once hastened. Propositions made by Mr. Schultz, of New York, to furnish a vessel had already been made during December, and he was notified on January 2d, that a staff officer would see him the next day ‘to conclude arrangements.’ The staff officer, Colonel Thomas, hired the Star of the West from Mr. Schultz for $1,250 per day because the movement could be made with this vessel, the ‘Star of the West,’ without suspicion. On the same day General Scott directed Colonel Thomas to have three officers and two hundred troops with one hundred extra stands of arms and ample ammunition to be embarked. The orders enjoined complete concealment of the troops when approaching the Charleston Bay, and that Maj. Anderson be instructed to use the guns of Sumter to silence any injurious fire that should be opened upon any vessel bringing reinforcement or supplies to his fort.

These preparations were complete on January 5th, and the Star of the West with the troops and supplies sailed, followed by the warship Brooklyn. On the morning of the 9th the well-armed vessel steamed into the bay toward Fort Sumter, and was turned back by the fire of a South Carolina battery. The whole affair was a trivial play that might be classed as comic were it not a part of an awful national tragedy. The scheme concerted between the administration and General Scott was to use, not the Brooklyn, a warship of the navy, but a hired vessel, and thus convey reinforcements secretly into Sumter. If the vessel was permitted to pass the Carolina batteries, Sumter would be reinforced by 200 men, with 300 arms and ample ammunition, and three months supplies. If fired on the cry would be raised that South Carolina had begun war on the United States by firing on an unarmed vessel carrying provisions to a starving garrison. [350]

These coercive demonstrations beginning during the last days of 1860 and openly pressed in January, 1861, were made known through many sources to the people of the South, and very rapidly increased the strength of the secession movement. The governors of the South seaboard States being fully informed of the purpose of the administration to hold and to garrison the forts on their coasts, took possession of such of them as could be reduced to possession without bloodshed. Elections for delegates to State conventions were held in several States, during these threatening movements of the Federal administration, resulting in the secession of Mississippi January 9th, Florida and Alabama January 19th, Georgia January 19th and Louisiana January 26th. So well satisfied in the beginning of this year were the Southern members of Congress as to the hopelessness of any compromise and the purpose of the new secretary of war to use all the force he could command to coerce the States that certain senators from Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, Texas, Mississippi and Florida held a meeting in Washington, on January 5th, and agreed to a set of resolutions asking for instructions from their respective States whether they should remain in Congress until the 4th of March, and also declared themselves in favor of immediate State secession, and the early formation of a Confederacy. Mr. Jacob Thompson, secretary of the interior, resigned his office January 8th, as also did Governor Thomas, of Maryland, secretary of the treasury, and General Dix was appointed to the place. The new Cabinet was now composed of Messrs. Black, Dix, Holt, Toucey, Stanton and King, who served in apparent harmony to the end of the term.

The affairs of the United States were in such disorder that on January 8th, the President sent to Congress a message urging its attention to the helplessness of the executive. The treasury was empty and lenders demanded twelve per cent interest; the army was chiefly [351] the Indians; and the vessels of the navy required repairs. He complained again that Congress was delaying the Legislation which would enable him to make aggressive war against States whose hostile attitude, as he termed the procedure of secession conventions, and military preparations in the South, had assumed alarming proportions. He earnestly urged Congress to consider its responsibility, either to declare war or ‘to remove the grievances that might lead to war.’

Mr. Jefferson Davis addressed the Senate on the general issue, proposing to Congress as the proper remedy ‘to assure the people of the South that you do not intend to use physical force against them, that you intend calmly to consider all the propositions which they make and to recognize the rights which the Union was established to secure; that you intend, to settle with them upon a basis in accordance with the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States. When you do that peace will prevail over the land and force become a thing that no man will consider necessary.’ No one among the conservative Northern statesmen listening at that moment doubted his sincerity in uttering these words of peace. That he preferred settlement on some basis like that proposed by Senator Crittenden to the secession of Mississippi, whose convention was at the same time debating secession, is beyond all doubt. His overtures in these general terms were in fact understood to mean that he would accept the Crittenden compromise, but to that pacific measure the majority in Congress was unalterably opposed. Had Mr. Trumbull, Mr. Seward, Mr. Fessenden, Mr. Collamer and Mr. Hale or other five only, of such statesmen responded to this spirit of Jefferson Davis, by declaring their readiness to put the Crittenden resolutions in force, it is reasonable to say that secession would have ceased that day, January 8th, the anniversary of Jackson's victory at [352] New Orleans, from which dates the rise of the United States to political ascendancy. The number five is named because on the will of no greater number the same compromise had been crucified in the Senate committee of thirteen.

But notwithstanding the threatening aspect now presented by both sides, the legislature of Virginia adopted resolutions January 19th, 1861, inviting all States to appoint commissioners to meet in Washington February 4th, to consider and if practicable agree upon some suitable adjustment of the existing unhappy controversies in the spirit in which the Constitution was originally formed. As evidence of its earnestness the legislature appointed from among its most eminent and conservative citizens ex-President John Tyler, William C. Rives, Judge Brocken-brough, George W. Summers, and James A. Seddon to act as commissioners; and in addition selected exPresi-dent Tyler as special commissioner to the President of the United States, and Judge John Robertson to the seceded States. The resolutions were promptly laid before Congress by President Buchanan, accompanied by a message of cordial approval in which he advised Congress to abstain from passing any law calculated to produce a collision of arms pending the contemplated proceedings. But the discussions in Congress were not peace preservative. Mr. Mason expressed his pride in the honorable office which his State had undertaken, but he warned the Senate that collisions of arms would end all negotiations, and declared that no seceded State had withdrawn nor assumed possession of any forts with warlike intent. Mr. Seward on presenting a memorial from citizens of New York praying for Congress to adopt some adjustment, made remarks which excited warm replies. He defined his position in four propositions, which he had recommended to his people as the means for restoring the breaches made in the Union. First, to speak for the Union; next, vote for the Union; third, give money [353] for the Union; and last, fight for the Union. Mr. Douglas condemned the extremists whose joint efforts, he said, led to the same end. Mr. Clingman, of North Carolina, argued that one of the three contingencies was before the country, either a satisfactory settlement, or a recognition of a peaceful separation, or thirdly, war. The best course, he believed, was to ‘make an adjustment, next to that, the recognition of the seceding States as independent republics, and the worst of all is war.’

The naval appropriation bill contained a clause that authorized the construction of seven ships of war, the passage of which was regarded as irritating the disunion sentiment. Another bill proposed to abolish the ports of entry on the Southern coast, and was resented as an attempt to coerce the South by congressional legislation against the commerce of the South. Mr. Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee, offered amendments to the Constitution providing for election of the president, vice-president, and senators by the people, and to select Supreme Court judges equally from the North and the South.

The Kentucky legislature having assembled on the 17th, adopted the Virginia resolutions, resolved to resist the invasion of the South, but urged the Southern States to arrest the progressing revolution. The legislature declined to call a convention but advised the holding of a national convention to pass resolutions, amending the Constitution. The Missouri legislature passed a bill calling a convention and other measures looking to secession. The governor of North Carolina opened correspondence with President Buchanan on the 8th, involving the subject of the rumored reinforcement of the forts, through which the governor was persuaded that the status quo would be observed. The sentiment of the State was described at the time by one of its well-informed citizens as follows: ‘She would respond to any fair proposition [354] for an equitable adjustment, but will insist on her rights at all hazards;’ and to do this the legislature on the 24th, called a convention. In Arkansas the general sentiment favored the call of a convention, which the legislature on January 16th unanimously ordered. The Union feeling in East Tennessee was strong enough to hold the secession movement under restraint until the invasion of the South was proclaimed by Mr. Lincoln. Texas assembled in convention on the 28th of January, and a few days afterward passed its ordinance of secession. Strong efforts were made in Maryland to induce the governor to call the legislature together, but he was opposed to secession, and refused to issue the proclamation. The other States of the South, South Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana, had already seceded.

The Peace Conference, composed of twenty-one separate States, met at Washington simultaneously with the assembling of delegates of the seceded States in Montgomery, February 4th, 1861. The seceding States were of course not represented. But the remaining seven States of the South, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky and Missouri, had their ablest men present as commissioners. The six New England States had sent such statesmen as Fessenden, Morrill, Crittenden, Boutwell, Tuck, Ames, Baldwin; New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania from the middle Atlantic seaboard had their embassadors, while Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Kansas stood for the West. Wisconsin, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, California and Oregon sent no delegates.

The venerable John Tyler, ex-President of the United States, was chosen president and made a strong, patriotic address, containing the pertinent remark, ‘Your patriotism will surmount the difficulties, however great, if you will accomplish but one triumph in advance, and that is a triumph over party. And what is party when compared [355] to the task of rescuing one's country from danger!’ Mr. Guthrie, of Kentucky, opened the important business of the body by moving the appointment of a committee composed of one member from each State to consider all propositions and to report on or before Friday. The committee was appointed, but unfortunately delayed its report ten days, which at last was unanimously agreed to, and was contested in the main body. The first resolution provided for the adoption of the old Missouri Compromise line, absolutely prohibiting slavery north of the line 36°30′ and leaving its existence in territories south of that line subject to judicial cognizance in Federal courts according to the course of the common law. This proposition received the votes of four Northern States, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. On the other hand, it was objected to on the first vote by three Southern States, Virginia, North Carolina, and Missouri; Virginia and North. Carolina objecting because of the clause which referred the legal status of slavery south of the line to the decisions of Federal courts, while the first clause made prohibition absolute without such reference; while Missouri disliked it because of its old hostility to the dividing line. On the second vote the section was adopted, with New England against it. Important sections of the report which related to the jurisdiction of Congress over slavery in the States and District of Columbia, and to compensate the owners of fugitive slaves where their property could not be repossessed, together with other minor sections of the series, were discussed and variously determined until finally seven sections were passed and presented to the Senate of the United States. The plan differed in several features from the Crittenden resolutions, being still more favorable, as Mr. Buchanan states, to the North, yet the distinguished senator from Kentucky promptly accepted it as a substitute for his own proposition, and eloquently urged its adoption. But the arrogance of a [356] sectional majority, inflated by the recent triumph, was too powerful to be allayed by the appeals of patriotism or the counsels of wisdom. （Jefferson Davis.)

The communication of the Peace congress was received by the Senate on the 28th of February and referred to a committee, which immediately reported it back without change by a majority vote. Mr. Seward and Mr. Douglas joined in offering a substitute to invite the legislatures of the States to take the subject under consideration and express their will to Congress. Mr. Hunter, of Virginia, moved to substitute the report of the Peace Conference by the Crittenden Compromise. Mr. Crittenden appealed for a vote favorable to either his own plan or that of the Pence congress. ‘I am for peace, I want to save the country and adjust our present difficulties. I shall vote for the amendments to the Constitution proposed by the convention, and there I shall stand.’ Mr. Mason declared that his State would deeply deplore that its mediation had not been effective. He believed that in the short time the convention had to deliberate they had done the best they could, but their action would place the Southern States in greater peril if the Constitution were amended as proposed. Mr. Trumbull, of Illinois, rebuked Mr. Crittenden for talking to the North about compromise when there was nothing to compromise about, and said that if he had appealed to the South, which was in rebellion and painted before them the hideousness of the crimes they were committing, calling on them to return to their allegiance and on the government to enforce its authority, we would have a very different state of things in the country. Mr. Pugh, of Ohio, entered the debate with a speech of great force, one statement of which caught particular attention. This was Sunday evening, toward the midnight of the session, when the hours were few until the new administration would be inaugurated. After referring to the fact that the Crittenden resolutions had been endorsed by [357] several States, he said, ‘It has been petitioned for by a larger number of electors of the United States. than any proposition that was ever before Congress, and I believe in my heart to-day, that it would carry an overwhelming majority of the people of my State, and of nearly every other State in the Union. Before the senators from Mississippi left the chamber, I heard one of them, who now assumes at least to be President of the Southern Confederacy (Mr. Davis), propose to accept it and to maintain the Union if that proposition could receive the vote it ought to receive from this part of this chamber (the Republican side). Therefore of all your propositions, of all your amendments, knowing that the historian will write it down that at any time before the first of January (1861) a two-thirds vote for the Crittenden resolutions in this chamber would have saved every State in the Union but South Carolina,—Georgia would be here by her representatives, and Louisiana also—those two great States which would have broken the column of secession. Yet, sir, it has been staved off, staved off for your futile railroad bill, and where is it to-night? Staved off by your tariff bill; staved off by your pension bill!’ Mr. Douglas concurred in the opinion of Senator Pugh and confirmed the statement that Mr. Jefferson Davis when on the committee of thirteen, was ready at all times to compromise on the Crittenden proposition, and that Mr. Toombs was also.

One vote after another was taken in both houses during the last hours of the session, of which it is remarked ‘a more conclusive proof of a determination somewhere to prevent every settlement of difficulties by any concession on the part of the North could not be furnished.’ (American Encyclopedia, 1861, p. 225.) [358]

Chapter 10:

The Confederation of the Southern States.

Delegates of seceded States meet in Montgomery

Mr. Davis

President

Washington

Constitution

Confederate States of America

on the 4th day of February, 1861, the date on which the Peace Conference met, the delegates from seceded States gathered in the city of Montgomery, Alabama. Seven Independent Republics, each covering territory nearly the extent of some European kingdoms, while all united would make an empire, had commissioned their delegates to form a Union under a written constitution. These Republics were South Carolina, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Georgia, Louisiana and Texas. By separate, independent action, each had withdrawn from the United States, and each had determined to form by the union of all in a national form, a Republican Government of Confederate States, whose right to exist should be peaceably recognized by all nations. The Convention was at first composed of forty-three delegates from six States, but subsequently Texas entered, making the seven States of the provisional Confederacy. Within the hall where they assembled were suspended the portraits of Washington, Marion, Andrew Jackson, Clay, and other deceased distinguished American patriots, while living actors in the present great civic event were [359] among the most eminent of American citizens. The city was full of visitors and the hall was thronged. The occasion was felt throughout the South to be momentous. ‘Perhaps no assembly of men ever took place under circumstances of greater anxiety and higher responsibility than those which surrounded and pressed upon this convention.’ Mr. Howell Cobb, who was a leading advocate of the compromise of 1850, elected by the Constitutional Union party of 1851, governor of Georgia, subsequently Democratic member of Congress, and lately Secretary of the treasury of the United States, was chosen chairman of the convention. Mr. J. J. Hooper, of Alabama, an editor and author of fame, was elected secretary. Being notified of his election, and assuming the chair, Mr. Cobb, in a brief address, marked by its absence of all passion, said that the great duty was now imposed upon the convention to provide for the States represented, a good government which will maintain with the United States, ‘our former confederates, as with the world, the most peaceful and friendly relations, both political and commercial.’

The convention adopted rules for its Government which recognized the separate sovereignty of the States and required that the voting shall be done by States. A committee was appointed to present a plan of government for consideration, which reported on the 7th of February a form of constitution for the Provisional Government of the Confederate States of America, by which the country was to be governed until the permanent Government was formed. After a brief discussion, the Constitution was unanimously adopted February 8th, and on the day following, Mr. Cobb, the President of the Convention, was sworn by Judge Walker to support it. The oath was then formally administered to all members on the call by States, and the convention was fully organized for business. [360]

The convention was composed of the following members:

South Carolina.—R. B. Rhett, James Chestnut, Jr., W. P. Miles, T. J. Withers, R. W. Barnwell, C. G. Memminger, L. M. Keitt, W. W. Boyce.

Georgia.—Robert Toombs, Howell Cobb, Benjamin H. Hill, Alexander H. Stephens, Francis Bartow, M. J. Crawford, E. A. Nisbett, A. R. Wright, T. R. R. Cobb, A. H. Kenan.

Alabama.—Richard W. Walker, J. L. M. Curry, Robert H. Smith, C. J. McRae, John Gill Shorter, S. T. Hale, David P. Lewis, Thomas Fearn, W. P. Chilton.

Mississippi.—W. P. Harris, Walter Brooke, A. M. Clayton, W. S. Barry, J. T. Harrison, J. A. P. Campbell, W. S. Wilson.

Louisiana.—John Perkins, Jr., D. F. Kenner, C. M. Conrad, Edward Sparrow, Henry Marshall, A. DeClouett.

Florida.—Jackson Morton, James Powers, J. P. Anderson.

Texas.—L. T. Wigfall, J. H. Reagan, J. Hemphill, T. N. Waul, John Gregg, W. S. Oldham, W. H. Ochiltree.

Under the adopted Provisional Constitution the Congress proceeded at noon, February 9th, to elect the President and Vice-President of the new Republic. The ballots were taken by States, and Mr. Jefferson Davis, who was at his home in Mississippi, received the entire vote for the presidency, as also did Mr. Alexander A. Stephens for the vice-presidency. It may be noted that while the names of other great men of the South had been most favorably mentioned, among them prominently that of Mr. Howell Cobb and Mr. Toombs, yet this prudent Convention turned at length without dissent to the two men who fully represented the cool, firm, conservative sentiment of their section. Mr. Davis had despairingly pleaded before the United States, within less than a month of the assembling of this Southern Congress, for a compromise that would arrest the pending secession of [361] his State; had given his word to Senators Pugh, of Ohio, and Douglas, of Illinois, specially, that he was ready to vote for the Crittenden resolutions and stand by the Union; and but two weeks before had delivered his calm, courteous and able speech of withdrawal from the Senate in obedience to the will of the State. At the moment of his election to the presidency, he was on his farm, preferring not to be the civic head of the Confederacy, but offering himself if needed, to its military service. Mr. Davis had only followed the secession popular movement. He did not lead it. He was thoroughly convinced of the legality of secession and in complete sympathy with Southern feeling, but he was among the last of the statesmen from the Confederate States to abandon all hope of an adjustment which would save the country from the horrors of war. Mr. Stephens was the leader in the South in 1860 of those who counseled political battle in Union against the triumphant sectional party. To the last moment he stood in Georgia against the passage of the act of separate State secession. He was National in his true sentiment as well as in reputation—a thorough devotee of the Union under the Constitution, and consistently a firm believer in the legal principles of the State-rights school. Upon the secession of his State, he did not hesitate as to his allegiance, but at once heartily and powerfully entered upon the patriotic duty of assisting in directing the actions of States and people to the establishment of constitutional free Government. Upon such men the seceded States placed administrative power, under a constitution like that which the fathers of the great American Union had fashioned. Their election was greeted with great applause by the crowded assembly which witnessed the voting, and was received in all the South with demonstrations of delight. It satisfied the nations of the world that intelligent statesmen were guiding secession, and should have satisfied the North that the Southern States proposed no act of rebellion, nor any hostility to the United States. [362]

The Provisional Congress began at once the operation of government. The President was directed to appoint committees on Foreign Affairs, Finance, Judiciary, Military and Naval Affairs, Commerce, Postal Affairs, Patents and Printing. All laws of the United States in force November, 1860, and not inconsistent with the Provisional Constitution, were continued in operation, and all revenue officers in the States were continued in office. A tariff for raising revenue was put under the immediate consideration of the finance committee. Committees were appointed to notify Mr. Davis and Mr. Stephens of the elections which had taken place. Mr. Stephens being in the Convention as a delegate from Georgia, announced on the 11th his acceptance in a short address declining to discuss the general policy prior to the arrival of the President-elect, and advising attention by the Congress to matters of present practical importance, after which the prescribed oath was administered.

The Vice-President in his address said to Congress, ‘We can be devoting our attention to the constitution of a permanent government, stable and durable, which is one of the leading objects of our assembling.’ This great duty was accordingly assigned to a special committee, of which Mr. Rhett--was chairman, formed by the appointment of two members from each State, which began its deliberations without delay. A resolution which changed the relations of the separate seceded States to the government of the United States was passed February 12th, providing that the Confederate government takes under its charge all questions now existing between the States of the Confederacy and the United States relating to the occupation of forts, arsenals, and all other public establishments. The States were all requested to cede the forts and other public property of like character to the Confederate government.

The flag of the Confederacy became the subject of some debate on the report of the Flag committee, during [363] which respectful references were made to the flag of the United States. It was generally argued that the Confederate flag should differ from the Stars and Stripes only enough to make it easily distinguishable. The committee recommended that the flag should be formed of a blue union in the upper left hand corner containing seven stars, and three bars, the central being white, and the upper and lower red. Their recommendation was adopted.

The committee on Military and Naval Affairs was directed to make provisions for such officers as might tender their resignations from the United States army or navy; and the committee on Commerce was instructed to inquire into the subject of navigation laws. Measures were adopted to admit without payment of duties all provisions, agricultural products, living animals and munitions of war. Goods, wares and merchandise purchased in the United States and imported before March 14th, were to enter duty free. Officers connected with the collection of customs at the time of organization of the Confederacy were continued with the salaries and duties attaching to their positions. Collectors and their subordinates were required to give bonds to the Confederate government and to take the oath to discharge their duties and support the Constitution.

The inauguration of Mr. Davis took place on the 18th of February, according to the arrangements of the Congress, and as his enemies at Washington were then charging him with ambition, it is just to let him testify for himself in regard to his elevation to this high position. He says: ‘As my election had been spoken of as a probable event, and as I did not desire that or any other civil office, but preferred to remain in the post to which I had been elected and still held at the head of the army of Mississippi, I had taken what seemed to me ample precautions to prevent my nomination to the presidency. I accepted the position because I could not decline it, [364] but with the expectation and intention of soon returning to the field. On my way to Montgomery brief addresses were made by me at various places which were grossly misrepresented at the North as invoking war and threatening devastation. Not deemed worthy of contradiction at the time when problems of vital public interest were constantly presented, these false and malicious reports have since been adopted by partisan writers as authentic history. It is sufficient to say that no utterances of mine, private or public, differed in tone and spirit from my farewell address to the Senate or my inaugural address at Montgomery.’ (Short History of the Confederacy, p. 60.) On the way from Mississippi to Montgomery Mr. Davis was made the object of the most patriotic demonstrations, which must have satisfied him that the Southern public was gratified by his election. He arrived at Montgomery on Saturday, the 16th, and was welcomed by a popular demonstration marked by enthusiasm well-tempered with the spirit which the gravity of the situation produced. His address from the balcony of his hotel the evening of his arrival was made in response to a general call, and it revealed the flow to which his feelings had risen at the close of his journey. Beginning with ‘Brethren of the Confederate States of America,’ as the opening words of the speech, he described the unity of the Southern people in blood and principles and purposes, from which he inferred a government of domestic peace and increasing growth. Touching on ‘a possible storm of war’ he predicted that the clouds would be dispersed and the sun outlive the storm. ‘If war should come, if we must again baptize in blood the principles for which our fathers bled in the revolution, we shall show that we are not degenerate sons, and prove that Southern valor still shines as bright as in 1776, in 1812, and in every other conflict.’

The Capitol hill in the fair city of Montgomery was almost literally covered, early in the morning of the [365] 18th, with companies of soldiers from several States, with citizens from all parts of the South, and adorned by the presence of large numbers of graceful Southern women. The inauguration ceremonies made an imposing pageant, but the interest of the public centered on the inaugural address, whose temperate tone and statesmanlike tenor disappointed such leaders as had hoped the President would be betrayed into some angry utterances. Mentioning the act of secession by the States, he said that ‘In this they merely asserted the right which the Declaration of Independence of 1776 defined to be inalienable. Of the time and occasion of its exercise, they as sovereigns were the final judges, each for itself. The impartial enlightened judgment of mankind will vindicate the rectitude of our conduct, and He who knows the hearts of men will judge of the sincerity with which we labored to preserve the Government of our fathers in its spirit. Thus the sovereign States, here represented, proceeded to form this Confederacy, and it is by the abuse of language that their act has been called a revolution. They formed a new alliance, but within each State its government has remained. As a necessity, not of choice, we have resorted to the remedy of secession, and henceforth our energies must be directed to the conduct of our own affairs, and the perpetuity of the Confederacy which we have formed. We have changed the constituent parts but not the system of our government. The Constitution framed by our fathers is that of these Confederate States. In their exposition of it, and in the judicial construction it has received, we have a light which reveals its true meaning.’ The President plainly declared that the Confederacy would meet war with war, and advised Congress to make military and naval preparation for it, but averring his own wishes to be for peace, he said, ‘If it be otherwise, the suffering of millions will bear testimony to the folly and wickedness of our aggressors.’ [366]

The Cabinet was soon organized, being composed as follows: Department of State—Mr. Robert Toombs, of Georgia; Department of War—Mr. Leroy P. Walker, of Alabama; the Treasury Department—Mr. Charles G. Memminger, of South Carolina; the Post—office Department—Mr. John H. Reagan, of Texas; the Navy Department—Mr. Stephen R. Mallory, of Florida; the Department of Justice—Mr. Judah P. Benjamin, of Louisiana.

Questions of inter-state commerce somewhat perplexing in their nature demanded immediate solution by the Confederate government. Among them, the most important was the trade that floated on the Mississippi river. The prospect of the shutting up of that river to western trade was alarming and irritating to the States lying above the Confederate border line. The Louisiana convention in appreciation of this alarm had pledged the faith of the State to preserve the navigation of the Mississippi free. Kentucky expressed the fear that unless the free trade policy be adopted the Confederacy will exact duties on goods passing up the Mississippi. This question proved to be one of the most difficult which the Confederate government had to determine; but the knot was cut by an act on February 22d, declaring the free navigation of the river.

A resolution instructing the committee on finance to inquire into the expediency of placing a duty on cotton exported to a foreign country was introduced by Mr. T. R. R. Cobb, of Georgia, who remarked on the power which the South held in its hands as the producer of a staple so necessary to the world. He thought that by embargo we could soon place the United States and Europe under the necessity of recognizing the independence of the Confederacy. Southern cotton was at that time seeking new channels to the sea. It was going up the Mississippi and Ohio rivers and by rail through Tennessee and Virginia to Norfolk. Railroad managers [367] were beginning to offer inducements to the shipment of cotton, the result of all which would make the blockade of Southern ports by the United States navy of no importance to foreign nations as long as they could get the cotton through these new channels. The question was referred to the Finance committee.

The future relations between the Confederate States and the United States were altogether unascertainable. On the part of the Confederacy it was determined to seek on the first opportunity the establishment of peaceful intercourse between the two nations. Accordingly it was made unofficially public that the Confederate authorities would send commissioners to Washington as soon as it should be intimated that they would be received, and that in the meantime nothing would be done to precipitate hostilities. Mr. Buchanan was understood as desirous at this time, after the affair of the Star of the West had failed, to preserve the status quo of affairs until the close of his term on the 4th of March. The policy of Mr. Lincoln had not been clearly divulged. But President Davis, acting on the authority given him by the Confederate Congress February 15th, appointed three commissioners to the United States, ‘clothed with plenary powers to open all negotiations for the settlement of all matters of joint property of any kind, within the limits of the Confederate States, and all joint liabilities with their former associates upon principles of right, justice, equity, and good faith.’ These distinguished Southern embassadors awaited instructions as to the time of their departure, and when President Davis received late in the month from President Buchanan ‘through a distinguished senator,’ an intimation that he would be pleased to receive a commissioner or commission from the Confederate States, and would be willing to transmit to the Senate any ‘communication received from them,’ President Davis hurried Mr. Crawford to Washington to act as special commissioner. Mr. Forsyth immediately [368] followed, but reached Washington after Mr. Crawford had ascertained that President Buchanan had in a panic recalled his promise and now declined either to receive him or to send any message to the Senate. The worried President said that he had only three days of official life left, and could incur no further dangers and reproaches from the North. （Davis, History of the Confederacy, p. 68.)

President Davis also appointed by authority of the Congress a commission to Europe to represent the Confederate States, especially in England and France, composed of the brilliant William L. Yancey and his associates, Mr. A. Dudley Mann, of Virginia, an accomplished diplomat, and Mr. Yost, of Louisiana.

Further measures were enacted during February and early in March to exempt certain goods from duty; to modify navigation laws; to punish persons convicted of being engaged in the slave trade; to establish additional ports of entry; to perfect the postal system; to provide money for the government; and to raise provisional military forces. An act designed to raise money authorized the President to borrow $15,000,000 payable in ten years, at eight per cent interest, and placed an export duty on cotton to create a fund to pay off the principal and interest of the loan. The military bill authorized the President to employ the militia, military and naval forces of the Confederate States, and ask for and accept the services of not exceeding 100,000 volunteers to serve for twelve months ‘to secure the public tranquillity and independence against threatened assault.’

The Constitution by which the permanent government of the Confederate States of America was formed was reported by the committee and adopted by the Provisional Congress on the 11th of March, 1861, to be submitted to the States for ratification. All States ratified it and conformed themselves to its requirements without delay The Constitution varied in very few particulars from [369] the Constitution of the United States, preserving carefully the fundamental principles of popular representative democracy and confederation of co-equal States. The changes which substantially improved the United States system were as follows: The official terms of the President and Vice-President were fixed at six years, and the President was made ineligible for re-election. In all cases of removals, except those of cabinet officers and diplomatic agents, the cause was required to be reported to the Senate by the President. Congress was authorized to admit cabinet officers to seats in either house, with the privilege of debate but without a vote, on any measures affecting their departments. The President was given power to disapprove any appropriation in a bill and approve others in the same bill. The States as such, were empowered to join in improving navigable rivers flowing between or through them. New States were admissible into the Confederation by vote of two-thirds of each house, the Senate being required to vote by States. A Confederate official exercising his functions within any State was subject to impeachment by its legislature, as well as by the House of Representatives of the Confederate States, but in all cases the trial was to be by the Confederate Senate. No act of bankruptcy would be permitted to discharge the debtor from contracts made before the passage of the act. General appropriations of money must be estimated for by one of the heads of the departments, and when this was not done, the appropriation could not be made except by two-thirds vote in both houses. Internal improvements by Congress, and protection to foster special branches of industry were forbidden. Citizens of the several States could not sue each other in the general Confederate courts, but were confined in such suits to the courts of the States. The power of Congress over the territories and the right of citizens of one State to enter any other State with his slave or other property were settled according [370] to the views of the South under the United States Constitution. In other respects the compact thus written, from which resulted the Confederate States of America, was modeled upon the great instrument adopted by the founders of the United States. Mr. Davis, who had no direct part in framing this supreme law of the government, declared his belief that it was a model of wise, deliberate statesmanship, and referring to the question so prominent in the discussions of North and South, he remarks, “With regard to slavery and the slave trade the provisions of the Constitution furnished an effective answer to the assertion so often made that the Confederacy was founded on slavery and intended to perpetuate and extend it. Property in slaves already existing was recognized and guaranteed just as it was by the Constitution of the United States, and the rights of such property in the common territories were protected against any such hostile discrimination as had been attempted in the Union. But the extension of slavery, in the only practical sense of that phrase, was more distinctly and effectually precluded by the Confederate than by the Federal Constitution. The further importation of negroes from any country other than the slaveholding States and territories of the United States was peremptorily prohibited, and Congress was further endowed with the power to prohibit the introduction of slaves from any State or territory not belonging to the Confederacy. Mr. Stephens, next in official rank, said concerning this constitution, ‘The whole document negatives the idea which so many have been active in endeavoring to put in the enduring form of history, that the Convention at Montgomery was nothing but a set of conspirators, whose object was the overthrow of the principles of the Constitution of the United States and the creation of a great slave oligarchy instead of the free institutions thereby secured and guaranteed.’

Having completely organized the government and put [371] in operation all measures necessary for its maintenance, the Confederate Congress adjourned on the 16th of March, at a time when the prospects of a peaceful termination of the questions between the two governments were so strong as to lull the South into an inactivity from which it was soon destined to be disturbed. [372]

Chapter 11:

Sectional administration at Washington.

President Lincoln's inauguration

Washington

Mr. Seward

Fort Sumter

Abraham Lincoln was inaugurated President of the United States on Monday, March 4th, 186. For four months the country had been in a state of unrest in consequence of his election difficult to portray so as to be well understood at a date removed by a third of a century from those times of painful occurrences.

Preparations for the inauguration of an unusual and dangerous military character had been made by General Scott to protect the President-elect from dangers wholly imaginary, as has been abundantly proved. Other preparations accorded with the dignity of the occasion when an eminent citizen, duly elected, was to be installed in an office equal to any which a nation may create. Mr. Lincoln's route from Springfield to the capital was made the scene of popular demonstrations, particularly in Philadelphia, where it was determined to convey him secretly into Washington ‘because General Scott feared he would be assassinated.’ Mr. Lincoln did not share in these anxieties, as he himself stated, and that there were no ‘plotters of assassination’ is evidenced by the positive testimony of men competent and credible. The lack of proof that any plot of this dastardly kind existed —a plot which would at that time have been utterly [373] disastrous to the secession movement, if proof of it could have been produced—confirms Mr. Lincoln's sensible opinion of the sensational story.

The President, undisguised, unless a mere cloak and hat be called a disguise, and accompanied by Mrs. Lincoln, made the night journey undisturbed, arriving in Washington unheralded. A sensational correspondent of the Northern press made up the story of the ‘Scotch cap and the long cloak,’ as the concealing garb worn to disguise the President-elect, which report was repeated until the equally false invention of the story of the capture of Mr. Davis in disguise was made as an offset.

On inauguration morning regular troops were stationed on Pennsylvania avenue, sharpshooters were posted on the roofs of houses, mounted men were distributed at all corners, policemen had special orders to make arrests, and detectives in ordinary clothes moved among the masses which thronged the avenue. President Buchanan and Mr. Lincoln rode in an open carriage together, preceded by mounted marshals, and escorted by regular cavalry; behind them armed infantry and marines marching by regiments, all of which gave to the scene, says Mr. Stephen Fiske in 1897, an appearance ‘more like escorting a prisoner to his doom than a President to his inauguration.’ For this unsightly employment of military force Mr. Lincoln was not responsible. It served to gratify General Scott's love of military display and was of practical political use in impressing the Northern people. Secession was then called the ‘conspiracy of a cabal,’ ‘the plot of traitors,’ and it had been rumored that the assassination of Mr. Lincoln and the violent seizure of Washington would be the first mad act in the tragedy of the rebellion. It suited the managers of the coercion policy to have this scenic display.

‘Little cheering and no enthusiasm greeted the procession,’ says an intelligent Northern spectator whose sympathies were with the new President. ‘As they [374] (President Buchanan and Mr. Lincoln) left the barouche at the steps of the capitol, Buchanan looked very grave, Lincoln, pale and anxious, and both were covered with dust.’ The inaugural was read distinctly, but without special emphasis, closing with the words: ‘We are not enemies, but friends; we must not be enemies; though passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds of affection.’ By the irony of fate, Justice Taney, who had pronounced the Dred Scott decision, administered to Mr. Lincoln the oath of his office to support the Constitution of the United States.

The inaugural, as it was afterwards understood by the South, set forth the purpose of Mr. Lincoln to prevent the dividing of the Union, but its declarations as interpreted by many at the time gave ground for the illusive hope that war would not be made upon the Confederate States. Members of the Confederate Congress on adjourning a week later, impressed by the inaugural with a hope of peace generally expressed this confidence in their States, and thus in some degree arrested Southern military preparations.

The new cabinet was formed by the appointment of William H. Seward, of New York, Secretary of State; Salmon P. Chase, of Ohio, Secretary of the Treasury; Simon Cameron, of Pennsylvania, Secretary of War; Gideon Welles, of Connecticut, Secretary of the Navy; Caleb Smith, of Indiana, Secretary of the Interior; Montgomery Blair, of Maryland, Postmaster General; and Edward Bates, of Missouri, Attorney General. The selections made by President Lincoln from among his recent rivals in the contest for the presidential nomination created some comment Thaddeus Stevens pronounced the new cabinet an assortment of rivals appointed from courtesy, an Indiana stump speaker, and two members of the Blair family. Cassius Clay said that Lincoln had offered him in writing the post of secretary of war, and that he had relied on the promise, but Seward and the [375] Southern Whigs persuaded the President not to make the appointment. Weed, Wade and Lovejoy feared that the cabinet would ‘surrender to the South,’ while border State supporters of Mr. Lincoln did not like the selection of Blair or Bates. But although Mr. Lincoln had many cabinet troubles, there was evident shrewdness in this selection of his advisers.

The commissioners from the Confederate States, Crawford and Forsyth, lost no time in pressing upon the attention of the new administration the adjustment of existing difficulties ‘upon terms of amity and good will’ which they had been appointed to negotiate. Their communication which was properly addressed to Mr. Seward, secretary of state, set forth the recent facts of secession and then announced that ‘with a view to a speedy adjustment of all questions growing out of this political separation upon such terms of amity and good will as the respective interests, geographical contiguity and future welfare of the two nations may render necessary, the undersigned are instructed to make to the government of the United States overtures for the opening of negotiations, assuring the government of the United States, that the President, Congress and people of the Confederate States earnestly desire a peaceable solution of these great questions; that it is neither their interest nor their wish to make any demand which is not founded in strictest justice, nor do any act to injure their late confederates.’

Mr. Seward had declined on the 11th of March to see Mr. Crawford and Mr. Forsyth even unofficially, and the official communication referred to was delivered sealed on the 13th and on the 15th a ‘memorandum’ by the Secretary was filed in his own office but not delivered to the Southern commissioners in which the view is set forth that the secretary of state cannot in any way admit that the so-called Confederate States constitute a foreign power, and that as his duties are confined to the [376] conducting of the foreign relations of the country and do not at all embrace questions arising between the several States and the Federal government he cannot hold correspondence with them. The ‘memorandum’ also referred the Confederate commissioners to the inaugural of the President for information as to the policy of his administration. Thus it appears that all negotiation would be waived away by a decision that a State had no way of official access to the general government. The ‘memorandum,’ alleged to have been filed on the 13th, was withheld from the public and also from the commissioners, although they were urging an answer. The commissioners were told that ‘Mr. Seward desired to avoid making any reply at that time.’ Mr. Justice Nelson, a personal friend of Mr. Seward, gave this information to Mr. Justice Campbell, his associate in the same court, with the assurance that Mr. Seward had a strong disposition for peace. This information caused Judge Campbell, who was a personal friend of the commissioners, to agree to meet Mr. Seward. The meeting took place and after the conference, Judge Campbell informed the commissioners in writing that he ‘felt entire confidence that Fort Sumter would be evacuated in ten days, and that no measures prejudicial to the Southern Confederate States is at present contemplated.’ Mr. Seward was informed of this assurance given Mr. Campbell after the interview, and in consequence of this understanding thus brought about, the commissioners ceased all pressure for the answer, meanwhile assuring President Davis of the progress of their mission, and restraining General Beauregard from all military demonstrations at Charleston. At a second later interview, Judge Campbell was again assured by the Secretary that the continued occupation of Fort Sumter was attributable to causes consistent with the intention to fulfill the engagement. The commissioners confiding in these assurances awaited the action of the administration until, alarmed by the outfitting of [377] a squadron in New York harbor, they again availed of the patriotic mediation of Justice Campbell on the 7th of April, and through him, even after the fleet was on its way to Charleston with instructions to reinforce peaceably or by force, they received from Mr. Seward the misleading message which has gone into history, ‘Faith as to Sumter fully kept—wait and see.’

