Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 2, Chapter 29:

Thomas's plans and operations were now all dependent on the course that Hood might take when the designs of Sherman could no longer be concealed; and the forces at Florence were anxiously watched to ascertain whether the national army was to advance [203] into Alabama, or remain for awhile on the defensive in Tennessee. Grant's first order to Thomas after Sherman moved was typical of his character and of what was to follow. On the 13th of November, Thomas telegraphed: ‘Wilson reports to-night that the cavalry arms and equipments applied for some weeks since have not yet reached Louisville. Their non-arrival will delay us in preparing for the field.’ But it was still possible that Hood might re-cross the Tennessee, in pursuit of Sherman. In that event, not a moment must be lost; and Grant telegraphed at once: ‘If Hood commences falling back, it will not do to wait for the full equipment of your cavalry, to follow. He should, in that case, be pressed with such force as you can bring to bear.’ Thomas replied the same night: ‘Your telegram of this A. M. just received. Am watching Hood closely, and should he move after Sherman, I will follow with what force I can raise at hand.’

Hood, however, had no idea of following Sherman. The campaign into Middle Tennessee was his own design,¹ and the dispositions of the national commanders appeared not in the least to disturb his plans. On the 16th of November, Sherman marched out of Atlanta, and the same day Beauregard telegraphed the news to Richmond: ‘Sherman is about to move with three corps from Atlanta to Augusta, or Macon, thence probably to Charleston or Savannah, where a junction may be formed with enemy's fleet.’ On the 19th, he announced again: ‘Enemy are turning their columns on shortest road [204] to Macon, and scouts . . report Fourteenth corps crossed Chattahoochee to join Sherman, giving him four corps. This information has been communicated to General Hood. It is left optional with him to divide, and reinforce Cobb [in Central Georgia], or take the offensive immediately, to relieve him.’ Hood chose the latter course, and Grant declared: This ‘seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. . . Had I had the power to command both armies, I should not have changed the orders under which he seemed to be acting.’

On the 21st of November, the rebel columns were in motion from the Tennessee, marching by the roads west of Pulaski, near which point Schofield was encamped. Hood evidently hoped to interpose his army between the national forces and Nashville; but Thomas divined his purpose, and at once directed Schofield to fall back from Pulaski, and concentrate in the vicinity of Columbia, so as to reach that place before the enemy. ‘Hood's force,’ he said to Grant, ‘is so much larger than my present available force, either in infantry or cavalry, that I shall have to act on the defensive.’² His only resource, he declared, was to ‘retire [205] slowly, delaying the enemy's progress as much as possible, to gain time for reinforcements to arrive, and concentrate.’ The portion of the Twenty-third corps which had been left at Johnsonville was now brought rapidly up to Schofield; and as all possibility of Hood's forces following Sherman was at an end, the garrisons along the Memphis and Chattanooga railroad were called in; but according to Thomas's invariable policy of guarding every possible point, these troops, instead of being sent to Schofield, were moved to Stevenson and Murfreesboroa, still further away from the enemy. On the night of the 23rd, Schofield evacuated Pulaski, and on the 24th, he reported himself in position at Columbia. This town is on the south bank of the Duck river, which here runs from west to east, and is at the crossing of the direct road to Nashville, distant only sixty miles. About half way between Columbia and Nashville, is Franklin.

On the 24th of November, Grant returned to City Point from the North, and at four P. M. that day, he telegraphed to Thomas: ‘Do not let Forrest get off without punishment.’ Thomas replied at length, detailing his difficulties, but concluded: ‘The moment I can get my cavalry, I will march against Hood. If Forrest can be found, he will be punished.’³ On the 25th, Grant telegraphed to [206] Halleck: ‘I think it advisable to send orders to Missouri that all the troops coming from there should receive their directions from General Thomas, and not listen to conflicting orders.’ These instructions were promptly carried out, and Thomas was made absolute master of all the troops within his territorial command. [207]

On the 27th, he announced the approach of detachments from Missouri. ‘As soon as Smith's troops arrive,’ he said, ‘and are adjusted, I shall be ready to take the field and assume the offensive.’ The same day Grant telegraphed to him: ‘Savannah papers just received state that Forrest is expected in rear of Sherman, and that Breckenridge is already on the way to Georgia from East Tennessee. If this proves true, it will give you a chance to take the offensive against Hood, and to cut the railroads up into Virginia with a small cavalry force.’ There were few events in war which to Grant did not seem to offer ‘a chance to take the offensive.’ Thomas, however, replied: ‘We can as yet discover no signs of the withdrawal of Forrest from Tennessee; he is closely watched, and our movement will commence against Hood as soon as possible, whether Forrest leaves Tennessee or not.’ Thomas was very well aware of the peculiarities of his chief, and the knowledge of them doubtless stimulated his anxiety; but nothing could goad him into action until he felt certain that every preparation was made, and every contingency cared for.

