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was by very far the most disagreeable period in his entire career.
The national army moved slowly up towards Corinth from the battle-field of Shiloh, after Halleck arrived, making no advance except when protected by intrenchments.
This was greatly to the dissatisfaction of both officers and men, to whom such operations were new, and seemed to savor of timidity.
But Halleck had derived a lesson from the assaults of Shiloh, and the outcry in consequence; he was determined not to be attacked unawares, and collected his forces from every quarter of his immense depart.
ment, concentrating a hundred and twenty thousand bayonets;1 yet it took him six weeks to advance less than fifteen miles, the enemy in all that while making no offensive movement; on the contrary, the rebels constructed defences still more elaborate than those behind which Halleck advanced.
Beauregard's strength was estimated at seventy thousand; he himself reported it at forty-seven thousand, and the officers and men of the national army were anxious to avail themselves of their vast superiority in numbers.
They believed, correctly, as was afterwards proved, that Beauregard was moving his troops from Corinth with a view to divide, and not to concentrate them.
Grant shared this belief, and expressed it. Late in May, he was at Halleck's headquarters, when the probability of an evacuation of Corinth was discussed, and then made the only suggestion he ventured to offer during the siege.
He recommended that an attack should be made on the extreme right of the
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