Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 1

[110] battles and campaigns by turns, under Halleck's supreme command; while in Tennessee, Bragg, who had outmarched and outmanoeuvred Buell, reaching Chattanooga first, though starting last, was now racing with the same rival for Louisville and the Ohio. The North was thus threatened with invasion in Maryland and in Ohio at the same time. Every man that it was thought possible to take from Grant, had been sent to Buell, and the former was left to shift for himself, almost without troops, and (fortunately for the country), almost without orders.

Van Dorn at last determined to move part of his force (under Price), east of Grant, apparently with a view to crossing the Tennessee, and reinforcing Bragg in the Kentucky campaign. Grant notified Halleck of the probability of such a movement, and of his intention to prevent it, and was immediately warned by his chief to leave nothing undone to avert the catastrophe. Grant's dispatches at this time bear witness to the constant anxiety the rebels occasioned him, and to the necessity for a sleepless and stubborn vigilance. On the 9th of September, he said: ‘Should the enemy come, I will be as ready as possible with the means at hand. I do not believe that a force can be brought against us at present that cannot be successfully resisted.’

On the 13th, Price advanced from the south and seized Iuka, twenty-one miles east of Corinth; Colonel Murphy, who was in command, making no resistance, but evacuating the place on the approach of the enemy. Grant telegraphed to Halleck on the 15th: ‘If I can, I will attack Price before he crosses Bear creek. If he can be beaten there, it will pre. vent the design either to go north, or to unite forces ’