During the 24th and 25th, the enemy skirmished with Schofield's troops in front of Columbia, but showed only dismounted cavalry; and on the 26th and 27th, the rebel infantry came up, and pressed the national lines strongly, still without assaulting. These movements betrayed an undoubted intention to cross the river above or below the town, and during the night of the 27th, Schofield evacuated Columbia, and withdrew to the northern bank. He had at first strong hopes of [208] being able to hold the line of Duck river until reinforcements could arrive. Two divisions of infantry were posted to hold all the crossings in the neighborhood of Columbia, Stanley was placed in reserve on the Franklin road, to keep open communication in that direction, and the cavalry, under Wilson, covered the crossings on the left or east of the command. But on the 28th, the rebel cavalry succeeded in pressing Wilson back, and effected a crossing at Hewey's Mills, five miles above Columbia, and by daybreak on the 29th, Hood's infantry was following in force. From Hewey's Mills a road leads direct to Spring Hill, fifteen miles in rear of the national army, and on the Franklin road. If the rebels could reach Spring Hill in advance of

Schofield, they would be able either to cut off his retreat, or strike him in flank as he moved. Schofield at once sent Stanley with two divisions of infantry to occupy Spring Hill and cover the trains, directing Cox to hold the crossings at Columbia, while the remainder of the infantry was faced towards Hewey's Mills, where the rebel army was crossing. Wilson was cut off, and no communication could be had with the cavalry. Stanley reached Spring Hill just in time to drive off a body of rebel cavalry, and save the trains; and about four o'clock Hood came upon the ground in force. Stewart and Cheatham's corps were with him, and one division of S. D. Lee; the remainder of the rebel infantry was left at Columbia, the only point where artillery could pass the river. Cheatham had the advance, and the attack on Stanley was made at once. The engagement was serious [209] and lasted until after dark, but Stanley held his own, and repulsed the enemy repeatedly, with heavy loss.

At about three P. M. Schofield became convinced that Hood would make no attack at Columbia, but was pushing his principal columns direct upon Spring Hill. He thereupon gave orders for the withdrawal of Cox's force at dark, and pushed on himself with Ruger's troops to open communication with Stanley. The head of the main column followed close behind. Schofield struck the enemy's cavalry at dark, about three miles south of Spring Hill, brushing them away without difficulty, and reaching Spring Hill at seven. Here he found Stanley still in possession, but the rebel army bivouacking within eight hundred yards of the road. Posting one brigade to hold the road, he pushed on with Ruger's division to Thompson's station, three miles beyond. At this point the camp fires of the rebel cavalry were still burning, but the enemy had disappeared, and the cross-roads were secured without difficulty. The withdrawal of the force at Columbia was now safely effected, and Spring Hill was passed without molestation in the night, the troops moving within gun-shot of the enemy. Before daylight, the entire national column had passed, and at an early hour on the 30th, Schofield's command was in position at Franklin.⁴ [210]

Thus one of the most difficult and dangerous operations in war was executed with equal success and skill; the army was extricated from a situation of imminent peril, in the face of greatly superior numbers, and the opportunity for which Hood bad labored so long was snatched from his grasp. It was one of the most brilliant exploits of the war, and one of the most important, as well, for had Schofield been defeated at Columbia, the entire North-West might have been endangered. Chicago and Cincinnati were defended at Spring Hill.

Immediately upon the evacuation of Columbia, Thomas ordered the abandonment of Tullahoma, on the Chattanooga railroad; Nashville was placed in a state of defence, additional works were constructed, and the fortifications were manned by a garrison composed of army clerks and railroad employes. A detachment of six thousand men,⁵ belonging to Sherman's column, left behind at Chattanooga, was recalled, and a brigade of colored troops, from the same point, was ordered [211] to Nashville. At an early hour on the 30th, the advance of A. J. Smith's command arrived, at last. Thomas's combined infantry force was now more than equal to that of the enemy.

But Franklin was twenty-five miles from Nashville, and Hood had not yet abandoned the hope of striking Schofield before he could be reinforced. The rebel army followed close on the national rearguard. Schofield, nevertheless, at first hoped to cross the Harpeth, at Franklin, before Hood's columns could come up in sufficient force to attack him. The river at this point runs from east to west, and leaving two brigades to retard the rebel advance, Schofield moved one division to the north bank, to cover the flanks, should the enemy attempt to cross above or below the town. His principal forces, however, remained on the southern side, with both flanks resting on the river. But Hood brought up and deployed two corps with astonishing rapidity, and moved at once to the attack. The national outposts, imprudently brave, held their ground too long, and hence were compelled to fall back at a run. In passing over the parapet, they carried with them the troops of the main line for a short space, and thus permitted several hundred of the enemy to follow; but the reserves on the right and left instantly sprang forward, and after a furious battle, regained the parapet, and captured every rebel who had passed. The enemy afterwards assaulted persistently and continuously with his whole force, from half-past 3 until dark; and afterwards made numerous intermittent attacks until nearly ten o'clock; but was steadily repulsed at every point on the line, which was two miles long. [212]

Wilson, meanwhile, had been driven back by Forrest, and crossed the Harpeth river above Franklin, leaving the national left and rear entirely open to the rebel cavalry. On the 30th, Schofield ordered him to send a division forward again, and hold Forrest in check till the troops and trains could all reach Franklin. This task was committed to Hatch, who performed it with great success, and then re-crossed the river and connected with the infantry. A short time before the principal assault, Forrest forced a crossing above Franklin, and seriously threatened the trains, which were accumulating on the northern bank, and moving towards Nashville. Wilson, however, drove him back to the southern side, and the immediate left and rear were again, for a time, secure.

