Col. John M. Harrell, Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 10.2, Arkansas
Clement Anselm Evans, Ed.

Grant, since his heart-blow directed against the Confederacy at Donelson, had been strangely left without definite command until the 17th of March, when seeming to have been restored, he proceeded to Savannah on the Tennessee, and permitted Gen. W. T. Sherman to take command of the force at Pittsburg landing. Buell's army was ordered to move on to Savannah. Grant expected to make Pittsburg landing a mere starting point for Corinth. But General Johnston observed that the enemy had violated a rule of the military art in throwing an inferior force on the enemy's coast without making his position secure by defenses or means of retreat, and he determined to attack, partly because he desired to return the blow of Donelson, also because there was such an excessive mortality from sickness in his army that it were better the men should die in battle than perish miserably by disease.

On the evening of the 2d of April, General Hardee led with the Third corps in the march toward the landing, and at daylight on the 5th, he had developed the lines of the enemy. But as late as half-past 12 on the 5th, the left wing of Bragg's corps had not appeared. General Johnston, looking at his watch and glancing at the sun, said, ‘This is not war; let us have our horses,’ and riding to the rear, found that part of the army delayed by the artillery of the reserve corps, which blocked the road. He ordered the road cleared, by which time it was 4 o'clock, ‘too late,’ as Colonel Munford said in his address, ‘to give battle then.’ Yet the Federals were in blissful ignorance that an army was drawn up in sight of their lines. A consultation of the Confederates closed with General Johnston quietly remarking, ‘We shall attack them at daylight to-morrow.’