On the next day, April 8th, the eyes of the commissioners, which had been blinded for twenty-three days, were opened, and they saw that they had been deliberately duped. Another communication was therefore sent by them on the 9th, addressed to Mr. Seward, which recapitulated the transactions of their official sojourn in Washington, and in indignant language boldly said to the Secretary. ‘had you met these issues with the frankness and manliness with which the undersigned were instructed to present them to you and treat them, the undersigned had not now the melancholy duty to return home and tell their government and their countrymen that their earnest and ceaseless efforts in behalf of peace had been futile and that the government of the United States meant to subjugate them by force of arms. Whatever may be the result, impartial history will record the innocence of the government of the Confederate States and place the responsibility of the blood and mourning that may ensue upon those who have denied the great fundamental doctrine of American liberty that “Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed,” and who have set naval and land armaments in motion to subject the people of one portion of the land to the will of another portion.’

Judge Campbell also discovered his own embarrassed position at the same time the eyes of Crawford and Forsyth were opened. On the 7th of April, Mr. Seward had said to him: ‘Faith as to Sumter fully kept—wait and see.’ On the next morning he read in the newspaper that a messenger from President Lincoln had already [378] given notice to Governor Pickens, of South Carolina, that Fort Sumter would be relieved ‘peaceably or by force.’ He states in his indignant letter to Mr. Seward that the same paper informed him that Mr. Fox, who had been allowed to visit Maj. Anderson, on the pledge that his purpose was pacific had, on returning to Washington, presented a plan for reinforcing Fort Sumter which had been considered several days by the Cabinet, had been adopted and was being actually put in execution at the moment when Mr. Seward had declared to him ‘Faith as to Sumter fully kept.’ Judge Campbell disclosed that in the first conference between himself, Justice Nelson and Mr. Seward, he was much pleased with the Secretary's observations as to the course of the administration. At that interview the general subject of the withdrawal of Maj. Anderson being under consideration, and a proposition being made by Judge Campbell to write to Mr. Davis, the exact words of Mr. Seward in his answer were, ‘before this letter reaches him Fort Sumter will have been evacuated.’ Mr. Stephens, whose information may be accepted, gives his opinion that President Lincoln changed his policy as to the inauguration of coercion, and that in the first days of his administration he intended to withdraw the garrison from Fort Sumter. This view is supported by the statement made by an equally observant and intelligent actor in the events of the time, Mr. John Sherman, who says in his ‘Recollections,’ page 442, ‘The period between the 4th of March and the 12th of April was the darkest in the history of the United States. It was a time of humiliation, timidity and feebleness.’ Rumors were getting abroad that the administration was about to surrender to the South. The war faction in the Republican party was becoming restive on account of the inactivity of the government Mr. Douglas was ably arguing in the Senate in favor of his resolution of March 15 for amendment to the Constitution and against a war of subjugation. Breckinridge [379] and Clingman, whose States had hitherto refused to secede, were pleading for the withdrawal of troops from the South with a view to negotiations. The peace feeling was moving northward and invading the ranks of the party of the administration. Intelligence was also given both North and South by telegraph March 14th Fort Sumter would be evacuated. It was from about this date that a change, according to Mr. Stephens' observation, began to take place in the policy of the Federal administration.

Mr. Stephens, in agreement with others, attributes this alteration in the mind of Mr. Lincoln to the pressure brought upon him by that extreme wing of his party which had been already offended by his apparent neglect of them in the formation of his cabinet. An imposing meeting of the war governors of seven States was held to organize a coercive movement by tendering to the President their military and financial support, thus inducing him to adopt a policy which would inevitably lead to war between the States North and South. Mr. Stephens expresses his belief that previous to this organized pressure Mr. Lincoln had determined on at least withdrawing Anderson from Fort Sumter as a tentative movement toward peace and reunion, that course being, according to a Cabinet member's statement, ‘all the administration can bear.’ President Lincoln was probably misinformed as to the extent to which Mr. Seward had committed himself and may have been unaware of the double dealing which was being practiced. The commissioners, however, were left without intimation until the 8th of April that their peaceful mission would be rudely thwarted. Mr. Seward stands in the history of this transaction unrelieved from the charge of duplicity. His defense may be on the doctrine that ‘all is fair in war’ and that in diplomacy ‘words may be used to conceal the truth,’ but the evidence is ample that he dealt with Judge Campbell and Judge Nelson, and with Messrs [380] Crawford and Forsyth in the same manner that he said he himself had once dealt with Jefferson Davis. Mr. Usher, formerly secretary of the interior, tells the following story (in ‘Reminiscences of Lincoln,’ p. 80) about a speech made by Mr. Seward: ‘Referring to a speech that Mr. Oakley Hall had then lately made in the city of New York, Seward said, “Oakley Hall says that I said in the winter before the war in a speech at the Astor House that the trouble would all be over and everything settled in sixty days.” I would have Mr. Oakley Hall to know that when I made that speech the electoral vote was not counted and I knew it never would be if Jeff Davis believed there would be war. We both knew that he was to be president of the Southern Confederacy and that I was to be secretary of state under Mr. Lincoln. I wanted the vote counted and Lincoln inaugurated. I had to deceive Davis, and I did it. That's why I said it would be all settled in sixty days.’

It is presumable that the wily secretary of state reasoned again in the same manner only three months later, ‘I had to deceive these confiding Southern gentlemen, and I did it.’ [381]

Chapter XII

Actual war inaugurated.

The fight for forts

Fort Sumter

South

the ‘state of war’ which had practically existed at least from the date of the approval by the United States of Anderson's destruction of property in Fort Moultrie and his tragic concentration in Fort Sumter, was now advanced to, and assumed the condition of, actual hostilities. The quasi truce suggested through the mediation of Justices Campbell and Nelson which had been faithfully kept by South Carolina and the Confederate government, was broken by the Federal administration, through preparations continuously made to invade the harbor of Charleston. Precisely when active hostilities between the States began has not been clearly determined, but war was flagrant even before the arrival of the Federal ships to reinforce Fort Sumter, and was especially manifested by the venture of the Star of the West to land troops with arms and ammunition. The old custom of nations to issue formal ‘declarations of war’ had gone into disuse. （Scott's Mil. Dict., 1861, title ‘War.’) Public war is now manifested by the hostile acts and declarations of one Government against another. South Carolina was a government de facto if not de jure on the 20th of December, 1860. The act of Maj. Anderson in destroying the armament of Moultrie and concentrating at Sumter was avowedly a [382] military movement of a hostile intent, so construed by South Carolina, and in that light was consented to by the United States. The secret proposition of the commanding general of the United States armies, General Scott, made in December after South Carolina became a government de facto, and which was acted upon by President Buchanan with the intention to throw troops, arms, ammunition and supplies into Fort Sumter, was itself an official institution of belligerency; and the passing of the Star of the West from the high seas into the bay of Charleston with these troops and war stores aboard, and within range of the batteries of South Carolina, with actual professed intention to effect a landing at the fort, was open war made manifest by the act.

It will be observed that no forts or other property formerly belonging to the United States were taken in the possession of the seceding States until after the concentration of Maj. Anderson's command at Fort Sumter, and after the information of the preparations made by General Scott for coercion by way of the sea had reached the authorities of these Southern States. The ordinance of secession being wholly civil was in no sense a manifesto of war, whether it was legal or illegal. If illegal, it was void, without force and irrecognizable by any court or nation until some act of war was committed. If legal, then any armed resistance to its proper operation conditioned hostilities. South Carolina did not interfere in any respect with the exercise by the Federal government of any of its functions until after the people of the State had by the formal act of their convention withdrawn from the Union and declared to the world the independent nationality of their State. Nor did the State take possession of the forts in its harbor until they were abandoned in a hostile manner, and even then a commission was sent to Washington by South Carolina prepared to negotiate all questions between the two Governments. No blood was shed, no violence done, no force [383] used, no movement made beyond what was necessary to gain the occupancy of its undefended property. It is certainly well understood that peace and not war would contribute to the interests and gratify the desire of the State. Its military measures, such as the organizing and drilling of troops, the repairing and construction of its harbor defenses and the manufacture of munitions, indicated apprehensions that the war begun by the events of the Fort Moultrie affair might be continued, but they were the ordinary and reasonable measures adopted by every nation for defensive purposes; and in addition its agreement faithfully observed, to make no attack on Fort Sumter on account of promises made to evacuate the premises, as well as its permission, continued into April, 1861, for Maj. Anderson to purchase fresh provisions in the markets of Charleston, point out a peaceable disposition which cannot be misunderstood.

After the Confederate States assumed control of the harbor defenses of Charleston, General Beauregard was assigned March 1st, 1861, to command of the troops, and all questions were now properly transferred from the State of South Carolina so that they should lie between the Federal and Confederate Governments, but the peace status remained unchanged by any act of the latter nation. The opinion extensively prevailed that Major Anderson's command would be withdrawn. Mr. Forsyth telegraphed March 14th to Governor Pickens, ‘I confidentially believe Sumter will be evacuated and think a government messenger left here yesterday with orders to that effect for Anderson.’ On the same day Captain Foster, U. S. Engineer, who was in charge of the works at Fort Sumter, writes to the chief engineer of the U. S. army at Washington. ‘The news received here yesterday by telegraph to the effect that orders were issued to evacuate this fort seems to have caused an almost entire cessation of work on the (Confederate) batteries around us.’ On March 12th, President Lincoln addressed to [384] General Scott a communication asking for information as to the means it would require to reinforce Fort Sumter, and on the 15th asked the secretary of war, Mr. Cameron, to give his opinion in writing on the question, ‘Assuming it to be possible to now provision Fort Sumter, under all the circumstances is it wise to attempt it?’ In his answer, delivered March 17th, the secretary of war says: ‘My mind has been most reluctantly forced to the conclusion that it would be unwise now to make such an attempt All the officers within Fort Sumter, together with Generals Scott and Totten, express this same opinion. I am therefore of the opinion that the cause of humanity and the highest obligation to the public interest would be best promoted by adopting the counsels of those brave and experienced men whose suggestions I have laid before you.’ Two days later, March 19th, President Lincoln directed General Scott to send to Fort Sumter some suitable person who would get accurate information in regard to the command of Maj. Anderson and report the result, upon which General Scott selected Captain G. V. Fox, formerly of the navy, indorsing the order with the note: ‘The within may do good and can do no harm. It commits no one.’ On the 20th a telegram sent to Mr. Toombs, the Confederate secretary of state at Montgomery, from the Confederate commissioners, Roman, Crawford and Forsyth, contained the following cheering intelligence: ‘If there is faith in man we may rely on the assurances we have as to the status. Time is essential to a peaceful issue of this mission. In the present posture of affairs precipitation is war. We are all agreed.’ The next day General Beauregard was informed by telegram from Mr. L. P. Walker, the Confederate secretary of war, that ‘the probability is if there be any reliance on rumors, semi-official in their character, that Fort Sumter will be shortly abandoned.’ It was at this date, March 21st, that Mr. Seward repeated to the Confederate commissioners through Judge Campbell [385] ‘that the failure to evacuate Fort Sumter was not the result of bad faith, but was attributable to causes consistent with the intention to fulfill the engagement.’ On the same day, Captain Fox arrived at Charleston, and calling on Governor Pickens obtained from him a passport to Sumter, expressly upon the pledge of ‘pacific purposes,’ and going at once, arrived at the fort late at night. Here he held a confidential interview with Maj. Anderson, and on the 22d left for Washington. Mr. Ward H. Lamon came two days afterward and by the same courtesy and confidence which had been extended to Captain Fox was escorted to Fort Sumter by Colonel Duryea, a member of the staff of Governor Pickens, and after delivering special dispatches from President Lincoln, and having an interview with Anderson, returned to Charleston. General Beauregard having heard a rumor that he would require of Maj. Anderson a formal surrender, hastened on the 26th, as lie states in a communication to him, to say that ‘having been informed that Mr. Lamon, the authorized agent of the President of the United States, advised Governor Pickens, after his interview with you at Fort Sumter that your command would be transferred to another post in a few days, and understanding that you are under the impression I intended under all circumstances to require of you a formal surrender or capitulation, I hasten to disabuse you, and to inform you that our countries not being at war and wishing so far as lies in my power to avoid the latter calamity, no such condition will be exacted of you, unless brought about as the natural result of hostilities.’ During this chronological tracing of events that concerned the peaceful evacuation of Fort Sumter, the reports of Maj. Anderson and Captain Foster show a state of inactivity on the part of the Confederates. Such expressions as, ‘Their works seem to be at a standstill,’ and ‘All operations looking to an attack on this fort have ceased,’ ‘There seems to be a general lack of [386] activity,’ and even to the 6th of April the same reports of Confederate quietness and inactivity were transmitted regularly from Fort Sumter to Washington.

But in the meantime Captain Fox had returned with whatever information he had gained by his special visit to Maj. Anderson, who had been kept in ignorance of the purposes of the administration, but was ‘in daily expectation since the return of Colonel Lamon to Washington, of receiving orders to vacate this post.’ Political ferment was occurring which threatened the repose of the President. General Totten, chief engineer, U. S. A., quartered at Washington, seemed to understand the situation, as it may be inferred from a sentence in his communication to the secretary of war, Mr. Cameron, ‘under the strongest convictions on some military questions upon which great political events seem about to turn, I feel impelled to state them,’ and proceeds to advise against an attempt to reinforce by exposing vessels to the fire of Charleston batteries. But, he says, ‘should the above reasoning not meet acceptance, or for political reasons should it be decided to hold and defend this fort (Sumter) to the last, then I have to say that every soldier that can be spared should be sent to its relief with the utmost dispatch, accompanied by military supplies of every kind and in the greatest abundance. Having no personal ambition or party feeling to lead or mislead me to conclusions, I have maturely studied the subject as a soldier bound to give all his faculties to his country, which may God preserve in peace.’

The Fort Sumter reinforcement question was determined finally on partisan political considerations. Party pressure overcame the ‘faith as to Sumter’ as ‘military necessity’ subsequently recognized no constitutional restraint. The advice of experienced and able military officers as to the futility of the attempt to reinforce Sumter by the employment of a few vessels went for nothing with the politicians, and since the attempt itself would [387] satisfy party clamor and strengthen the administration they were determined to make it. The South could at least be forced to fire the first gun, and that would be worth the cost of the expedition and the destruction of a fleet. The border States were also insecure and must be conciliated. Kentucky, which President Lincoln declared was ‘the key of the situation,’ had asked for a convention of all States to agree on the Crittenden Compromise, and resolved to remain in the Union only on the condition that Mr. Lincoln would not make war on the seceded States. Virginia was still interceding for peace through her committee which was in Washington, and to this committee Mr. Lincoln proposed that if the State convention then in session would bind the State not to secede under any circumstances and adjourn sine die he would order the evacuation of Fort Sumter; a condition that no free people would accept, and which the commissioners had no authority to consider. (Reminiscences of Lincoln, p. 87.)

President Lincoln entered into the views of Captain Fox notwithstanding the opposition of General Scott, and as valuable time was being lost in the discussion, he directed Captain Fox to prepare for the voyage, but to make no binding engagements. In his first efforts he met with the opposition of Mr. Marshall, on whom he had relied. Mr. Marshall declined to aid him because the attempt to reinforce Sumter would not only thwart the proposed loan, but ‘would bring on civil war.’ Delays which Captain Fox says ‘belong to the secret history of this period, prevented a decision until on the afternoon of the 4th of April, when the President sent for me and said that he had decided to let the expedition go, and that a messenger from himself would be sent to the authorities of Charleston before I could possibly get there to notify them that no troops would be thrown into Sumter, if provisions were allowed peacefully to be sent to the garrison.’ [388]

The ‘Powhatan,’ the ‘Pocahontas,’ the ‘Pawnee,’ and the ‘Harriet Lane’ were placed at the disposal of Captain Fox by the secretary of the navy. On the 5th of April he engaged the ‘Baltic’ to carry supplies and recruits, hired three steam tugs, and rapidly fitted out an expedition. The command of the naval force was tendered to Commodore Stringham, a naval officer of high authority, but he declined because he considered the expedition to be too late to be successful. Colonel H. L. Scott, aide to General Scott, was directed by confidential orders to supply recruits, but he ridiculed the idea of the government relieving Sumter and the owners of tugs so generally refused to risk their vessels that only three could be hired at exorbitant rates. Supplies, however, were easily purchased, and the expedition was thoroughly provisioned. All being made ready, the ‘Powhatan’ sailed on the 6th. The messenger from Washington was started the same day to Governor Pickens to notify him that ‘faith as to Sumter fully kept’ meant that the fort would be provisioned as soon as he would consent for it to be done; otherwise the fleet and Maj. Anderson were prepared to see that the fort was held and reinforced. The tug ‘Uncle Ben’ steamed out on the 7th, the ‘Harriet Lane’ and the tug Yankee on the 8th, the ‘Pawnee’ and the ‘Baltic’ on the 9th, the ‘Pocahontas’ on the 10th. This considerable fleet, commissioned to execute the plan of Captain Fox, encountered a heavy gale, which continued during the whole passage, delaying the voyage so much that the rendezvous at Charleston did not begin until the 11th or 12th, the ‘Harriet Lane’ being the first vessel to arrive. All finally arrived, and in addition to the fleet, the steamer Nashville and a number of merchant vessels anchoring near the bar increased the imposing naval demonstration. A portion of the war ships stood in towards the bar at sunrise of the 12th but the captain of the ‘Pawnee’ refused the request of Captain Fox to [389] stand in to the bar with him because his orders required him to remain and await the ‘Powhatan;’ and besides he ‘was not going in there to inaugurate civil war.’ Other vessels steamed in and as they neared the land the smoke and shells from the Confederate batteries, which had just opened, became visible. The sound of war at once drew the remark from the gallant commander of the ‘Pawnee,’ Captain Rowan, that he would ‘stand in with his ship and share the fate of the army.’ The weather was bad and the sea was heavy, the warships inside the bar had no boats nor men to carry in supplies, the ‘Powhatan’ had not arrived, the ‘Baltic’ could not withstand the very heavy swell, first running ashore on a shoal and then anchoring far out in deep water. One of the tug boats had been driven by the gale into the hands of the ‘rebels’ at Wilmington, and the others, had not arrived. But the indomitable Fox persisted in hoping that all the elements of his carefully planned attack on Sumter would yet get together. Pursuing this hope he organized a boat's crew, pulled in to the ‘Pawnee’ from the ‘Harriet Lane,’ purposing to make an effort to reach Sumter with provisions even in the absence of the tug boats, but the heavy sea forbade the venture. An ice schooner was then captured and loaded for entering the harbor at night.

But in the afternoon the fort was surrendered. On the 14th it was evacuated, on the 15th the garrison was taken to the ‘Baltic,’ and Fort Sumter went into the peaceable possession of the Confederacy. Captain Fox's plan was designed to secure the reinforcement of Fort Sumter peaceably if the Confederates consented, but forcibly if they objected. The objections of South Carolina at first and the subsequent declarations of the Confederate States had been very plainly made. It was understood on both sides that the attempt to reinforce by provisions and troops, or by either, would provoke war. The steaming into the harbor of Charleston was understood [390] by the well-informed captain of the ‘Pawnee’ as ‘the inauguration of war.’ The political maneuver of the expedition was to gain an advantage whether the fort was reinforced or compelled to surrender. But Captain Fox cared little for the politics in the question and therefore planned for a successful, forcible, hostile reinforcement with provisions and troops. His plan required three hundred sailors, a full supply of armed launches, three tugs, and the support of the ships of war assigned him by the Secretary, and the ‘Baltic’ freighted with stores and recruits. The expedition meant war as far as evidences by preparation can prove the warlike intent. The expedition was as warlike as the Spanish Armada, and its failure does not defend it from the true charge that it was designed to institute war against the Confederate States.

It is not to be presumed that the policy of Mr. Lincoln in this special expedition had no outlook beyond the provisioning of Fort Sumter. Success in that venture would have necessitated, upon the same policy, the reduction of the other forts and the occupation of Charleston. In the changes in the plan, which were ordered in Washington, Mr. Lincoln was not conscious that his signature to the orders would deprive the expedition of the means to accomplish an object which he held to be of vital importance. The feebleness therefore with which hostilities were inaugurated was owing to the storms of the sea, and the interference at Washington while the expedition was in progress, but not with any intent that ample force should not be used.

The political aspect of this event reveals an astute calculation of consequences following the failure or the success of the expedition. If successful, Charleston must fall into Federal control; if unsuccessful, the Confederates, having been forced to fire the first gun, would be at disadvantage before the country on that account. In either case the result could be turned to profit. The [391] timely letter written from Washington May 1st, by Mr. Lincoln to console Captain Fox, sustains this view. In this cordial letter the sympathizing President says to Captain Fox: ‘I sincerely regret that the failure of the late attempt to provision Fort Sumter should be a source of any annoyance to you. The practicability of your plan was not in fact brought to a test. By reason of a gale, well-known in advance to be possible and not improbable, the tugs, an essential part of the plan, never reached the ground, while by an accident for which you were in nowise responsible, and possibly I to some extent was, you were deprived of a war vessel with her men which you deemed of great importance to the enterprise. I most cheerfully and truly declare that the failure of the undertaking has not lowered you a particle, while the qualities which you developed in the effort have greatly heightened you in my estimation. For a daring and dangerous enterprise of a similar character you would to-day be the man of all my acquaintances whom I would select. You and I both anticipated that the cause of the country would be advanced by making the attempt to provision Fort Sumter even if it should fail, and it is no small consolation now to feel that our anticipation is justified by the result.’ The calculation was thus coolly made by President Lincoln and Captain Fox that the mere attempt itself to reinforce Sumter would accomplish a desired political result. If it caused the firing of a single gun by the Confederates, if the attempt caused the military reduction of the fort by the secessionists, or if the expedition composed of strong ships, manned by disciplined, well-armed troops, should succeed; in any event ‘the cause of the country would be advanced by making the attempt to provision Fort Sumter.’ The consolation of the administration came with the fulfillment of the anticipation shown in the issue of the President's proclamation, the firing of the Northern heart on account of the firing of the first gun [392] on the flag, and the consequent response to the call for seventy-five thousand volunteers to invade the South and put down ‘the rebellion.’ [393]

Chapter XIII

The call to arms.

Lincoln's call for 75,000 volunteers

North

President Lincoln was evidently prepared to hear that the Confederates had resisted his warships and that Fort Sumter had surrendered. His proclamation calling for 75,000 volunteers for three months to suppress the insurrection and summoning Congress in extra session on the 4th of July was promptly written on the 14th of April and dated as being issued April 5th, within a day after the delivery of Fort Sumter to General Beauregard. The proclamation recited that the combinations formed by seven States were too powerful to be suppressed by judicial proceedings, and it was therefore thought fit to call out the militia of all the States to the number of seventy-five thousand. The persons composing the ‘combinations’ were also commanded to ‘disperse within twenty days.’ On the same day the secretary of war made his formal requisition for three months militia on the governors, assigning to each the quota of his State. Fort Sumter was surrendered on Saturday the 13th, evacuated on Sunday the 14th, on Monday the 15th these documents were spread throughout the country by the press, and on Wednesday troops were put in motion toward Washington. This extraordinary celerity is evidence of the well-devised plan to produce an issue on which coercion [394] could be made popular on the plea that the South had fired the first gun and begun the war.

The responses to the call for troops from the ‘war governors’ were as prompt as the proclamation itself; but the governor of Kentucky replied, ‘Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister States.’ The governor of Virginia responded that ‘the militia of Virginia will not be furnished to the powers at Washington for any such use or purpose as they have in view.’ The governor of Tennessee said, ‘Tennessee—not a man for coercion, but 50,000 for defense of our rights and those of our Southern brothers.’ The governor of North Carolina replied tartly, ‘I can be no party to this wicked violation of the laws of the country and to this war upon the liberties of a free people. You can get no troops from North Carolina.’ Missouri's governor answered, ‘The requisition is illegal, inhuman, diabolical and cannot be complied with.’ Governor Hicks, of Maryland, replied by stating the condition of affairs in his State.

The proclamation dispelled all doubt of the purpose of the administration at Washington to enforce the claims by actual war by land as well as by sea, and preparations were therefore at once made in the Confederacy to defend the States from invasion. Virginia, South Carolina, Tennessee and Arkansas necessarily seceded, while Missouri and Kentucky announced their purpose to be neutral. The States thus late in the Southern movement against sectional abuse of the United States government held to and maintained the right of resistance even by separation but their actual exercise of the right was a forced and emphatic denial of coercion and a firm refusal to be made parties to an unlawful attempt to subjugate the Southern States which had seceded. They joined these States in secession, not to make war for conquest, nor for National aggrandizement, nor to destroy the Union, but to repel an invasion already imminent and to defend themselves [395] against armies already in the field, ready to march upon campaigns for conquest.

The Confederate Congress was not in session during these exciting events and President Davis with his entire cabinet and executive officials was still at Montgomery. The States were barely adjusted to their new relations and it was not possible for the Confederate States to do more than to rapidly gather together their men to defend their soil. No hostile movement against Washington was feasible, but the cry of danger to the capital was shrewdly used at once to rally the North. While Virginia, North Carolina and Maryland were yet in the Union on the date of the proclamation of Lincoln, they would unquestionably have refused permission for the transportation of any troops of the existing Confederacy across their territory to attack Washington. Probably the secession of Maryland would have imperiled the capital but it was in no wise endangered even after the secession of Virginia by the prompt movement of that State to gain possession of Harper's Ferry. Yet the politic appeal for troops to rally for defense of the nation's capitol was made with good effect, and the excitement was increased in consequence of the position taken by Maryland that the United States ought not to use that State in conveying armed men to invade Virginia. Governor Hicks had consented to ask the administration to respect the wishes of Maryland to have no Federal troops sent over its territory to invade Virginia, and on April 16th Mr. George P. Kane telegraphed to know whether an attempt would be made to pass volunteers from New York intended to make war upon the South. On the 19th General Thomas, adjutant-general, wired that ‘Governor Hicks has neither right nor authority to stop troops coming to Washington. Send them on prepared to fight their way through if necessary,’ which message was sent ‘by order of the Secretary of war.’ The military department of Washington was at once extended over Maryland, Delaware and [396] Pennsylvania, by General Scott, and posts were ordered to be established ‘all along the road from Wilmington, Delaware, to Washington City.’ Citizens of Baltimore sent telegrams to Mr. Cameron, April 19th, imploring him not to send troops through their city. The Baltimore and Ohio railroad refused to transfer the troops. But notwithstanding all these precautions the issue was made by pressing a body of Massachusetts soldiers into the city and the tragedy of April 19th followed. Citizens resented this invasion, the Federal soldiers fired and thus the first battle of the Confederate war in which blood was shed, was fought on the soil of a State which had not seceded.

The political effect, however, was satisfactory to the administration for the time, and an agreement was then made with the mayor of Baltimore that troops should not be sent through the city. Annapolis was then substituted as the rendezvous en route to Washington, but finally the occupation of Maryland was made complete. Orders rapidly followed to place troops in position to advance on Baltimore and for a short time the war on the Confederacy was concentrated against Maryland. In less than five days after the unfortunate occurrences on the 19th of April in Baltimore, the Federal troops were passing through Annapolis to Washington. ‘A joint movement was contemplated from Philadelphia and Annapolis against Baltimore. The legislature was called to meet at Frederick City and the spirit of resistance pervaded many parts of the State. But the disadvantages were too great to be overcome and in a few weeks Baltimore was held by the Federal army.’

President Davis issued a proclamation on the 12th of April previously to the fight for Fort Sumter, convening the Congress on the 29th, ‘prompted by the declaration of hostilities contained in the message sent by President Lincoln to the governor of South Carolina delivered on the evening of April 8th.’ He stated as a ground of apprehension of trouble that the naval expedition fitted [397] out in New York to operate against the Southern coast was already out at sea, and ‘according to the usual course of navigation the vessels designed for Fort Sumter might be looked for on April 9th.’ Hence the promised notice by President Lincoln was not communicated to the commissioners at Washington, although dated April 6th, but was timed to reach Charleston at a late hour on the eve on which the fleet was scheduled to arrive at that port. A storm delayed the expedition. The delay gave time for communication between Charleston and Montgomery, which resulted in the defeat of the hostile descent, and thus the immergent proclamation by President Davis of April 12th to assemble the Confederate Congress, antedated the call of President Lincoln on the States for 75,000 volunteers. The Confederate government now saw that the design of the Washington administration was to ‘place the besieging force at Charleston between the simultaneous fire of the fleet and the fort,’ and hence it was necessary to reduce the fort before that purpose could be effected. Congress was therefore called; war had been commenced by the United States and action thereon had to be taken at once.

Two days after the call of President Lincoln for 75,000 troops the Confederate President issued his proclamation offering letters of marque and reprisal to all who may desire by service in private armed vessels on the high seas to aid the government in resisting aggression, basing his proclamation on the declarations in President Lincoln's call to arms. The seriousness of the situation was deeply felt throughout the South, amidst the general rejoicing over the accessions of border States, and the earnest preparations made by the Southern governors to meet all requisitions for troops. Planters realized that the need of food and forage supplies would be great, and while continuing to plant cotton they enlarged the area of corn. Merchants were crippled in business and commerce was [398] already stayed. but the realities of war were not yet experienced.

President Lincoln followed his call for the militia of the States by another proclamation issued April 19th declaring a blockade of the ports and promising to make it effective. Among other war measures the United States government caused to be seized at once all original and copied dispatches which had accumulated for twelve months in the telegraph offices. ‘The object of the government in making this seizure was to obtain evidence of the operations of Southern citizens with their Northern friends.’（Amer. Ency., 1861, p. 718.) A few days later another call was made for additional troops.

The Confederate Congress assembled at Montgomery in obedience to the proclamation of the President on the 29th of April, 1861, two weeks after the surrender of Fort Sumter. The permanent constitution had been ratified by all the States and the pleasing fact was stated by President Davis in the first sentence of his message. The declaration of war made by President Lincoln in his proclamation demanded congressional action to provide for the defense of the country. The able message fully reviewed the history of the issues which had disturbed the peace of the country as well as the unavailing efforts of the Confederate government to effect a peaceful settlement. Referring to the patriotic response of the people to the call for troops, the message declared that requisitions for troops had been met with such alacrity that the numbers tendering their services have in every instance greatly exceeded the demand, and that men of the highest official and social position are serving as volunteers in the ranks. ‘In independence we seek no conquests, no aggrandizement, no cession of any kind from the States with which we have lately confederated. All we ask is to be let alone—that those who never held power over us shall not now attempt our subjugation by arms. This we will, we must resist to the direst extremity. The moment this [399] pretension is abandoned the sword will drop from our hands and we shall be ready to enter into treaties of amity and commerce that cannot but be mutually beneficial.’

The Confederate Congress proceeded earnestly to do the important work for which it was assembled. Acts were passed recognizing the state of war existing with the United States, authorizing the issue of letters of marque by the President and authorizing him to accept the services of volunteers in the Confederate army without regard to the place of enlistment. Arkansas was admitted into the Confederacy, and Virginia being also recognized as one of the Confederate States, the members elect, Mr. J. W. Bockenbrough and Mr. Waller R. Staples, took their seats. Mr. T. J. Clingman, of North Carolina, present as a commissioner from that State, was invited to attend all sessions of Congress and participate in its deliberations. The appointment by the President of judges and marshals in Confederate courts were confirmed. On the 1st of April a bill was passed which gave authority for the issue of fifty millions of dollars in bonds, running twenty years at eight per cent interest or in lieu of these bonds twenty millions of treasury notes in small denominations without interest. The ‘produce loan’ was devised upon the idea that cotton could be made a basis of security, the Confederate government proposing by this measure to take a loan in produce from the planters and issuing its bonds in payment. In response to the plan, conventions of planters were held in various States, committees to take subscriptions were appointed and within a few months the entire amount was subscribed The device brought very little money into the Confederate treasury, but proved to be greatly useful in furnishing supplies for the army. President Davis remarked concerning its utility: ‘Scarcely an article required for the consumption of our army is provided otherwise than by subscription to the produce loan so happily devised by Congress.’ [400]

Another bill provided that persons indebted to creditors in the Northern States may pay the claim into the Confederate treasury and were prohibited from making payment otherwise pending the existing war. The tariff bill was passed; but the blockade, although it was as yet ineffective, began to diminish foreign commerce to such extent that little revenue was obtained from that source. Mr. Stephens proposed at Montgomery to make substantial use of the ‘cotton power’ of the Confederacy by a purchase on its part of the entire annual crops as they should become prepared for market and to pay the planters in eight per cent bonds running not over thirty years. The plan included the use of this cotton as security for government loans. The estimate was that four million bales would come into the possession of the Government before the close of the year 1861, and upon this basis the Confederate finances would be safe.

The sessions of Congress were usually held in secret in order to discuss fully the important practical war measures necessary for the defense of the Confederacy, among which was the question of removing the seat of government to Richmond. This necessary step having been taken on the 22d of May, a committee composed of Mr. Rives, Mr. Hunter, and Mr. Memminger was appointed to transfer the military department, and when all other arrangements for the change were made Congress adjourned. The reasons for this transfer of the Confederate capital to Richmond are given in a patriotic speech made by Mr. Howell Cobb, president of the convention, at Atlanta, Georgia, May 22nd: ‘I will tell you,’ said he, ‘why we did this. The Old Dominion has at last shaken off the bonds of Lincoln and joined her noble Southern States. Her soil is to be the battle ground and her streams are to be dyed with Southern blood. We felt that her cause was our cause, and that if she fell we wanted to die by her. We have sent our soldiers on to the posts of danger and we wanted to be there to aid and [401] counsel our brave boys. In the progress of the war further legislation may be necessary, and we will be there that when the hour of danger comes we may lay aside the robes of legislation, buckle on the armor of the soldier, and do battle beside the brave men who have volunteered for the defense of our beloved South.’

Mr. Blaine remarks concerning the state of affairs at this date: ‘The Confederacy was growing in strength daily, State after State was joining it; energy and confidence prevailed throughout all its borders.’ （Twenty Years, p. 314) In addition to the important accessions already named North Carolina joined the Confederacy; Tennessee authorized a military league with it; Maryland divided and enthralled made a protest against secession, but still opposed coercion; the governor of Kentucky issued a proclamation of neutrality; and Missouri was forbidding hostilities inside its limits. Foreign nations were beginning to manifest a purpose to maintain neutrality and recognize the belligerency of the two governments. There was a great lack in the South of arms and ammunition, but none of volunteers; the food supplies were as yet abundant; the Southern people were united, and ‘the flower of their youth’ were eagerly pressing into military service. [402]

Chapter 14:

Military and political activity.

Confederate war policy

Potomac

the Confederate policy was to conduct the war defensively. President Davis had sufficiently intimated his own views through his message of April 29th, 1861, and while there was no little popular call for immediate relief of Maryland, the counsel for a defensive policy prevailed. The Vice-President, Mr. Stephens, who had negotiated with Virginia the immediate union of that great State with the Confederacy, said in a public speech April 30th, ‘A general opinion is that Washington City is soon to be attacked. On this subject I can only say that our object is peace. We wish no aggressions on any one's rights, and will make none. But if Maryland secedes, the District of Columbia will fall to her by reversionary right, the same as Sumter to South Carolina, Pulaski to Georgia, and Pickens to Florida. When we have the right, we will demand the surrender of Washington, just as we did in the other cases, and will enforce our demand at every hazard, and at whatever cost.’ President Davis, perceiving that the main attack by land would be made upon Virginia, was actively co-operating with Governor Letcher to meet the threatened invasion of his State. His unavailing sympathy for Maryland is [403] at this day expressed in his correspondence with the Virginia authorities in which he urged them to ‘sustain Baltimore if practicable.’ But it was not practicable. Virginia, on adopting the ordinance of secession April 17th, organized the State forces, and after his resignation from the United States army, appointed General Robert E. Lee to the command of the Virginia army and navy. An advisory council was also selected, who had charge under Governor Letcher, of military affairs. Harper's Ferry, abandoned April 18th, was occupied by Virginia soldiers under Colonel Thomas J. Jackson, and General Taliaferro was placed in command at Norfolk. General Joseph E. Johnston was assigned to command of the forces of the State near Richmond. There was doubtless an enthusiastic feeling among the Virginia troops to ‘make a dash into Maryland, capture Washington and end the war.’ But the natural impulse was kept under the control of the leaders, and no such movement was seriously considered, although the advisory council requested the governor to send a commissioner to Maryland to ascertain the condition of affairs in that State, and endeavored to supply the requisition of General Steuart for arms.

The Federal forces, which had been assembled at Washington, began to cross the Potomac on the 24th of May, and meeting no resistance, took possession of Alexandria. Time had been taken to bring Maryland under military control, and Baltimore had been under the command of Federal officers since the 13th of May, after which the policy of the administration was now to reduce Virginia to submission and overthrow the Confederacy by the capture of Richmond. Troops were also ordered according to this plan into Western Virginia and steamers with reinforcements appeared at Old Point and Newport News, while the main army crossed the Potomac.