In the battle of Franklin, Schofield had not more than twenty-two thousand infantry and four thousand three hundred cavalry engaged.⁶ Hood's force was at least thirty thousand infantry and seven thousand cavalry. Schofield lost one hundred and eighty-nine killed, one thousand and thirty-three wounded, and eleven hundred and four missing; total, two thousand three hundred and twenty-six. The rebel loss was seventeen hundred and fifty killed, three thousand eight hundred wounded, and seven hundred and two prisoners; total, six thousand two hundred and fifty-two.⁷ Six general [213] officers of the enemy were wounded, five killed, and one was captured. The unusual disparity in the losses was of course occasioned by the fact that the rebels assaulted breastworks, while the national troops, except at a single point, remained entirely under cover. Half of Schofield's loss occurred in the two brigades which remained in front of the line after their proper duty as outposts was accomplished, and in the hand-to-hand encounter which ensued over the portion of the parapet which was temporarily lost by the precipitate retreat of this force. Nevertheless, Hood admitted that the stand made on the hills occasioned him a delay of several hours.

This victory was of enormous consequence to the national cause. It not only saved Schofield's army and at the same time greatly weakened Hood, but it was a fatal blow to all the expectations of the enemy, and created a depression in the rank and file from which they never recovered. But, notwithstanding the repulse he had inflicted, Schofield very well knew that Hood was still his superior in numbers, and would doubtless promptly attempt to avail himself of that superiority before it was gone. The national flank and rear were insecure, and communication with Nashville was threatened. Schofield considered that to remain at Franklin was to hazard the loss of his army, by [214] giving the rebels another chance to cut him off from his reinforcements. After consulting with his corps and division commanders, and receiving the approval of Thomas, he determined to retire at once to Nashville.⁸ Accordingly, at midnight of the 30th of November, the army was withdrawn from the trenches, and crossed the river without loss. Hood brought his artillery forward in the night, so as to open on Schofield in the morning, but in the morning the national forces had disappeared. During the 1st of December they assumed position in front of Nashville.

At 11.30 P. M. on the 30th of November, Thomas announced the result of the battle to Grant, and the arrival of A. J. Smith's last division at Nashville. ‘I am in hopes now,’ he said, ‘to be able to manage Hood, notwithstanding the great superiority in numbers of his cavalry.’ Schofield had not yet withdrawn from Franklin, and Grant understood from this despatch that Thomas meant to move at once with his reinforcements upon the defeated enemy, and complete the success which had been already achieved. But the next day, at nine P. M., Thomas reported different plans: ‘After Schofield's fight yesterday, feeling convinced that the enemy far outnumbered him both in infantry [215] and cavalry, I determined to retire to the fortifications around Nashville, until General Wilson can get his cavalry equipped; he has now but about one-fourth the number of the enemy, and consequently is no match for him. I have two ironclads here with several gunboats, and Commander Fitch assures me Hood can neither cross Cumberland river, nor blockade it. I therefore think it best to wait here until Wilson equips all his cavalry. If Hood attacks me here, he will be more seriously damaged than yesterday. If he remains until Wilson gets equipments, I can whip him, and will move against him at once. I have Murfreesboroa strongly held, and therefore feel easy in regard to its safety. Chattanooga, Bridgeport, Stevenson, and Elk river bridge have also been strongly garrisoned.’

This determination of Thomas to remain on the defensive, after a victory, was in direct opposition to both the judgment and instincts of Grant. He preferred to take advantage of Schofield's success, and to press the enemy at once with the reinforced army, before the influence of defeat was gone. At eleven A. M. on the morning of the 2nd, he telegraphed: ‘If Hood is permitted to remain quietly about Nashville, you will lose all the road back to Chattanooga, and possibly have to abandon the line of the Tennessee. Should he attack you, it is all well; but if he does not, you should attack him before he fortifies. Arm, and put in the trenches, your quartermaster's employes, citizens, etc.’

The government shared very fully this anxiety of the general-in-chief, and an hour after sending his own despatch to Thomas, Grant received one from the Secretary of War: ‘The President feels solicitous [216] about the disposition of Thomas to lay in fortifications for an indefinite period, “until Wilson gets equipments.” This looks like the McClellan and Rosecrans strategy of do nothing, and let the enemy raid the country. The President wishes you to consider the matter.’ To this Grant replied: ‘Immediately on receipt of Thomas's despatch, I sent him a despatch which no doubt you read, as it passed through the office.’ He was not satisfied with this, however, and at 1.30 P. M. on the same day, forwarded a second message to Thomas: ‘With your citizen employes armed, you can move out of Nashville with all your army, and force the enemy to retire, or fight upon ground of your own choosing. After the repulse of Hood at Franklin, it looks to me that, instead of falling back to Nashville, we should have taken the offensive against the enemy, where he was. At this distance, however, I may err as to the best method of dealing with the enemy. You will now suffer incalculable injury upon your railroads, if Hood is not speedily disposed of. Put forth, therefore, every possible exertion to attain this end. Should you get him to retreating, give him no peace.’

