Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 1

[413] effects of the blow dealt them at Vicksburg, the only port then closed to national vessels in the Gulf of Mexico would undoubtedly have fallen at once, and a base have been secured for important operations towards the north. It is not improbable that the capture of Mobile, at that time, would have shortened the war by a year. But this was not allowed.

On the 24th of July, Grant renewed his suggestion: ‘It seems to me that Mobile is the point deserving the most immediate attention.’ And, on the 1st of August, he telegraphed to Halleck: ‘Mobile can be taken from the Gulf Department, with only one or two gunboats to protect the debarkation. I can send the necessary force. With your leave I would like to visit New Orleans, particularly if the movement against Mobile is authorized.’ The leave was not granted, the movement was not authorized, and the golden opportunity was slipping by. Grant got restive under this restraint, and, on the 25th of September, he returned to the subject: ‘I am confident that Mobile could now be taken, with comparatively a small force. At least, a demonstration in that direction would either result in the abandonment of the city, or force the enemy to weaken Bragg's army to hold it.’ On the 30th, he once more urged: ‘I regret that I have not got a movable force with which to attack Mobile or the river above. As I am situated, however, I must be content with guarding territory already taken from the enemy. I do not say this complainingly, but simply regret that advantage cannot be taken of so fine an opportunity of dealing the enemy a heavy blow.’

Halleck replied to this, on the 11th of October: ‘I regret equally with yourself that you could not ’