President Davis and his executive assistants arrived at Richmond from Montgomery as these movements began, [404] and entered actively upon measures to meet the formidable invasion. But by successive advances the confident Federals pressed their advantages, notwithstanding the checks they received and their signal repulse at Big Bethel on the 10th of June. The war cry ‘On to Richmond’ was started by the Northern press to arouse enthusiasm in that section, and the meeting of the Confederate Congress at the Virginia capital was to be prevented, or if it should assemble the Confederate government must be dispersed. A quick crushing of the rebellion was declared to be the policy of the Federal administration.

The Confederate government now presented to the world the aspect of a well-organized nation attacked by another nation seeking its subjugation. Its people had expressed their will by unconstrained ballot in favor of secession—the States had acted in accordance with this popular expression—the written Constitution evidenced the wisdom of their Statesmen—and the organization of all departments of civil government was complete. The change from association with the United States to the Confederate States had produced no popular outbreak, nor embarrassed the administration of justice in the courts. Commerce was interrupted only on account of the hostility of the United States to the withdrawal of the seceded States, but in all other respects the great event was unattended by any circumstances that occur in violent revolutions.

The Confederate Congress assembled in the hall of the House of delegates, Richmond, Virginia, on Saturday, July 20th, 1861. President Davis' message was read and referred to appropriate committees. The secretary of war asked for the call of three hundred regiments additional to the one hundred and ninety-four regiments and thirty-two battalions already accepted, which Congress met by providing for 400,000 additional troops, and the issue of $100,000,000 in bonds, and the same amount in [405] treasury notes to carry on the war. Official reports show that all Confederate troops at this time enrolled constituted a force entirely insufficient to meet the large armies which the United States were calling into the service.

Confederate finances required the attention not only of Congress but of the experienced financiers of the Confederacy. A convention of bankers had met in Atlanta, June 3rd, and after electing Mr. G. B. Lamar, president, and Mr. James S. Gibbs, secretary, passed resolutions to advance funds to the government until its treasury notes could be issued, and then adjourned to meet in Richmond, July 24th, during the sitting of Congress. At that time the patriotic bankers again met, in larger numbers, comprising representatives from all the principal banks of the South, and pledged their full financial support of the government.

The Congress laid a direct tax assessed by States which it supposed would yield fifteen millions, and authorized the issue of one hundred millions in treasury notes, but the fifteen millions borrowed in February, the loans on produce, and the measures of the former and the present Congress, all combined, placed at the control of the government very little above two hundred millions of dollars to carry on the war. The States, however, acting separately, made special and large appropriations, and individual resources were used in generous donations for the equipment of volunteers. Confederate money was freely received and used everywhere by the banks, and in commerce by the people. So great, however, was the paper issue even in 1861, by States, counties and corporations, which could not be absorbed in trade, on account of the blockade, that depreciation took place at once. In the summer of 1861 specie went to a premium of 15 percent for the best currency, and at the close of the year the depreciation had gone to nearly fifty cents on the dollar. Congress endeavored to preserve the Confederate credit by all measures it could devise. Sustained by [406] the banks it made its loans at what should be considered a low rate of interest, and attempted to provide for the payment of that interest by special tax of fifty cents upon each one hundred dollars in value upon nearly all real and personal property.

The United States Congress met in extra session ‘in a fortified city’ on the 4th of July, 1861. Among the distinguished leaders who supported war measures with vigor were Sumner, Fessenden, Chandler, Trumbull, Wade, Hale, Wilson, Sherman and Chase. The conservatives were represented by Pearce, Polk, Richardson of Illinois, Saulsbury, Bayard and Bright. Every New England senator except Morrill was given chairmanship of some committee. Sixteen States were put in complete control of the government. By a political understanding during these early months of the war, neither party was to take political advantage and endeavor to gain party credit by the success of coercion. Hence it happened that the disturbing slavery question was kept in abeyance except to agree by resolutions that the war was not waged to emancipate the slaves. The public declaration was to be made that the safety of the capital from the assaults of the insurgents, the saving of the Union, the rescue of Southern Union people from the control of the disunionists, the recovery of the forts and the honor of the flag, were to be the grounds of armed invasion in the Southern States. （Blaine, ‘Twenty Years,’ pp. 323, 353.) The House organized by electing Mr. Grow, speaker, defeating Mr. F. P. Blair, of Missouri. The war leaders were Stevens, Conkling, Washburne, Lovejoy, Morrill and Colfax. Opposed to them were English, Voorhees, Pendleton, Corning, Richardson, Cox, Vallandigham, and Crittenden.

The message of President Lincoln related almost wholly to matters of the war then in progress. The two things uppermost for earnest consideration were the armies and the money necessary to conduct a vigorous war. [407] Referring to the occupancy of Fort Sumter by the Federal garrison, he claimed this to be necessary in order to maintain ‘visible possession’ and that the Confederate Government desired to reduce the fort for a similar reason. It also wanted the advantage of visible possession. The President attacked Virginians with a severity which betrayed the disappointment of his desires to control that State, and with some evidence of anger signified a purpose to make the State suffer for its action. （Blaine, 335.) ‘The people of Virginia,’ said he, ‘have allowed this giant insurrection to make its nest within her borders and this Government has no choice left but to deal with it where it finds it.’ The President asked Congress to furnish him for this purpose ‘four hundred thousand men and four hundred millions of money.’ Congress legislated on scarcely any matters except such as affected the conduct of the war. Within a month after the message was read seventy war bills were passed. The President's unauthorized proclamations were confirmed, and his demands for men and money were complied with. All these extreme measures were not passed, however, without the resolute opposition of statesmen who desired to see the Union preserved without the destruction of the Constitution. The suppression of the writ of habeas corpus in Maryland was attacked from many quarters. Mr. Latham, of California, would not ‘indorse blindfold everything the government might do.’ Mr. Kennedy, of Maryland, protested against the proclamation as unnecessary and without warrant of law. Mr. Polk, of Missouri, urged that the President's conduct was perilous, and particularly characterized his interference with commerce as a crime which the secession of the States did not mitigate. Mr. Powell, of Kentucky, opposing the resolution to legalize the President's acts, charged the supporters of the administration with the responsibility for disunion and war. ‘I think,’ he said, ‘that in this age as a Christian, enlightened people we should settle these difficulties without a resort to [408] arms. If senators on the other side of the chamber last winter had co-operated with senators on this side, and we could have had a corresponding action in the House, I have no doubt all these difficulties could have been settled. * * * When the warlike spirit that now sweeps over this land shall have subsided, the people of this country will calmly and dispassionately look into the history of the times, and if this government be overthrown, impartial history will hold you responsible for it; for you could have settled the controversy; you could have settled it peaceably; you could have settled it without impairing any rights of any man or any State in the North by granting proper guarantees to the South which would do you, your property or your States no harm. You declined to do it; the responsibility is with you.’ The defense of the President was equally strenuous, and the resolution confirming his acts was agreed to.

Perplexing questions confronted both governments immediately upon the institution of hostilities between States which had so long continued in the Union together, under their constitutional agreement. Among them were the ‘war’ power of the President of the United States, or of Congress, the extent of the authority of military commanders, the disposition of captured or refugee slaves, the relation of the people of a seceded State to the State government, the treatment of persons captured in arms on land or sea, and such like. The Federal Government caused all these questions to become all the more perplexing by its persistence in assuming that the secession of the States was a mere insurrection and their confederation was only a combination of individuals. Certain constitutional difficulties that stood in the way of coercion were so plainly pointed out by jurists who were accustomed to construe the law without regard to political necessities that for a time the administration moved with some care in military operations against the Southern States. A few of these questions are here briefly mentioned [409] as examples of a large number which constantly arose and required immediate solution:

The ‘Savannah,’ a small schooner, was the first to sail June 3rd, under a Confederate commission as a privateer, and being soon captured by the U. S. brig Perry, its crew were put in irons as pirates. Mr. Davis made an immediate demand that they should be treated as prisoners of war, stating to President Lincoln that ‘if driven to the terrible necessity of retaliation by your execution of the officers and crew of the “Savannah,” that retaliation shall be extended so far as shall be requisite to secure the abandonment of a practice unknown to the warfare of civilized man.’ European nations agreed with the views held by President Davis, and by this course in the case of the ‘Savannah,’ as well as of the ‘Jefferson Davis,’ the United States government was compelled to respect the belligerency of the Confederate States.

Another troublesome question concerned the negroes in Federal lines. Immediately after the invasion of Virginia many negroes escaped from their owners into the Federal camps,—an occurrence which raised in General Butler's opinion, ‘questions of very considerable importance, both in a military and political aspect.’ Since these negroes would come into his lines, General Butler determined ‘until better advised, as these men were very serviceable, and he had great need of labor in his quartermaster's department, to avail himself of their services.’ He accordingly resolved to receipt for them as he would ‘for any other property of a private citizen which the exigencies of the service seemed to require.’ Another question raised by Maj. Carey in an interview with General Butler was the transit of persons and families northward from Virginia, which General Butler also settled by declining to permit their removal through the blockade on the ground that these families should be kept in Virginia as hostage for the good behavior of the [410] citizens, and for the further reason that this removal would reduce the number of consumers of provisions. (Ii Records 650.) A proposition was made by Governor Letcher to Mr. Hemeken, the agent of the New York and Virginia steamship company, to purchase the steamships Yorktown and ‘Jamestown,’ which he had already seized. The acceptance of this proposition by Mr. Hemeken raised a question in Mr. Seward's mind which he solved by declaring that the acceptance of the proposition was an act of treason. On the 25th of May, Mr. John Merryman, a reputable citizen of Maryland, was arrested at night in his home by an armed force and conveyed to Fort McHenry, where he was imprisoned. He sought liberation at once by his petition to Chief Justice Taney, praying the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. Justice Taney took the customary legal proceedings against the military commander, but his writ being refused, and his order of attachment disregarded, the venerable head of the judiciary of the Union found the civil government powerless, and could merely record his decision that ‘upon the face of the returns the detention of the prisoner was unlawful on two grounds:’ 1. The President under the Constitution and laws of the United States cannot suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or authorize any military officer to do so. 2. A military officer has no right to arrest and detain a person not subject to the rules and articles of war, for an offense against the laws of the United States, except in aid of the judicial authority and subject to its control. General Scott impatiently rebuked General Butler by telegram for his ‘hazardous occupation of Baltimore,’ which was made without his knowledge and approbation, commanded him to ‘issue no more proclamations,’ to which Butler replied that he acted on ‘verbal directions received from the war department.’ An order from General Scott quickly followed removing General Butler to Fortress Monroe, on account of which the removed [411] officer complained to Mr. Cameron that he was quite content to be relieved altogether, but ‘will not be disgraced.’ Mr. Ross Winans, of Baltimore, had been arrested by General Butler on the 15th of May and sent to Fort McHenry, but he was promptly released by General Cadwallader, who succeeded Butler in command. The Union defense committee, of New York, through its chairman, Mr. J. J. Astor, Jr., proposed to send a number of rifled cannon to Fort Pickens, but Secretary Cameron would ‘give no such authority as is therein asked for, and informed the committee that the war department would act through the agency of its own proper officers.’ On the 21st of May, the ‘Nightingale,’ of Boston, sailing under American colors, was captured by Alfred Taylor, U. S. Navy, with a cargo of 961 slaves, presenting the singular projection of the unlawful slave trade by a Boston ship into the great crisis of the slavery institution.

General Scott ordered the arrest of the Baltimore police board by General Banks, successor to General Cadwallader. They were accordingly seized and imprisoned in Fort McHenry, their powers suspended, and a provost marshal appointed. Marshal Kane had been previously arrested. These illegal and violent proceedings of General Banks were resented with warm indignation by the respectable officials who were thus taken from their homes by military force at night and confined in prison without information of the cause of their arrest. Having no redress by any court, they forwarded an able memorial to the United States Congress, accompanied by another from the mayor and council of the city. Congress received these memorials and by resolution called on the President to explain the arrest and imprisonment of these police commissioners. The President replied with the brief and formal answer that ‘the public interest forbade compliance with the request of Congress.’

These very troublesome domestic questions were [412] matched by foreign affairs equally perplexing. Mr. Seward, as secretary of state, in charge of foreign affairs, had on the 9th of March addressed a circular letter to all the ministers of the United States in foreign nations urging them to counteract the designs of those who would invoke foreign aid in their attempts to overthrow the Republic, and describing the disturbance at home as a transient affair. Again on April 24th the Secretary forwarded a more formal and impressive letter to those ministers who were appointed to Great Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, Austria, Belgium, Italy and Denmark, specially relating to the question of neutrality in war. This diplomatic correspondence exhibits the early anxiety of the United States concerning the attitude of these great nations. ‘It is understood,’ he wrote to Mr. Judd, who was appointed to the court of Prussia, ‘that the so-called Confederate States of America have sent or are about to send agents to solicit recognition in Europe. * * * Your most efficient and unfailing efforts must be put forth directly and even indirectly to prevent the success of that ill-starred design.’ He continued and cautioned the minister at Belgium against the probable promise of the Confederates to make a tariff better suited to manufacturing interests than the existing United States tariff, and instructed him to say that ‘the tariff is not permanent and will certainly be modified if it should prove to be onerous to foreign commerce.’ The general correspondence with Great Britain was not pleasing to Mr. Seward, and Lord John Russell's remark to Minister Adams about the first of April that the matter was not ripe for decision one way or the other, was by no means satisfactory.

France was disposed to take no hasty action, but intimated quite early in April, 1861, that the Confederate government might be able to claim belligerent rights as a nation de facto; finally saying that the commercial interests at stake were so great that France was compelled [413] to join with Great Britain in meeting the condition of things which imperiled those interests. Mr. Dayton, the new minister, was promptly instructed to protest against any, even unofficial, intercourse between Confederate agents and the French government, and to declare that the United States cannot be content with any concert among foreign nations to recognize the insurgents as a belligerent power.

The Confederate government had sent Major Caleb Huse to Europe to make contracts for the manufacture of arms, and Captain Semmes had also gone into the Northern markets to make purchases of munitions of war. A more formal effort to gain access to the governments of Europe was made in March by the appointment of three commissioners, William L. Yancey, P. A. Yost and A. Dudley Mann, who went without delay to England. Afterward two other embassadors were appointed, James M. Mason and John Slidell, and eventually distribution of these eminent men among the foreign courts was made by sending Mr. Mason to England, Mr. Slidell to France, Mr. Yost to Spain, and Mr. Mann to Belgium. Mr. Yancey returned home and was elected to the Confederate Senate.

These representatives of the Confederacy abroad were all able and experienced statesmen. Mr. Yancey, a lawyer and political leader in Alabama, possessing the gift of remarkable eloquence, had often discharged positions of public trust. Mr. Mason had become an experienced legislator in the House and Senate of the United States; Mr. Slidell, also a member of Congress from Louisiana, a minister to Mexico, and United States Senator, and Judge Yost, a distinguished jurist from the same State, were all competent to discharge the duties assigned to them, Mr. A. Dudley Mann had gained extensive diplomatic experience in negotiation of treaties with the German states, and as special commissioner to Switzerland in 1850. He was also the private secretary [414] of President Pierce for a short time in 1853, and had afterward given his services to development of Southern resources.

The manufacturing and general commercial interests of European nations began to suffer, especially from the anticipated want of the usual cotton supply. The blockade was not regarded with favor nor a long continuance of hostilities in America, which had already suspended the profitable commerce of England and France. The Confederate commissioners pressed their claims upon the attention of the sovereigns to whom they were sent by all the indirect channels through which they could operate, and secured the sympathy of large numbers of men of prominence in commercial and political life. On the 13th of May, the decision of Great Britain to maintain strict neutrality and to accord to both contending parties the rights of belligerency was announced by the proclamation of the Queen. France had been inclined to tender its good offices to adjust American troubles, but had refrained from the fear of being misunderstood, and now simply adopted the course of England. No application in form had as yet been made by the Confederate commissioners for any purpose of recognition, but as Minister Dayton writes in June, there was a fear felt that a military reverse at this time, if it were to occur, would very decidedly incline France and England to recognize the Confederacy. Mr. Seward therefore directed all his efforts with great ingenuity, to prevent any foreign encouragement to the Confederate movement, constantly urging that it was ‘casual and ephemeral, a mere insurrection,’ such as European governments could not afford to encourage; one while threatening war on Europe and then making concessions even to a reluctant accession to the declaration of the Congress at Paris, pure and simple. The position that privateersmen were pirates was also abandoned, and the claim of a right to close part of its ports by a paper blockade was withdrawn upon the [415] significant declaration by the European powers that the execution of privateersmen would be inhuman, and an ineffective blockade would not be tolerated. Spain and Portugal published brief proclamations of neutrality, but the Emperor of Russia through a letter of Gortschakoff to the Russian minister at Washington, expressed his unfriendliness to secession and conveyed his assur-ance that ‘in every event the American nation may count upon his most cordial sympathy during the import-ant crisis through which it is passing.’ Thus stood the relations of the two contending governments with the nations. The Confederacy had won its right to be known as a government de facto and to be treated as a lawful belligerent. Its proceedings had commanded the respect of statesmen, and its able commissioners were in position to present its cause to public consideration. .On the other hand it was at disadvantage in the estimation of European courts in being classed among revolutionary governments, and was to great extent debarred public sympathy because of the slavery question. Its ability to maintain its independence by military resources had not yet appeared, while the widely published preparations of the United States impressively pointed out the military strength which was about to be employed to crush the rebellion. The status was expectant; events were not even foreshadowed; uncertainty prevailed while the armies of the two contestants were drawing toward the battle ground on the soil of Virginia. [416]

Chapter 15:

Federal reliance on physical force.

Comparison of resources

Ward Richmond

first Manassas

Washington

Confederacy

Europe

Trent

all civil movements of the period centered on the military situation. War was fully on between two powerful nations having the same civilization, language, religion and general ideas of government, and both unprepared to fight. The North with twenty million population, a regular army and navy, many manufactures of munitions, superiority in wealth, and with free access to the world by land and sea, was arrayed against the South with its six million white population, army and navy to create and to arm, without war supplies and with ports nearly closed. In intelligence, courage, energy, morality and devotion to country let it be conceded simply that the two peoples were equal. In physical resources it is plain that the superiority was with the North in the lowest proportion of three to one—but more accurately, five to one. Enthusiasm in its cause pervaded the South so that on the venture for independence its people in rare unity pledged all they possessed; while opposing appeals for the preservation of the Union and defense of the capital, coupled with the avowal that these alone were the objects of the [417] war, were answered at the North by an immediate flow of money and men to sustain the administration.

Four Federal armies of 100,000 men were now deployed upon the territory of Virginia, all disposed so as to bear upon Richmond, the capital of the Confederacy. Fewer than two-thirds that number of Confederate troops were maneuvered by their skillful officers to resist the invasion. At the first encounter misfortune befell the Confederacy in western Virginia, and notwithstanding the Southern victories at other points the Federal armies advanced from the Potomac during the first summer months of 1861, deeper into the heart of Virginia.

The battle of Manassas, July 21st, became the climax of these movements of the Federal and Confederate armies, in which the combatants actually engaged were nearly evenly matched, the Confederates putting into the fight a total of about 28,000 and the Federals assaulting with about 35,000 men. Whether by superior skill of Confederate generals and harder fighting by the soldiers, or any other cause, the fact of a most thorough and mortifying defeat of the Federals remains as the ineffaceable result of this early encounter between the two armies. The political purpose of the battle, based upon undue confidence in the immense preparations for overwhelming victory, also broke down completely, and the promoters escaped indignation only by the loud cry which they uttered for a vast army and unlimited expenditures to save the capital.

The story of this remarkable first campaign against Richmond is well told by the following extracts from the official dispatches as they appear in the ‘Records,’ the dates of which should be noticed:

Gen. Scott to McClellan, July 18: ‘McDowell yesterday drove the enemy beyond Fairfax court-house. He will attack the entrenched camp at the Manassas junction to-day. Beaten there the enemy may retreat both upon Richmond and the Shenandoah valley. I may reinforce him (Patterson) to enable you to bag Johnston.’ [418]

Secretary Cameron to Governor Curtin, July 18: ‘The Pennsylvania troops were expected to have joined the forces going into battle this week. I trust there will be no delay to prevent them sharing the honors of the expected battles.’

General Scott to McClellan, July 21 a. m.: ‘Johnston has amused Patterson and reinforced Beauregard. Mc-Dowell this morning forcing the passage of Bull Run. In two hours he will turn the Manassas Junction and storm it to-day with superior force.’

Mendell to Gen. Thomas, July 21, 4 p. m.: ‘General McDowell wishes all the troops that can be sent from Washington to come here without delay.’

Gen. Scott to the general commanding at Baltimore, July 21: ‘Put your troops on the alert. Bad news from McDowell's army, not credited by me.’

Capt. Alexander to Washington: ‘General McDowell's army in full retreat. The day is lost. Save Washington and the remnants of this army. The routed troops will not reform.’

Gen. Scott to McClellan: ‘McDowell has been checked. Come down to the Shenandoah valley and make head against the enemy in that quarter. Banks and Dix will remain in Baltimore, which is liable to revolt.’

Gen. Scott to McDowell: ‘Under the circumstances it seems best to return to the line of the Potomac.’

Jefferson Davis to Gen. Cooper, Manassas, July 21: ‘Night has closed upon a hard fought field. Our forces have won a glorious victory. The enemy was routed and fled precipitately, abandoning a very large amount of arms, munitions, knapsacks and baggage. The pursuit was continued along several routes toward Leesburg and Centerville until darkness covered the fugitives. Our force engaged not exceeding fifteen thousand; that of the enemy estimated at thirty-five thousand.’

Col. Kerrigan, at Alexandria, to Cameron, July 22: [419] ‘There are about 7,000 men here without officers. Nothing but confusion.’

Gen. Mansfield to Capt. Mott at the Chain Bridge, July 22: ‘Order the Sixth Maine to keep these demoralized troops out of their camp.’

Gen. Mansfield to Gen. Runyan, July 22: ‘Why do the regiments I sent to you yesterday return so precipitously to Alexandria without firing a shot?’

Col. Thomas A. Scott to Gen. Mansfield, July 22: ‘Allow me to suggest that you man the forts and prevent soldiers from passing over to the city. Their arrival here would produce a panic on this side. The enemy is still pressing McDowell and you need every man in the forts to save the city.’

W. T. Sherman to the adjutant general, July 22: ‘I have at this moment ridden in with, I hope, the rear men of my brigade, which in common with our whole army has sustained a terrible defeat and has degenerated into an armed mob.’

Townsend to McDowell, July 22: ‘General Scott says it is not intended you Should reduce your command to the minimum number of regiments mentioned by him to-day, but if the enemy will permit, you can take tomorrow or even the next day for that purpose.’

Secretary Cameron to Moses H. Grinnell, July 22: ‘The capital is safe.’

Gen. Scott to Gen. McDowell at Arlington, July 23: ‘It is reported that Mr. Jefferson Davis or the enemy is advancing on your lines. This is possible. Rally and compact your troops to meet any emergency.’

These few extracts from the records exhibit the utter rout of the Federal army in a state of panic which was transmitted even to the Congress at Washington. Mr. Crittenden, on the 22d of July, seized the opportunity to propose a declaration, afterwards called the ‘panic resolution,’ of certain good intentions of the government in making the aggression upon the South, which was passed [420] without delay. A determined effort was made to cast the blame of the battle upon General Scott, but in his own defense he at once declared that he had fought the battle against his judgment. He said in the presence of Washburne, Logan, McClernand and Richardson, who were conferring with President Lincoln and the secretary of war, ‘After my superiors had determined to fight it, I did all in my power to make the army efficient.’ Mr. Lincoln replied: ‘Your conversation seems to imply that I forced you to fight this battle.’ To which General Scott responded: ‘I have never served a President who has been kinder to me than you have been.’ This evasive answer was accepted as an exoneration of the President, but the secretary of war and the cabinet generally were understood as having insisted on a forward movement and a successful battle at that time. Mr. Richardson, of Illinois, in addressing the House on this question, said:

‘Mr. Speaker, standing here in my place, I desire to say of Abraham Lincoln—If you let him alone he is an honest man; but I am afraid he has not the will to stand up against the wily politicians who surround him and knead him to their purposes.’

The Southern people were enthusiastic in their first congratulations at the result of this great encounter of the armies, but as they learned more of the disintegration of McDowell's army there was much criticism of the cessation of pursuit. It appeared to many that Maryland might have been occupied, Washington captured and the war ended. The question, however, may never be settled, since even the participating generals and intelligent civil officials disagree. It is in evidence, however, that the Southern army lacked sufficient cavalry, that the troops had been engaged for two days and sank down in weariness to rest at midnight after their great victory, that they fought their battle against odds and it was not known, even the next day, that the rout was so complete. Besides, heavy rains set in, rendering the Virginia roads [421] impassable, while sickness had withdrawn at least twenty per cent from the effective force. President Davis personally testifies that he himself did not antagonize the wishes which any officer expressed to make an immediate advance into Maryland. The Confederate army was, nevertheless, in fact, moved far forward and occupied Munson's Hill, where the inhabitants of Washington could see its flags waving. After a few days' rest and recruits having arrived, the Confederate army favored the forward movement with an eager desire to liberate Maryland, believing that bold aggression would speedily terminate hostilities. Another view was held, that the change of the Confederate war policy from the defensive to the offensive would arouse the North, break down the peace party and overthrow all influential men in the North who were seeking an opportunity to bring the war to a close, honorable to both sides. From this class of Northern men the most earnest appeals were made to Southern leaders to prevent invasion. At the same time it was known that England and France, after according belligerent rights, had intimated, much to the indignation of Mr. Seward, that possibly the Confederate States might be able to make a case demanding the recognition of its nationality. It was thought advisable to press at once this claim because from the date of the victory at Manassas the Confederate government was rightfully entitled to this foreign courtesy. In its official offices it was administering wisely all the regular functions of the good government of a people who were united in its support. It had tendered its hand to be taken into the fellowship of nations by regular appointment of eminent embassadors. It had large territory, ample resources and all possessions needful to sustain its population and contribute to the commerce of the world. And now it had demonstrated its military ability by assembling a strong army and achieving a success in battle of an imposing magnitude. But the appeal was made in vain. The European powers [422] merely seized upon this and other successes of the Confederates to worry the Washington administration and to hold a position from which either side could be taken as the war might turn.

The belligerent effect on the Northern mind by the battle of Manassas appears to have been really produced by the boldness displayed by Mr. Lincoln. He rallied the terrified Congress to provide for an army of 500,000 men, stirred up the war governors and called General McClellan to Washington to take charge of the work of organizing, equipping, and disciplining the great force with which he proposed to renew the contest. The fears of ‘a border outbreak,’ which had in part caused the passage of the panic resolution of Mr. Crittenden, contributed, however, to a change of the field of military operations from the ill-fated territory of Virginia to the Southern coast and the Western States, thus diverting the thoughts of the Federals from their bad fortune at Manassas. In August strong naval expeditions were sent southward, which succeeded in securing a foothold on the coasts of North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia; armies were collected in the West for the purpose of holding Missouri and Kentucky; and with an ever-present fear that Washington might be captured, it was carefully curtained with an increasing number of defenses.

The hope of the Southern people that peace would follow this bloody battle was deferred by these Northern preparations for more powerful and extensive invasions. The Confederate States after uttering their congratulations found it to be necessary to prepare again for battle, and although Congress recorded its gratitude for victory and its hope for peace, the demand for war legislation was as great as ever. President Davis nominated Beauregard for the rank of general, which was at once unanimously confirmed by Congress. As a special distinction the commission was dated July 21, 1861, the date of the Confederate victory at Manassas. Two additional [423] commissioners to Europe were authorized by Congress to be appointed by the President, and he was also empowered to determine the destinations of commissioners already appointed under former congressional action. Congress recognized the State government of Missouri with Claiborne F. Jackson, governor, and provided for its admission into the Confederacy when the Constitution should be ratified by the legally constituted authority. The same act provided for material aid to be given to the State while defending itself against invasion by the Federal armies. The Confederate government was also constrained in view of the full development of the war policy of the United States to adopt such a line of legislation as its necessities demanded. An act passed by Congress in May prohibited debtors from making payment to their creditors in the United States except such as resided in Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri and the District of Columbia. Payment generally ceased in accordance with this act, but the indebtedness was not transferred to the Confederate treasury as the act provided, the debtors preferring to let their debts stand and await the result of the war. At its close these debts were generally settled on terms satisfactory to the Northern creditors, and former business relations resumed. Another act was entitled ‘An act concerning alien enemies,’ under which President Davis issued his proclamation, August 14, 1861, requiring all alien enemies of the Confederacy to depart from the Confederate States within forty days of the date of the proclamation. The proclamation, however, was not applicable to citizens of the United States who would make declaration of intention to become citizens of the Confederacy, nor was it extended to citizens of the States of Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, District of Columbia; the territories of Arizona and New Mexico, and the Indian Territory south of Kansas were also excepted. Very few persons left the Confederate States in consequence of this act, and its practical effect was merely to unify the population. [424]

The Confiscation bill introduced in the United States Congress early in July produced debate, but was at length passed and approved by the President on the 8th of August. In retaliation the Confederate Congress subsequently enacted the Sequestration law. This Confederate sequestration act, although it was thought to be necessary to parry the force of similar legislation by the United States, was not favored throughout the States. The feature objected to most strenuously was that which required the receivers appointed under the act to apply for writs of garnishment for the purpose of enforcing answers from garnishees as to their possession of any property of the alien enemy. The law ceased to be enforced as the war progressed, although it had been pronounced constitutional by the courts. Another act was passed on account of the abduction of slaves by the enemy, which prescribed a uniform mode of preserving the evidence of the abduction and the value of the property to the end that indemnity might be exacted.

In accordance with the authority conferred by this Congress, the Confederate President appointed John Slidell and James M. Mason diplomatic agents in October, 1861, with power to enter into conventions for treaties with England and France. They were commissioned to secure from these European powers recognition of the Confederate government as a nation, based upon the vast extent of territory, its large and intelligent population, its ample resources, its importance as a commercial nation, and withal the justice of its separation from the United States. It was expected that these statesmen would be able to convince Europe of the ability of the Confederate States to maintain a national existence, as belligerent rights had already been accorded. With all the usual credentials and necessary powers the commissioners departed for Havana, Cuba, on the blockade-runner Theodora, where they arrived in safety and were presented to the captain-general of the island by the British consul, [425] not in official capacity but as gentlemen of distinction. Afterward they went as passengers aboard a British merchant vessel, The Trent, carrying English mails, and sailed for England. In the meantime Captain Charles Wilkes, U. S. N., commanding the United States sloop-of-war, San Jacinto, carrying thirteen guns, who appears to have had a zeal not according to knowledge, was busy in carrying out a purpose to capture the Confederate commissioners and executed his designs with success enough to produce a sensation which involved his government in a serious difficulty with England, from which extrication was gained only by very mortifying explanations. Cruising near the island on the alert for the ‘Trent,’ Captain Wilkes sighted the approaching vessel on the high seas, and gave the command to ‘beat to quarters, hoist the colors and load the guns.’ The next proceeding was to fire a shot across the bow of the ‘Trent,’ which caused that vessel to display the British colors without arresting its onward speed. A shell from the ‘San Jacinto’ across her course brought the ‘Trent’ to without delay and Captain Wilkes then sent his executive officer with a guard of marines and a full armed boat crew to board the British ship. Lieutenant Fairfax, the executive officer, went aboard, and informing Captain Moir of the ‘Trent’ as to the object of his visit, asked for the passenger list, saying that he would search the vessel to find Mason and Slidell. But while the English captain was protesting against this breach of international law and refusing to show any papers, the two Confederate commissioners with their associates, Eustis and McFarland, appeared and united with the British officer in his protest. At this juncture the other Federal officers in the armed. cutter came aboard with a number of marines and. other armed men of the boat's crew and the second cutter also appearing alongside Captain Wilkes formed a line outside the main deck cabin into which the Southern passengers had retired to pack their baggage. This show of force [426] was followed by the actual compulsion which it was demanded should be used and by which the commissioners were forcibly transferred from under the English flag to the boat for confinement aboard the ‘San Jacinto.’ The ‘Trent’ was then permitted to pursue her voyage, while the ‘San Jacinto’ steamed away with her prisoners to Fortress Monroe, and on arrival was hailed with the hearty laudations of Congress and the compliments of some portions of the press. Captain Wilkes for a brief moment was the pride of the nation. But in a few days he heard himself condemned for his officiousness in terms which showed very clearly that he had involved his government in a very disagreeable and dangerous controversy with Great Britain.

The boarding of the ‘Trent’ was an outrage of national amity which could not escape the indignation of all maritime nations. It was perpetrated by a zealot who was too stupid to foresee its ill effect on the relations which his own country was endeavoring to maintain with Europe, and it produced a sensation which for awhile seemed to threaten the total failure of coercion. It is not surprising that on getting the full news of the event President Lincoln said to the attorney general: ‘I am not getting much sleep out of that exploit of Wilkes, and I suppose we must look up the law of the case. I am not much of a prize lawyer, but it seems to me pretty clear that if Wilkes saw fit to make that capture on the high seas, he had no right to turn his quarter-deck into a prize court.’ The shrewd President saw that Wilkes could not let the ‘Trent’ go free, while he bore away from her the American passengers as ‘contraband,’ or as ‘conspirators,’ thus choosing to determine himself a question which only an admiralty court duly constituted could adjudicate. The President also soon realized that the rash act was very inopportune as well as illegal. Mr. Seward hurried to communicate with Mr. Adams, the United States minister at London, the shrewd suggestion that ‘in the capture [427] of Messrs. Mason and Slidell on board a British vessel, Captain Wilkes having acted without any instructions from the government, the subject is therefore free from the embarrassment which might have resulted if the act had been especially directed by us.’ ‘I trust,’ he wrote, ‘that the British government will consider the subject in a friendly temper and it may expect the best disposition on the part of this government.’ The penetrating mind of Lincoln had reached the core of the outrage, and the cunning Secretary saw the only way out of the difficulty. Mr. Adams was therefore immediately instructed as to his line of diplomatic work, even before the British government had communicated its indignation to its minister at Washington. But Earl Russell was soon ready to inform Lord Lyons officially that intelligence of a very grave nature had reached her Majesty's government concerning ‘an act of violence which was an affront to the British flag and a violation of national law.’ The Earl further expressed the trust that the United States will of its own accord offer to the British government such redress as alone could satisfy the British nation, namely, the ‘liberation of the four gentlemen and their delivery to your Lordship in order that they may again be placed under British protection, and a suitable apology for the aggression which has been committed. Should these terms not be offered by Mr. Seward, you will propose them to him.’ It should be borne in mind that the report of the affair made by Commander Williams, the British agent, to the admiralty must be accepted as the unprejudiced account of the events which transpired aboard the ‘Trent’ With very slight protest Mr. Seward in answer to Lord Russell's letter admitted the facts to be as stated, and based the defense of his government mainly on the fact that Wilkes acted ‘without any direction or instruction or even foreknowledge on the part of the United States government.’ Upon all grounds the best course to be pursued was the one suggested kindly [428] and firmly by the English government, but Mr. Seward proceeded to write, after nearly a month's delay, an elab-orate argument ending only as it must have ended, in his repeating that ‘what has happened has been simply inadvertence,’ and that for ‘this error the British government has the right to expect the same reparation that we as an independent state should expect from Great Britain or from any other friendly nation on a similar case.’ After this explanation and apology the Secretary concluded his remarkable document by writing that ‘the four persons in question are now held in military custody at Fort Warren in the State of Massachusetts. They will be cheerfully liberated. Your Lordship will please indi-cate a time and place for receiving them.’ Mr. Seward must have felt the sting which was put in the acceptance of his apology by the English government. That final rejoinder which went through the hands of Lord Lyons to the table of the secretary of state very coolly declared the apology to be full and the British demand complied with. Such pungent sentences as the following appeared in the final British communication: ‘No condition of any kind is coupled with the liberation of the prisoners’ —‘The secretary of state expressly forbears to justify the particular act of which her Majesty's government complained’—and Lord Russell threateningly says that if the United States had sanctioned the action of Wilkes, it ‘would have become responsible for the original violence and insults of the act’—‘It will be desirable that the commanders of the United States cruisers be instructed not to repeat acts for which the British government will have to ask for redress and which the United States government cannot undertake to justify.’ The illustrious prisoners were placed under the British protection with as little parade as possible and Captain Wilkes was left to enjoy as best he could the compliments hastily voted by Congress. The Confederate hope that European nations would unite with England in some policy severer [429] than the demand for apology and restitution which Mr. Seward could so easily make was dissipated. The threatening affair produced a ripple, became a mere precedent in national intercourse, and passed away. Lord Russell and Mr. Seward were alike gratified by the termination of the trouble. These upper and nether millstones then went on grinding the Confederacy which lay between. [430]

Chapter 16:

The permanent Confederate States of America.

Character of the Confederate government

President

all these historical transactions of the Federal Government in 1861, the relations of foreign nations, the military movements, the actions of Confederate and Federal citizens, have been marshaled in order, so as to furnish a medium through which a clear and just view may be had of the civil action of the Confederate authorities amidst the great difficulties which beset the cause they were chosen to manage.

We now enter into a further special investigation of the executive and legislative departments of the Confederate government in 1862, under the permanent Constitution, which had been ratified by the States,—the Congress in session, the President inaugurated, and all the orderly machinery of a well-established government in full operation, obstructed only by the coercive measures of the United States. We have under consideration a republican government, based on the confederated principle, exactly like the United States—a government formed by the agreement unanimously of several great States in a time of profound peace, which perfected a national union without insurrection or rebellion and without the arming of a regiment with intent of making war—a great government in extent of territory, in the [431] numbers and qualities of its people, in resources of prosperity, and with the prospects of exerting a wholesome international influence. It was now a little beyond one year old as a Confederacy, but many of its constituent States were among the oldest on the American continent, and all of them were habituated to the restraints as well as the advantages of free constitutional government. The ancestors of its people had framed the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States, while as jurists they had construed the fundamental law, and as soldiers had led great armies on behalf of the common country. Such were the people who formed the Confederate States of America.

Within a few days after his formal inauguration, Mr. Davis sent in to Congress February 25, 1862, his first message under the permanent organization which has all the features of the grace and force which characterized the State papers produced by him. Its value as a historical document fairly exhibiting the state of the Confederate movement as well as its general principles is sufficiently great to authorize its introduction without any abbreviation, into general political literature.