Then, as the equipment of the cavalry was the great reason assigned by Thomas for delay, he telegraphed at 7.30 P. M. the same night to Stanton: ‘Do you not think it advisable to authorize Wilson to press horses and mares in Kentucky, to mount his cavalry, giving owners receipts, so they can get their pay? It looks as if Forrest will flank around Thomas, until Thomas is equal to him in cavalry.’ At ten P. M., he said to Halleck: ‘Is it not possible now to send reinforcements [217] to Thomas from Hooper's department? If there are new troops organized, state militia, or anything that can go, now is the time to annihilate Hood's army. Governor Bramlette [of Kentucky] might put from five to ten thousand horsemen into the field to serve only to the end of the campaign.’

At ten P. M. this night, Thomas replied to his chief: ‘Your two telegrams of eleven A. M. and 1.30 P. M. received. At the time that Hood was whipped at Franklin, I had at this place but about five thousand men of Smith's command, which added to the force under Schofield, would not have given me more than twenty-five thousand; besides, Schofield felt convinced that he could not hold the enemy at Franklin until the five thousand could reach him. As General Wilson's cavalry force also made only about one-fourth that of Forrest's, I thought best to withdraw troops back to Nashville, and wait the arrival of the remainder of Smith's force, and also of a force of about five thousand, commanded by Steedman, which I had ordered up from Chattanooga. The division of General Smith arrived yesterday morning [December 1], and Steedman's troops arrived last night. I now have infantry enough to assume the offensive, if I had more cavalry; and will take the field anyhow, as soon as McCook's division of cavalry reaches here, which I hope will be in three or four days. We can neither get reinforcements nor equipments at this great distance from the North very easily, and it must be remembered that my command was made up of two of the weakest corps of General Sherman's army and all the dismounted cavalry except one brigade; and the task of reorganizing and equipping has met with [218] many delays which have enabled Hood to take advantage of my crippled condition. I earnestly hope, however, that in a few days more I shall be able to give him a fight.’

Grant was unconvinced by this reasoning, for he believed that Hood's obstacles and disadvantages were equal to those of Thomas, and that one gained as much as the other, by delay. For a day or two, however, he refrained from further urging his subordinate, but on the 3rd, he said to Sherman, with whom he was attempting to communicate: ‘Thomas has got back into the defences of Nashville, with Hood close upon him. Decatur has been abandoned, and so have all the roads, except the main one leading to Chattanooga. Part of the falling back was undoubtedly necessary, and all of it may have been. It did not look so, however, to me. In my opinion Thomas far outnumbers Hood in infantry. In cavalry Hood has the advantage in morale and numbers. I hope yet Hood will be badly crippled, if not destroyed.’

Grant was entirely right in his estimate of the relative numbers of the opposing armies. Sherman had left sufficient men behind for every emergency, and it was only Thomas's policy of scattering his forces and defending every assailable point, which had left so small an army for Schofield at Pulaski and Franklin, and made the first falling back inevitable. Steedman might have been recalled on the day that Hood advanced from the Tennessee, and even Stoneman would have been better occupied resisting, the principal rebel army at the West, than in following Breckenridge's three thousand men with double their number in East Tennessee. Thomas [219] also very greatly over-estimated Hood's force, both in infantry and cavalry; but after Hood was defeated with a loss of six thousand men at Franklin, and Thomas was reinforced by ten thousand men under Smith, and five thousand under Steedman, as well as the black brigade from Chattanooga, while additions were daily making to Wilson's command, there could be no question of the national preponderance. On the 2nd of December, Thomas's infantry in front of Nashville, numbered forty thousand,⁹ while Hood was reduced to twenty-three thousand; yet Thomas remained behind his fortifications and Hood enjoyed all the moral and substantial results of a victory. The national army was besieged by a force at least one-third smaller than its own; every railroad but one was abandoned to the enemy, and there was no telegraph line out of Nashville except to the North. These were not the fruits which should have followed a victory; and either Grant, Sherman, or Sheridan would undoubtedly have moved upon the enemy, disordered by defeat and weakened by loss, before he had time to recover.

Doubtless there were difficulties. Thomas complained [220] that his cavalry was inefficient, and it was certainly inferior in numbers to that of the enemy; but both Grant and Sherman considered that Thomas needed a smaller body of horse than he himself was persuaded he required. Wilson, his cavalry commander, was a young man with very large ideas of what he wanted; full of energy and spirit, but lacking in judgment and headstrong in opinion. He desired a large and admirably equipped command of cavalry. There can be no doubt that such a command was eminently desirable, but it was not indispensable. It was far from being necessary to risk the security of Tennessee, or the upsetting of all Grant's plans at the South and East as well as the West, in order to raise or equip another thousand or two of horse. A cavalry officer might be excused for magnifying the importance of his command, or insisting on the necessity of his accoutrements; the latter at least was within his province; though Wilson himself was the very man to have moved, ready or not, at the word of command. But the general of a great army should have risen to a height from which all the contingencies of the campaign and all the circumstances of the field would have assumed their proper proportions. Thomas's own campaign was, after all, but one of many, and it was necessary for the general success that it should be fought at a certain time. Canby's operations in the rear of Hood were intended to be co-operative with Thomas's advance; and Sherman and Meade and Butler and Sheridan were all included in the scheme, in which the army in Tennessee bore only a part. Thus the delay of Thomas might defeat operations a thousand miles away. [221]

