Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 1

‘ [472] will surrender his position to the enemy. I have offered to give him more troops from Kentucky, but he says he cannot supply them. Immediate aid from you is of vital importance.’ The reply to this was on the same day: ‘I am pushing every thing to give Burnside early aid. I have impressed on him in the strongest terms, the necessity of holding on to his position. Sherman's troops are now at Bridgeport. They will march to-morrow, and an effort will be made to get a column between Bragg and Longstreet, as soon as possible.’

Halleck's distrust of Burnside was not deserved. That officer's dispatches all indicate an intention to defend himself. On the 3d, he said: ‘The season is so far advanced, that I fear there must be great suffering in this command, unless we are fortunate enough to occupy Cleveland, and the line of railroad from here to Chattanooga.’ This did not look like falling back. ‘We will endeavor to check them, if they attempt to cross the Tennessee river. . . . . It is clear to me that it will be a hard task to hold East Tennessee, with the enemy's forces as they are now situated, unless he is constantly occupied by forces immediately in his front. There are reports of very large bodies of troops concentrating against me, but I believe them all exaggerated.’ Burnside, indeed, was always sanguine; his fault was rather to underrate difficulties, and to overestimate his own powers or means of conquering them, than to be cowed by what opposed him. He was more likely to risk too much, than to withdraw.

On the 12th, he said: ‘We will endeavor to hold in check any force that comes against us, until Thomas is ready. . . . . This country certainly ought ’