The message was received with favor by the Congress and people of the Confederate States, and was closely read both in Europe and the United States by those who were greatly interested in the events transpiring on the American continent. Congress, as usual, distributed the able paper appropriately among the committees and then addressed itself earnestly to the consideration of all measures necessary to the conduct of the internal affairs of the Confederacy as well as to such as were required to meet the pressure of the war waged by the United States.

Congress, having assembled and organized in February, had under consideration a resolution offered by Mr. Foote, of Tennessee, declaring against the defensive policy of the Confederate administration, and in favor of [432] decided aggressive activity. The resolution read, ‘That whatever propriety there may have been in the original adoption of what is known as the defensive policy in connection with the prosecution of the pending war for Southern independence, recent events have already demonstrated the expediency of abandoning that policy henceforth and forever, and that it will be the duty of the government of the Confederate States to impart all possible activity to our military forces everywhere, and to assail the forces of the enemy wherever they are to be found whether upon the land or the water, with a view to obtain the most complete security for the future.’ The resolution was understood by many as designed to impugn the policy of the administration, as there had been in those States which were overrun by Federal armies very open complaint against the supposed purpose of the Confederate government to wear out coercion by what is called the Fabian plan of defense. These complaints now began to find an utterance in Congress itself. Mr. Foote very warmly urged the hearty adoption of his resolution, which expressed, as he believed, the conviction of the country. ‘No people in revolution,’ he said, ‘could be successful by adopting the defensive policy.’ Instead of his resolution being aimed at the President, as Mr. Jenkins, of Virginia, had asserted, Mr. Foote declared that he had high authority for saying here that Mr. Davis was opposed to that defensive policy which ‘somebody,’ he knew not who, had imposed upon the country. He proceeded, to announce that Judge Harris, of Mississippi, who was the President's intimate friend, had authorized him to say that President Davis had no participation in stopping the onward movement of the Confederate armies. Mr. Foote insisted that a vigorous onward movement immediately after the battle of Manassas would have been advantageous to the Southern cause, and he now favored some similar movement. He believed that we should enter upon the soil of the enemy [433] and win an indemnity along with independence, but above all things that the war should be kept outside our borders. Another object contemplated through the resolutions was to let other nations know that the Southern people were resolved to achieve their independence. Mr. Boyce, of South Carolina, supported the resolution with a vigorous speech advocating ‘all possible energy in prosecuting an offensive warfare. We should have pursued from the first a more aggressive policy which would have given position to the Southern States, encouraged our friends, and discouraged our enemies. Such a policy had been indicated by the President when on his way to be inaugurated as President of the provisional government. Mr. Walker, the former secretary of war, had said that the flag should float over the Capitol at Washington. The expression was thought at the time to be unwise and that we should have used peaceful words while preparing for the war that might come. But the war should now be prosecuted with vigor.’ There was decided opposition expressed from many quarters to the resolution. Mr. Jenkins, of Virginia, led, declaring that the change of policy proposed would necessitate the increase of an army to double its present strength. Mr. Machen, of Kentucky, said: ‘I come from a land which is now resonant with the fife and drum from Yankeedom. Still I am not in favor of adopting a new policy, or having Congress dictate what shall be the disposition of our forces with regard to the enemy. Congress should not usurp the military power.’ The resolution was laid on the table.

Four days later Congress came readily to unanimous agreement upon another proposition concerning the unaltered purpose of the Confederates to effect a political separation from the United States. The resolution to this effect was offered by Mr. Rowe in the House, February 24th, as follows: ‘Whereas, the United States are waging a war against the Confederate States with the [434] avowed purpose of compelling the latter to reunite with them under the same Constitution and government, and Whereas, the waging of war with such an object is in direct opposition to the sound Republican maxim that “all government rests upon the consent of the governed,” and can only tend to consolidation in the general government and the consequent destruction of the rights of the States; and Whereas, this result being obtained, the two sections can exist together only in the relation of the oppressed and oppressor because of the great preponderance of power in the Northern section, coupled with dissimilarity of interests, and Whereas, we, the representatives of the people of the Confederate States in Congress assembled may be presumed to know the sentiments of the said people, having just been elected by them; therefore be it Resolved, that this Congress do solemnly declare and publish to the world that it is the unalterable determination of the people of the Confederate States (in humble reliance upon Almighty God) to suffer all the calamities of the most protracted war; but that they will never, on any terms, politically affiliate with a people who are guilty of an invasion of their soil and the butchery of their citizens.’ This bravely uttered declaration against all terms of political reunion with the States from which secession had been effected, thus unanimously and officially announced, came nearly four months after the tabling of all conciliatory resolutions which had been offered in the United States Congress, and occurred during the heated discussion in Washington over the invasive army operations under cover of the new doctrine of ‘war powers.’ Its general tone was temperate indeed, except in the use of the term ‘butchery,’ as the killing of soldiers in battle was termed. This may be charitably regarded as an excusable reproach in view of the frequent application of similar epithets to Confederate people by their adversaries.

The disposition of the cotton, tobacco and other [435] products of the soil so as to prevent their falling into the hands of the Federal armies, and to make them available on the Confederate side, drew out the various views of members of Congress in frequent and extended discussion. The Senate had adopted the bill reported by its committee on military affairs by which it was made the duty of all military commanders in the service of the Confederate States to destroy all cotton, tobacco and other property that may be useful to the enemy, if the same cannot be safely removed, whenever in their judgment the said cotton, tobacco and other property is about to fall into the hands of the enemy. It was stated that not more than five per cent. of the cotton and tobacco in the Confederacy would probably be liable to destruction under this law. In the House, on March 3d, a resolution was passed advising all growers of cotton and tobacco to withdraw from cultivation of these products and to devote themselves to the production of provisions, cattle, sheep, hogs, and the like, in order to sustain the armies. But the resolution was earnestly opposed after it had reached the Senate. Mr. Brown thought that an advisory resolution would have no good effect. On the contrary it virtually offers a premium on treachery. Patriotic citizens would obey it, but the Shylocks bent on gain would pay no attention. He favored a compulsory law, and intended to introduce a bill of that nature. If there was evil in the cotton crop, we should take it by the throat. The vigorous prohibition under penalties proposed by the senators was declared by others to be violation of the Constitution, inasmuch as it worked a forfeiture, created a new crime for that purpose, and as a revenue measure, could not originate in the Senate.

Besides, Mr. Wigfall, senator from Texas, was not sure that it was good policy to neglect raising cotton. Unless we continue to raise it, England would foster its cultivation, and after the war the South could no longer control the market. This is the policy desired by England, [436] and it is that which has prevented the raising of the blockade. During the discussion, Senator Brown fell into the line of reasoning which was being so strongly followed in the United States Congress, that in time of war the powers of Congress were augmented, and that it was quite different from peace. To this remark Mr. Clay, of Alabama, soon replied that he must deny that the Constitution was so elastic as to be able to expand its powers in war and contract them in peace. The Constitution was the same always. The senator from South Carolina, Mr. Barnwell, was not ready to abandon the production of cotton, because it is not only a great source of wealth, but it increases our importance among the nations. He urged that we must raise it, hold it, and fight for it. The South must let the world know that we have it and will sell it cheap. The current of opinion seemed to set strongly against both the House resolution of advice and the compulsory proposition of Senator Brown. The senator from Virginia, Mr. Hunter, objected to the bill for compulsory legislation for the two reasons that it taxed the patriotism of the planter, and that Congress had no power to interfere with the internal affairs of any State. He did not believe that reduction of the quantity of cotton would be any inducement to foreign nations to raise the blockade. Great Britain desires to become the main producer of cotton, and is willing for it to be kept for years at a high price. Cotton is the source of power in the Confederacy so long as we can raise it in large quantities at low prices. On the constitutional question Senator Hunter held that the Confederate States government had not the least right to go into any of the States and say how much cotton should be raised. The sovereignty of the States themselves hardly dared do this, much less the delegated power of the Confederacy. The reasons given by Senator Semmes, of Louisiana, for his vote in favor of compulsory legislation, were that ‘the South must abandon all [437] dependence on foreign intervention for any cause. Cotton is not king. The English will not interfere, because it is not to their interest. Rather than make war on the United States, she would pay for the maintenance of her horde of starving operators in order to gain time to foster the growth of cotton in her colonies. Warning should be given to the South to prepare for a lengthy war, and that produce must be raised for subsistence.’ Mr. Wigfall suggested that England wished to see the Southern production of cotton destroyed in order to become both spinner and raiser and thus command the world. She abandoned the West Indies to abolition in order to foster cotton raising in India. The resolution was lost upon the final vote, but the debate showed on the one hand a conscientious and delicate regard for constitutional safeguards, even in doubtful questions, and on the other hand the admitted necessity for the production of ample supplies out of the soil to sustain the Confederacy. The allusions to England indicated the growing distrust of the policy of that influential power and the waning of the only hope that the Confederacy would have her sympathy.

In the matter of foreign affairs the Congress declined to send commissioners to the industrial exhibition to be held at London, and also refused to pass a resolution requesting the President to recall at once the Confederate commissioners who had been sent to Great Britain. The resolution further proposed to abandon all further attempts to conciliate the favor and secure the recognition of that government. The resolutions were not received with favor and failed to pass by a decided majority.

The policy of the Confederate States on the question of peace was indicated by a resolution unanimously adopted by the Senate, declaring that no peace propositions would be entertained which excluded any portion of the soil of the Confederate States. . This was probably designed to reassure certain States which had at first [438] attempted to be neutral, that the Confederacy would not abandon them for the sake of securing peace. In West Virginia there was also a large number of adherents to the South who objected to the proposed dismemberment of Virginia. The resolution gave to them also a similar pledge that Virginia should not be divided by the consent of the Confederate States.

Another bill containing a retaliatory clause against the United States failed to pass. It was a House bill on free trade, repealing the tariff and throwing open the Confederate ports to the commerce of the world, except the United States. Congress adjourned on April 21st, to meet again on the 18th of August.

The privations resulting from the interruptions of foreign trade which caused the Confederates to practice the closest economy also gave a remarkable stimulation to all kinds of domestic manufacturing. Saltpeter and salt works were established, salt mines were opened, extensive tanneries were put in operation, foundries especially for cannon and for making swords and for altering and repairing guns were erected. Cotton mills were worked to their utmost, small woolen mills were built, and the manufacturing of boots, shoes, clothing and blankets sprang up in every State. The common domestic looms supplied with thread from the cotton cards, the reel and the warping bars, were built and operated by the Southern women in every county. Plain, of course, were many of the fabrics thus produced, but they sufficed to work up the raw material rapidly and contributed largely to meet the pressing wants of the armies.

A convention of representative business men from several States assembled February 26, 1862, in Richmond, to consider the uses to which the production of cotton and tobacco might be put in aiding the Confederacy. The question was under consideration in Congress, and its difficulties had not been solved. But the convention, with patriotic fervor, determined to devote these two [439] great crops ‘to the cause of independence,’ as the chair. man termed the military defense of the Confederate States. Congress afterward legalized the destruction of cotton ‘whenever it was about to fall in the hands of the enemy,’ and this destruction for the general welfare created, of course, a claim on the Confederate government for the value of the destroyed product; but whether the claim would be met or remain forever unpaid did not prevent the ready sacrifice of the great staples by fire, as the Federal armies advanced into the Confederate territory.

The pressure of the Federal armies in all directions began to be so serious that the necessity arose for making use of the labor of negroes on fortifications. General Magruder had called the attention of the authorities at Richmond to this important means of constructing the needed defenses with sufficient rapidity to make them available, and after deliberation the measure was adopted authorizing the impressment of slaves for the purpose and providing for compensation to their owners.

Martial law was declared February 27th by President Davis over Norfolk and Portsmouth, and some months later over Richmond.

The reverses occurring during the early spring in the West produced disappointment at Richmond. Fort Donelson had fallen, the Confederate defenses were threatened in all Western points, and a general alarm was felt that the Confederacy would be split in halves by the resolute advances made from the Ohio river, and along the Mississippi. The governors of Tennessee and Georgia were aroused to special activity, the latter on account of the invasion threatening the seaboard, and the other by the invasion of his State.

The Confederates were cheered in the midst of the reverses they were suffering at many points by the renowned achievements of the naval gunboat, the ‘Virginia,’ in its victory at Hampton Roads over five Federal [440] vessels. The U. S. frigate Merrimac had been scuttled by the Federals on the first evacuation of Norfolk, but the Confederates raised her, and with ingenuity which confounded their adversaries, converted her into a ship of war, roofed and ribbed with iron, and floating deep in water. Dropping down the Elizabeth river into Hampton Roads March 8th, this strange ironclad, now called the ‘Virginia’ and commanded by Captain Buchanan, destroyed the U. S. sloops Cumberland and ‘Congress,’ stuck the ‘Minnesota’ aground in shallow water where she could not be reached, and ran off the other two Federal frigates. This gallant vessel next day attacked the newly arrived ‘Monitor’ with daring gallantry, but being unable to break through the invulnerable armor by which she was protected, withdrew disabled to her former moorings.

The Confederacy will always be accorded the credit of having produced, in an extremity, with rough materials, and in a short time, a revolution in navies and maritime war. The ironclad ram now entered conspicuously upon the attention of all governments.

Another cheering event occurred which gratified the Confederate administration as a valuable auxiliary brought into action through the agencies which had been early established in Europe. The construction of the ‘Oreta’ at Liverpool had been contracted for by the Confederate authorities in strict compliance with the laws respecting the obligations of neutral governments, but the building of the ship had been objected to by the United States government, and its movements were subjected to the closest scrutiny. At length, on March 23rd, the ‘Oreta,’ without anything aboard which could prove her to be a war vessel, sailed from Liverpool, arrived safely at Nassau, and was taken charge of by Captain Maffit, who had escaped with a cargo of cotton from the South. Under his command the name of the vessel was changed to ‘The Florida,’ and it became a [441] ship of war, subsequently doing great damage to Federal commerce.

The Confederate war department was now the center of busy and extensive preparations to meet the evidently powerful invasions of the South from all available points of its circumference toward and into the centers of its territory. General Lee was placed in charge of military affairs on the 13th of March. All furloughs for whatever cause were revoked by a general order issued by Adjutant and Inspector-General S. Cooper. The order recited that ‘the enemy presses on every side and the necessities of the service demand new illustrations of that noble self-denial which has been so many times evinced since the commencement of our struggle for independence.’ At Richmond it was acknowledged that the disasters we have suffered are mortifying to us and exhilarate our enemies, but they have startled without crippling the Confederacy. Severe criticism said, ‘Had the government lain still two months more, with the army dwindling daily under the furlough system, disgusted with the inaction of stationary camps, while it was quarreling with the generals and the people sinking under indifference, we would have been overrun between the 15th of April and the first of May.’ The harshness of this censure merely reveals the impatient temper as well as the alarm of many who did not fully understand the difficulties which prevented a more aggressive conduct of the defensive war.

The efforts put forth by the Confederate war management to procure arms for the men already enlisted, appear pitiful in any present view of the appeals made for any arm that would serve the purpose of a military weapon. The ordnance department was wholly stripped at this early date of all supplies, and the government as an expedient only caused a call to be made by Mr. O. Dimmock, colonel of ordnance of Virginia, upon the people to sell their double barreled shot guns, sporting [442] rifles or ‘any kind of weapon that will be useful in the field.’ Agents were appointed in various central positions to collect and forward these private arms. Regiments were recruited and mustered into service armed with guns suitable only for the sports of the forest.

Similar calls were also made for sulphur, lead and saltpeter. Speculation in these articles had occurred and was officially condemned. Bells were asked for to be converted into cannon. General Beauregard made his own special appeals for the gift of the bells of the churches. Women gave up their kettles and other copper utensils; country forges turned steel files into rude bayonets and useless pikes. Every available piece of metal capable of being used in increasing the munitions of war was brought into the common stock.

But it will be observed that in the meanwhile the administration was availing of every opportunity to get cargoes of cotton out to sea, and to bring in through blockade a return cargo of arms, clothing and blankets. Some of these returns came into obscure ports while others came by way of Mexico, overland, through Texas. The large quantity of arms which had been captured from the Federals was now in Confederate service, and manufacturing was urged and established to provide the supplies needed by armies in the field.

By the first of April the general condition of the Confederacy for defense was greatly improved. The absentees from the armies had returned, new recruits had come in, the short term regiments had re-enlisted, and the general spirit of the army and the people improved.

One event scarcely known, however, throughout the Confederacy, was the enforced abandonment by the direction of the war department, of all lower Florida. The State had enjoyed a general exemption from invasion until the naval expeditions under Dupont resulted in the capture of the towns on the Atlantic side with little [443] resistance. Fernandina, Jacksonville and St. Augustine fell into the hands of the United States. Finally the entire coast of Florida was under Federal control. The war department removed munitions from the State and transferred the troops to Tennessee.

A singular scheme for the armed colonization of this State is described by a Federal authority of that date and is here reproduced to show the extent to which it was then supposed that the United States government might exercise the power of subjugation. ‘A scheme for the armed colonization of Florida was brought to the notice of the Federal government by Eli Thayer, of Massachusetts, during the year. It consisted of a proposition for an expedition of 10,000 colonists enlisted for six months, and to be supplied with arms, subsistence and transportation by the government, and a commander whose business it should be to occupy and hold the public lands of the State, and the lands of disloyal citizens which were to be seized for the non-payment of taxes under a law of Congress passed at the session then closed. It received some consideration by the government, but was not adopted.’ A resemblance appears between this scheme and a plan urged by General Sherman in a letter to his brother, the eminent statesman.

The military operations for the next two months, April and May, 1862, show advances made by the Federal armies and navies, and the skill, both civil and military, with which the invasion was met. McClellan, on the first of April, made a change of base and concentrated his forces near Fortress Monroe to advance on Richmond from the peninsula with a fully equipped command consisting of over one hundred thousand men. He was confronted by the Confederate armies under General Johnston, who at length evacuated Norfolk and fell back slowly on a well-chosen line of retreat toward the defenses around Richmond. In the West the Confederate lines of defense were totally changed by the battles [444] of Shiloh and Corinth and the fall of Nashville, nearly all Tennessee falling into Federal possession. Naval expeditions captured or beleaguered the coast towns, including the important captures of Fort Pulaski and New Orleans. Meanwhile McClellan was steadily forcing his way toward Richmond and a crisis in Confederate affairs appeared to be coming. [445]

Chapter 17:

The Confederate States' policies.

Second session of Congress

The second session of the Confederate Congress began August 18, 1862, under the buoyant influences of the late victories achieved by the Southern army, relieving Richmond from siege and again driving the invading army back to the protection of the Potomac. The United States Congress had adjourned July 17th, one month before, and the Confederate States government was in full possession of all its proceedings.

The message of President Davis was read to both houses without delay. In its opening, the sufferings endured by the people, and the gallantry of the troops on hard. fought battle fields, were referred to with grateful expressions. Our army had not faltered, and the great body of the people had continued to manifest zeal and unanimity. The vast armies which threatened the capital of the Confederacy, had been defeated and driven from the lines of investment, and the enemy repeatedly foiled in his efforts for its capture, is now seeking to raise new armies on a scale such as modern history does not record to effect that subjugation of the South so often proclaimed as on the verge of fulfillment. With vigorous language the message described ‘the changed character of the hostilities waged by the enemy,’ reciting the destruction [446] of private property, the arrests of noncombatants, orders of banishment against peaceful farmers, confiscation bills designed to ruin the entire South, and many other acts which the message stigmatized as contrary to the usages of civilized warfare. The President also called the attention of Congress to the unchecked forgeries by citizens of the United States of the moneyed obligations of the Confederacy, suggesting that the United States civil government and the military officers must have knowledge of these crimes since the invading armies are found to be supplied with the spurious currency. Two generals, says the message, are arming the trained slaves for warfare against the citizens of the Confederacy, and the message points plainly to General Butler as one who ‘has been found of instincts so brutal as to invite the violence of his soldiery against the women of a captured city.’

In considering these acts the message states that remonstrances made to the commander-in-chief of the United States armies had been evaded and that retaliation in kind in many cases is not only impracticable, but, as was remarked in an earlier message, ‘under no excess of provocation could our noble hearted defenders be driven to wreak vengeance on unarmed men, on women or on children.’ Yet stern and exemplary punishment can and must be meted out to the murderers and felons who, disgracing the profession of arms, seek to make of public war the occasion for the commission of the most monstrous crimes. The criticism that had been made on conscription had impaired the efficiency of the law, and in view of the necessity of harmonious action the President called on Congress to devise means for establishing that co-operation of the States and the Confederate States which was indispensable to success, declaring it to be his pleasure and duty to aid in measures that would reconcile a just care for the public defense with a proper deference for the most scrupulous susceptibilities of the State authorities. [447]

The credit of the government was reported as being well sustained. The accumulated debt was still small, notwithstanding the magnitude of the military operations in which the Confederate States were involved. Congress at its last session had provided for an issue of bonds, to be used in the purchase of supplies, but sellers of produce had shown such a decided preference for treasury notes as to encourage the increased issue of that kind of currency. In answer to the apprehension that this inflation might produce a hurtful depreciation, the message proposed that the notes should be convertible into eight per cent bonds of the Confederate States, which was considered as a sufficient and permanent safeguard.

The war department earnestly advised additional legislation to promote the proper execution of the conscript act, and particularly to unite depleted companies and regiments by some fair system of consolidation. Some important railroads had become greatly impaired by the heavy demands for transportation, and it was becoming necessary for the government to take control of military transportation, and to put the roads into good serviceable condition. The President recommended an increase of the army to meet the large accessions recently called into the field by the President of the United States. Further enrollment may not become necessary, but that necessity might possibly arise during recess of Congress, and hence legislative authority should be given for calling such forces at once into the field. Referring to the exchange of prisoners he was able to state that the long denied object had been recently effected, and was being executed, and he expressed the hope that the cartel would speedily restore ‘our brave and unfortunate countrymen to their places in the ranks of the army from which by the fortunes of war they have for a time been separated.’ The navy department had been actively engaged in attaining the best possible results by the use of all the means it could command. Part of its effective work was [448] done ashore and part afloat. A few vessels had been constructed and equipped both at home and abroad. Ordnance and ordnance stores had been manufactured, coal and iron mines had been developed, and workshops established.

Mr. Miles, of South Carolina, introduced a variety of bills designed to extend the application of the conscription law to all citizens under forty-five years of age; to retaliate where partisan rangers captured by the enemy were not treated as prisoners of war, to enforce the laws on felonies against any soldier of the United States army committing felony by delivering the offender if captured to the civil courts for trial; to prevent the arming of negroes; to retaliate for the seizure of private citizens of the Confederate States by the enemy; to put an export duty of twenty per cent on cotton and tobacco as a fund to indemnify losses of citizens by the acts of the enemy. These bills show the nature of the legislation suggested by the events then passing rapidly into history. They were referred to committees, discussed and determined according to the judgment of Congress as hereinafter stated.

The increase in the army being the subject of discussion, the conscription law and its workings were discussed at length with considerable spirit. Mr. Foote called attention to the doubts of its constitutionality existing at the time of the passage of that measure, and expressed his opinion that if the expedient should be allowed to be established as a permanent system, the result would be the subversion of State sovereignty and popular freedom. The necessity under which the act was passed had grown out of neglect by the provisional government to legislate at the beginning of war so as to provide for deficiency in the army, and he alleged that no such necessity now existed because the States stood ready to respond to all requisitions. Collision with State authorities would certainly occur if the new law asked for by the war secretary [449] should be passed, as it would sweep into the Confederate army all the militia away from State control. Mr. Foote's views were sustained by some others in Congress, but the general course of the debate developed the disposition to coincide with the urgent request of the war department.

The bill extending the conscript liability beyond thirty-five years of age caused a very warm discussion, involving all general principles, as well as the details of the bill, bringing into permanent view the controversies which had occurred between the Confederate authorities and the executives of two or three States. The two houses disagreed and a committee of conference became necessary, which finally reported favorably to a concurrence of the House with the amendments of the Senate. The necessity, however, for a speedy enactment of the proposed extension appeared to be so great that Mr. Boteler, of Virginia, immediately after the report of the committee, called for the question in order to prevent delay by further discussion. On an appeal to him by Mr. Foote not to make the call, Mr. Boteler declared that whatever his desire might be to extend the courtesy asked for, he was now blind to everything except the welfare of his country. He had recently heard the army of Virginia appealing for reinforcements and it was now time for the eternal talk on the bill to cease. The call was sustained by the House, and the bill passed, whereupon Mr. Kenan, of Georgia, moved to reconsider the vote. He said that the act prevented an adjustment that could have been made to establish peace between the State and the Confederate States. The provision stricken from the House bill was that which authorized the President to make requisition for needed troops through the governors of States. The discussion on account of the conscript law had been created chiefly by its ignoring the control of the governor over the citizen militia in the States. He believed that requisitions on the governors [450] would be complied with and appealed for reconsideration in order that this cause of internal trouble be removed.

Mr. Foote sustained the member from Georgia in his motion, remarking that a state of dissatisfaction with the conscript law similar to that which existed in Georgia existed elsewhere. ‘Why should the consolidationists in the State dictate to the House the course it should pursue?’ After further debate in which the propriety of the measure was carefully set forth, the House refused to reconsider by a decided vote of 53 to 24.

These congressional proceedings occurred amidst military events which brightened the Confederate prospect. Following the brilliant battle of Second Manassas, by which General Pope was dismounted from his ‘headquarters in the saddle,’ came the steaming of the Alabama out upon the high seas to become the terror of the United States shipping. Kentucky was entered by Bragg, and Lee was marching across the Potomac. Fright at Washington again disturbed the administration, and hope at Richmond shone like a star overhead guiding the Confederacy to success. The capture of Harper's Ferry by Jackson increased the Confederate expectations, but the battle of Sharpsburg and the withdrawal of Lee from Maryland tempered their joy.

By evident preconcert the governors of several Northern States assembled to advise President Lincoln and to renew their former pledges of support. This meeting was made contemporaneous with the issuance, September 22, 1862, a few days after the battle of Sharpsburg, of the first tentative emancipation proclamation, and also of the proclamation of general martial law by the President of the United States—the two documents expediently going together, since it was not yet clear that the radical change in the object of the war would be well received throughout the North, or be pleasing to the Union soldiers.

This first emancipation proclamation of President Lincoln, [451] taken in connection with the arming of negroes for military service, and the attempted breaking up of plantation work, was construed throughout the South as the initiative of a policy designed to instigate servile insurrection. Southern people were alarmed at the atrocious results that could ensue through the United States military under. some officers who had already manifested the desire to use negro insurrection as a means to a quick though horrible suppression of the rebellion. The soldiers being absent from their unprotected homes were also greatly incensed by a war measure so violative of the usages of civil war. These fears felt at home by defenseless women, and the indignation of the armies in the field, demanded the attention of the Confederate President and Congress.

The question was raised in Congress for the first time by the introduction by Mr. Semmes, of Louisiana, of the following strong resolution:

Resolved by the Congress of the Confederate States. That the proclamation of Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of America, issued in the city of Washington in the year 1862, wherein he declares ‘that on the first of January in the year of our Lord 1863, all persons held as slaves within any State or designated parts of a State whereof the people shall be in rebellion against the United States shall be henceforth and forever free,’ is leveled against the citizens of the Confederate States, and as such is a gross violation of the usages of civilized warfare, and an invitation to an atrocious servile war, and therefore should be held up to the execration of mankind, and counteracted by such retaliatory measures as in the judgment of the President may be best calculated to secure its withdrawal and arrest its execution.

Very violent speeches were made, and some indefensible measures of retaliation were proposed during the discussion of the preliminary emancipation measure. The earliest impulses of the South, under the feeling that a [452] great wrong was to be attempted against the people in their homes, were to manifest resentment by retaliation of such a severe kind as to arrest at once the insurrectionary design. The most violent advocated the raising of the black flag and the discontinuance of all the courtesies of war, as soon as this attempt to employ the negroes against the people of the South should be put into execution. The majority, however, counseled moderation in view of the faith that the negroes would not be seduced in any great numbers to accept this method of securing their freedom. The resolution of Mr. Semmes was therefore referred to the judiciary committee which recommended the passage of a bill reciting in preamble the rights of the States to withdraw from the United States, denouncing the war of subjugation, and the manner in which it had been conducted, especially in the ‘war power’ acts of confiscation, banishment, imprisonment, burning of dwellings, organization of slaves by military officers, blockading harbors with stone instead of ships, besides many other acts therein enumerated, concluding with the declaration that it is the evident purpose of emancipation by military force to excite servile insurrection, and that justice and humanity required the government to endeavor to repress the lawless practices and designs of the enemy, by inflicting severe retribution. The bill proposed to treat as felons officers of the Federal army who shall command, arm, organize or prepare negroes for military service; also all such officers who incite slaves to rebellion, or induce them to abscond under the acts of the United States Congress and proclamation of the President of the United States, providing that every such person when captured shall be tried by such military courts as the President shall direct; the President also being empowered to commute the punishment or pardon unconditionally or on such terms as he may see fit.

This bill reported by the committee, although guarded [453] in the violent provisions which were produced by the excited temper of the moment, was considered by Mr. Hill, of Georgia, and others as dignifying the proclamation beyond its real importance. Its author, President Lincoln, intended it as a brutem fulmen, and so Mr. Hill regarded it. He favored the simplest legal action of Congress in taking notice of it. In his opinion, the right existed to declare certain acts as crimes, and the actors as criminals, and a criminal cannot escape on a plea of being a soldier. As a member of the committee and in accordance with the understanding of the committee, he reported another bill, to be printed and considered by the Senate. Mr. Hill's bill, in two short sections, defined the injuries done to unarmed citizens under pretense of waging war, and the inciting of slaves to insurrection, or to abandon their owners, as crimes subjecting the offenders to be treated as criminals, and not as prisoners of war. The presumption would be against soldiers captured on Southern soil after the emancipation proclamation should be put into effective action, that they were there with intent to incite insurrection.

These bills and other resolutions were introduced and printed for consideration, all of which evinced the Southern feeling against any war measures which brought these unusual auxiliaries to the Federal armies against the lesser number of armed men which the South could bring into the field. But as the subject fully developed the extreme retaliation at first proposed grew into disfavor, so that on the last day the question was disposed of satisfactorily by referring the entire matter of retaliation to the discretion of the President.

The sequestration act proposed at this session authorizing the President by proclamation to direct all persons who adhere to the United States government to leave the Confederacy on pain of forfeiture of their property elicited discussion as to the powers of the government in time of war. The bill was opposed on account of the hardships it [454] would work upon good citizens who were inside the Federal military lines, and under duress had acquiesced in the rule of the United States.

Mr. Wigfall regarded the bill as of doubtful constitutionality because it invaded the right of the States to which their citizens were responsible and not to the Confederate States. Mr. Hill argued that under the circumstances of secession every citizen had the right to elect with which of the two governments he would act. The Confederate States had also the right to say that every citizen deciding to be a citizen of the United States should leave the Confederate States and go to the United States. But that decision once made by word or act to be a citizen of the Confederate States could not be changed at the pleasure of the citizen. The Confederate government had the right to define by law who are aliens and who are alien enemies. The Georgia senator had casually used the word revolution in referring to secession, which caused Mr. Wigfall to exclaim that Mr. Hill was agreeing with Lincoln and Seward in calling this a revolution. This, said he, is no civil war. There was an example of civil war in the State of Kentucky, where the citizens of the same State were organized in fighting each other. This is a war made by certain States against other States. He also insisted that there was no such person as a citizen of the Confederate States. Citizenship is by States, the Confederate citizenship comes through the States. There was no legal ‘allegiance’ to the Confederate States. Mr. Hill replied at length that the citizen of the State did owe allegiance to the Confederate States. The first allegiance is due the State and through the State he owes allegiance to the Confederate government. Resuming his first proposition that the individual resident of the South at the outset of secession had the right to choose his government and go to its support, he said, ‘If this were not true the United States could hang General Buckner, of Kentucky, for violating an allegiance [455] with the United States, and the Confederate government could hang Andrew Johnson for violating an allegiance to this government. The old doctrine that allegiance once is allegiance always has been exploded. Citizenship is made up of the consent of the individual as well as of the government.’

Mr. Oldham entering into the discussion expressed the view that every citizen of a political community owes allegiance to the sovereign power. In this country the people are the sovereign power, and every citizen owes allegiance to the political community that constitutes his State. He owes similar allegiance to this sovereign power that English people owe to the English government. Mr. Oldham's idea was that obedience was due to the Confederate government by the citizens of the State, but that his ‘allegiance’ was due the State. The State could direct him as to his duty to the general government which it commanded him to obey. Mr. Hill answered that he would not quibble over words. All he had to say was that every citizen of the Confederate States owes allegiance to the Confederate States. Call it allegiance or obedience. His idea was that the States were originally sovereign and they are so still. As such they had the right to exercise sovereign power. By their own consent they delegated sovereign power to a common government, not to an agency, but a government, which they call a government in the compact, and in that compact they say that all citizens of States are citizens of the Confederate States. The men who were originally citizens of the States, and who are yet citizens of the States, owe their first allegiance to the States, but through the States they owe allegiance to the Confederate government. The Senator said that the State had the power to qualify that allegiance to the common government, but that when the compact was dissolved, the citizen had the right to elect. Alluding to the origination of secession, Mr. Hill showed that by recurring to the history of the United [456] States government it would be found that the great cause of disruption was the interference by States with a compact into which they had solemnly entered. ‘No man found cause for dissolution in anything that the Federal government did, for all declared that they wanted to preserve the Union until Lincoln was elected; nor in the decisions of the supreme court; nor could any objection be laid against the Federal Congress, for there the conservatives had a majority. What was the difficulty, Mr. President? The Northern States, sir, passed their personal liberty bills and nullified the acts of Congress. The State governments would not render up fugitives, declaring they were not criminals in withholding the escaped negroes, alleging they were not property; and the State judges took it upon themselves in their State courts to set aside the acts of Congress passed to carry out the fugitive slave law. These were the enormities that drove the South to her condition of determined secession. And when Mr. Lincoln was elected, it was thought he was seeking not to continue the Federal government, but to pervert the government and to accomplish through Federal agency what the Northern States had already sought to do by State action. That perfected the argument.’ Mr. Wigfall, expressing with some indignation his surprise at Mr. Hill's statement that the Federal government never trespassed upon the rights of the Southern States, brought out Mr. Hill's explanation that the trespasses of the Federal government were not the evils alleged by the people in seceding. It was the trespasses committed by the States in the North in their faithlessness to the common compact. ‘I held the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional, but the Federal government as such did not commit the trespasses which drove the Southern people into secession.’ Mr. Wigfall, interrupting with questions and remarks, denied very decidedly the observation of Senator Hill that there had been no cause of complaint against Congress on the ground [457] that the aggressors on the South were in the minority. ‘Why, sir,’ he exclaimed, referring to the last Congress under Buchanan's administration, ‘in that Congress the Black Republicans had an overwhelming majority in the House against us, and a tie vote in the Senate, with a Republican casting vote.’ The debate, wandering over a wide field of theories touching here and there the measure under discussion, was terminated by laying the bill on the table.

The foreign affairs committee had for some days under consideration a plan for establishing at least a sympathetic connection between the Confederate States and the States of California and Oregon and all territories beyond the Rocky Mountains. A league, offensive and defensive, was embodied in a series of resolutions which had been previously presented by Mr. Foote. California this year was entirely in the control of the Republican party. Leland Stanford was elected governor in 1861, defeating the two Democratic candidates. The united Democratic vote in 1861 was over 63,000 and Stanford's vote was 56,000, so that if Democrats had united Stanford would have been defeated. The party continued its divisions and was defeated again in 1862, when the legislature was strongly Republican. In Oregon similar divisions of the Democrats took place, and the old designations of ‘Douglas Democrats’ and ‘Breckinridge Democrats’ were used. The ‘Douglas’ Democrats united with the Republicans in the ‘Union’ party, and elected Governor A. C. Gibbs. The Democratic ticket polled 34,000 votes.

The counterfeiting of the Confederate treasury notes by parties in the United States (referred to in the President's message) who sold them in quantities to United States soldiers and others for use among the ignorant and unsuspecting people of regions over-run by the Federal armies, had become such a serious evil as to provoke strong remonstrance against the practice as being contrary [458] to the usages of enlightened nations when at war with each other, and to require the Confederate Congress to declare counterfeiting and passing counterfeit money by the armies of the United States a felony. This counterfeit money was styled by the counterfeiters ‘fac similes’ of Confederate money, and was sold by them under that pretense, but the counterfeiting was so close as to be capable of ready use as money and was in fact so employed. Senator Clay, of Alabama, declared that ‘the enemy by counterfeiting our currency had aimed one of the deadliest blows at our cause. They had boldly advertised these counterfeits for sale and among their dead who fell in battle it. was rare to find one who had not on his person more or less of spurious Confederate treasury notes. Some law to repress this counterfeiting by providing a speedy punishment should be passed.’ The bill was passed October 11, 1862.

The signal military successes of the Confederate armies occurring through 1862 encouraged the Confederate Congress to hope that a just and honorable peace might be concluded. There was always a general popular opinion that the Confederate government should seize every opportunity to bring the issue between the two governments to a peaceful solution. The government was constantly made aware of this disposition of the people, and was as constantly on the alert to find the occasion when the Confederate authorities could get access to the government at Washington. Such an occasion, in the opinion of Mr. Foote, had come in the result of the conflicts between the two armies during the summer. He therefore introduced a resolution to dispatch commissioners to Washington empowered to propose the terms of a just and honorable peace. Mr. Holt, of Georgia, also offered the following expressive substitute:

‘The people of the Confederate States are and have been from the beginning anxious that this war with the United States should be conducted according to the rules [459] established by civilized and Christian nations, and have on their part so conducted it; and the said people ardently desire that said war should cease and peace be restored, and have so announced from the beginning: Therefore, Resolved, that whenever the United States government shall manifest a like anxiety and a like desire it shall be the duty of the President of the Confederate States to appoint commissioners to treat and negotiate with the said United States government upon said subjects or either of them.’