Besides this, Grant contemplated possibilities that were perhaps not so apparent to his subordinate. In all military matters, his imagination was not only vivid, but what may be called dramatic, as well. He knew what he himself would do in Hood's position, and often said at the time that so long as Hood was free, the whole West was in danger. Had he commanded the rebel army, he would have ignored Nashville altogether, and allowing Thomas to reinforce and refit his cavalry at leisure, would have moved to the North, when Thomas would have had nothing to do, but to follow. It was not only Nashville that Grant was considering, but Louisville, and the country beyond the Ohio. At no period of the war did those who approached him closest perceive so many signs of anxiety as now. He feared the undoing of all that had been achieved at so much cost at the West; he feared another race between the armies, for the Ohio; the necessity for raising fresh levies; the arousing of disaffection in Indiana;—issues compared with which the remount of Thomas's cavalry, or even the fate of Nashville, was insignificant.

What added to his solicitude at this crisis was the personal respect and regard he entertained for Thomas. The kindly nature of the man had won upon Grant; and still more the splendid services he had rendered the country; the firm loyalty Thomas had displayed at the beginning of the war; the genuine truthfulness, the sturdy honesty, the steadfast patriotism, that were part of his character. Grant was thoroughly assured that Thomas intended well; that it was a feeling of duty which held him back; that the subordinate's love for the [222] country and devotion to the cause were no less than his own. It pained him to differ with the soldier with whom he had shared so many campaigns; he was unwilling to show distrust in the efficiency of one who had been so efficient; to over-rule the general who was the object of so much deserved attachment from individuals and armies.

And yet he had no doubt that Thomas's judgment was wrong; that the arming of even five thousand cavalry was of far less importance than the immediate destruction of Hood; that the danger which existed so long as Hood was undestroyed was infinitely more important than all the good which ten thousand fresh cavalrymen could accomplish; and above all, that the army on the Cumberland was fully able, at this moment, to destroy its opponent. And so there came, amid all the other anxieties that crowded on the general-in-chief, this new and unexpected care created by Thomas's determination to delay.

Meanwhile, the first news from Sherman was received, through the rebel newspapers. Immense supplies in kind, intended for Hood and Lee, had been piled along the roads, all of which Sherman had seized, or the enemy was obliged to destroy, to prevent their falling into his hands. The consternation on his line of march was universal. Spies and scouts, prisoners and refugees, soon confirmed the story. There were even indications of a disposition to submit, such as had hitherto not been permitted to appear. Four newspapers on one day called for another leader. ‘The people,’ they declared, ‘will follow. They are tired of this madness, and if it [223] does not cease, nothing but ruin is before them.’ Every effort, nevertheless, was made by the rebel rulers to withstand the advance of Sherman. Bragg and Beauregard were summoned, the one from the East, the other from the West; for unless the rebels meant to yield everything, they must defend Augusta and Savannah. But there was no organization, and little to organize. Breckenridge was reported to have been ordered from West Virginia, and Early from the Valley; but these rumors were soon ascertained to be false; Wilmington, however, was certainly stripped of its garrison, and the governors of five states were called upon for the reserves. Information also came from various sources that an attempt would be made to throw troops into Savannah. Ossabaw Sound, in that vicinity, was the point where it was expected Sherman would appear. Here supplies were waiting for him, and hither Grant sent a messenger with orders, to greet .him on his arrival. The inland fortifications were believed to be weak, but the obstructions in the Savannah river prevented any aid to Sherman by the fleet, until he actually struck the coast.

As yet, however, it was far from certain that Sherman would not turn to the Gulf of Mexico, and maps and newspapers were carefully studied by Grant, to divine his course. Meanwhile, the cooperative movement of Canby was delayed, as we have seen. Until Thomas assumed the offensive against Hood, Canby was obliged to hold Vicksburg and Memphis so that they could not be seriously threatened, and his own expedition into the interior was thus postponed. At last, came rumors of the capture of Millen by Sherman, and, on the [224] same day, the news of Schofield's victory at Franklin; and Grant again proclaimed at the camp fire his admiration for Sherman, while all remembered how constantly he had insisted that Schofield was a fine soldier, and needed nothing but opportunity to prove it. Grant, indeed, had kept him in place against determined opposition from various quarters; and now, if only the success at Franklin was followed up, so that Canby could move into Mississippi, the danger at the West was past.

But while thus zealously watching the varied interests and changing circumstances in Georgia and Tennessee, as well as at Richmond and in the Valley, Grant had also planned to take advantage of Sherman's march by a new movement on the Atlantic coast. Wilmington, near the mouth of the Cape Fear river, in North Carolina, was the only important seaport now open to the enemy. At this point the rebels still received supplies of arms and clothing from abroad, and hence they sent out in return cotton and other products, by British blockaderunners. The Bermuda isles are close at hand, and if they once arrived at Nassau, the British flag protected rebel goods as well as the vessels of rebel sympathizers. During the entire war, indeed, whole branches of British industry had thriven on this contraband commerce, at the expense of the Union. Batteries of cannon were cast at Manchester for the rebel army, and ships were built in Liverpool and Glasgow yards, especially to run the national blockade; and by these means the existence of the rebellion was undoubtedly prolonged. At first, Mobile, and Charleston, and other ports had shared this traffic; but during the last year, the blockade [225] had become so efficient that Wilmington was the only entrance left by sea for any considerable amount of supplies. Strenuous efforts had of course been made to seal this harbor, but hitherto with only partial success. The nature of the outlet of Cape Fear river is such that without possession of the land at a point near the mouth, it is impossible to entirely close the port. To secure the possession of this point required the co-operation of a military force; and during the summer of 1864, Grant agreed to furnish a sufficient number of troops for the purpose.

A formidable fleet was accordingly assembled, the command of which was entrusted to Admiral Porter, with whom Grant had served with complete co-operation and success in his Mississippi campaigns. It was originally intended that the expedition should set out in October; but through the imprudence of officers both of the army and the navy, and afterwards of the public press, the exact object of the enterprise became known; and the enemy thus warned, prepared to resist it. This caused a postponement of the expedition; but towards the end of November, the project was revived; and six thousand five hundred men were promised from the army of the James. Grant selected Major-General Weitzel to command the force, and sent him down the coast, to reconnoitre the ground, and procure all the information possible in regard to the character and strength of the forts at the mouth of Cape Fear river. Butler of course was fully informed of the enterprise committed to his subordinate, and had frequent conferences with Grant on the subject. [226]

In the meantime, as we have seen, Sherman had proceeded so far into Georgia that the rebels, in order to raise a force against him, had nearly abandoned Wilmington, as well as Fort Fisher, at the mouth of the Cape Fear river. On the 30th of November, Grant notified Butler that Bragg, who had been in command at Wilmington, had set out for Georgia, taking with him most of the forces in North Carolina. ‘It is therefore important,’ he said, ‘that Weitzel should get off during his absence; and if successful in making a landing, he may, by a bold dash, succeed in capturing Wilmington. Make all the arrangements for his departure, so that the navy will not be detained one moment by the army.’ In conjunction with Weitzel's movement, Butler had been ordered to send a force of from three thousand to four thousand men, under General Palmer, to cut the Weldon railroad south of the Roanoke river, and Grant now asked: ‘Did you order Palmer to make the proposed move yesterday? It is important he should do so without delay.’ In answer to this, Butler visited Grant in person at City Point, and received further instructions for Weitzel to move as soon as the fleet was ready. The same day Grant said to Admiral Porter: ‘Southern papers show that Bragg, with a large part of his force, has gone to Georgia. If we can get off during his absence, we will stand a fair chance, not only to carry Fort Fisher, but to take Wilmington. The troops will be ready to start the moment you are ready.’

In connection with this expedition, an experiment had been suggested by Butler, from which that commander hoped important results. His idea was [227] to blow up a vessel loaded with gunpowder, in the neighborhood of Fort Fisher, with the expectation that the fort would be injured, if not destroyed, by the explosion. Grant had little faith in the scheme, and the opinions of the engineers were adverse; but the naval authorities, including Admiral Porter himself, favored an attempt. On the 3rd of December, Grant wrote to Sherman: ‘Bragg has gone from Wilmington. I am trying to take advantage of his absence to get possession of that place. Owing to some preparations Admiral Porter and General Butler are making to blow up Fort Fisher, and which, while I hope for the best, I do not believe a particle in, there is a delay in getting the expedition off. I hope they will be ready to start by the 7th, and that Bragg will not have started back by that time.’ On the 4th, he said to Butler: ‘I feel great anxiety to see the Wilmington expedition off, both on account of the present fine weather, which we can expect no great continuance of, and because Sherman may now be expected to strike the seacoast at any day, leaving Bragg free to return. I think it advisable for you to notify Admiral Porter, and get off without delay, with or without your powder-boat.’

On the 3rd, as has been stated, the generalin-chief wrote to Sherman, sending his despatch to the blockading squadron, to be forwarded as soon as the army was heard from on the coast. ‘Since you left Atlanta,’ he said, ‘no very great progress has been made here. The enemy has been closely watched, though, and prevented from detaching against you. I think not one man has gone from here, except some twelve or fifteen hundred cavalry.’ [228] He then went on to state a general idea of his plans for Sherman's future action, but without giving minute directions. ‘With your veteran army, I hope to get control of the only two through routes from East to West, possessed by the enemy before the fall of Atlanta. This condition will be filled by holding Savannah and Augusta, or by holding any other port to the east of Savannah and Branchville. If Wilmington falls, a force from there will co-operate with you.’