These resolutions embraced the views of perhaps the entire body of Congress. Mr. Foote had been one of the most aggressive among the members of the Confederate Congress representing the fiery element, and Mr. Holt had been among the most reluctant to engage his State in secession. Together they represented a popular Southern sentiment that prevailed from the beginning to the close of the war. The resolution and substitute were tabled together pending the military events then rapidly following each other in Virginia.

The forced loan, as the bill was called to collect in kind one fifth in value of all produce and of all increase of live stock, the value of which was to be receipted for and the receipt to be exchangeable for six per cent income tax bonds, failed to pass, though earnestly pressed. Several important bills passed, such as the act to encourage the manufacture of shoes and clothing for the army, which provided for the admission free of duty of cotton cards, card cloth, machinery, and other articles required for manufacturing purposes. Another bill was passed to raise troops in Kentucky and Missouri, authorizing the President to appoint general and field officers for the organization of such forces. The rate of interest on the funded debt of the Confederate States was reduced, together with amendments to fix the rate of interest on the new issue of bonds at seven per cent, also to authorize the issue of six per cent convertible bonds. The appro- [460] priation bill provided for the following expenditures: For ordnance service, $2,500,000; pay of the army, $18,--660,189; transportation of troops, etc, $7,404,075; sub-sistence of prisoners of war $200,000; bounty of $50 to soldiers $3, ooo,000; medical and hospital supplies $400,000; deficit in postoffice department $800,000; deficit in quartermaster's department $39,000,000; interest on the public debt $2,500,000; subsistence of the army $6,571,672.91. The total appropriation was $85,000,000. Having been in laborious session during two months of great excitement Congress adjourned October 13, 1862. [461]

Chapter 18:

United States measures, civil and military.

Emancipation proclamation

Southern

Confederate

the proclamation of September, 1862, was designed by President Lincoln as the precursor of the proclamation of emancipation dated to begin with the year 1863. ‘Mr. Lincoln was himself opposed to the measure,’ says Mr. Julian, of Indiana, ‘and when he very reluctantly issued the preliminary proclamation in September, 1862, he wished it distinctly understood that the deportation of the slaves was in his mind inseparably connected with the policy.’ His doubts as to his right to emancipate embarrassed him, and his fears as to the change of the war policy from ‘saving the Union’ to freeing the negro, delayed his action. The humane view of the question was not the most vivid. Political considerations alone brought on the determination to place the war ‘on a clearly defined anti-slavery basis.’

Even then the philanthropic impulse which (if unhindered by selfish interests) might have controlled all parties, exerted no influence which can entitle the emancipation proclamation of January 1, 1863, to veneration as one of the magna documenta of human freedom. It was not, as it should have been, a courageous declaration that every negro had the right, if any had, to be set [462] free on fair terms, and that therefore the government which had caused his enslavement must rescue him from that condition. There was no frank concession that capital had been lured by the nation into a vast investment in slave labor which was entitled to protection, notwithstanding secession had resulted from the fear of its destruction. The tremendous reform was in fact preceded by frantic declarations that the purpose of the war was not to raise the negro to the common brotherhood of ‘equality before the law’ nor to condone the mutual error of slavery by satisfying all just demands which emancipation exacted. It was even trifled with by the authorized statement of the head of the nation to Greeley, August 22, 1862, one week before the preliminary proclamation, as follows: ‘If I could save the Union without freeing any slaves, I would do it. If I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would do it.’ The President's devotion to the view he entertained of the Union, and which he afterward expressed in his memorable short speech during the dedication of the national cemetery at Gettysburg, is well worthy of profoundest national respect, but he was not the emancipator of the negro race.

The proclamation only went so far as to serve a military purpose. It simply called a reserved instrument of war into a field of operations where the battles of two years, with the customary array of resources, still left the Union armies defending Washington. With flagrant denial of the right of every negro in the slaveholding sections to emancipation if any were set free, the proclamation left slavery untouched in whole districts of the border States. ‘It did not pretend,’ says Mr. Julian, of Indiana, ‘to operate upon the slaves in other large districts in which it would have been effective at once, but studiously excluded them while it applied mainly to States and parts of States within the military occupation [463] of the enemy (the Southern armies) where it was necessarily void.’ It proclaimed freedom where it could not operate, and left slavery in States where military power could enforce a decree of emancipation.

The emancipation policy was adopted as a political as well as a military necessity. The humanity of freedom was only an incident of the policy. The pressure of the most active wing of Mr. Lincoln's party had borne upon him with such increasing violence that the President was compelled to explain to the border States, and to his conservative friends, that the proclamation had become ‘a necessity to prevent the radicals from openly embarrassing the government in the conduct of the war.’ Governor Andrews, of Massachusetts, had begun earnestly to demand the privilege ‘to fire on the enemy's magazine,’ by which he was supposed to mean an explosion throughout the South of negro insurrection. The Massachusetts convention had not voted a resolution of confidence in the administration, and Mr. Chase was writing of Mr. Lincoln's recreancy to the party which had elected him. The ‘pressure’ prevailed and the ‘war policy’ took a new turn.

The general effect at the North of this distinct change of war policy was at first a revolt of the conservatives through which the administration suffered defeats at the fall elections of 1862 in the great States, New York, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois. Uneasiness pervaded the popular mind and the soldiery were disturbed by this new reason for the sacrifice of their lives. Europe also became ‘cold and menacing.’ Lord Lyons dispatched to his government that the President ‘had thrown himself into the arms of the radicals.’ Yet the measure compacted about the President a body of men who rallied from the temporary disasters which followed the adoption of their policy and gave him a support which at length drew to their line almost the entire population of the Northern States. [464]

The Southern people read the proclamation as evidence that the radical measures which had been long threatened would now be attempted as far as they could be made effective by military force. The conservatives in the Border States were astounded, and now realized the situation into which they had come by the drift of events. The slaves, however, did not rise in arms nor organize the exodus that had been predicted, but they pursued the plow in peace, and protected the homes where they had been reared. One ardent advocate who was helping to make the pressure on Mr. Lincoln effective, had written of the negroes that ‘one universal hallelujah of glory to God, echoed from every valley and hilltop of rebellion, would sound the speedy doom of treason.’ But while the hallelujahs of this class of Southern population were certainly heard, they were such as had been sounding for a century at the camp-meetings and corn shuckings. Where the Federal armies spread over the plantations there was indeed such a considerable flocking of the slaves into the Federal camps, that the increasing numbers of all ages more than supplied the demand for camp labor and created open complaint against the colored camp followers.

Southern resentment of the emancipation policy was not aroused so much by the attempt to proclaim a freedom which could not, as confessed by jurists, be thus conferred, as it was by the declaration of the intention to reinforce the armies of the United States with regiments of negroes. The use of this means to bring the South to terms had begun to be vehemently urged early in 1862. Mr. Stevens, of Pennsylvania, the leader of the ‘war power’ wing, had openly advocated at the outset of the war ‘the arming of the negroes who were the slaves of the rebels,’ and at this date declared in Congress that ‘it is the only way left on earth in which these rebels can be exterminated.’ The United States Congress very rapidly moved up to this advanced line and adopted [465] measures for the enrollment of one hundred and fifty thousand negro soldiers to suppress the rebellion. But this mortifying concession that the Union armies were unable to end the war, and that the Southern slaves must now save the Union, was not reached in legislation without the earnest and indignant protests of Northern statesmen. Mr. Cox, of Ohio, Mr. Thomas, of Massachusetts, Mr. Richardson, of Illinois, and many others, joined the representatives from the Border States in resistance to this radical and dangerous change in the objects of coercion. During the debate on the general conscription bill pending an amendment offered by Mr. Cox, of Ohio, ‘That no one shall be enrolled under this act except able bodied white male citizens of the United States,’ Mr. Mallory, of Kentucky, said, ‘Why is this measure called for at this time? The answer is one which is very galling to the pride of the administration and its supporters. It is a complete confession of incompetency to manage the stupendous war in which it finds itself involved—a most humiliating and reluctant acknowledgment that its measures have been mistakes—its policy a blunder.’ But notwithstanding these protests the measure was adopted and enrollment soon began, influenced somewhat by a strong reason in favor of the enrolling of negroes in Federal regiments which was given by an influential Northern man in the following language: ‘The approach of a draft which would fall heavily upon the workshops, manufactures, and farmers of the North, already depleted of their operatives to such an extent as to greatly enhance the price of skilled labor, led to the conviction on the part of the great body of the people of the North that these thews and sinews (i. e. negro men) thus at their command, and for the most part ready and willing for their service, might as well be employed as their own, so far as they would go toward filling up the ranks of the armies east and west.’

In January, 1863, Governor Andrews, of Massachusetts, [466] was authorized to raise regiments of negroes. In March, George L. Thomas, adjutant-general, was sent West to organize the colored fugitives into military commands. General Prentiss formed two regiments at Helena; General Thomas five at Milliken Bend, three at Grand Gulf, and before leaving the West in June organized twenty more. General Banks chose to call the colored body which he also organized, the Corps d'afrique. Over 15,000 were quickly mustered in the Gulf department, to which adding the regiments raised in South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, and Maryland, the total soon reached 50,000 men. This was conceived to be a very appreciable relief from the burden of the impending draft, and an important accession to the necessary military strength of the Federal armies. It was found necessary very soon to put these negroes, who were enlisted to do only post and garrison duty, into the forefront of battle, even ‘in several instances in the lead in assaulting columns,’—as at Port Hudson and Fort Wagner, on which occasions their white commanders bear testimony to the efficiency with which they fought. The negroes are entitled to the credit of vindicating the statement as to a military necessity for their enrollment to enable the Federal armies to match the Confederate.

No danger from servile insurrections was seriously apprehended even in the sections most densely occupied by the negroes, but there were well-grounded fears of outrages that could be perpetrated by negroes collected at random, armed, undisciplined, and officered by white men of vindictive mood and avaricious mind. Southern people saw in this use of the negroes as soldiers the willingness of the extremists to make a war of havoc, resulting in the extermination of white and black alike; —into which lurid aspect of the question they were led by speeches in Congress, the tone of the press, and the recommendations of prominent army officers. In addition to these fears there was the powerful Southern [467] repugnance, which the administration at Washington disregarded, to an armed conflict between the two races. To the influences of these fears, and of resentment to the indignity thus offered, must be credited the first outbursts through the South, while the subsequent conservative action of the Confederate authorities will commend the wisdom with which the ‘new policy’ was treated. When the Confederate Congress assembled, President Davis called attention in his message of January 12, 1863, to the emancipation proclamation as a war measure which encouraged a servile population to a course of action which would doom them to extermination. In its political aspect the Confederate President regarded the proclamation as a justification of the earliest fears felt by the South on the ascendency into power of the new sectional power, and that it created an insurmountable barrier to the reconstruction of the Union. ‘So far as regards the action of this government on such criminals as may attempt its execution,’ the message proposed to deliver to State authorities all commissioned officers of the United States captured thereafter in any of the States embraced in the proclamation that they may be dealt with in accordance with the laws of those States providing for the punishment of criminals engaged in inciting servile insurrection, but enlisted soldiers were to be discharged on parole according to the customs of war. The President thus treated the new measure as an attempt to excite insurrection of slaves, which was contrary to the penal statutes of the Southern States, and proposed to leave the offenders to the action of the State courts. Congress having already the exciting question under consideration, adopted the course which has been mentioned.

Amidst these civil proceedings in the beginning of 1863 the Confederate armies were considerably strengthened by the operation of the several enrollment acts, although bounties for enlistment had been discontinued, [468] and no inducement for volunteering was offered except the choice of the company in which the recruit desired to serve. The Federal and Confederate army operations in the West are shown by the army orders and reports in January, 1863, of General Sherman and of General Pemberton. Of the first Federal attempt General Sherman says, ‘We failed in one great purpose of our movement—the capture of Vicksburg.’ General Pemberton from headquarters at Vicksburg congratulates his army for ‘their gallant defense of the important position.’ These orders and reports refer to the defeat of the strong movement begun November 28, 1862, under Grant, Sherman, McClernand and other skillful Federal commanders to capture the important positions in the West defended by Pemberton, S. D. Lee and Forrest. In the East the Federals had recoiled from their bloody defeat at Fredericksburg, in December, 1862, and with a change of commanders were organizing the next advance on Richmond. The Confederate armies were likewise concentrating all available forces to renew the combat as soon as the Virginia winter surrendered to the spring. Army operations in the West after January 8, 1863, included a variety of engagements, culminating in the disastrous surrender of Vicksburg; while in the East the army of Lee fought the battles of Chancellorsville, and, marching again across the Potomac, lost the battle of Gettysburg. These two events occurred simultaneously the first week in July, 1863, and considered together foretokened the ultimate defeat which the Confederacy at last sustained.

The embarrassments of the Confederacy were not diminished by the successes of 1862, nor by the increase during that and the following year of the Southern military force. The first impression that the war would be short was now changed early in 1863 into a doubt whether it would end in several years. In consequence of the uncertainty of the struggle Confederate finances [469] which were based necessarily on the success of secession could not be managed so as to avoid the depreciation of the currency. The expenses had increased, the public debt was becoming enormous, and the Confederacy was already moving on without the ‘sinews of war.’ There was a vast excess of paper money and yet there seemed no other way to sustain the government. Some financiers proposed the discontinuance instantly of any further issue. Taxation and loans were urged as the only means of reaching a safe financial footing. The issue of bonds with interest payable in coin, the interest to be assured by a lien on a specific part of the revenue, was suggested, and it was also insisted that all outstanding treasury notes and other government securities should be heavily taxed. The secretary of the treasury found it a difficult task to provide a sufficiency of money for the extraordinary demands of the government, and saw with chagrin the Confederate notes depreciate until they became nearly unavailable for the purchase of food and clothing for the army.

In the extremity many expedients were tried. Among them an act was passed during the early part of 1863 by which the government was authorized to seize or to impress produce necessary for the army. The act provided for payment at a price fixed by State commissioners and the impressment officials were forbidden to take supplies which were necessary for family use or on the way to market for immediate sale. But the enforcement of the impressment created excitement and produced discontent. Producers accustomed to sell their products at the market price were not satisfied with the rate fixed by government, and while the majority obeyed the law there were evasions which greatly embarrassed the officers in charge of its execution. Delays and waste, with occasional abuses, hindered the operation of this plan to regulate prices and to sustain the Confederate currency.

The strain of two years on the machinery of railroads [470] had also worn down the facilities of transportation to such an extent as to make it already difficult to haul troops and supplies with sufficient rapidity and safety. The rate of speed was now reduced to ten miles per hour, and the tonnage lessened nearly fifty per cent. All railroads had become necessarily part of the military organization, so that their condition was to be considered in estimating the efficiency of the military corps. Besides this disadvantage the area of food supply had shrunken one half. At first nearly the entire country south of the Ohio river, and even in some measure beyond, could be relied on for the means of subsistence. But now a large part of Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee and North Carolina were occupied or raided by Federal commands, and the blockade shut out the world. Unfortunately, also, the wheat crop of 1862 had failed to an unusual extent, so that with insufficient supplies and a deficiency in the means of transportation the Confederates went forward into the year 1863 with many misgivings but not without a hope of achieving the independence for which they ventured on secession.

Congress took up the serious question of supplies early in the session and by resolution requested President Davis to issue an address to the people. The address was accordingly issued April 10, 1863, containing a frank statement of the situation and appealing pathetically ‘in behalf of the brave soldiers now confronting the enemy, and to whom the government is unable to furnish all the comforts they so richly merit.’ The address of President Davis was followed at once by similar appeals from the governors of the several States, and by resolutions which were passed at public meetings. The commissary general suffered great anxiety and sought by personal travel throughout the South to secure effective answer to the appeals thus made. The agitation preceding and following these appeals fortunately occurred [471] during the spring planting season and to it may be attributed the improved food supply for that year.

The accumulation of government cotton had in the beginning of 1863 amounted to about a half a million bales, stored generally in sheds at the distance of five or more miles from any railroad, and the principal agent of the government appointed to purchase cotton issued a circular July 25, 1863, in which he stated the policy of the government to be the same as to private or public cotton, viz.: ‘Apply to it the torch whenever in imminent and manifest danger of falling into the hands of the enemy, but only in such cases.’ The advice was most patriotically followed in many cases by the owners themselves. [472]

Chapter 19:

Intensified hostility.

Mediation attempted

France had proposed in 1862 to England and Germany that the three nations whose commerce was being injured most by the Confederate war join in suggesting an armistice between the Federal and Confederate governments with a view of settling their difficulties, and the friendly proposition was declined.

But in November, 1862, after the elections had gone against the Washington administration, the letter from Lord Lyons, British minister, to Earl Russell, disclosed a reopening of the question of foreign mediation. This interesting letter, describing very fully the effect of the victory of the peace party and referring to the dismissal of McClellan by Mr. Lincoln in the midst of these Democratic exultations as a sign that the President had thrown himself entirely into the arms of the extreme radical party, proceeded to discuss the prevailing views of mediation. Many of the conservative leaders who were seeking for means to secure peace feared ‘that a premature proposal of foreign intervention would afford the radical party a means of reviving the violent war spirit,’ and that the present moment was peculiarly unfavorable for such an offer. The conservative policy was—an armistice to be proposed by the United States;--a convention of States, also to be proposed by the United States, to reconstruct the Union and to offer amendments [473] to the Constitution. Lord Lyons wrote his own opinion ‘that the present moment is not a favorable one for making an offer of mediation. It might embarrass the peace party.’ ‘It would,’ he says, ‘in all probability be rejected by the President, who appears to have thrown himself into the arms of an extreme radical party.’ The views of that party, thus mentioned by the British minister, were clear and defined. ‘They declared that there was no hope of reconciliation with the Southern people, that the war must be pressed per fas et nefas until the disloyal men of the South shall be ruined and subjugated, if not exterminated; that not an inch of the old territory must be given up, and that foreign intervention in any shape must be rejected and resented.’ Commenting on the war policy, his Lordship remarks, ‘the political interests of the party now in power render the continuance of the war a necessity for it. Its only chance of regaining its lost popularity lies in successful military operations. Unless it can obtain a much higher place in public estimation than it now occupies, not only will its tenure of power become extremely precarious, but some of its leading members may be called to a severe account for their extra-legal proceedings.’

The French secretary for foreign affairs sent a note on the part of his government to the French minister at Washington in January, 1863, restating the desire of France to proffer its offices in restoring peace and regretting the little success which its overtures had gained at Washington. On receiving the note M. Mercier, the French minister, made a special visit to Mr. Seward, to present the dispatch, the reply to which was made in the United States secretary's letter to Mr. Dayton, minister at Paris. Mr. Seward answered the French suggestion that commissioners be appointed by the two peoples at war to meet on neutral ground and adjust their difficulties, by saying that however benevolent the desire of France, the suggestions which it has proposed ‘amount [474] to nothing less than a proposition that, while this govern. ment is engaged in suppressing an armed insurrection, with the purpose of maintaining the constitutional national authority, and preserving the integrity of the country, it shall enter into diplomatic discussion with the insurgents whether that authority shall not be renounced, and whether the country shall not be delivered over to disunion to be quickly followed by an ever-increasing anarchy.’ Replying further, Mr. Seward objected to the mode of reconciliation by a board of commissioners, and called attention to the existence of the Congress of the United States as the proper body where all the interests of all States could be debated. The congressional form of conference, and not the commission proposed by France, would be in his opinion in compliance with the Constitution of the United States. The United States Congress immediately discussed the correspondence and passed resolutions to be transmitted to all foreign countries, declaring ‘every proposition of foreign interference in the present contest as so far unreasonable and inadmissible; that its only explanation will be found in a misunderstanding of the true state of the question and the real character of the war in which the Republic is engaged.’ Thus a blundering diplomacy conspired with the behests of party policy to cut down the growing hope of national peace.

The relations between the Confederate States and foreign nations had grown more unsatisfactory to the struggling people of the new nation, notwithstanding the several controversies which at times threatened conflict between the United States and Great Britain. The Confederate government and people became convinced that Mr. Yancey correctly stated their case on his return from Europe, in saying that no hope of aid from foreign sources could be entertained until the South had virtually won the battle by its armies.

One apparently serious and early subject of diplomatic [475] correspondence was caused by the construction at British ship-yards of vessels reported to be designed for the use of the Confederacy. The steamers Alabama and Florida, first floated as harmless trade vessels, had soon appeared in the character of destructive battleships, and the fear was reasonable that an increase of the Confederate navy of that pattern might effectually ruin all commerce by vessels bearing the United States flag. Mr. Adams, the American minister at London, raised the question with Lord Russell during the latter part of 1862, submitting formally to him the views of the United States government on the rights and obligations of neutrals. The reply of Lord Russell sharply reminded Mr. Adams that the Queen's neutrality proclamation of May 13, 1861, had been set at naught by the agents of the United States, who had bought and shipped from British ports to New York, ‘vast supplies of arms and warlike stores.’ The Confederacy had likewise procured munitions of war in the same way, but his Lordship writes that ‘the party which has profited by far the most by these unjustifiable practices has been the government of the United States.’ After which rebuke the British earl formally stated the history of the ‘Alabama's’ construction under the name of ‘290’ and denied all liability for its operations on the high seas. Further correspondence contained the declaration of Lord Russell that ‘it is notorious that large bounties have been offered and given to British subjects residing in the United States to engage in the war on the Federal side.’ The settlement of the ‘Alabama’ question was postponed, and the subsequent actions of the British government do not appear to have given any considerable irritation to the United States.

The Confederacy had been disappointed also by the action of the French government, whose emperor had at first openly adopted the current opinion of European statesmen that secession would become successful. This early prejudgment caused the United States to make [476] unceasing efforts to thwart any combination of European powers in the least degree favorable to the Confederate movement. France, more conspicuously than any other power, had also intimated the desire for foreign intervention as the means to bring the American war to a speedy close. Upon this view of the emperor, and the certainty that foreign intervention would result in the partition of the United States, the Confederate authorities indulged for two years the dream of independence, while the fear of that result caused Mr. Seward to express his views in amiable phrase like this: ‘We wish to avoid anything calculated to irritate France, or to wound the just pride and proper sensibilities of that spirited nation, and thus to free our claim to her forbearance in our present political emergency from any cloud of passion or prejudice. Pursuing this course the President hopes that the prejudgment of the emperor against the stability of the Union may the sooner give way to convictions which will modify his course.’ Other countries had exerted no influence favorable to the Confederacy, and the impression prevailed, especially after the battles of Gettysburg and Vicksburg, that no positive step would be taken toward interference in the American strife unless some decided and well-sustained advantage should be gained by the Confederacy.

But amidst all the heartless movements of diplomacy, amidst all the violences of war—the tread of troops, the beat of drum, the roar of deadly guns, the outcry of assault and defense, the groaning of dying soldiers and the moans of the bereaved at home—amidst all those there was not a day during the horrible conflict when there was not heard the voice of the angels of reason and humanity calling for peace. Both nations had officially declared the desire for peace from first to last, and both nations maintained war from beginning to end; but the main question was constantly and unhappily restricted to the terms of peace and on conditions which involved scarcely [477] more than the fate of political parties. The peace feeling after nearly three years of fighting was still repressed into impotency by the same spirit which had at first ‘let loose the dogs of war.’ Two samples of the maneuvering which meant no more than those plays with pawns designed to draw out more potent pieces, are here given to show that the ‘son of peace’ did not rule over the American house.

President Lincoln had made proclamation calling on the people to give thanks to God for recent victories, reciting the advantages belonging to a united country, whereupon Mr. Wood, of New York, offered a resolution in Congress that ‘Whereas, in view of these triumphs it is no longer beneath our dignity, nor dangerous to our safety to evince a generous magnanimity becoming a great and powerful people, by offering to the insurgents an opportunity to return to the Union without imposing upon them degrading and destructive conditions; therefore, resolved, that the President be requested to appoint three commissioners who shall be empowered to open negotiations with the authorities at Richmond to the end that this bloody, destructive and inhuman war shall cease, and the Union be restored upon terms of equity, fraternity and equality under the Constitution.’ The resolution was laid on the table by a party vote of 98 yeas and 59 nays. On the same day Mr. Green Clay Smith offered resolutions that ‘believing as we do that the only hope of saving this country and preserving this government is by the power of the sword, we oppose any armistice, or intervention, or mediation, or proposition for peace from any quarter so long as there shall be found a rebel in arms against the government,’ and this resolution was agreed to by a similar vote of 96 yeas against 65 nays. Mr. Rogers offered resolutions declaring that the States in rebellion have the right to reorganize their State governments, to elect representatives in Congress and to be represented in the Union with all the rights of [478] the people of the several States, without any condition precedent except liability to be punished according to the laws; Mr. Dawson, of Pennsylvania, proposed that the President make a proclamation that hostilities cease against any State whenever it shall submit to the authority of the Federal government; and Mr. Long, of Ohio, afterward pushed these proffers of peace by a resolution, earnestly and respectfully requesting the President to appoint Franklin Pierce, Millard Fillmore, and Thomas Ewing, and such others as he may select to meet a like commission from the Confederate States ‘for the purpose of ascertaining before the renewal of hostilities shall have again commenced whether the war shall not now cease, and the Union be restored.’ These laudable efforts to bring together in amity the wearied contestants were made during a long lull of active war produced by the snows and sleets of winter, but they all fell one by one beneath the relentless axe of this same party vote.

On the other side we find a manifestation of Confederate feeling in the consideration during the year 1863 of ‘peace resolutions’ by the legislatures of the States and the press of the South, as well as in the public addresses of common statesmen. Mr. Stephens, the Vice-President, whose course indicates throughout an earnest desire on his part to be an agent in the pacification of the country and even in the restoration of the Union, began to say at this period that ‘the only terms on which we can obtain permanent peace are final and complete separation from the North.’ Mr. Herschel V. Johnson, who was the running mate of Mr. Douglas in 1860, said to the Georgia legislature, ‘There is no step backward, we cannot yield if we would.’ The feeling grew to be general that neither aid from foreign nations nor the fraternal efforts of the peace party in the Northern States could be relied on, but that physical force alone, or some possible accident, must determine the great issue. Later on, however, [479] peace efforts were renewed (as we shall see), and with the same disappointing result.

The position assumed by the Federal administration in the beginning of the conflict of the armies in 1860 that the struggle was not public war, but was only an insurrection, involved it in a series of perplexities. Among these the proper treatment of persons captured with arms in their hands was a question of great difficulty unless the admission of public war was allowed. Upon the insurrection theory it was broadly said in Washington that those who were captured should be tried as traitors and suffer the penalties prescribed against rebels, and unfortunately it was at first feared that any concession of belligerent rights made by the United States would encourage European nations to go further and recognize the Confederate States government. The weakness of President Buchanan in attempting to counterpoise secession and coercion as coequally wrong, was followed by the double dealing of Seward in the peace negotiations, and then after battle had begun the most momentous interests were made to turn on political phrases which were carefully employed. Thus, Confederate privateering was officially called piracy, notwithstanding the protest of every court in Europe, and the first crews captured were ironed as felons. From this first false position the administration was compelled to retreat. In pursuance of this mistaken policy the Southern soldiers first captured in battle were denied exchange as such because of the same fear that the exchange of prisoners according to the usages of war might in some way be regarded as a concession that public war existed. The cruel course produced hardships which brave men suffered, and embarrassed military officers who preferred to wage war in due form. Humanity required the evasion of this political policy, and under its inspiration swaps were made by commanders on the field instead of exchanges, which the common law of all great wars requires. After many [480] months of this trivial by-play, during which the Confederate authorities constantly sought to place the struggle fully within the control of the usages in public war, negotiations concerning prisoners were allowed, which resulted in an arrangement for general exchange, by which large numbers of soldiers were released and re. turned to the field. The wise arrangement, however, was disturbed by various insufficient causes, and even broken off entirely by the United States authorities until the unpopularity of the suspension brought about the formal cartel of July 22, 1862, through which exchanges were once again for a time resumed. Certain orders of General Pope, then commanding in Virginia, in which citizens were threatened with arrest as spies and held as hostages against ‘bush-whackers’ and the case of Mumford at New Orleans, executed by order of General Butler, provoked retaliatory orders by President Davis, to which President Lincoln responded with orders of a similar nature, all of which, with other difficulties in the execution of the cartel, induced President Davis to send the Vice-President of the Confederacy, Mr. Stephens, to seek an adjustment of these difficulties by a personal interview with the President of the United States.

The letter of instructions given to Mr. Stephens by President Davis stated: ‘You will perceive from the terms of the letter that it is so worded as to avoid any political difficulties in its reception. Intended as one of those communications between belligerents which public law recognizes as necessary and proper between hostile forces, care has been taken to afford no pretext for refusing to receive it on the ground that it would involve a tacit recognition of the independence of the Confederacy. Your mission is simply one of humanity and has no political aspect.’ The distinguished commissioner was authorized to negotiate fully in settlement of all the difficulties of exchange of prisoners and to make any arrangements that would place the mode of warfare on a humane [481] basis. Going with this authority Mr. Stephens reached Newport News, and there asked permission to proceed to Washington, but upon the reference of his mission to the authorities at the Federal capital the reply was returned: ‘The request is inadmissible. The customary agents and channels are adequate for all needful military communications and conferences between the United States forces and the insurgents.’ Thus at the moment when Lee had been repulsed at Gettysburg and was now recrossing the Potomac a mere technical objection was again raised and an opportunity for an important conference between Mr. Stephens and Mr. Lincoln was thrust aside. Contemporaneous, too, with this mission of the Vice-President new orders were issued from Washington relating to the cartel, and a new section was added to former general orders which produced still further embarrassments.

The disposition of negroes captured in battle still further disturbed the regular process of exchange, there being on the side of the Confederates an outstanding menace, which was met on the side of the Federals by the firm declaration that ‘the law of nations and the usages and customs of war as carried on by civilized powers permit no distinction as to color in the treatment of prisoners of war as public enemies.’ In this singular course of the questions involved in the treatment of white prisoners of the same country it came to pass that the condition of the negro brought about the concession by the North at last, which should have been made at the outset of the struggle, and produced an appeal to the laws of public war which the South had made in vain. A record of that year recites that “not a single instance has occurred of a negro soldier or a commissioned officer of a negro regiment being exchanged or recognized as a prisoner of war. On the other hand no instance has come to light of the execution by the Confederate authorities of the death penalty upon prisoners of this class.” [482]

In October, 1863, the number of Confederate prisoners in possession of the Federal government amounted to about 40,000 men. The Federals in the Confederate hands were only 13,000. This excess had been gained by the battles since the spring of the year and became a reason urged by General Hitchcock why he would not accept Mr. Ould's proposition in October ‘that all officers and men on both sides be released in conformity with the provisions of the cartel, the excess on the one side or the other to be on parole.’ This proposition of Mr. Ould to relieve the prisons of their burden in the beginning of winter and to release nearly sixty thousand sufferers by exchange or on parole found great favor in many parts of the North. Pressure for its acceptance was made in earnest by the North, but the reply was final that the effect would be to release 27,000 more Confederates than Federal soldiers from the restraints of prison life. From this date general exchange was discontinued, although certain special deliveries were effected. General Butler by his own request was appointed agent of exchanges at Fortress Monroe in December, thus closing the year 1863 with a total cessation of an arrangement which was indispensable as means to mitigate the horrors of war.

An amnesty proclamation was issued by President Lincoln December 8, 1863, as a part of the scheme adopted at Washington for reconstruction of the States. The proclamation offered Federal protection to such State governments as should be set up according to the mode prescribed by the general government and to them only. The President frankly gave as a reason ‘why this benefit was tendered only to State governments set up in this particular way’ that otherwise the majorities in the States sought to be reconstructed were averse to the ‘particular way’ proposed. The part of the proclamation tendering the pardon to individuals prescribed an oath required to be taken and registered to support the Constitution, all acts of Congress, and all proclamations [483] of the President having reference to slaves. Pardon was given to all persons on taking this oath except civil or diplomatic agents, judges, congressmen, military officers above the rank of colonel in the army or lieutenant in the navy, officers who had resigned from the United States army to enter Confederate service, and all persons who had treated captured colored soldiers otherwise than as prisoners of war.

The plan of reconstruction proposed in connection with the proffered amnesty provided that whenever in any seceded State a number of voters not less than one-tenth in number of the votes cast in such State in the presidential election of 1860 have taken the amnesty oath and re-established a State government, which accords with the terms of the oath, the State so re-constructed shall be reorganized and protected. The purpose made evident by this empowering of one-tenth of the voters to construct State governments according to a plan by which even the one-tenth were bound by oath made reconstruction more objectionable to the South than it was before the proclamation of amnesty. The iron-clad oath, the proscription of so large a class, and the commission of State government to a tenth only of the voters of a State, all of whom were put in one class by the required oath, gave the Confederates no encouragements to trust the restoration of the old constitutional relations of the States. The plan, however, was put into operation in such States as could be brought in part or entirely under military control. [484]

Chapter 20:

The Inhumanities of war.

Exchanges

South

North

there were two obstacles to exchange of prisoners from the outset of the war, one of which was theoretical, and is noticed by Hon. S. S. Cox in his ‘Three Decades of Federal Legislation.’ It was the theory that the fighting which was going on was not public war, but only an insurrection. Dilemmas occurred almost daily in the career of this theory, out of which the only extrication was to affirm the singular doctrine that the United States had the privilege of saying when the fighting was public war and when it was only insurrection. The facility with which statesmen accommodated principles to conditions in those dreadful days of peril to life and liberty, now astounds sober reason. The other obstacle was that practical one, appearing later in the struggle, which General Grant presented from the military standpoint in opposition to exchange of prisoners near the opening of the spring campaign of 1864, in these words: ‘I did not deem it advisable or just to the men who had to fight our battles to reinforce the enemy with thirty or forty thousand disciplined troops at that time.’

Grant's view was practical military cruelty, while the theoretical idea was the product of the combined genius for extricative expedients for which Mr. Seward and Mr. Stanton had no equals. Mr. Cox punctured the theory at the outset in 1861 when Mr. Lincoln applied it to the case [485] of the seamen of the ‘Savannah,’ who had been tried and convicted as pirates, but whose peril was retaliated by the Confederate threat to hang certain Federal officers if these seamen were hung. Mr. Cox argued the cause of the limited exchange before the President until he cried out: ‘Ah, there it is—you would have me recognize these pirates as belligerents. Remember that to fight on land is one thing, but on an unstable element like the sea where men are isolated and helpless, it is another.’ Mr. Cox says he considered the answer as having in it no element of humanity or international law, and replied, ‘Where is the difference, in intent or conduct? Does the difference consist in one shot being fired on the land and the other on the sea?’ There was of course no reasonableness in the position assumed by the administration and it was compelled to yield. Seward ordered the special exchange of the prisoners and Mr. Cox afterward pressed to passage his resolutions at the second session of the Thirty-seventh Congress for general exchange.

It is clear that the interest of the Confederacy was on the side of quick exchanges of prisoners and equally so that it was ready to make them for humane reasons. Difficulties were presented alone by the Federal view of the conflict which Confederate determination overcame or obviated from time to time. The care of Federal prisoners was a burden to the Confederacy since it was found to be easier to fight than to feed them. Hence all concessions were made for the sake of exchange, man for man, until at length the peremptory cessation of compliance with the cartel of 1862 forced the construction by both sides of prison dens. Elmira prison, Johnson's island prison, Fort Delaware prison, with all their somber annals were the inevitable results of the cessation of regular exchanges. And so was Andersonville on the Southern side. Andersonville prison in Georgia, Elmira prison and Johnson's island, Fort Delaware and the [486] prison ships were the inevitable results of the cessation of the exchanges of prisoners usual in wars. It became plain to the Confederate government in January, 1864, that it would be compelled to guard and support for an indefinitely prolonged time the increasing numbers of prisoners taken by its armies in battle, and in view of its diminishing resources, as well as its inability to certainly hold any positions securely, except such as were within the most central part of the South, at a distance from the Federal fleets and armies, the situation was embarrassing.

After careful consideration the principal site selected for the construction of a prison was in the upper central part of south Georgia, in precisely the region chosen more than thirty years after as a suitable location for a large colony of pensioned Union soldiers and their families and friends emigrating chiefly from the West. The new city of Fitzgerald, said to contain in 1897 several thousand Northern colonists, was built in the section where the Andersonville prison was constructed. This location was chosen as a prison site on account of its salubrity, mild winter climate, the nearness to saw mills and grist mills, the large area of food-producing country in southwest Georgia, and certainly also because it was little exposed to raiding forces such as threatened the Libby prison at Richmond. In constructing this prison an enclosure of thirty acres in shape of a parallelogram surrounded two hills, and a box canal was built through which a bold stream of clear, pure water was made to flow with conveniences for bathing, the lowest outlet being arranged for proper police purposes. ‘Several bold springs of pure water emerged from the north bank of the stream and numerous wells of pure water were made inside the prison.’ The camp was laid off by streets, and sheds were constructed for protection against rain and cold. It does not appear that there was any neglect of precautions against disease, or any failure of effort to render the unavoidable horrors of prison life bearable. [487] A competent authority declares, ‘if it had not been that the fortunes of war crowded the prisoners to this spot, producing the direful effects of an unforeseen pestilence, a better selection could not have been made in this part of the South for the health and comfort of the captives.’ It will be considered that no mountainous section of the South, nor any portion of its sea-coast was at this time so securely in the possession of the Confederates as to justify the location in such sections. The Confederates were compelled to go into the interior for the site of their prison under so many disadvantages that the exchange man for man as was proposed would have been greatly in their interest. The rations were chiefly cooked in the bakery outside the walls, and issued regularly once a day, all faring alike,—the Confederate troops on duty and the prisoners receiving the same rations. The hospital, like all the structures, was a rude inclosure of five acres, well shaded and watered, and furnished with tents, and it would have been ample in ordinary circumstances, but was suddenly made insufficient by great outbreaks of diseases of the bowels. Every comfort, however, was provided for the sick and wounded that could be obtained within the limited means of the Confederate government. The greatest difficulty was experienced in procuring medicines and anti-scorbutics, which were inhumanly made contraband of war by an order of the Federal government, and the most rigid discipline failed to make the prisoners pay that attention to cleanliness which was absolutely necessary. Even the guards on duty and several Confederate officers were attacked by the diseases of the camp.

It will be noted that the selection of this prison was made in the beginning of 1864, after the fatal decision of the Federal administration against exchanges, and that with all the hurried efforts of the Confederates the place was scarcely ready when on the first of March a body of 850 unfortunate foreigners were necessarily sent from captured [488] New England regiments whom the Confederate government would have gladly released by exchange. Very soon thereafter the prisoners taken from Sherman by the Confederate army under General Johnston began to come in, with many from other sources, until in May the prison was crowded. The advance of Grant on Richmond also made it necessary to empty Libby prison on the States farther south instead of sending them as President Davis earnestly desired into their own lines in exchange for Confederate equivalents. The removal of this body required transportation, guards and rations which were very greatly needed by General Lee, and their ‘equivalents’ from Johnson's Island or other Northern prisons would have given the Confederate commander several more divisions of gallant soldiers. Whatever else is doubtful about the prison question it is well ascertained that the Confederate President craved his imprisoned legions while his antagonist thought it ‘better to feed them than to fight them.’

The total number of prisoners in this prison of 1864 appears to have been increased about as follows: In April, 10,000; May, 18,000; June, 26,000; July, 31,000; August, 31,000. After this date the number was suddenly decreased to 8,000 in September, and to 4,000 in October, by the removal of all the prisoners except invalids and nurses to Millen in the eastern part of Georgia. This change was made in consequence partly of the advice of General Winder, and also because of a threatened raid from Sherman's army then at Atlanta. The deaths during five months from March 1st to August 1st, were only 4,485, about ten per cent. But on the occurring of a pestilence in the form of dysentery, scurvy and gangrene, the deaths increased greatly during the months of August, September and October. In consequence of the dangerous nature of the diseases appearing in the camp the Confederate government directed the above stated removal of at least 20,000 prisoners to other points [489] remote from Andersonville as soon as barrack accommodations could be built and supplies collected. The removal was effected as rapidly as possible and by the last of September all were gone except such as were in the hospitals unable to travel. It thus appears that Andersonville was used as a main prison not more than six months, during the first four of which the percentage of mortality did not reach the average rate at which Confederate prisoners died in Northern hands, and that as soon as possible the prisoners were removed. The medical corps detailed to remain with the great body of the infected, struggled with the desperate disease with all odds against them. The camp being relieved of all except about 5,000 invalids and nurses, besides laborers and a small guard, the surgeons were enabled to improve the general sanitary conditions and to erect new and large hospital sheds. Confederate surgeons ‘remained by their dying patients when even their own countrymen had deserted them,’ some dying at their posts, and all evincing a devotion to professional duty and humanity which merits the linking of Andersonville prison and the heroic charity of their profession together. But with all their care the progress of death was terrible for two months. In fact, ‘at one time it had been thought by the medical officers that nearly all the infected would die, but by the use of vegetables in such quantities as could be procured and an acid beer made from cornmeal and sorghum molasses, the death rate fell from about 3,000 in August to 160 in December.’

In the beginning of these horrors the Confederate government renewed the efforts for exchange of prisoners for at least the one good reason that the captives on their hands were an immense disadvantage. Supposing that the South had no humane feelings toward Northern captives and cared nothing for the appeals of its own brave soldiers suffering at Elmira, Johnson's Island and elsewhere, it will still appear that there were military [490] and civic reasons for the humane efforts so zealously put forth to relieve the brave men held in such prolonged and fatal bondage. This fact is sufficient answer to all statements that the South obstructed exchanges, just as a New England audience was once convinced that Southern planters did not use negroes in place of mules at the plow, since the negro had a money value of $1,500 and mules could be bought for $150.

Senator Hill, of Georgia, in his crushing, unanswered reply to Senator Blaine in the House of Representatives January 11, 1876, collates the efforts to facilitate exchanges, and coming to this period of horrors, says:

Then again in August, 1864, the Confederates made two more propositions. I will state that the cartel of exchange was broken by the Federal authorities for certain alleged reasons. Well, in August, 1864, prisoners accumulating on both sides to such an extent, and the Federal government having refused to provide for the comfort and treatment of these prisoners, the Confederates next proposed, in a letter from Colonel Ould dated the 10th of August, 1864, waiving every objection the Federal government had made, to agree to any and all terms to renew the exchange of prisoners, man for man and officer for officer, as the Federal government should prescribe. Yet, sir, the latter rejected that proposition. It took a second letter to bring an answer to that proposition. Then again in that same month of August, 1864, the Confederate authorities did this: Finding that the Federal government would not exchange prisoners at all, that it would not let surgeons go into the Confederacy, finding that it would not let medicines be sent into the Confederacy, meanwhile the ravages of war continuing and depleting the scant supplies of the South, which was already unable to feed adequately its own defenders, and much less able to properly feed and clothe the thousands of prisoners in Confederate prisons—what did the Confederates propose? They proposed to send home the [491] Federal sick and wounded prisoners without equivalent. Now, sir, I want the house and the country to understand this: That in August, 1864, the Confederate government officially proposed to Federal authorities that if they would send steamships or transportation in any form to Savannah, they should have their sick and wounded prisoners without equivalent. That proposition communicated to the Federal authorities in August, 1864, was not answered until December, 1864. In December, 1864, the Federal government sent ships to Savannah. Now the record will show that the chief suffering at Andersonville was between August and December. The Confederate government sought to avert it by asking the Federal government to come and take its prisoners without equivalent—without return, and it refused to do that until four or five months had elapsed.

The efforts of the Confederate government to have the imprisoned soldiers of both armies released were strenuously supported by their friends at home and by the appeals of the prisoners themselves. The Richmond government was beset with communications from citizens inclosing distressing accounts of the treatment to which Confederate prisoners were subjected in Northern prisons, and violent censures of Mr. Davis became common because he did not enforce better treatment on Confederate soldiers in these Northern prisons by retaliation, since he was unable to effect the customary exchanges. In the same way the administration at Washington was besieged by the friends of Federal prisoners, and by appeals from prisoners themselves, urging that no party or military considerations should doom the Union troops to the continued horrors of prison life. The pressure grew as the summer came on and the numbers of these unfortunate heroes of both armies had increased until it became necessary for the Washington administration to give a reason for the refusal of these powerful appeals. The reason was given by the military chieftain, but a [492] better should have been discovered and announced by the civil authority at Washington. General Grant was compelled to assume the responsibility and having no other ground to stand upon he placed the denial of all these appeals upon ‘military necessity.’ The same plea of military necessity having been used to excuse all the early measures which the conservative statesman at Washington had opposed, was now employed to defend a policy which according to Junius Henri Browne, a Northern gentleman, cost the Republic at least twelve or fifteen thousand heroic lives. He might have added the same number of equally heroic Confederates, and given 30,000 as the total life-loss by the cruelties of ‘military necessity.’ The reason given by General Grant was sound enough from the ferocious military idea that ‘war must be made terrible,’ and his justification rests upon his obligations as the lieutenant-general commanding all the armies of the Union to destroy the Con federate forces as quickly as possible. Influenced by this, view of war General Grant sent a dispatch to General Butler August 18, 1864, in the midst of the Andersonville horrors, containing these words: ‘It is hard on our men held in Southern prisons not to exchange them, but it is. humanity to those left in the ranks to fight our battles. Every man released on parole or otherwise becomes an active soldier against us at once, either directly or indirectly. If we commence a system of exchange which liberates all prisoners taken, we will have to fight on until the whole South is exterminated. If we hold those caught, they amount to no more than dead men. At this particular time to release all rebel prisoners north would insure Sherman's defeat and would compromise our safety here.’ This remarkable confession was made with thorough knowledge of the vast resources of the United States.

But General Grant did not assume this responsibility without the previous sanction of the civil government [493] The policy had been fixed at Washington, and the cabinet secret was divulged in a speech by General Butler at Lowell, Massachusetts, August, 1865, in which he informed the public that this continued imprisonment of Union as well as Confederate soldiers was the policy of Mr. Stanton, the secretary of war. In the speech he ‘stated positively that he had been ordered by Mr. Stanton to put forward the negro question to complicate and prevent exchanges,’ and he boastfully declared at another time that he had discharged this task so offensively as to produce the required result, thus justifying the charge made by other Northern men that the miseries and deaths of these Union soldiers were ‘due alone to Edwin M. Stanton's peculiar policy and dogged obstinacy.’ In addition also to Grant's military reasons for desiring that no prisoners of war should be exchanged, there is given by General Butler in his official report to the committee on the conduct of the war a very remarkable personal objection to exchange, as follows: ‘In case the Confederate authorities should yield to the argument, and formally notify me that their former slaves captured in our uniform would be exchanged as other soldiers were, and that they were ready to return us all our prisoners at Andersonville and elsewhere in exchange for theirs, then I had determined with the consent of the Lieutenant General (Grant), as a last resort to prevent exchange, to demand that the outlawry against me should be formally reversed and apologized for before I would further negotiate the exchange of prisoners.’ General Butler coolly excuses himself in the same reports for complicity in the schemes of cruelty, by the statement ‘that those lives were spent as a part of the attack upon the rebellion devised by the wisdom of the general-in-chief of the armies to destroy it by depletion, depending on our superior numbers to win the victory at last.’ The battle for the Union was accordingly transferred in 1864 from the soldiers in the field to the sufferers in the prisons. [494] Victory was to be won over the South by the confinement of fighting men in prisons, although they should die there like sheep in the shambles.

A statement of Colonel Ould, agent of exchange, was made and published in 1868, verifying the facts concerning the questions relating to prisoners between the two governments and his testimony remains unimpeached. He says that the first cartel of exchange, which bears date July 22, 1862, was designed to secure the delivery of all prisoners of war, the fourth article providing that all prisoners of war should be discharged on parole in ten days after their capture. From this date until the summer of 1863 the Confederacy held the excess of prisoners, and during that interval of about a year the Confederate authorities made prompt deliveries of all prisoners except the few held under charges. On the other hand, during the same time the cartel was-notoriously violated by the Federal authorities on various pretexts. In the summer of 1863, the Federal authorities insisted on limiting exchanges to such prisoners as had been placed in confinement, which was in violation of the cartel, and was proposed after the excess of prisoners had changed to the Federal side. The new proposition nullified that part of the cartel which required the discharge on parole or delivery of prisoners within ten days after capture. The cartel was thus for a time interrupted, but in August, 1864, the Confederate government, moved by the sufferings of prisoners, abated their demand for the delivery of the excess on parole according to the cartel, and formally consented to exchange officer for officer and man for man. The official note to General Mulford, then assistant agent of exchange, containing this consent to the exchange, was unanswered, and after two weeks, the same proposal was forwarded to General Hitchcock, the Federal commissioner of exchange. No answer to either letter was received. General Mulford, on August 31, 1864, informed Ould that he had no communication from [495] his government on the subject. An offer which would have released within ten days every Northern soldier in the Confederate prisons, but at the same time have left a large number of Southern soldiers in Northern prisons because the excess was then on the Federal side, was not even noticed.

In January, 1864, and even before that date it was feared by the Confederate authorities that prisoners of war on both sides would be held in captivity without the benefits of exchange. Colonel Ould, the Confederate agent of exchange, therefore wrote, January 24, 1864, officially to General Hitchcock, the Federal agent of exchange, a formal proposal to have surgeons appointed by both governments to take charge in the prisons of the health and comfort of the prisoners. The surgeons were also to act as commissaries with power to receive and distribute money, food, clothing and medicines. But even this very humane offer was not answered, although its acceptance would have alleviated the sufferings and saved the lives of thousands of brave men. In the summer of 1864, Colonel Ould was instructed by Mr. Davis to offer to deliver all sick and wounded prisoners without any exchange whatever, and accordingly he did offer to send ten or fifteen thousand to the mouth of the Savannah river without requiring any equivalents, but the acceptance of this noble proposal was delayed for months. Finally, about the last of the year, vessels were sent to receive this free offering, and Ould turned over as many as could be transported—some thirteen thousand—among whom were over five thousand well men. In return the Federal agent sent in at the mouth of the Savannah river about 3,000 sick and wounded Confederates from Northern prisons.

During this same summer the deficiency in medical supplies became so embarrassing that the Confederate administration offered to buy from the United States, payable in gold, cotton or tobacco, these needed medicines, [496] stipulating that they might be brought into the Confederate lines by United States surgeons and dispensed by them solely for the benefit of Union prisoners. To this offer there was no reply. In the meantime the blockade was effective and medicines were contraband.

Colonel Ould declares concerning Colonel Mulford that ‘while he discharged his duties with great fidelity to his own government he was kind and tender to Confederate prisoners—an honorable and truthful gentleman to whom he could appeal for the truth of statements with which he was familiar,’ and other corroborations of Ould's testimony are to be found in the report of Major General Butler to the committee on the conduct of the war. Ould was subpoenaed to testify in the trial of Wirts and expressed his intention to tell the whole story as to the conduct of the two administrations in the matter of the treatment of prisoners, but his subpoena was revoked by the prosecution. Mr. Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederacy, was conspicuously active from the beginning to the close of the Confederate war in attempts to secure the usual exchanges of prisoners common among civilized nations at war, on which account he was particularly qualified to speak as a credible witness. Condemning the cruel and untenable position of the Federal administration that the crew of the Savannah and all other ships of the Confederate navy were pirates, he expresses the opinion in his work prepared since the war that the desistance of the authorities at Washington from this position was due alone to fear of England, and that the cartel for general exchange afterward agreed to was forced by public sentiment. The policy pursued by the administration at Washington as he viewed its effects, produced the difficulties of exchange, and the consequent intolerable sufferings and deaths in Northern and Southern prisons. The question of exchange was treated by the Federal authorities almost solely as a policy of war, by which captured men [497] should be made to suffer for their cause in prison whenever such suffering contributed to the crushing of the rebellion. Confederate sentiment unvaryingly required the opening of the prisons by equal exchange and the settlement of the issue by treaty or battle. ‘I insist,’ says Mr. Stephens, ‘upon irrefutable fact that but for the refusal of the Federals to carry out an exchange, none of the wrongs or outrages, and none of the sufferings incident to prison life on either side could have occurred.’

There is no purpose in this history to recount the cruelties practiced during the great struggle of the South for independence, and hence no account will be given of the atrocities at Camp Douglas, Rock Island, Elmira, Point Lookout or anywhere perpetrated by Federal subordinates in charge of Confederate prisoners. There were sufferings in all prisons and brutalities perpetrated in this as in other wars, but the proofs furnished by the evidence of General Butler, by the orders of Federal military officers, by the orders and communications of General Grant, and by the reports of Secretary Stanton, all of which are of record, fix the responsibility of this uncivilized mode of war upon the Federal administration. Secretary Stanton's report of July 19, 1866, shows that 26,246 Confederate soldiers died in Northern prisons, and 22,576 Union soldiers died in Southern prisons. Twelve per cent of the Confederate prisoners who fell into Northern captivity died notwithstanding all the facilities for receiving food, clothing, medicines and healthful conditions which the United States unquestionably possessed, while in the absence of these requisites on the part of the Confederacy the astonishing fact appears that less than nine per cent of the Union soldiers in Southern hands died in prisons. It is indisputably established that the Confederate authorities constantly pressed exchanges on equal terms, that they acceded to terms that were unequal for the sake of ex- [498] change, that they proposed many measures of relief which were denied, that at length the most pitiable and unusual of all spectacles occurred when a deputation of Union soldiers appeared in Washington, sent by Mr. Davis to plead for release by fair exchange, and to plead in vain. [499]

Chapter 21:

The politics of 1864 as a factor in the war.

Armies East and West

South

after the battles of Gettysburg and Vicksburg the movements of the armies in various parts of the field brought on a number of conflicts, especially in the West. The main Confederate army had fallen back to Chattanooga and thence to Chickamauga valley, where it was followed by the Federal forces. Upon this ground the battle of Chickamauga was fought September 20th, and a technical victory won by the Confederates. The Federals were forced back to Chattanooga, whence, after two months delay, they advanced again, and achieving a victory at Missionary Ridge, closed active operations for a time, with the general situation in the entire West decidedly advantageous to the United States. In the East the Federal use of the signal advantages gained by the defeat of Lee at Gettysburg was chiefly for some time in congratulations at the escape Washington had made, and the delivery of Pennsylvania from the ‘tread of the hostile invader.’ With a slowness that seems remarkable the Union armies along the Potomac were employed in what has been called ‘a campaign of strategy,’ which [500] permitted Lee to send Longstreet to Chickamauga, and in the last days of November, 1863, produced the abortion of Mine Run.

The United States Congress assembled at this juncture, December 8, 1863, and received the President's congratulations on the favorable aspect of affairs. The message announced that by the complete opening of the Mississippi river the Confederacy was divided into two distinct parts. Tennessee and Arkansas had been cleared of insurgent control; emancipation was accepted in Maryland and missouri; one hundred thousand negro slaves were in the United States military service, and ‘the annual elections of 1863 are highly encouraging.’ The President pronounced the period as ‘the new reckoning—the crisis which threatened to divide the friends of the Union is past.’ Mr. Lincoln had sufficient grounds for the exultant tone of his message.

The President of the Confederate States addressed the Southern Congress which assembled December 7, 1863, in his annual message admitting the ‘grave reverses,’ but called attention to the victories won by the gallant troops so ably commanded in the States beyond the Mississippi over the invaders of Louisiana and Texas, and to the successful defense of Charleston against the joint land and naval operations of the enemy, while on more than one occasion the army in Virginia had forced the invaders to retreat precipitately to their entrenched lines. ‘If we are forced,’ says the Confederate President, ‘to regret losses in Tennessee and Arkansas, we are not without ground for congratulation on successes in Louisiana and Texas.’ And to further encourage the South in its struggle for independence the message earnestly insisted that ‘whatever obstinacy may be displayed by the enemy in his desperate sacrifices of money, life and liberty in the hope of enslaving us, the experience of mankind has too conclusively shown the superior endurance of those [501] who fight for home, liberty and independence, to permit any doubt of the result.’

No signs appeared anywhere in the beginning of 1864 that the seceded States were willing to abandon the Confederacy unconditionally. In some quarters there were demonstrations in favor of a renewal of attempts to procure peace and restoration of the Union. ‘But as the friends of reconstruction could promise nothing from the Federal government except submission and emancipation, and as they possessed no control of any political organization which could sustain their views, they seem to have become finally silent.’ There was in fact a general acceptance of the view that the war must proceed, that political questions were settled, and the result must be left to arms. ‘We cannot contemplate,’ says one public appeal of that date, ‘the coming of the next and fourth campaign of the pending war without solicitude. Our enemies will commence the next campaign with some advantages of position which they did not have in the beginning of 1863. It will be incumbent upon us during the current year to call out all our resources and put forth all our strength.’

The Confederate Congress, which was now in session at Richmond, was composed of many able statesmen. In the Senate were Clay and Jemison from Alabama; Johnson and Mitchell from Arkansas; Baker and Maxwell from Florida; Hill and Johnson from Georgia; Burnett and Sims from Kentucky; Symmes and Sparrow from Louisiana; Brown and Phelan from Mississippi; Clark from Missouri; Davis from North Carolina; Barnwell and Orr from South Carolina; Haynes and Henry from Tennessee; Oldham and Wigfall from Texas; Hunter and Caperton from Virginia. In the House the members were distinguished for conservatism and ability, among whom were Curry, Clopton, and Pugh, Garland, Trippe, Ewing, Breckinridge, Conrad, Davis, Barksdale, Vest, Ashe, Boyce, Gentry, Vaughn, Bocock, and Boteler. Mr. [502] Bocock was speaker and Albert Lamar clerk. The gravity of the situation evidently impressed the Confederate Congress, and in appreciation of the peril of the government immediate attention was given to filling up the thinned ranks of the armies. In the Senate Mr. Brown, of Mississippi, offered resolutions declaring that every male citizen should be enrolled in military service; that all laws authorizing substitutes be repealed; that foreigners should leave the country or take up arms to defend it, and that necessary civil positions should be filled by details. In addition to these measures he proposed to levy direct taxes sufficient to conduct the war; to make Confederate notes a legal tender; to prohibit trading in gold, silver and United States currency, and to make these laws ‘war measures’ so that offenders should be tried by court martial. The military committee reported a bill to repeal all former laws which permitted the employment of substitutes, which was passed. Mr. Foote proposed resolutions requesting the President to withdraw diplomatic agents and dismiss all foreign consuls from the Confederacy. He also asked for investigation into the charges which had been made by the Northern press that the Confederacy was starving Federal prisoners, which was agreed to. Bills were passed prohibiting all traffic in United States currency. The conscription act was discussed at length and finally passed, declared all men between eighteen and fifty-five years of age subject at once to military duty, and required them to report within a certain time or be liable to trial for desertion. All mechanics would be detailed as well as railroad men, telegraph operators and miners. The country was thus placed under general military control and the Confederacy girded itself to renew the contest in 1864.

The political temper at Washington was sufficiently threatening to let the Confederacy understand that all of these preparations to exhaust the resources of the South in the cause it had espoused would be unavailing. The [503] year 1864 was opened with a number of Federal resolutions indicating the purpose to meet every demand of war in order to subdue the seceded States. Some of these were insanely violent. Such, for example, as the resolution offered by Mr. Myers to ‘prosecute the war until the rebellious States be conquered, and when the people have taken the oath they shall be pardoned, their leaders hung and the war cease.’ Similar ill-tempered resolutions were proposed and passed, and while they were softened by others of a more conciliatory character, yet none which opened the way to any peace negotiations found favor with the Congress. The contest for the party control of the government was near at hand and the preliminary movements having been already made these congressional resolutions were designed to have a bearing upon the ballots in Northern States rather than to show any patriotic purpose to bring the war to speedy and just conclusion. Mr. Chase, lately secretary of the treasury, was an aspirant to the Presidency even while serving in the cabinet, and had united with the ultra radicals of his party in an effort to secure the nomination. His charge against Mr. Lincoln was incompetency and conservatism; but it is difficult even at this date to see how the President could have been less conservative unless he would issue a proclamation of extermination, nor how any other could have better managed the extraordinary difficulties which he encountered in subduing the South. Mr. Chase soon discovered that he had placed himself in a false position and withdrew his name from the contest.

But the Presidential election of 1864 had engaged the attention of the anti-administration leaders of other parties who had been seeking during 1863 some common basis of opposition upon which they might make a successful race. Democrats calling themselves war Democrats and announcing their devotion to the Union held a party conference at Chicago November 24, 1863, preliminary to the call for a national Democratic meeting in [504] May, 1864. Another convention of Union men had assembled at Rochester, who also denounced secession and declared their opposition to the unconstitutional acts of the administration, and this was followed by still another convention held in Cincinnati December 4th, and again in Philadelphia December 24th, at which the conservative platform adopted by the legislature of Kentucky January 11, 1863, was made the basis of party union, and General McClellan was recommended as a candidate for the Presidency. There were enough elements of dissatisfaction in these various conventions to give Mr. Lincoln some fears and the Confederacy some hope that the party in power could be overthrown. The Congressional maneuvers for party advantage appear in the yet more distinct avowals made by the administration party of the war-power policy, and the settled purpose to crush the rebellion. Retracting nothing that had been avowed or done the administration resolved to stand or fall upon the emancipation proclamation; the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, and unconditional submission of the seceded States to the authority of the Federal Union.

The Confederate Congress had little to do. Its measures for prosecuting the war were quickly passed and the burden of the execution thereof rolled upon the Confederate executive, the governors of the States and the ever-faithful soldiery. The general principle of the war had been settled. The ‘war power’ had become incorporated at Washington as a new force among the powers conferred by the Constitution. Mr. Lincoln had concluded the angry controversy on this subject by his simple, terse declaration that ‘the Constitution conferred the war power in time of war.’ After this the Confederates knew that their States might be overturned, their property confiscated, and themselves banished according to this view of the Constitution. The Northern States also knew that this meant the use of force to keep down any [505] recusants who might desire to secure peace contrary to the policy of the administration. It was definitely settled that slavery would be abolished without compensation to the owners of negroes, and whatever else might be done under the war power was left to conjecture of no pleasing kind. Whether there would be any public exchange of prisoners, or how hostilities would be conducted, depended wholly upon the preponderance of power. With the political questions or war policy of the Washington administration the Confederates had nothing to confront except their armies. These questions had been in review before both nations for three years and decision had been made by Presidential proclamation, congressional legislation, military orders, and even judicial decisions against the Confederate States.

There was left, however, the faint hope that the election of 1864 would show gains even over the vote of 1862 against the administration, and bring the people of the United States to consideration of the terms of peace. Speeches were therefore made by President Davis, Vice-President Stephens, and Governor Letcher, of Virginia, and various editorials were published in Southern newspapers, to arouse the people to make the most resolute resistance until these questions could be passed upon at the ballot box by the people of the United States. An amendment of the Constitution of the United States was proposed January 11, 1864, to abolish slavery in all the States, which failed to pass the U. S. Senate, and became one of the main issues in the ensuing presidential election. A resolution declaring the constitutional objects of the war to be simply the restoration of the Union on the basis of the Constitution, and requesting President Lincoln to issue a proclamation inviting the revolted States to repudiate their secession ordinance upon the pledge of restoration to all their rights under the Constitution, was merely ordered to be printed, and another resolution in February, 1864, requesting the President to appoint [506] Pierce, Fillmore and Ewing commissioners to meet Confederate commissioners before hostilities commenced, to ascertain whether honorable peace may not be made, was voted down, yeas 26, nays 96. These and other resolutions offered in the U. S. Congress were forecasts of the issues on which the battle for political supremacy, now near at hand, was to be fought.

Preparations were meanwhile made during the winter for battle along all the lines of the interior of the Confederacy to which the Federal armies had penetrated, and with equal vigor the Confederates prepared for either offensive or defensive war, as they might have opportunity. The Confederate enrollment contained a few above 400,000 men, of whom it is stated that about one half were effective and in the field. The Federal force on duty at various places is officially reported as over a million men. This disparity of numbers though great, was less important than the difference in the resources of the two governments, and the only advantage which can be placed to the account of the South was its position as the defender of its soil.

The fighting opened for the year with surprising victories for the Southern armies. At Olustee, Florida, General Finegan and General Colquitt signally defeated General Seymour, and rescued a large part of that State. General Sherman had captured Meridian, in Mississippi, but was forced to beat a retreat to Vicksburg on account of the destruction of his cavalry by Forrest. In April Taylor attacked Banks at Mansfield, Louisiana, and drove him with great loss back to New Orleans. Hoke captured Plymouth, North Carolina, and the raid of Kilpatrick, with the disreputable accompaniment of the Dahlgren effort to burn Richmond and murder President Davis and his cabinet, were both defeated.

But these affairs did not affect the general course which military events were now taking. The two great armies of the Union, one in Virginia, the other in the West, in [507] Georgia, and Tennessee, both under the direction of General Grant, were the instruments by which the Confederacy was to be dissolved. These twin armies were so disposed by the plan of General Grant as to act in concert, in order that if both were victorious the Confederacy would be overwhelmed, and if either was defeated the other could render assistance. Defeat of both was not contemplated, but even in that contingency Grant had the pledge of his government to honor his further requisitions without question. The official control of the government by the result of the pending presidential election depended apparently on the success of these armies. ‘It is going on well,’ said Mr. Lincoln some months afterward, as the political campaign progressed, ‘a little more luck in our battles will make it all right.’ The forces of these great dependencies were well distributed. General Butler with 30,000 men had charge of the line along the James; General Sigel marched into the famous valley of Virginia, and General Meade with the main command under the immediate eye of Grant, amounting to about 125,000 men, occupied the north bank of the Rapidan. The other great army, commanded by General Sherman, extended from Dalton westward among the hills of Georgia, with instructions to force General Johnston, the Confederate commander, through Georgia, or to destroy his command in battle. The collision in Virginia between the armies of Lee and Grant began May 4th and continued nearly every day through the bloody series of engagements called ‘the battles of the Wilderness.’ The campaign of a month brought the Federal army to the McClellan position of 1862, but with losses from all sources which would have barred further progress had not reinforcements been freely furnished according to the promise of his government. The estimates are that Grant's army had contained 192,160 men, of which he had lost 60,000; Lee had 78,400 men and had lost nearly 20,000 in killed and wounded. In Georgia the two antagonists [508] at first confronted near Dalton, but by a series of flanking movements which he was able to make with his superior force, General Sherman followed the retreat of Johnston from the 4th of May until he reached Atlanta the following July, timidly consuming two months in traversing less than one hundred miles, the rate of speed being not quite two miles per day and meanwhile suffering severe punishment in all battles fought during his advance.

On reaching the vicinage of Richmond and Petersburg the Federal commander, after making desperate efforts in vain to break Lee's lines for three days in June, began a plan of intrenchments from which to conduct the slow siege of the Confederate capital, on a line of operations which not only took all the summer, but exhausted the succeeding winter. President Lincoln saw the situation. His best general—the best at least, for the present stage of the war, had ‘hammered’ Lee for months, only to wear out the splendid army which had begun the spring movement, in getting again on the ground from which Lee and Jackson had driven McClellan two years before, Butler had been bottled up on the James by Beauregard, Sigel defeated in the valley by Breckinridge, and after all, Grant's army had been compelled to intrench and await reinforcements on the ground most unfavorable for assault on the Confederate capital. Mr. Swinton, the historian, says ‘so gloomy was the military outlook after the action of the Chickahominy (second Cold Harbor, June 2), and to such a degree, by consequence, had the moral spring of the public mind become relaxed, that there was at this time great danger of a collapse of the war.’ And besides all this, the Democratic National Union convention was about to assemble. The President looked over the despairing field, and complying with the request of his deeply impressed Congress appointed for the first time since the war began a day of public prayer for the suppression of the rebellion. [509]

Chapter 22:

The decisive year—1864.

Political battle of 1864 in the North

Niagara

The political battle of 1864 set in array at the North on the side of the administration was vehemently pronounced to be based on condemnation of secession, vindication of coercion, abolition of slavery and subjugation of the seceding States. It was urged that the defeat of Lincoln would be a Northern approval of disunion, a rebuke of the armies, and re-establishment of the arrogant slave power. In the temper of the times there was but a little chance of so directing Northern popular sentiment as to change the administration of the government in the midst of war. War was party necessity and the source of its power. An armistice as suggested by the opposition might be fatal to party supremacy. It might afford occasion to arouse the supposed latent Union sentiment in the Southern States. It might give time for sober reflection in the conditions of 1864 which were different from those of 1861. It might result in divisions among Southern leaders and Southern States. Mr. Davis favored an armistice but if it had been agreed on his Confederate presidency would have been imperiled. Probably the Confederate government would have dissolved. On the other hand, Mr. Lincoln was even at the point of a fierce earnestness opposed to any armistice—Grant's hammering must not cease. [510] Sherman must push on. The press must give daily notice of the speedy subjugation of the rebellion. A truce pending the canvass for the presidency might result in peace, reunion, overthrow of the Confederacy, abolition of slavery, but these gracious results would be brought about by parties opposed to the administration.

An armistice in order to dissolve the Confederacy and restore the Union without further bloodshed was the policy of the Northern conservatives. No Southern representative men have been suspected of any complicity with these fraternal and patriotic designs further than to suggest that fighting should cease and peace conferences be held. Fidelity to the Confederacy distinguished Confederate leaders. But this policy was openly and honestly avowed by eminent Northern leaders who held that it was not treasonable to the Union to suspend coercion and test the sincerity of Southern declarations in regard to peace. The openly stated position of Northern leaders who favored a temporary peace was that secession must be abandoned or the war would be pressed to the utmost subjugation. But with this outspoken notice to the South these patriotic leaders avowed their belief that the South would surrender to overtures of honorable peace and therefore they proposed to make them.

But while this agitation of the armistice plan was under discussion, Mr. Lincoln was at the Philadelphia Fair, June 15, 1864, and speaking to the people he said, ‘This war has taken three years. It was begun or accepted upon the line of restoring the National authority over the whole National domain, and for the American people, as far as my knowledge enables me to speak, I say we are going through on this line if it takes three years more.’ The armistice policy had been often brought forward in Congress and by portions of the public press, only to be invariably treated as if it were a truculent submission to the South. Mr. Lozier asked consent, May 30, 1864, to offer resolutions that the President [511] be required to adopt measures to suspend hostilities for a limited time, and to provide for a general convention through which the differences may be settled and the Union restored, but objection was made and the resolution was not proposed. Mr. Le Blond, of Ohio, two weeks later offered an amendment to the enrollment bill then pending in the U. S. Congress that compulsory enrollment be suspended till such time as the President shall have made a request for an armistice and shall have made such efforts as are consistent with honor to restore harmony among the States by the appointment of commissioners empowered to negotiate for peace upon the terms of a restoration of the Union under the Constitution and until such offer shall have been rejected by the so-called Confederate government. This reasonable and patriotic resolution received only thirteen votes. Ninety-one votes were recorded against even a suspension of the draft preliminary to the offer of an armistice and the appointment of commissioners.

There were undoubtedly very powerful peace currents, genial as the gulf stream, setting in at this date from many sources upon the great throbbing bosom of the American people. They are all perceptible now by every one who reads the signs of those times. Those officials to whom the great interests of the South had been committed spoke of peace with due caution, sometimes uttering defiance and high resolve to maintain the Confederate cause at every cost, and yet it must be remembered that disunion for its own sake was never the ‘cause of the South.’ A Confederate senator from Georgia, one who was the right hand supporter of Mr. Davis, said in public speech to his people at home that slavery should be surrendered before constitutional rights were abandoned. All the declarations of eternal fealty to the Confederacy made in 1864 must be read and understood as expressions conditional upon the persistent maintenance by the administration at Washington of the [512] principles and policy it had adopted under the so-called war power. Mr. Stephens has recorded in his work on ‘The War Between the States’ that he was at any time ready to advocate the reunion of the States upon the single but fundamental principle that the States were to have supreme control of their domestic affairs. It was under the influence of this genial current that the Georgia resolutions of March, 1864, were passed which gave warm color to the report that a Peace party movement was not only contemplated but actually organized in the South. These resolutions set forth very powerfully the ultra State Rights theory of Federal government and arraigned the Federal Constitution for its ‘monstrous usurpations of power, and undisguised repudiation of the Constitution,’ but they also declare that ‘while we regard the present war between these Confederate States and the United States as a huge crime whose beginning and continuance are justly chargeable to the government of our enemy, yet we do not hesitate to affirm that if our own government and the people of both governments would avoid all participation in the guilt of its continuance, it becomes all of them on all proper occasions and in all proper ways—the people acting through their State organizations and popular assemblies, and our government through its appropriate departments—to use their earnest efforts to put an end to this unnatural, unchristian and savage work of carnage and havoc. And to this end we earnestly recommend that our government immediately after signal successes of our arms, and on other occasions, where none can impute its action to alarm instead of a sincere desire for peace, shall make to the government of our enemy an official offer of peace on the basis of the great principle declared by our common fathers in 1776, accompanied by the distinct expression of willingness on our part to follow that principle to its true logical consequences.’ The resolutions concluded with the avowal that defensive [513] war must be sustained by all the resources of the State and ‘until the independence and nationality of the Confederate States is established upon a permanent and enduring basis’ These Georgia resolutions were in general accordance with a peace policy which had been constantly urged by Southern statesmen. They were designed to make an impression upon the Northern mind during the early stages of the presidential campaign which would affect the election so as to change the control of national affairs from the radical to the conservative element. The worthy object was held, however, throughout the South, to be doubtful of attainment. ‘The peace talk,’ said an influential paper, ‘is designed to help the Northern Democrats, but it is a great mistake. It helps Lincoln, as we shall see to our sorrow.’ About the same time resolutions of like import were considered in the North Carolina legislature, declaring that ‘formal negotiations for peace on the basis of separation from the United States, should be instituted,’ and further recommending that proposals from the Confederate authorities be made to the Federal Congress looking to the holding of a peace convention for the adjustment of difficulties whose action shall be subject to ratification by the people. Mr. Wright, of Georgia, introduced resolutions in the Confederate Congress which seemed necessary on account of a public utterance by President Lincoln that no proposition for peace had yet been made by the Confederate government The resolutions after referring to the statement declared that such propositions were prevented from being made by the President of the United States in that he refused to hear or to receive two commissioners appointed to treat expressly for the preservation of amicable relations between the two governments. Nevertheless, that the Confederate States may stand justified in the sight of the conservative men of the North of all parties, the resolutions proposed a meeting of representatives of all States to consider [514] whether an agreement can be entertained to recognize the Confederate States, and then the formation of a new government of all the States founded on the equality and sovereignty alike of all the States, but if this last object cannot be effected then an agreement to be made upon treaties, offensive, defensive and commercial between the two governments. Mr. Leach, of North Carolina, in May of the same year, offered other resolutions which recited that the administration at Washington had by legislation subverted the original Union, and that all the States should fall back upon the rights for which the Revolution had been fought. Upon this view his resolutions proposed that the delegates from each Southern State acting in sovereign and independent character appeal to the Confederate President to appoint commissioners to propose an armistice of ninety days, and report the answer received from the Federal government. If the armistice should be agreed to, the details of further negotiations were to be provided for through commissioners appointed by the States. Objection was raised that the resolutions provided for separate State action on a question constitutionally committed to the Confederate government. The general views expressed in the resolutions met with some favor but they were laid on the table by a decided vote of 62 yeas to 22 nays.

The United States Congress was not unaffected by these undercurrents of the peace movement. Prominent Northern leaders were saying, ‘Let commissioners be appointed without waiting for an armistice. Let negotiations begin.’ They were further urging that the illegal proclamations of Mr. Lincoln should be declared null and void. Mr. Long, of Ohio, boldly advocated a policy of peace which brought on his head the censure of the radical majority, and Harris, of Maryland, nearly shared the same distinction. The magnificent Voorhees exclaimed with burning eloquence that the baleful hand of political destructionists, who then unhappily possessed the [515] high seats of national authority, did not want peace. In a notable speech on the state of the Union in March, 1864, he charged that these destructionists ‘invoked the storm which had rained blood upon the land. They courted the whirlwind. They danced with hellish glee around the bubbling caldron of civil war. They welcomed with ferocious joy every hurtful mischief which flickered in its lurid and infernal flame.’ No Confederate oratory exceeded the vehemence with which the ‘War Power party’ was assailed by members of Congress who saw the peril of liberty amidst the fierce strife between the sections. The press also ventured to assail the ultraists in an occasional exercise of its guaranteed freedom, notwithstanding frequent suppressions by military orders.