All this while, he remained as anxious as ever to utilize his various forces in every field. On the 28th of November, he had said to Sheridan: ‘My impression now is that you can spare the Sixth corps with impunity: I do not want to make the order for it imperative, but unless you are satisfied that it is necessary for the defence of the Valley, I should like to get it here as early as possible.’ On the 3rd of December, he announced to Meade: ‘The Sixth corps will probably begin to arrive here to-night, or in the morning. As soon as it does get here, I want you to move with the Second, and about two divisions of the Fifth corps, down the Weldon road, destroying it as far to the south as possible.’ Later on the same day, he continued: ‘I think there should be a force of twenty thousand, and then all the reserves that can possibly be spared from the lines should be held ready to go after the enemy, if he follows.’ This movement would be simultaneous with that of Palmer in North Carolina, and both were intended, not only to distress Lee still further for his supplies, but to prevent reinforcements being sent to [229] Wilmington, when Weitzel's expedition should start.

It was at this time reported that Lee's cavalry had been sent to Georgia, to aid in the resistance against Sherman, and on the 30th of November, Grant said to Meade: ‘Try to ascertain how much force Hampton has taken from here with him. He has gone himself, beyond doubt.’ Then with his usual policy, he continued: ‘If the enemy has reduced his cavalry much, we must endeavor to make a raid upon the Danville road. Bragg has taken most of the troops from Wilmington to Georgia, which will aid an expedition I have ordered to cut the Weldon road south of the Roanoke.’ At the same time, as Hampton had been sent to Georgia, and Lee's infantry would be occupied in watching Meade's movement southward, Grant reverted to his constant idea of destroying the connection between Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley. On the 4th of December, he telegraphed to Sheridan: ‘Do you think it possible now to send cavalry through to the Virginia Central road? It is highly desirable this should be done, if it is possible.’ On the 5th, he gave Meade instructions to move down the Weldon road as far south as Hicksford; and on the 6th, he said to Butler: ‘A movement will be commenced on the left to-morrow morning. Make immediate preparations so that your forces can be used north of the river, if the enemy withdraw; or south, if they should be required. . During to-morrow night, withdraw to the left of your line at Bermuda Hundred the troops you propose to send south [under Weitzel], unless otherwise directed.’ [230]

Thus, while bringing troops from the Shenandoah, and suggesting new operations to Sheridan; while planning a movement for the army of the Potomac, which might necessitate drawing largely from that of the James; Grant at the same time availed himself of the absence of Bragg, occasioned by Sherman, to initiate an attack on Wilmington; and directed the co-operation of Palmer with the expeditions of both Weitzel and Meade; he also sent orders to Sherman to guide him on his arrival at the coast, and he made Canby's movements depend on those of the army in Tennessee. He once declared that his first object, on assuming command of all the armies, was to use the greatest number of troops possible against the enemy; and his second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the rebels, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left for them but submission to the laws of the land. His first object had certainly been achieved; all the troops possible were constantly in use against the enemy: and as for the second,—although there was a good deal besides hammering in the elaborate strategy of 1864, the attrition undoubtedly went on.

In the meantime, the situation at Nashville was becoming daily more humiliating and dangerous. Although Thomas telegraphed on the 3rd of December: ‘Have succeeded in concentrating a force of infantry about equal to that of the enemy,’ he remained entirely on the defensive, and the rebels entrenched themselves on a line only two miles from the city: the national fortifications extended from the Cumberland river on the right to the river again on the left, and all outside was held by Hood. [231] ‘No telegraph communication south,’ said the operator there, on the 3rd, to his fellow at Grant's Headquarters; ‘No telegraph communication south, from Nashville, of course, but we can communicate with Chattanooga via Cumberland Gap and Knoxville. Nothing heard from Forrest, but General Wilson is looking after him, and no apprehension is felt.’ And this was the mortifying sequence to the great campaigns of Grant and Sherman for Chattanooga and Atlanta. The national troops were held in Nashville, and communication with Chattanooga was by the North. Comfort was even taken by the besieged that no apprehension was felt in regard to Forrest; although even this comfort the general of the Western army did not share; for he telegraphed, on this day, to Halleck: ‘As soon as I can get the remaining brigade of General McCook's division of cavalry here, I will move against the enemy, although my cavalry force will not be more than half that of the enemy. I have labored under many disadvantages since assuming direction of affairs here; not the least of which was reorganizing, remounting, and equipping of a cavalry force sufficient to contend with Forrest.’ On the same day, he reported: ‘The enemy made no demonstration to-day except to advance his pickets on Nolensville, Franklin, and Hillsboroa pikes. I have a good entrenched line on the hills around Nashville, and hope to be able to report ten thousand cavalry mounted and equipped, in less than a week, when I shall feel able to march against Hood.’

Forrest, meanwhile, was operating on the blockhouse and telegraph lines, between Nashville and Murfreesboroa, and on the 3rd and 4th of December, [232] he captured three stockades, as well as a train of cars on the Chattanooga railroad, and reported two hundred and sixty prisoners. So secure, indeed, did Hood now feel, that, on the 4th, he ordered Forrest to move with two divisions of cavalry, nearly his entire force,¹⁰ and a division of infantry, against Murfreesboroa, thirty miles away. Forrest started on the morning of the 5th, and Thomas's cavalry force was then far superior to that which remained with Hood.