In fact, the general situation through the first half of 1864 was exceedingly favorable to the institution of a policy which it would seem, in the light now shining on that eventful period, might have stopped the ‘carnage and havoc’ and re-introduced all States without dishonor of any into the enjoyment of ‘a more perfect union,’ than that from which they sought separation. The circumstances grew more and more auspicious even amidst the great battles between Lee and Grant until they culminated in July. Taking a view of the situation on the Fourth day of July, 1864, that day sacred to the patriotism of the whole country, it is seen that it might have been set apart for a conference between Grant, Sherman, Farragut, and Sheridan on behalf of the Northern army and navy, and Lee, Johnston, Buchanan and Forrest on behalf of the South. At that time Grant had reached the suburbs of Richmond but had paused to institute his siege. Sherman had passed Kenesaw mountain, and was on the northern side of the Chattahoochee. The blockade was practically effective along the entire Confederate coast, and the Western as well as the Trans-Mississippi States were debatable ground. Mr. Lincoln's proclamation [516] for 500,000 troops was ready to go before the country, and notwithstanding the discouragement on account of the prolongation of war the North showed no weakening in purpose to at least maintain the integrity of the Union. Even the so-called ‘Copperhead’ was as resolute on that point as the most vicious radical. The Southern side showed the army of Lee sustaining every assault and so far able to maintain the defense of Richmond against great odds as to permit the dispatching of Early and Breckinridge to drive Hunter from Lynchburg and to march to the Potomac where the Fourth of July found them ready to cross for the purpose of attacking Washington. Johnston had preserved his army and was crossing the Chattahoochee to defend Atlanta, at which point a concentration of State troops was contemplated. Kirby Smith, Taylor, Stephen D. Lee and Forrest were still in position to protect the West and even to advance northward if Sherman should be checked. The Confederacy was not yet exhausted and popular faith in success had not died out. The two great antagonists were thus confronted in July, 1864, with the possibilities of devastation, death and suffering such as only a civil war can cause, all of which were unhappily realized by the neglect of this opportunity to secure peace.

Even the political situation was in great degree favorable to an honest, patriotic effort at reconciliation. Only two conventions had been held, one of these representing the most irritating and vicious extremists of the North, who could be content with nothing except the degradation of the South at large by military subjugation, including the rape of its lands, the burglary of its homes, the murder of its leaders and the exile of its noble people. This mob which met on May 31st, put Fremont at their head, and their action only intensified the critical favorableness of the hour for patriotism to act. The other convention which met in June at Baltimore, a Southern city, had actually discarded the name of the party that [517] had inaurguated war and with at least a seeming desire to abandon sectionalism had assumed the title of ‘The National Union Party,’ although the platform certainly belied the name, and lacked the one plank for which North and South were yearning. It lacked the plain declaration that all the States could at once resume toward each other and toward the government their former co-equal relations, a distinct negativing of the policy of conquest and military reconstruction. On the contrary it emphasized subjugation by arms, and denounced with vigor any compromise with rebels or any offer to them of terms of peace except such as may be based on unconditional surrender. It even assumed the responsibility of endorsing all the war measures, notwithstanding the courts had in some form expressed judicial condemnation of them. Yet notwithstanding these flies in the pot of ointment the way to peace was not entirely closed. Mr. Lincoln on his first response to the nomination shrewdly avoided committing himself to the platform and in his formal letter merely said, ‘the resolutions of the convention, called the platform, are heartily approved.’ Doubtless he meant a full approval without subjecting himself to the iron-clad restraints of a document manifestly designed to catch the votes of extremists without losing the support of the ‘war democracy.’

Nearly two important months followed before the meeting of the third or Democratic convention, during which time the whole question of peace went under formal review.

The Southern aspect of the peace question at this juncture may now be considered. On account of information early in 1864 that there was a state of political feeling favorable to the terminatior of the war, a special commission was sent to Canada as a position where interviews might be held which could lead to an amicable settlement. Clay, of Alabama; Holcombe, of Virginia; and Thompson, of Mississippi, three among the most [518] eminent men of the South, constituted the committee on the part of the South, and selected Niagara Falls, on-the border, as the place where they might meet such Northern statesmen as would interest themselves in the cause of peace. Horace Greeley at that time devoted his great influence to the effort to gain peace together with a restored Union. His idea was that a frank interchange of views would bring the two parties to a state of complete reconciliation in which he certainly had at first the sympathy of Mr. Lincoln. But at an interesting juncture, propitious indeed for adjustment, President Lincoln withdrew his recognition of the friendly movement, causing by this withdrawal of his favor an unfortunate and deeply regretted failure.

The conference proposed to be held at Niagara Falls was of much greater significance than any peace movement of this important date. The action of the Confederacy in stationing the three eminent statesmen in a position where they could be easily reached betrayed a desire for conference whose purpose could not be mistaken. Mr. Greeley was well advised that this overture by Mr. Davis could be turned to advantage by meeting it fully, whatever the result. With great carefulness he protected himself against all charges of disloyalty to the Union, while with enthusiasm equally great he pressed Mr. Lincoln to sanction and foster the proposed interview. If the South was for peace they must abandon secession, if for independence they must expect subjugation. On this basis Mr. Greeley could not see any reason why the administration might not develop the Southern ultimatum. But the party managers became frightened. The opposition was preparing for the Chicago convention in August. After wavering a while the President called off the interview and the budding peace withered at the touch of political necessity.

The history of this Clifton House procedure for the settlement of the war, as it was told by the testimony of the [519] actors, warrants the strong expressions of regret at the. failure made by Mr. Greeley and the Southern commissioners. No peace movement appears to have so much embarrassed Mr. Lincoln's administration. Greeley had called the special attention of the President to the presence of these Southern gentlemen who were in the confidential employment of the Confederate government, and could at any time be invested with the authority to act on questions of peace. He declared that unless Mr. Lincoln met these commissioners ‘in the same spirit he would be held personally responsible by his countrymen and by posterity for every drop of blood that was thereafter shed and every dollar that was thereafter spent.’ Thus urged, the President requested Greeley to go quietly to Niagara Falls and find out what he could; a request which the great peacemaker eagerly accepted. Mr. George N. Sanders, a prominent politician of the Douglas school, was found to be at the Clifton House, from whom it appears the first communication was made July 12, 1864, to Mr. Greeley that Hon. Clement C. Clay, James P. Holcombe and George N. Sanders were ready to go to Washington if granted a safe passport. Mr. Greeley replied July 17th to the note of Mr. Sanders by addressing his letter to Clay, Jacob Thompson and Holcombe, and stating that he was informed they were ‘duly accredited from Richmond as the bearer of propositions looking to the establishment of peace,’ and tendering safe conduct. Immediately on receiving this communication Clay and Holcombe responded that they were not ‘duly accredited,’ as stated, but that they were authorized to declare that if the circumstances disclosed in the correspondence were communicated to Richmond, the credentials would be given either to themselves or that ‘other gentlemen clothed with full powers would be immediately sent to Washington to terminate at the earliest possible moment the calamities of the war.’ This important information that the specific authority to propose terms of peace had [520] not been conferred, but that full powers would be conferred at Richmond, was telegraphed by Mr. Greeley to Mr. Lincoln, with request for further instructions. The instructions were brought by Colonel Hay and were of such a nature that all negotiations were abruptly ended. Mr. Lincoln's letter on this grave matter in which the vast interests of the people of the North and South were greatly concerned, began with an inexcusable flippancy like the heading of an advertisement of strayed cattle. This official letter of the President, dated July 18th, from the executive mansion, to be brought by Colonel Hay for delivery through Mr. Greeley to gentlemen who would be accredited by the belligerent Confederacy to propose peace was addressed: ‘To whom it may concern.’ The body of the ‘instructions’ following this promiscuous superscription merely authorized safety passports to accredited persons bringing the unconditional surrender of the Confederate armies. The Confederate representatives, in indignation at receiving a paper so different from the safe conduct they expected, as accredited bearers of propositions looking to the establishment of peace, left on record, July 21st, their judgment concerning the “sudden and entire change in the views of the President and of his rude withdrawal of a courteous overture for negotiation at the moment it was likely to be accepted. Mr. Greeley's disappointment was severe. He at least, believed the moment had come when honest diplomacy would restore the Union, and expressed his regrets of ‘the sad termination of the steps taken for peace from the change made by the President in his instructions given him to convey commissioners to Washington for negotiations unconditionally.’ Mr. Lincoln chose to make no public statements, and the Confederate authorities had none to make except the fact that once more their attempts to approach the Washington administration had been thwarted. The issue the same day on which he signed the ‘To whom it may concern’ paper, of his [521] proclamation calling for 500,000 men for one year to be drafted after September 5th, if not furnished before, sufficiently explained the position of the administration.

A condition was now created which made the theory of ‘a Union as it was and a Constitution as it is,’ impracticable. The conditions existing in 1860 could not be restored by even the combined wisdom and power of all parties in both sections. Human events in their course create political relations wholly new. It was unfortunate for the cause of peace that party fortunes prevented the application of the truths of the times to the facts which had appeared. Reverence for constitutional restrictions on Federal power had fallen in the exigencies of war among the thieves who left it half dead. It was yet but half dead, and might have been restored, to life, but it was left on the wayside, where it still lies awaiting the coming of a patriotism which will displace the usurpations of the ‘higher law’ and enthrone constitutional law in the hearts of the American people. Slavery was also as much doomed in July, 1864, as it was at Appomattox in 1865. Neither peace and Union, nor peace and disunion, could have saved the institution. This fact had become so apparent to the Confederate leaders that they would have abolished slavery in order to secure independence. But the words which should have been bravely spoken from housetops on both sides at the risk of imprisonment, banishment and death, were whispered only in closets. Mr. Lincoln whispered union and Mr. Davis called for peace. But the two magnates supreme in the realm of influence stood before the public on only two terms: Mr. Lincoln said ‘Submission;’ Mr. Davis said ‘Independence.’ Probably neither meant all these two words implied. [522]

Chapter 23:

The critical situation.

Re-survey, military and political

McClellan

Lincoln

re-survey of the same period already considered will be taken in this chapter on account of the supremely important civil history made during the critical summer months of 1864. These four central months of May, June, July and August, were replete with events both military and political, by which the destiny of the Confederacy was determined. Grant began in May that military policy which appeared to his mind to be the sure winner in a long struggle. All through May and June he ‘hammered’ against Lee's lines and through July and August laid siege against Richmond with some desperate and unsuccessful assaults. Through the first three months Sherman crept after Johnston with a caution which evinced his esteem of that Southern general's reputation, and in September entered Atlanta, from which he drove the citizens and afterward burned their homes. The Confederate war ship ‘Alabama’ on June 19, 1864, fought the ‘Kearsarge,’ whose concealed armor resisted the guns of the Confederate vessel, and at the end of the daring duel the ‘Alabama’ went down, having made its name illustrious in naval story. Early and Breckinridge entered Maryland, defeated [523] Wallace at Monocacy on July 9, 1864, and formed line in sight of the national Capitol to the consternation of the administration. Admiral Farragut steamed into Mobile Bay with his fleet the first week of August, captured the Confederate ship ‘Tennessee,’ drove the other vessels up the river and reduced the forts but failed to take the city. Meanwhile Forrest in June put Sturgis to rout at Tishomingo Creek and Morgan re-entered Kentucky, while Price again marched into Missouri. Altogether the Confederacy was showing a wonderful amount of energy in the employment of its daily lessening resources. Mr. Lincoln felt and expressed in August his discouragement on account of the failure to secure any decided victories, and especially that Richmond was so successfully defended. He then turned for consolation to further enrollment of the negro slaves, and in his August interview with Judge Mills, of Wisconsin, he cried out: ‘Abandon all the posts now garrisoned by black men, take 200,000 men from our side and put them in the battlefield or cornfield against us and we would be compelled to abandon the war in three weeks!’ General Grant at this time built his expectations of success on the approaching exhaustion of Confederate fighting men. Writing from his headquarters to Washburne, August 16, 1864, he comforts the administration with these words: ‘The rebels have now in their ranks their last man. The little boys and old men are guarding prisoners, guarding railroad bridges and forming a good part of their garrisons for entrenched positions. A man lost by them cannot be replaced. They have robbed alike the cradle and the grave to get their present force. Besides what they lose in frequent skirmishes and battles, they are now losing from desertions and other causes at least one regiment per day. With this drain upon them the end is not far distant if we will only be true to ourselves.’ The letter of the great Union general was written to a great politician and was designed for political [524] use, but it makes some singular military confessions. With the immense resources of the Union to draw upon even by the pending draft the excited President pinned his own hope to the sleeve of uniformed colored troops, two hundred thousand strong. With the same resources at his unquestioned requisition and with great armies East and West obedient to his sole command, the lieutenant-general allows himself to be defeated for eight months after discovering that the small force in his own front was composed of the last men that could be armed, a force whose loss could not be replaced, and daily diminishing by desertions and other causes at the rate of a regiment per day. Supposing that Lee had 50,000 men in small regiments of 500 men each, his army at this rate of desertions and other causes would all be gone in one hundred days, or reckoning as General Grant meant, 1,000 men as a regiment all would be gone in fifty days. It is very plain that the statement was grossly erroneous. All these extraordinary statements, however, serve to show not only the extremity of the South at this period, but also the masterful management by Lee of the heroic armies under his command, and as well the fortitude of a people who contributed for their defense the fruits of the cradle and the withered leaves of the grave, as well as ‘the flower of their chivalry.’

The political campaign consentaneous with the military movement of this period, fairly opened on the last of May as heretofore mentioned, in a convention of the extreme radical part of the Republican party, held in Cleveland, Ohio, which in a brief platform declared in favor of the most ultra war measures, even to the immediate confiscation of Southern lands and a division of them among Federal soldiers. This, however, was not a new view, as confiscation had often been urged in Congress before, and as far as possible had been put in practice under the war power. Even General Sherman had written a recommendation of this measure as the surest way of [525] ending the rebellion. The convention merely repeated this old and strong appeal to the mercenary spirit and nominated very appropriately General John C. Fremont as their candidate, who, however, disappointed them at the beginning by dissenting from their confiscation policy, and in finally abandoning the canvass. Very marked opposition had been displayed to Mr. Lincoln's re-election by many who had been his supporters. Chase, as has been remarked, schemed for the succession. Dissatisfaction existing in New York had led to a public meeting in honor of Grant with an ulterior purpose of projecting his name upon the attention of the Union, which purpose met its defeat in Grant's open declaration for Lincoln. In fact, there was no one who stood so prominently forward as Lincoln, with whose candidacy the party in power had won its first victory, and this became evident even before the convention met.

On the 7th of June, 1864, the delegates to the Republican convention assembled in Baltimore according to the authorized call. The week immediately preceding had been employed in highly exciting military demonstrations, in the midst of which the delegates were assembling to consider the nomination of their party for the Presidency. Sherman was giving battle at New Hope church in Georgia and Grant was making his grand general assault on Lee's lines at Cold Harbor. Both generals received their punishment at the hands of the Confederate armies. Sherman recoiled from Johnston and once more glided around the flank of an army whose front he could not break. Grant made storming assaults until 12,737 of his brave men were put out of line, and the remainder stubbornly but wisely refused to charge again. ‘Another charge being ordered,’ says Swinton, ‘no man stirred, and the immobile lines pronounced a verdict silent yet emphatic against slaughter.’ To this date General Grant's losses for the campaign as stated footed up sixty thousand men. [526]

Under these conditions the convention met, and discarding its old name of Republican, called itself ‘Union,’ thus for the first time confessing to a yearning to be considered ‘National.’ The ‘Union National Convention;’—with this superscription the delegates from all parties enrolled their names, among whom were many of the most distinguished men of the nation. Several war governors were prominent among other eminent leaders, such as Cameron, Thaddeus Stevens, Dickinson, Grow, Dennison and Preston King. Delegates from the manipulated Southern States were after parley allowed to vote, except those from Virginia and Florida. The platform was composed of trenchant and defiant declarations against any terms of peace with the South except such as would be based upon an unconditional surrender, and it demanded also a vigorous prosecution of the war. The complete extirpation of slavery was of course to be effected, and the emancipation proclamation was adopted as the fixed policy of the party. Mr. Lincoln's measures were endorsed and the Monroe doctrine was thrown in as a hint to Maximilian in Mexico. The platform was so satisfactory to the extremists that it was adopted by acclamation and upon it Mr. Lincoln was nominated without dissent. The choice of a candidate for the vice-presidency resulted in the rejection of Daniel S. Dickinson, of New York, through the politicians of his own State, and the nomination of Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee. This nomination from a Southern State was urged on the ground that it would nationalize the Republican party, which in itself was a confession that the claim to the recently adopted name needed at least this shadowy support.

The platform and the nomination of Mr. Lincoln were expected by the South and the announcement of the event produced no special comment in Richmond. The Confederate Congress continued its legislation on the currency and the means of obtaining supplies. A bill [527] was passed allowing further time to persons within the enemy's lines to fund their treasury notes, which the President failed to approve. A new tax act was passed levying an additional one-tenth tax required by former acts to be paid in kind and confirming the impressment laws. Supplies necessary for the support of the producer and his family, and to carry on his ordinary business were exempted. The secretary of war was given the discretion to collect or not to collect the additional one-tenth in particular localities, and also the privilege of selling the products received under the act, to State officers for the use of the families of soldiers. Impressment of supplies was authorized to be made only by officers and agents appointed for the purpose. The Confederate Congress then adjourned, June 15th, to meet again in the following November.

The period so auspicious for truce and peace passed on into the meeting of the National Democratic party in Chicago, August 31, 1864, to formulate a platform and put out opposition candidates pledged to invite the Southern States to resume their former relations as far as the new conditions created by the war would permit. The time for the assembling of this convention had been first fixed for the Fourth of July but was wisely postponed in view of the pending efforts to secure peace. It now assembled after these efforts had failed and while new and gigantic measures were in progress to carry on the war. The general, central principle which this assembly seems to have desired to put in issue at the ballot box, was that the Southern States should have the option of reconstruction and resumption of their places in the Union on the old constitutional basis, or on refusing that they should be subjugated by war. The other side was already before the country upon the proposition that the South must first unconditionally surrender, must be subjugated and then reconstructed. Both parties [528] were for war to preserve the Union. The issue was on the mode of restoration.

The convention was called to order by August Belmont, chairman of the National Democratic convention. Governor Bigler, of Pennsylvania, was made temporary chairman, and Governor Seymour, of New York, was elected permanent president. Among the hundreds of distinguished statesmen who came as delegates were Tilden, Pendleton, Hunt, Guthrie, Stockton, S. S. Cox, Voorhees, Saulsbury, Vallandigham and Allen. The speeches of Governor Bigler and Governor Seymour before the great body surveyed the rise and progress of alienation between the sections, the efforts to keep the peace, the congressional battle for constitutional liberties, and the overthrow of the Constitution in the needless exercise of the war power by the administration. The platform began with a patriotic resolution of unswerving fidelity to the Union, which was followed by another containing the expression ‘that after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war,’ during which public liberty and private right had been trodden down and the Constitution disregarded in every part, immediate efforts should be made for a cessation of hostilities with a view to a convention of States or other means to restore peace on the basis of the Federal Union of the States. This resolution was drawn with care, but it contained one word on which the party was assailed with a success which proves how easily popular prejudices may be played upon. That word was ‘failure.’ ‘Four years of failure to restore the Union by war’ was a fact upon which it was proposed to try a conference of all the States as a means to restore the Union. But in the campaign which followed the party had to meet the charge that they had dishonored the brave armies of the Union by pronouncing all their valor and their blood ‘a failure.’ Certainly this was not in the letter or the spirit of the platform, and was disavowed by every [529] speaker on that side, nevertheless it went into the popular mind that the opposition had denounced the soldiery of the Union. The platform declared for an unimpaired Union and indicted the administration on all the grounds of usurpation which had become familiar by frequent use. The arraignment was startlingly terrible, and being true, justified secession before every popular tribunal in the world. These fearful counts in the accusation of this convention of eminent men against the administration were as follows: Usurpation of extraordinary and dangerous powers not granted by the Constitution; the subversion of the civil by military law in the faithful States; arbitrary military arrest, imprisonment, trial and sentence of American citizens in States where the civil law exists in full force; suppression of freedom of speech and of the press; denial of the right of asylum; open and avowed disregard of State rights; employment of unusual test oaths; interference with and denial of the right of the people to bear arms in their defense; direct interference of the military in elections and disregard of the Constitution in every part. This burning impeachment exceeded all the causes set forth by the Colonies in the Declaration of Independence to justify their rebellion against King George. They were deliberately published by a vast convention composed of men who were among the ablest and most conservative in the Union, and they were applauded in every State of the Union. The evidence to sustain every charge was at the command of these distinguished Northern men, all of whom were devotees of the Union and many of them actual soldiers in the army. The reading of the lurid lines so long after the restoration of the Union produces a shudder because it is thus made to appear that on the holiest of pleas the most tyrannical acts can be perpetrated in a republic as well as in a monarchy. The Confederate leaders said in 1860: ‘We fear that these things will be done.’ The most [530] patriotic of Northern men said in 1864: ‘They have been done.’

The convention nominated McClellan, a great soldier of unquestioned devotion to the Northern side of the secession question. He did not suit the Maryland delegation on account of certain military orders, but his unmistakable purpose to fight the South unless her States came back into the Union pleased the convention, and those Confederate leaders whose ultimatum was independence took no comfort from his nomination. If they had inclined to indulge a hope of success through McClellan one line in his letter of acceptance would have banished the illusion:—‘The Union must be preserved at all hazards.’ But there was one other remark in the same letter which drew the line sharply between McClellan and the party supporting Lincoln. That remark, full of wisdom, is in this language: ‘When any one State is willing to return to the Union it should be received at once with a full guarantee of all its constitutional rights.’ The utterance was wise, but it was dangerous to the Confederacy, for it avowed a policy which at that juncture might have had responses from some Confederate States or parts of States. It was patriotic and humane; but it beat the brave man who uttered it. It was not in line with the proposed radical reconstruction of the entire theory of constitutional government.

No one who candidly surveys the political field of the Confederate war period will fail to see that the Northern Democrats were compelled by their political interests and by their Union record to be the most incorrigible, unyielding opponents of permanent secession. The party record from the days of Jackson through the period of the Texas annexation, when their freesoil opponents were threatening to cause a New England secession, and through the days of the compromise of 1850, when the party alignment was on concession and conciliation, as against sectional obstinacy; and through the battles of [531] their chieftains against the sectional party of 1856, as they had fought the abolitionists because of their disunionism; and finally their stand for true Nationalism in 1860;—all this record made it certain that the Democracy of the North would not agree to separation—would agree to anything that was honorable, but would not consent to separation. It can be recalled in this connection that no Democratic editor nor statesman advised the government to ‘let the wayward sisters go in peace.’ Not in a single instance did one of their statesmen urge opposition to the measures of the radicals except on the main ground that they were rendering the restoration of the Union more and more difficult. The most vigorous appeals made during any Congress on behalf of legislation that would quickly bring back the seceded States came from Democratic members. Not even Mr. Vallandigham, who was banished South for denouncing the policy of the administration in public speech, ever uttered a word which signified his willingness to any terms which included the success of secession. On being thrust by a military Union guard against and across the military secession line, he surrendered himself as a prisoner, announcing to his captors unmistakably his determination to stand by the Union. General McClellan also, as the nominee of the Democratic party in 1864, just as clearly and forcibly declared that the war should proceed even to subjugation, unless the Southern States consented to cease hostilities and return to the Union under the protection of well-understood constitutional provisions. Some Southern leaders deceived themselves with the hope of such sympathy from the Democratic statesmen who withstood the encroachments of the executive and Congress upon the plea of ‘military necessity,’ as would help the South finally to a recognition of its independence; but the most careful search does not betray the Northern Democracy in any counsel or co-operation with the South at any time, in any scheme [532] to close the war by consenting to secession. The position of the Democrats was, in fact, the precise ground taken by Mr. Lincoln at the beginning of his administration and from which he receded under radical pressure. That position was ‘the Union without slavery, or with slavery —but the Union must not be dissolved.’ The leading proposition which they brought forward at various times during four years was that this single question be submitted in any feasible way to the Southern people—Are you resolved on attempting only one end, to establish an independent government? If the answer should be in the negative, the government would then hear the grievances which had caused secession, would redress every wrong, and disarm the spirit of disunion. If, on the contrary, a separate nation was proposed without regard to any adjustment of grievances, Democracy would oppose against it all the entire resources of the United States.

Confederate leaders were greatly influenced from the beginning of the trouble, by proper consideration for the position of the large majority at the North who like themselves opposed the sectional policy of the party which bore Mr. Lincoln into the presidency. It was the earnest desire of this vast Northern conservative element, as was evinced by hundreds of popular demonstrations, to have all hostilities averted with the hope that by lapse of time and mutual forbearance secession could be arrested and the Union preserved. There was undoubtedly very general sympathy at the South with this view of the situation, notwithstanding the fears of the radical aims of the new party. The same consideration for these Northern patriots caused the Confederate authorities to announce that their policy was defensive. The opposition to invasion of Maryland or attack on Washington immediately following the great Confederate victory at Bull Run, was based partly on this policy. Hesitation to cross the Potomac or the Ohio is attributed to the same desire not [533] to arouse the war spirit of the North. Mr. Stephens, the Vice-President, was decided in his views that the Confederacy should ally itself with the anti-Republicans and demonstrate a willingness to even reform the Union upon the basis of the Constitutional recognition of the sovereignty of States in matters purely domestic. The rapid development of the coercion and subjugation policies to which Mr. Lincoln yielded dissipated the early hope of reconciliation, and yet the overtures for adjustment were suggested from year to year at every favorable turn in the current of hostile encounter. The Confederate States had looked with eager concern upon the first political skirmishing of 1863 and 1864 preliminary to the great battle for the presidency of the United States. Settlement with a new administration was now believed to be feasible—with the existing administration impossible.

Within a week after the adjournment of the Chicago convention there were sufficient successes of the Federal forces in various places to be utilized for popular demonstrations which instantly and powerfully aided the canvass for Mr. Lincoln. Mr. Seward said, ‘Sherman and Farragut have knocked the planks out of the Chicago platform.’ President Lincoln also saw that it was advantageous on many accounts to issue a Thanksgiving proclamation. National salutes from military headquarters and navy yards were fired with a fervor which stirred the orators of the hustings. Reverses in the field, said Mr. Lincoln, will make our case doubtful, but with victory the election will take care of itself.

The political campaign grew to its highest heat very rapidly in September. During that month Confederate leaders were desirous to impress the Northern mind with the belief that McClellan's election would bring about a cessation of hostilities, and lead to some bloodless settlement of the disputes between the sections. That view was also urged by Northern speakers and editors who [534] supported McClellan upon their belief that the Southern States would willingly return to the Union on the defeat of the sectional party. Resolutions debated in State legislatures and public meetings encouraged that hopeful aspect of the question, particularly certain resolutions in Alabama, which declared in reference to the overtures of the Chicago convention that ‘if the aforesaid party is successful we are willing and ready to open negotiations for peace on the basis indicated in the platform adopted by said convention—our sister States of this Confederacy being willing thereto.’ In the Georgia legislature a series of resolutions offered by Linton Stephens defined very clearly the position of the South, and said, ‘We hail with gratification the just and sound sentiment coming from a large and growing party in the North that all associations of these American States must be voluntary and not forcible, and we give a hearty response to their proposition to suspend the conflict of arms and hold a convention of States to inaugurate a plan of permanent peace.’ In North Carolina a disposition to bring about peace through the encouragement of the conservatives of the North became apparent as the Presidential canvass proceeded. Mr. Boyce, in an open letter, urged that ‘the only political organization which proposes to intervene between us and the war party North is the party which adopted the Chicago platform. Now should we pursue a policy to build up that party or not? I think most decidedly we should. My great purpose is to break down the wall of fire which separates us from the influences of peace in the North. I have great faith that if Lincoln and his policy were once repudiated and negotiations for peace entered upon, that very moment we would approach nearer to an auspicious result.’ Vice-President Stephens zealously supported the policy that some decided and prominent action should be taken by the Confederate government toward meeting the overtures of the Chicago resolutions. His reasons were [535] that the conservatives of the North still outnumbered the radicals notwithstanding the prejudices created since the war commenced, and that it was expedient to let them know the reasonable terms on which the South was willing to stop the further shedding of fraternal blood. The only objection to these views was made that Southern overtures of any decided character would certainly be construed in the South as evidence that the Confederate government was despairing of success, which would discourage the armies, while they would also increase the growing confidence at the North that the rebellion was nearing its end. They would encourage the Northern war party. Therefore nothing was done of an official nature by the Confederate government. Perhaps nothing could have been attempted. President Davis and other Confederate leaders had already openly signified their preference for the success of McClellan on the ground that peace on proper terms could be secured if a change of administration at Washington should take place. This was as far, they thought, as prudence would permit them to go. Herschell V. Johnson, who had been the candidate for Vice-President of the United States with Stephen A. Douglas for President, entered with sympathetic earnestness into the policy of co-operation with the Chicago convention, but declared his conviction that any movement proceeding from the South ‘would be regarded as our confession of overthrow, and the pre. monitory symptoms of our readiness to sue for mercy on the bended knees of unconditional surrender. We have avowed our desire for peace and our readiness for negotiations from the very beginning of the war, in every form in which organized communities can give expression to their will. We have avowed it in executive messages, in legislative resolves and congressional manifestations. What more can we do in our situation? * * * In view of the avowed object of the war on the part of the Northern Government it is very certain that there can be no peace [536] upon any honorable terms so long as its present rulers are in power. * * * Subjugation is no worse than the submission offered to us as the only condition of peace. It would at least save us our honor.’ Alluding to the possibility of the election of McClellan he said that ‘it will bring the two contending parties together face to face in the arena of reason and consultation. Then and there can be discussed the history of all our difficulties, the principles involved in the bloody issue, and the respective interests of both governments. Such is my conviction of the omnipotence of truth and right that I feel an abiding confidence that an honorable peace would ultimately spring from such deliberations. * * * I would not be understood as standing on any point of etiquette as to who should take the initiative. All I mean to say is that in view of the avowed policy of the United States government any advance on our part is already rejected before made and that we cannot make any upon the conditions announced by its President. I would not hesitate to take the initiative if there was the least hope of a favorable response or an honorable result. Such I believe to be the temper of our people. Such I am satisfied is the sentiment of the President of the Confederate States. He has avowed it on every occasion which required him to allude to the subject.’

It must be kept clearly in mind that Mr. Stephens and others who associated with him in urging the Confederate administration to initiate during this canvass a movement to assemble an independent Congress or convention of all the several States immediately after the election of McClellan, entertained no design of abandoning the Confederacy. On the contrary they urged with emphasis that the success of the peace party at the North would secure the independence of the South or a reorganization of the Union, which would “secure peace on this continent for ages to come. ‘In every view I can take of the subject,’ said Mr. Stephens, ‘I regard the success [537] of the State Rights party at the North of the utmost importance to us. With these views you readily perceive how I regarded the action of the Chicago convention as a “ray of light,” the first ray of real light I had seen from the North since the war began. * * * The issue of this war, in my judgment, was subjugation of independence. I so understood it when the State of Georgia seceded, and it was with a full consciousness of this fact with all its responsibilities, sacrifices and perils, that I pledged myself then and there to stand by her and her fortunes whatever they might be in the course she had adopted.’

But the South was as unable to relax the political grasp of the administration as it now was to resist the great military resources which were pressing it toward inevitable defeat. The elections went on with the usual incidents of a presidential campaign, but also with the additional circumstance that the military began now to be made useful in their management of elections to high civil office. The newly constructed governments of Tennessee and Kentucky found that they had been formed for special political purposes and the Federal military were on duty to see that the ballots were cast to suit. The army vote itself was given almost unanimously for Lincoln, and while in New Hampshire, Connecticut, New York, Deleware, Oregon, New Jersey, Maryland and Pennsylvania the vote was close it yet appeared in the final count that Lincoln had carried all Northern States except New Jersey, together with the votes of Missouri and West Virginia, which were plundered for the occasion. The peace party thus went down in overwhelming disaster. [538]

Chapter 24:

The last stages of the struggle.

Confederate Congress, November, 1864

Congress

in this state of affairs the Confederate Congress met in Richmond November 7, 1864, for its last session. The message of President Davis treated especially on the general state of the war, the employment of negroes in the army and negotiations for peace. The message said on the negro question, that the employment of slaves with the army as teamsters or cooks or in the way of work on fortifications, or in the government workshops, or in hospitals or other similar duties was authorized by the act of February 7th last, and that provision was made for their impressment to a number not exceeding twenty thousand if it should be found impracticable to obtain them by contract with the owners. The law contemplated the hiring only of the labor of these slaves and imposed on the government the liability to pay for the value of such as might be lost to the owners from casualties resulting from their employment in the service. This act had produced less results than was anticipated, and further provision was required to render it efficacious. ‘But my present purpose,’ said the President, ‘is to invite your consideration to a radical modification in the theory of the law.’ The modification referred to was explained to consist in the view that the slave bore the relation of a person to the State, while under the Confederate as well as the United [539] States law he was viewed also as property subject to impressment. On account of this relation and because many questions arising under the existing law which authorized contracts and impressments for short terms the President suggested that the government acquire by purchase the entire property in the labor of the slave. ‘Whenever the entire property,’ says the message, ‘in the service of a slave is thus acquired by the government, the question is presented. By what tenure should he be held? Should he be retained in servitude or should his emancipation be held out to him as a reward for faithful service, or should it be granted at once on the promise of such service?’ The policy of engaging to liberate the negro on his discharge after service faithfully rendered seemed to the President preferable to that of granting immediate manumission or to that of retaining him in servitude. An enlargement of negro enrollment on this plan to forty thousand in the number of negroes to be used for specified purposes and additions to the duties already performed by them of service as pioneers and engineer laborers was regarded by President Davis as desirable. The President carefully distinguished between employing negroes in defense of the homes where they were reared and the inciting the same negroes to insurrection and murder. He regarded it as justifiable if it became necessary to organize the negroes to repel the invasion of the country in which they lived, and that their freedom would be justly won by such employment of their services. On the other hand the incitement of negroes to insurrection was iniquitous and unworthy of a civilized people. ‘Such is the judgment of all writers on public law as well as that insisted on by our enemies in all wars prior to that now waged against us. By none have the practices of which they are now guilty been denounced with greater severity than by themselves in the two wars with Great Britain in the last and in the present century; and in the Declaration of Independence of 1776 when enumeration was made [540] of the wrongs which justified the revolt from Great Britain, the climax of atrocity was deemed to be reached only when the English monarch was denounced as having incited domestic insurrection against us.’ President Davis did not favor any general arming of the slaves for the duty of soldiers. The white man of the South who was accustomed to bear arms should be in the army and the negro accustomed to labor should be employed in that species of service. ‘But,’ said he, ‘should the alternative ever be presented of subjugation or the employment of the slave as a soldier there seems no reason to doubt what should then be our decision.’

Mr. Davis made a further remark in this message of November, 1864, which exhibits the trend of his own thoughts and the views of others like himself who were then contemplating the possibility that slavery would finally be discontinued. Referring to the freedom that could thus be acquired through military service by at least forty thousand able-bodied young negro men, he said:

‘The social and political question which is exclusively under the control of the several States has a far wider and more enduring importance than that of pecuniary interests. In its manifold phase it embraces the stability of our republican institutions, resting on the actual political equality of all citizens, and includes the fulfillment of the task which has been so happily begun, that of Christianizing and improving the condition of the Africans who have by the will of Providence been placed in our charge. Comparing the results of our own experience with those of the experience of others who have borne similar relations to the African race, the people of the several States of the Confederacy have abundant reason to be satisfied with the past and use the greatest circumspection in determining their course.’

Congress proceeded to legislate so as to remove the evils of exemptions and details; also to authorize and regulate sequestration and to provide for raising revenue by direct [541] taxation. The existing tax laws on incomes and salaries were continued in force. Strong independence resolutions were unanimously passed, and a bill, apparently unnecessary, defined and provided for the punishment of conspiracy against the Confederate States. Nothing definite was done in making effective the employment of negroes.

The subject of negotiations for peace engrossed the attention of Congress, to a large degree, excluding other discussions. The President said in his message that ‘the disposition of this government for a peaceful solution of the issues which the enemy has referred to the arbitration of arms has been too often manifested and is too well known to need new assurances. But while it is true that individuals and parties in the United States have indicated a desire to substitute reason for force and by negotiation to stop the further sacrifice of human life and to arrest the calamities which now afflict both countries, the authorities who control the government of our enemies have too often and too clearly expressed their resolution to make no peace except on terms of our unconditional submission and degradation, to leave us any hope of the cessation of hostilities until the delusion of their ability to conquer us is dispelled. * * * Peace is manifestly impossible unless desired by both parties to this war, and the disposition for it among our enemies will be best and most certainly evoked by the demonstration on our part of ability and unshaken purpose to defend our rights and to hold no earthly price too dear for their purchase. Whenever there shall be on the part of our enemies a desire for peace there will be no difficulty in finding means by which negotiations can be opened, but it is obvious that no agency can be called into action until this desire shall be mutual. When that contingency shall happen, the government to which is confided the treaty making power can be at no loss for means adapted for accomplishing so desirable an end. In the hope that the day will soon be reached when under Divine favor these States [542] may be allowed to enter on their former peaceful pursuits and to develop the abundant natural resources with which they are blessed, let us then resolutely continue to devote our united and unimpaired energies to the defense of our homes, our lives and our liberties. This is the true path to peace. Let us tread it with confidence in the assured result.’ [543]

Chapter XXV

The last Great peace efforts.

Mission of Mr. Blair

Davis

Lincoln

Blair

among all the efforts to bring the leaders of the two governments together so as to have a consultation, none excited more hope than the informal undertaking by the venerable Francis P. Blair, of Maryland. During the latter part of December, 1864, he proposed in confidential conversations with his friends to go to Richmond and see Mr. Davis, whom he had long known, and there initiate a movement by which the armies of Grant and Lee would cease fighting each other and march together against the French emperor of Mexico. On the 28th of December this venerable and patriotic enthusiast obtained from President Lincoln a brief pass to ‘go South and return.’ Two days later President Davis received his request to be permitted to visit Richmond, which was at once granted, but for some unexplained reason the letter of the Confederate President was delayed in Washington, though at last delivered after having been opened. Failing after two efforts to see President Lincoln before leaving for the South Mr. Blair proceeded to Richmond and held a confidential interview with President Davis on the 12th of January, 1865. The Confederate President received his distinguished visitor with cordiality as an old acquaintance and also with the consideration due the great mission on which he had volunteered. Mr. Blair had come only as a private gentleman, with neither [544] credentials nor instructions, merely proposing to present a plan of his own, the chief feature of which was to make a diversion which would result in peace and reunion by turning the two armies against the Emperor Maximilian in assertion of the Monroe doctrine which was popular South and North. In addition to the unfolding of this plan of peace he replied to a question of Mr. Davis by stating that he had no assurance that President Lincoln would receive commissioners from the Southern States, but offered his opinion that he would do so at this juncture. The Confidential interview was protracted until a thorough comprehension of the mission was obtained by President Davis, and it was closed by his writing the following significant letter at once, which he submitted to Mr. Blair and signed. It will be read with interest as manifesting the mind of the Confederate President at that time, as showing his disposition to make peace, and as exhibiting his carefulness in the use of words so as to avoid giving offense. One phrase only seemed to imply independence as his ultimatum. That was the expression: ‘The two countries.’ The following is the letter addressed to Mr. Blair:

Richmond, Va., January 12, 1865.

Sir: I have deemed it proper and probably desirable to you to give you in this form the substance of remarks made by me to be repeated by you to President Lincoln.

I have no disposition to find obstacles in forms and am willing now as heretofore to enter into negotiations for the restoration of peace; and am ready to send a commission whenever I have reason to suppose it will be received, or to receive a commission if the United States govern-. ment shall choose to send one. That, notwithstanding the rejection of our former offers, I would, if you could promise that a commissioner, minister, or other agent, would be received, appoint one immediately, and renew [545] the effort to enter into conference with the view to secure peace to the two countries.

Jefferson Davis.

With this important letter Mr. Blair returned to Washington, and showing it to President Lincoln, obtained from him a communication designed to be read by the Confederate President. This letter, also addressed to Mr. Blair, and dated at Washington, January 18, 1865, was as follows:

Sir: You having shown me Mr. Davis' letter to you of the 12th instant, you may say to him that I have constantly been, am now and shall continue ready to receive any agent whom he or any other influential person now resisting the national authority may informally send to me with the view of securing peace to the people of our one common country.

Abraham Lincoln.

Thus far the preliminaries seemed to gratify Mr. Blair, ‘It was well you wrote me that letter,’ he said to Mr. Davis when he reached Richmond, on his second visit bearing the letter from Mr. Lincoln, and on which action was taken at once notwithstanding its careful avoidance of all recognition of Confederate States officials, its characterization of the Confederate President as simply one of a number of ‘influential persons engaged in resisting the national authority,’ and its plain foil of the intimation of Mr. Davis that there were two countries.

What prevented the success of this mission? President Davis thought that during Blair's stay in Richmond he discovered more than ought to have been known abroad concerning the weakness of the Confederacy, and the anxiety for peace which disturbed men's minds. His visits excited great interest and great hopes in Richmond. His high character, his Southern blood, his sage-like appearance, his supposed influence at Washington, all contributed to make him and his objects deeply interesting [546] to the prominent leaders of the Confederacy. It does not appear, however, in any way, that Mr. Blair sought or took advantage of the courtesies which he received. His visits, however, did indeed encourage the hope that subjugation with military force could be averted, a result which was generally regarded as a calamity to be followed by the total overthrow of all liberties.

Looking into Washington at the same period for insight into influences employed against this mission, there appeared two movements—one in Congress and the other from without—which obstructed the pending negotiations. That which occurred in Congress and so fully described in the work of the Hon. S. S. Cox, ‘Three Decades in Federal Legislation;’ was the sudden resurrection, January 6, 1865, of the Thirteenth amendment to the Constitution which had been slumbering on the table since the last Presidential campaign. Mr. Cox says of this amendment that ‘it was a part of the program for strengthening the Federal cause. Mr. Seward and the President considered it worth an army. Whether they were right or not the amendment was not pressed until just before the negotiations at Hampton Roads.’ It was bruited around Washington about the first of January that Blair was entertaining the President with a scheme by which it was proposed to terminate the awful strife of North and South by negotiations with the ‘insurgents.’ It was time, therefore, to interpose some obstacle which would make the Confederacy unwilling to negotiate. The Thirteenth amendment would accomplish the purpose. It was therefore called up, and pressed with vehemence while the great peace mission of Mr. Blair was pending, and was yet more warmly urged when the commissioners from President Davis were actually seeking access to the President of the Union. Mr. Pendleton, Mr. Voorhees, and other statesmen, opposed the amendment because they doubted its constitutionality. Mr. Cox opposed its consideration then as being inopportune. The rumor [547] was abroad, said he, that ‘a commissioner of the United States was then in Richmond (Mr. Blair) with the confidence and assent of the administration to meet a commissioner on the part of the Confederate authority, and that they had agreed to call a national convention in correspondence with the Chicago platform.’ Mr. Cox did not doubt the power to make this amendment, but he urged with great force the impropriety of raising this impediment to peace. Said he: ‘So long as there is a faint hope of a returning Union I will not place obstacles in the path. I would rather illuminate, cheer and clear the pathway to the old homestead. All I do and all I forbear to do is to save our imperiled government and restore our priceless Union. Show me that, and I will vote for your amendment. But, as it stands to-day, I believe that this amendment may be an obstacle to the rehabilitation of the States.’

This debate went on while Mr. Blair was prosecuting his plan of negotiations. He had returned to President Davis, delivered to him the letter of President Lincoln and on the 18th of January was again in Washington. Immediately after he left, President Davis called Vice-President Stephens into his counsel, informed him concerning all that had passed, and having his concurrence as to the main fact that a commission should be sent to Washington, appointed as that commission Mr. Stephens, Mr. Campbell and Mr. Hunter. These gentlemen proceeded at once on their embassy and reached the headquarters of General Grant on the day that the decisive hour arrived on which the amendment was pressed to vote.

‘Every radical was in his seat and for the amendment.’ The majority favored its passage. But a minority insisted that it was designed to defeat, and would defeat, the peace which Confederate commissioners were at that moment seeking. It is strangely true that at that hour ‘high officials stated that no further negotiations were possible; that so Mr. Blair had reported, who had just [548] come from Richmond.’ The President's private secretary declared that he knew of no such commission. The President himself wrote a note, January 31, 1865, to Mr. Ashley, the mover of the amendment, that he knew ‘of no such commission or negotiation.’ Mr. Cox excused these singular declarations from high quarters, but was so well convinced that they were mistaken as to cast his vote against the amendment which in his opinion was perilous to peace. ‘It was an obstacle, as it turned out,’ he says, ‘notwithstanding Mr. Seward's belief that it was an aid.’ It is to be noted as a significant circumstance that the amendment passed while General Grant was detaining the commissioners by special instructions from Washington, that it was promptly approved, that the interview of the commissioners was then allowed, and that they were quickly confronted with the embarrassing information that this amendment to abolish slavery had passed. Even that, however, did not drive them back to Richmond.

Another influence which contributed to blight the budding promise of the flower of peace, was the anxious gathering of partisans at Washington to prevent such a collapse of war. One of these obstructionists, Mr. Henry Ward Beecher, was a fair representative of that class of radicals who were in perpetual dread lest the goodness of Mr. Lincoln would in some way be the undoing of their cause. He came and thus tells his own story: He had been in England and returned in 1864 to find that ‘there was some talk,’ as he says, ‘of compromise with the South. Mr. Blair had told the President that he was satisfied if he could be put in communication with some of the leading men of the South, in some way or other, that some benefit would accrue. Lincoln had sent a delegate to meet Alexander Stephens and that was all the North knew. We were all very much excited over that,’ said Mr. Beecher. ‘The war had lasted so long, and I was [549] afraid Lincoln would be anxious for peace, and I was afraid he would accept something that would be of advantage to the South, so I went to Washington and called upon him. I said to him, “ Mr. Lincoln, I come to know whether the public interest will permit you to explain to me what this Southern commission means.” He went to his little secretary, and came out and handed me a little card as long as my finger and an inch wide, and on that was written, “You will pass the bearer through the lines. A. Lincoln.” “ There, ” he said, “ that is all there is of it. Now, Blair thinks something can be done, but I don't, but I have no objection to have him try his hand. He has no authority whatever but to go and see what he can do.” ’

All efforts to restrain Mr. Blair, or to prevent the Confederate President from making another attempt at negotiation, entirely failed. Notwithstanding all disadvantages he appointed a commission from which resulted the Hampton Roads conference, as history designates the informal conversation between the Confederate commissioners, as heretofore named, on the one part, and President Lincoln and Mr. Seward on the other part, which was held on board a United States steamer in Hampton Roads, February, 1865. It will be seen on review of the entire history of the event that the United States carefully and firmly held all advantages in the conference while admitting the commissioners to an interview. This is made evident by the following facts: It appears that Mr. Blair left Washington for Richmond without the privilege of a final conversation with the President which might give color to any rumor that he went by authority. Without credentials or instructions his visit to Richmond was to present his own plan, gain knowledge of the mind of Mr. Davis, ascertain the temper of Confederate leaders, and to close his work without committing Mr. Lincoln to anything whatever. The letters to himself which he procured from President Davis first, and next from President Lincoln, were dangerous. [550] documents, but the Federal President wrote briefly, avoiding the slightest reference to Mr. Davis as an official, and only noticing his letter as coming from an influential insurgent. So far as receiving an agent was concerned it was of no consequence to the Federal President whether he came from President Davis or any other influential person engaged in resisting the Federal authority. He was even so particular as to rebuke the harmless words, ‘two countries,’ as used by the Confederate President, and to require Mr. Blair to bear witness to that particular fact. After the three ‘influential persons’ appointed as Confederate commissioners were on the way towards Washington, he also so far ignored their business as to declare on January 31st, that he knew of ‘no commission and no negotiations,’ evidently meaning that he did not look upon them as the commissioners of any government. The interchange of official telegrams between the civil and the military authorities from January 29th further show an absurd continuance of all this trivial caution, while the modes adopted to let these ‘persons’ come on without their presence having any significance, were too puerile to have so seriously engaged the attention of the secretary of state and the secretary of war who had contrived them. Then again, in further purpose to allow no possible equality in the conference to be considered, and no official character to exist, the influential trio were first to be interviewed and their dignity lessened by a mere messenger from the President. They were then required to say to this messenger in writing that they were coming only to have an informal colloquy, and finally to signify, before they could get any further, that they fully understood the ultimatum of President Lincoln. The commissioners had expected to go to Washington, as Mr. Blair had been to Richmond, but they were met aboard a United States steamer with no one to hear them but President Lincoln and Mr. Seward, his secretary of state. Keeping in view these circumstances under which the [551] Confederate States President sought for peace, the detailed account of the famous Hampton Roads conference will be interesting.

The following events re-stated with their dates will show the progress of this peace movement and assist in understanding it: On December 28th, the pass of President Lincoln was delivered to Mr. Blair; December 30th, President Davis received Mr. Blair's request to visit Richmond, which was immediately granted; January 12, 1865, the first interview between Davis and Blair took place, at the conclusion of which the letter already quoted was written; January 18th, the letter of Lincoln to Blair, written to be read by Davis, was delivered, with which the peacemaker went back to Richmond; January 21st, the second conference took place between Blair and Davis, after which Blair returned to Washington. Davis consulted Stephens, and the three commissioners, Stephens, Campbell and Hunter were appointed. The commission or certificate of appointment signed by Mr. Davis for the guidance of these statesmen read simply that ‘in conformity with the letter of Mr. Lincoln of which the foregoing is a copy, you are requested to proceed to Washington City for an informal conference with him upon the issues involved in the existing war, and for the purpose of securing peace to the two countries.’ The use of the words ‘two countries’ instead of ‘two governments’ was discreetly and delicately made by the Confederate President in avoidance of any question which might be raised by the Washington administration, the ‘country’ being a region, a territory, a people and their institutions, while a ‘government’ is a body politic, governed by one authority. In fact the point was considered by the United States officials and fully waived. Rumor went out after the fall of the Confederacy and continued afloat for many years, notwithstanding its refutation, that the commissioners were trammeled by imperative instructions which required them to treat only on the basis of [552] independence, and that in consequence of these instructions their mission failed. This rumor had its origin in the disappointments and sufferings which followed the dissolution of the Confederacy, but afterward was used in justification of the action of the United States authorities at Hampton Roads, and in derogation of the character of President Davis. The certificate, however, as Mr. Davis calls it, contained nothing more than is above quoted, and aside from what is there written no instructions were given. On this question Mr. Stephens says: ‘The reports were utterly unworthy of notice. * * * We had no written instructions upon that subject, or any other except what were contained in the letter of appointment, nor any verbal instructions on that subject inconsistent with the terms of that letter.’ With considerable emphasis Mr. Stephens repeated the statements contained in his ‘War Between the States’ through a public letter in 1874, saying again ‘there were no instructions whatever given by Mr. Davis to the commissioners as to the terms on which they should agree to treat upon the subject of peace.’ The report of the commissioners explains fully why their efforts failed, and each has with some indignation resented the imputation on their judgment in accepting a trust with conditions which, as alleged, barred its execution. In President Lincoln's brief explanation to Congress of the conference, he remarks that it was not said by the other party that in any event or any condition they ever would consent to reunion, and ‘yet they equally omitted to declare that they never would so consent.’ This omission itself entirely refutes the rumor and no declarations of President Davis were needed to show that such terms were included in this remarkable commission which was entrusted to three eminently wise, discreet and patriotic men. As became his office, the Confederate President certainly desired, even passionately, to secure the success of the secession ordained by the States. Independence out of the Union because their [553] constitutional equality in it was imperiled was the simple object aimed at in the formation of the Confederacy, to attain which all energies were directed. Even in January, 1865, this object was not considered by Mr. Davis, Mr. Stephens and the large majority of the Confederate Congress, as unattainable. Neither the army nor the citizens of the South were ready for unconditional submission and they would have been astounded by any instructions to the commissioners to surrender without terms before striking another blow for independence. Mr. Davis says in a public letter in reference to his sense of official responsibility, ‘I do not know how any one could have expected me, under the trust which I held from the people of the Confederate States, to propose to surrender at discretion the rights and liberties for which the best and bravest of the land were still gallantly struggling, and for which so many had nobly died.’ The testimony clearly disposes of the rumor concerning instructions, and after this examination of it a further view of events may be taken of the history of the Hampton Roads conference.

On the 29th of January the commissioners, having reached that part of the Federal front which was occupied by the Ninth army corps, made their presence and business known with request to cross the lines at once on their way to Washington. After passing the military channel of communication their note reached the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, and the same day was at once referred to President Lincoln, and at the same time General Ord, commanding at the front during General Grant's temporary absence, was directed by the secretary of war not to allow the commissioners to enter the lines unless by instructions from the President. On January 30th President Lincoln telegraphed General Ord, through Secretary Stanton, to inform the ‘three gentlemen, Messrs. Stephens, Hunter and Campbell, that a messenger will be dispatched to them at or near where they now are [554] without unnecessary delay.’ The messenger to be sent was Major Thomas T. Eckert, who was given very precise instructions to first secure from the commissioners an agreement in writing that if they are allowed to pass through the United States military lines it will be understood that they do so for the purpose of an informal conference on the basis of the letter dated January 18th, of Mr. Lincoln to Mr. Blair. General Grant, however, had returned to the army and had received direct another application on January 30th, by the commissioners to pass his lines under safe conduct, and without waiting for directions from Washington directed them to be received at his headquarters and await instructions. This unexpected action caused President Lincoln to telegraph to Grant to detain the gentlemen in comfortable quarters, and meanwhile Major Eckert reached him with a special dispatch to have an interview secured between himself and the Confederate commissioners. Mr. Seward followed on the 31st, bearing explicit instructions from the President to make known to them that three things are indispensable, to-wit: (1) the restoration of the national authority throughout all the States; (2). no receding by the executive of the United States on the slavery question from the position assumed thereon in the late annual message to Congress; (3) no cessation of hostilities short of an end of the war, and the disbanding of all forces hostile to the government. They were to be informed that all propositions of theirs not inconsistent with the above would be considered and passed in a spirit of sincere liberality, but Mr. Seward was commanded not to definitely consummate anything. This letter of instructions was given on the afternoon of January 31st, at the time when the Thirteenth amendment was on its passage in Congress, and it was followed early next morning, February 1st, by a telegram to Grant from Lincoln—‘Let nothing which is transpiring change, hinder or delay your military movements or plans.’ Another dispatch of the same date required [555] Major Eckert to place himself under direction of Mr. Seward, who reached Fortress Monroe on the evening of that day. Major Eckert had already communicated with the commissioners the terms on which they might remain within the lines on their mission, but Mr. Stephens and his associates regarded this reception of their overtures as designedly contrived to embarrass if not to humiliate them. They placed their case again directly before General Grant, who checked the President in a resolution hastily formed to recall Seward with Eckert, by a telegram on the night of February 1st, in which he informed the President of his fear that the return of the commissioners without a hearing would have a bad influence; that he was satisfied of their good intentions and their sincere desire to restore peace and union, and he suggested an interview between them and Lincoln himself. This dispatch of General Grant changed the President's purpose, and the commissioners having further considered their situation signed the terms prescribed for their admission to the conference. The President resolving now to be present in person at the conference came to Hampton Roads where he joined Secretary Seward on the night of the 2nd and next day received the commissioners on board a steamer.

The conference took place February 3, 1865, to the result of which two countries at least were looking with great solicitude, but the history of what was said and done can be gathered alone from the earliest accounts of it given carefully to the world by all the five great actors; since by agreement not a line was written in the conference room nor a witness admitted to be present. The distinguished parties themselves have all spoken and from these sources the record is made. It appears that the first words bearing on the objects of the meeting were uttered by Mr. Stephens in the form of a question addressed to President Lincoln, whether there was any way to put an end to the present trouble. To this broad [556] and significant inquiry the President at once replied that there was but one way that he knew of and that was for those who were resisting the laws of the Union to cease that resistance. But Mr. Stephens sought again to know if there was no plan on which existing hostilities might cease and the attention of both parties be turned from the questions involved in the strife and diverted to some great common aim which might lead to the restoration of the Union.

The evident allusion of the second question to the plan of Mr. Blair to divert the two armies into an invasion of Mexico, which the Confederate commissioners themselves did not favor, brought from the President a distinct disavowal of having given Mr. Blair an authority to speak for him and an earnest declaration that he could entertain no proposition for ceasing active military operations which was not based upon a pledge first given for the ultimate restoration of the Union. The Confederate commissioners had not expected such an immediate and flat statement, and were without authority or inclination to give a pledge unaccompanied with any understanding whatever as to the course the United States would pursue toward the States and the people of the South in respect to their lives, property and local government. Judge Campbell therefore interposed at this point with a direct inquiry as to the plan on which the reestablishment of national authority would take place in the event the South agreed to the general terms as stated by Mr. Lincoln, thus presenting a question which the commissioners had previously considered as one to be asked, provided the armistice should be refused. It was, in fact, the precise pivot on which the issue could be made to turn toward peace with a Union promptly restored, or war with distraction long continued. It was reasonable beyond all question that these three eminent statesmen should have the fair, explicit and reliable answer from President Lincoln:—that secession be abandoned, that [557] the Thirteenth amendment be added to the Constitution, or at least be fairly voted upon by all the States; that the Federal civil authority be completely restored in all respects everywhere; that the seceded States repeal for legal reasons the ordinances of secession and resume fully by their own immediate action their constitutional relations in the Union; that general amnesty be proclaimed and all minor legal questions be remanded to the judiciary for adjustment. Whether these terms would have been agreed to so that they could have been satisfactorily executed is not known, yet if they had been sincerely agreed on and honorably carried out by the rapid method of State conventions, the political as well as the military disturbances between the sections would have ended within a few months. But they were not offered.

Upon several of these questions intimations were made which very nearly approached all that the Confederate commissioners could have demanded. As to the abandonment of secession that was positively required by the President. The ratification by the States of the Thirteenth amendment was taken into discussion during which the President with caution expressed an individual willingness on his own part to be taxed to remunerate the Southern people for their slaves and that he should be in favor individually of the government paying a fair indemnity for the loss to the owners. He knew of some persons who favored an appropriation of four hundred millions for that purpose. But he declared that he would give no assurance and make no stipulation. Mr. Seward accepted this general intimation of the President that the Northern people would be willing to pay about the amount as an indemnity to the owners of emancipated slaves, which would be required to continue the war. To this extent and no farther went even the hint of compensated emancipation. There was no offer either express or implied by the President and his secretary of state to guarantee such a result, and the commissioners understood [558] the intimation as a vague suggestion on which they could base no proposition. Their action was accordingly unaffected by it, nor were they trammeled in any degree by instructions which prevented their consideration of it. The abolition of slavery they clearly understood to be one of the terms of peace, especially since Congress had at this particular juncture passed the necessary amendment to enforce the emancipation proclamation, from which Mr. Lincoln plainly stated he would not recede; but they were not invited to trust that negro property would be paid for upon the abandonment of secession. No part of the accounts given by any of the parties to the Hampton Roads conference authorized this view.

But still more important to the South and the Union itself than slaves or their value was the question of the status of the States and people of the States upon surrender by negotiation. What position would the States of the South occupy on their abandonment of secession? To what extent would the Federal majority assume the attitude of a conqueror? To this vital question the President answered as to his own opinion the States would be restored to their practical relations to the Union, but said emphatically he could not enter into any stipulations upon the subject, and in reply to the urgency of Mr. Stephens on this matter ‘persisted in asserting that he could not enter into any agreement upon this subject or upon any other matters of that sort with parties in arms against the government.’ Mr. Stephens still insisted that if the President could issue a proclamation of emancipation as a war measure of doubtful constitutionality he could certainly enter into a stipulation to preserve the statehood of the States and carry it out as a war measure also; but on the exhaustion of all suggestions the President still returned firmly to his first and only proposition—an unconditional surrender of the States and their people. Not the slightest deviation from this was admissible.

The conference had reached the line where it seems the [559] Southern commissioners would have taken a step committing their government to dissolution without another battle, provided only they had been fully and frankly assured by authority to be trusted that the Union even without slavery would be at once re-established, the States with all their rightful relations restored, the people of the South protected, the Constitution respected and sectionalism ended forever. But around the form of the President was the portentous shadow of the radical war cloud, an influence that he could not withstand at that time. His ultimatum was dictated by a fierce policy that does not clearly appear to have been his own, and even his hint that he would temper wrath with mercy was given with qualifications. He could give no assurances, make no stipulations, enter into no agreement, and have no understanding as to the result of surrender.

The commissioners returned to Richmond and made their report, with which every one was disappointed, and, says Mr. Stephens, ‘no one more so than Mr. Davis.’ The Confederate President transmitted the report to Congress and all plans for negotiation being thwarted addressed himself to the means at his disposal for defending the South by arms. [560]

Chapter XXVI

The situation in 1865.

Military Disparities

South

President

President

Confederate States of America

the military situation of the Confederacy in 1865 must be considered in connection with the effort made by its leaders on behalf of peace, as previously related. From the most available data it is ascertained that the total of the Confederate troops in and around Richmond and Petersburg present for duty February 20, 1865, was in round numbers 57,000 of all arms and branches of service. Of this total 45,567 were infantry, the remainder cavalry and artillery. From this date losses occurred which could not be replaced and at the time of Grant's final and successful assault Lee had in his line of thirty-five miles only about 38,000 infantry. The cavalry were reduced to a small body mounted mainly on broken-down horses. This estimate is made on the reports of the army of Northern Virginia, also the conclusions of Major-General Humphreys of the Federal army and of Swinton, the Northern historian. The United [561] States secretary of war, Mr. Stanton, reports that Grant's available force at the same period, March 1, 1865, was 162,239. According to General Humphrey's calculations Grant's total on the morning of his final assault on Lee's lines was 124,700 present for duty, equipped in line of battle. This is exclusive of officers, details, sick and non-combatants. The fairest comparison of forces at that time, March 31, 1865, is made by the respective reports of both armies, which show in round numbers on the Confederate side 38,000 muskets, 5,000 artillery, 3,000 cavalry, 46,000 electives as the highest total, and on the Federal side 125,000 as the lowest available total in actual line of battle. Thus it appears indisputable that Grant had three lines of battle each the equal of one under command of Lee. He was enabled thereby to cover Lee's entire front with a line as strong as his own and still could move two nearly equally strong armies on his flanks. With this advantage on the morning of April 1, 1865, the attack was made by three men against one, and at the close of the day that ratio was largely increased through Confederate losses.

This, however, was not the only disparity between the two armies. Perhaps no armies had been so well equipped as those which Grant commanded in his advance on Richmond during 1864, but the preparation for the final assault in 1865 exceeded all equipment which had been made during the war. Lee had met these armies through the preceding years with constantly decreasing numbers and daily diminishing supplies. Hence his army was in all extremities from the 1st of January, 1865.

Thus it appears even from the military situation around Richmond that the Confederate States government had now no adequate military support, and its attempts to negotiate a peace on terms which ought to be understood before surrender had wholly failed. Its life, like that of every other civil government, was dependent upon military resources. Its civil authority was obeyed indeed to the [562] last by its patriotic people because they loved the government itself and respected their noble leaders. But while all the functions of the great civil government were in complete operation as to its own people wherever the army of invasion had not obtained possession of the territory, yet there was a total deficiency of resources to withstand the military forces pressing from without against the life of the new Republic. Still it was considered wise as well as brave to continue in the struggle. Surrender immediately after the Hampton Roads conference—an unconditional surrender such as Mr. Lincoln flatly proposed with reliance upon only such liberal treatment as the radical Congress would allow—would have been forever questionable. Its consequences no one can declare. Such a surrender in March, 1865, would have been the submission of one to three in numbers ready for battle, and at least one to ten in the general sinews of war, a disproportion ordinarily warranting capitulation, but that preponderance was not regarded as such a reason for unconditional surrender as could be accepted by the people of the South or the intelligent people of other nations. There were many able men who foresaw the approaching disaster, and who regarded the defeat of the Confederacy as inevitable, but their prevision was founded on theory. Their reasoning was indeed logical, and their predictions were literally fulfilled, but it was necessary to show not by theory, not by argument, but by a fact which all the people South and North would clearly understand, that the South was beaten beyond remedy by the overwhelming superiority of its opponents. Appomattox and Bentonville made this demonstration. Ten thousand men whose commissariat had been collapsed twenty-four hours leaving them without rations, but who moved in line of battle on the morning of April 9th to beat out of their way one hundred thousand other men, each of which mighty host was well-fed, well-armed, well-rested and all buoyant with the victories of the past [563] few days—this picture settled the question. ‘The South lost all but honor,’ is therefore a phrase her orators can repeat with pride through all the ages. ‘Fought to a frazzle’ was the graphic word Gordon sent to Lee, only a few hours before actual surrender, which determines the time when the proud spirit yields to physical force. ‘We wore ourselves out whipping you,’ said a Southerner in quick reply to a Northern inquirer as to the reasons why the cause was lost.

But aside from the necessity to preserve the self-respect of those valiant Americans of the South who were the equals of all others in the government to which they surrendered, it was not expedient to leave the readjustment of the Union to the sentimental liberality which political partisans might choose to affect. There was no partisan liberality needed and there was no ground nor call for magnanimity. The crushing of the gallant armies which had fought to the last left all the great principles of our government unsurrendered. Nothing passed away but slavery—which itself was not a principle, but only a dispensable feature in the government of the United States and of the Confederate States. Nothing visible was surrendered except the worthless arms and worn out property of the Confederate army. Even slavery was extinguished by the civil process of Constitutional amendments by the States; and the right of secession, which New England people so early and fondly cherished, came to be denied to them even by the post-bellum action of the Southern people. The vast armies which invaded the South returned enriched only by relics gathered in their campaigns and the civil government of the Union had gained no power to oppress any section.

It is well that all this is true. It is best that no treaty stipulations immediately after Hampton Roads conference were entered into which could involve our free principles or betray the nation into reliance on that treaty as a supplement to the constitution. As the question stood at the [564] end of the battle strife, the law remained regnant instead of a discretionary power. The tyrannical dogma of military necessity was at once abrogated. Readjustment must therefore be made legally and constitutionally or it would not stand. Reconstruction or any plan that deprived intelligent, law-abiding citizens of the South of their power in the Nation would involve its projectors as the unrighteous subverters of government in an odium from which there can be no recovery. The preservation of the liberties for which the Union was at first formed demanded obedience by the North which had conquered, as well as by the South which had been subjugated. That duty of obedience to the fundamental truths on which our government is founded remained unchallenged when the last Confederate soldier gave up his gun.

It was for this great result that the final fight was made. This saving of the Southern equality in the Union, and at the same time the saving of the North from the evils that would come to it from any agreement which gave them authority to dominate any part of the Union, was surely an achievement which gave to Appomattox a glory in defeat greater than the glory even of First Manassas, where such a superb victory was won. The blood which brave men shed in March and April, 1865, was not poured in vain. North and South have gained alike by the last sacrifices of the Confederate people. Free government by a firm Constitution and wise statute law is not lost. The seceded States returned to the Union, but surrendered no right of man by treaty with a superior power— as they had suffered no dishonor in defeat upon the battle field.

Resuming consideration of closely allied military and civic events we see that on the third of March, the day preceding the inauguration of President Lincoln for the second term, he instructed General Grant through the secretary of war to have no conference with General Lee unless for the capitulation of his army or some purely [565] military matter, which order was probably given because of the report that Lee was seeking a conference with Grant to arrange for an honorable peace. The military convention, which many trusted in as a mode by which the two great commanders could bring war to a close, did not enjoy the favor of Secretary Stanton. Military operations consequently became more decidedly vigorous immediately after the inauguration, the Confederacy on its part exhausting every source from which its armies could be recruited or supplied, and the United States pouring from its abundance whatever the armies of Grant required. Lee had well matured plans both for meeting battle along his lines around Richmond and for retreating further into the interior. Grant naturally expecting that his sagacious foe would attempt to elude him if resistance became futile, provided all means at his command to make defense disastrous and retreat impossible. Fighting along the line with constant extensions beyond the Confederate front, occupied the month of March, and it was in the midst of these military movements that President Davis sent in his last message to the Confederate Congress, March 13th, very near the day of its adjournment, but not a line of it betrays to the public the uncertainty of the imminent issue. The perils of the Confederacy were frankly stated in the message, but the President proceeded with suggestions for maintaining Confederate independence. He proposed that two millions in coin be raised for purchasing army supplies, that revenue measures be adopted, impressment of provisions and clothing be regulated, that a general militia law be enacted and that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus be suspended. Once more he repeated the account of the efforts made to stop the war by any form of negotiations and made in vain, since the administration at Washington had declined peremptorily every plan presented except the one of unconditional submission. ‘There remains then for use no choice but to continue this contest to a [566] final issue.’ The Confederate Congress delayed its adjournment beyond the appointed time, at the President's request, and with some modifications converted his suggestions into laws. One act provided for raising coin to furnish necessary supplies for the army, and generous Virginia advanced at once $300,000 in specie for that purpose. The banks in other States were likewise put in readiness to meet the requisition. A general militia law was also enacted, and after considerable hesitation authority was given to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in certain cases for a limited time. Then Congress adjourned the latter part of March to assemble no more.

Only a few days later Grant broke Lee's lines, forcing his retreat and causing the removal of the Confederate government from Richmond. The surrender of Lee's army at Appomattox and of the army of General Johnston in North Carolina quickly followed. President Davis having gone into North Carolina, understood the situation of the civil government and expressed to his Attorney-General, George Davis, his conception that he was himself now more of a soldier than anything else. In answer to the inquiry of the attorney-general whether it was possible to serve him officially any further, the President replied on April 25, 1865: ‘It is gratifying to me to be assured that you are willing at any personal sacrifice to share my fortunes when they are least promising. * * * It is due to such generous friendship that I should candidly say to you that it is not probable that for some time to come your services will be needful. * * * Should you decide (my situation having become rather that of a soldier than a civil magistrate) to retire from my cabinet, my sincere wishes for your welfare and happiness will follow you.’

Notwithstanding its precarious situation the Confederate States had still a legal existence although its military support was gone. Every State ordinance of secession was still in force. The Constitution of the Confederate [567] States still evidenced the compact by which the States had confederated. The State governments under that Constitution were still operating except where they were obstructed by military authority. Jefferson Davis was still President and commander-in-chief. His cabinet in part, as far as he required, were with him, and a small military body was detailed to escort him. Thus he passed through South Carolina into Georgia, held his last cabinet council in Washington, Georgia, and then, anxious for the safety of his family, pushed on westward designing to cross the Mississippi river. While thus seeking to reach the western Confederacy Mr. Davis was captured, imprisoned, bound in chains and closely guarded.

In the meantime a most deplorable event happened in the unexpected assassination of President Lincoln, concerning which it may be earnestly said that all verbal resentment of that crime was paralyzed by the inexpressible horror of it. The shame of it still disgraces the continent. It was a disreputable American event, when the elected head of a free people fell by the hand of an assassin whose lips profaned a sacred State motto in the very act of hideous murder. Complicity with such a crime could only occur among demons of the most vicious class, and it is unthinkable by any brain untempered by hate and unswayed by excitement that men of established good fame would share with the chief criminal the guilt of a murder so hurtful to public interests, so foul in its motive, so base in its execution. Not far away from the guiltiness of actual complicity with this chief crime of the American continent lies the guiltiness of the slanderers who falsely accused innocent men of aiding and abetting this desperate deed. It is not easy to distinguish between the offense by which the innocent Lincoln lost his valuable life and the offense of the attempt to murder the character and then take the life of the innocent Davis. Much mitigation, however, of the offense against justice at this moment, when a whole land was in a storm of [568] passion on account of the enormous crime of Booth, must be admitted. Some cool men were for the hour set aflame. Some fair men were borne out on the wave of public resentment to speak and act unjustly. But it cannot be conceived that many men of reason and reflection joined and remained in the view that such men as Jefferson Davis and Clement C. Clay were in any respect accessory to the assassination of Mr. Lincoln. In fact, such men very soon recovered themselves and protected the national honor against the projectors of the shame of an effort to connect President Davis and other Confederate leaders with the assassin and his guilt. Soon after his arrest Mr. Davis was shown the proclamation of Andrew Johnson, accusing him of being accessory to the murder of President Lincoln, and he at once said to the United States officer who had him in charge, ‘There is one man who knows that this proclamation is false, and he is the man who signed it, for he knows that I preferred President Lincoln to himself.’ President Davis again said in referring to one very important bearing of the assassination, that ‘but for the untimely death of Mr. Lincoln the agreement between Generals Sherman and Johnston would have been ratified and the wounds inflicted on civil liberty by the reconstruction measures might not have left their shameful scars on the United States.’ In small atonement for this gross blunder the accusation was soon abandoned.

[569]

Conclusion

The Confederate States of America soon ceased to exist. The overthrow and disbanding of its armies destroyed its belligerency; its civil authority becoming scattered and powerless could not operate, and therefore its position as a government de facto became untenable; what it still was de jure on account of the demands of Constitutional law was practically determined by the necessary resort to State action for the abrogation of the secession ordinances, also to State consent to the Constitutional amendments then proposed. Thus it was dissolved by war and by the action of the States which had formed it. The Confederacy had won the encomium of eminent publicists as having the best form of Constitutional government the world ever saw. Its administration had been able, humane, and considerate of the common welfare. Its leaders were among the most intellectual, cultured and patriotic of mankind. Its people enjoyed the highest civilization, and its soldiers were as brave as any legions ever led in patriotic war. It now ceased to have political existence, but remaining as a memory of noble things; well deserving the esteem which great nations gave it, and the fame which history preserves.

The course to be pursued in restoring all the States to their true relations in the Union was indicated by the Constitution of the United States, and this method was so obvious to the Southern seceded States that they proceeded at once to resume their practical duties which the Union under the Constitution required. Unfortunately, a theory of Reconstruction was adopted by Congress, in the place of Restoration, which led to consequences deplored by the best citizens of the whole country. [570] This history, however, closes without entering upon the period of Reconstruction. It concludes in concurrence with the familiar encomium on the Confederate government by an Englishman of distinction:

No nation ever rose so white and fair,
None fell so pure of crime.

Atlanta, Ga. 1899.

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Table of Contents:

The civil history of the Confederate States

brig.-Gen. Clement A. Evans.

Chapter 1:

North and South.

Chapter 2:

Agitation and settlement.

Chapter 3:

Attempts to nullify the Compromise.

Chapter 4:

The New anti-national movement.

Chapter 5:

The Conflict over the Constitution

Chapter VI

The crisis produced by sectionalism.

Chapter VII

Opportunity to stay secession lost.

Chapter VIII

Secession made inevitable.

Chapter 9:

Coercion and its consequence.

Chapter 10:

The Confederation of the Southern States.

Chapter 11:

Sectional administration at Washington.

Chapter XII

Actual war inaugurated.

Chapter XIII

The call to arms.

Chapter 14:

Military and political activity.

Chapter 15:

Federal reliance on physical force.

Chapter 16:

The permanent Confederate States of America.

Chapter 17:

The Confederate States' policies.

Chapter 18:

United States measures, civil and military.

Chapter 19:

Intensified hostility.

Chapter 20:

The Inhumanities of war.

Chapter 21:

The politics of 1864 as a factor in the war.

Chapter 22:

The decisive year—1864.

Chapter 23:

The critical situation.

Chapter 24:

The last stages of the struggle.

Chapter XXV

The last Great peace efforts.

Chapter XXVI

The situation in 1865.

Conclusion