On the 4th, the enemy extended his lines and threw up new works; at the nearest point the rebel skirmishers were now only four hundred yards from Thomas's main works. Citizens and negroes were impressed to complete the entrenchments. That night Thomas reported that the enemy had planted a battery on the river, and captured two steamboats, but the naval force drove the battery away, and recaptured the steamers. ‘I have heard,’ he said, ‘from Tullahoma, by Knoxville, to-day. The railroad is uninjured that far, and no signs of the enemy in that neighborhood. I have heard nothing in direction of Murfreesboroa, and therefore infer enemy has made no move in that direction yet, but is now turning his attention to crossing the river below. Any such attempt I am prepared to meet.’ [233]

Grant had anticipated this danger, and was now intensely anxious in regard to the situation. On the 5th, he telegraphed: ‘Is there not danger of Forrest moving down the Cumberland to where he can cross it? It seems to me, whilst you should be getting up your cavalry as rapidly as possible to look after Forrest, Hood should be attacked where he is. Time strengthens him in all probability as much as it does you.’ In this surmise he was entirely right, for Hood, at this very juncture, reported to his superiors: ‘Our line is strongly entrenched, and all the available positions upon our flanks and in rear of them are now being fortified with strong self-supporting detached works, so that they may be easily defended, should the enemy move out upon us. The enemy,’ he continued, ‘still have some six thousand troops strongly entrenched at Murfreesboroa. This force is entirely isolated, and I now have the largest part of the cavalry under Forrest, with two brigades of infantry in observation of these forces, and to prevent their foraging in the country. Should this force attempt to leave Murfreesboroa, or should the enemy attempt to reinforce it, I hope to be able to defeat them.’

On the night of the 5th, Thomas telegraphed: ‘If I can perfect my arrangements, I shall move against the advanced portion of the enemy on the 7th;’ but on the 6th, he suspended the movement again. At eight P. M. that night, he telegraphed to Grant: ‘Your telegram of 6.30 P. M., December 5, just received. As soon as I can get up a respectable force of cavalry, I will march against Hood. General Wilson has parties now out pressing horses, [234] and I hope to have some six or eight thousand cavalry mounted in three or four days from this time. General Wilson has just left me, having received instructions to hurry the cavalry remount as rapidly as possible. I do not think it prudent to attack Hood with less than six thousand cavalry to cover my flanks, because he has under. Forrest at least twelve thousand. I have no doubt Forrest will attempt to cross the river, but I am in hopes the gunboats will be able to prevent him.’

Before receiving this despatch, Grant had finally given a peremptory order. At four P. M. on the 6th, he telegraphed: ‘Attack Hood at once, and wait no longer for a remount of your cavalry. There is great danger of delay resulting in a campaign back to the Ohio river.’ Thomas replied, at nine P. M., the same night: ‘Your telegram of four P. M. this day just received. I will make the necessary dispositions and attack at once, agreeably to your orders, though I believe it will be hazardous, with the small force of cavalry now at my service.’

That night news came from Van Duzer, the operator at Nashville: ‘Scouts report large force twenty miles down river, towards Harpeth shoals, and say rebels propose to cross Cumberland river there, soon as it can be forded and river is too low for gunboats, which will be soon, unless rain falls.’ It looked, indeed, as if Hood's boasts were about to be realized. Not only was the national army enclosed in the capital of Tennessee, but if the rebels once crossed the river, it would be cut off entirely from the North. Nevertheless, Thomas did not attack.

Hood at this time reported: ‘Middle Tennessee, although much injured by the enemy, will furnish [235] abundance of commissary stores. . . The cars can now run from here to Pulaski. . . we have sufficient rolling stock captured from the enemy to answer our purposes. I will endeavor to put this road in order from Pulaski to Decatur, as soon as possible. As yet I have not had time to adopt any general system of conscription, but hope soon to do so, and to bring into the army all men liable to military duty.’

There were delays at the East, as well as the West; and on the 5th, Grant said to Meade: ‘We will not wait for Getty's division. How soon can you move troops? I have been waiting to get off [Weitzel's] troops down the coast, but as Palmer has already moved from Newbern, will wait no longer.’ ‘Palmer probably started from Newbern yesterday, with a force of from three to four thousand men, to cut the same [Weldon] road south of the Roanoke.’

On the 6th, he gave Butler detailed orders for Weitzel's operations. ‘The first object of the expedition under General Weitzel is to close to the enemy the port of Wilmington. There are reasonable grounds to hope for success, if advantage can be taken of the absence of the greater part of the enemy's forces now looking after Sherman in Georgia. . . The object of the expedition will be gained by effecting a landing on the main land between Cape Fear river and the Atlantic, north of the north entrance to the river. Should such landing be effected while the enemy still hold Fort Fisher and the batteries guarding the entrance to the river, then the troops should entrench themselves, and by co-operating with the navy, effect the reduction and capture of those places.’ [236]

That night General Butler embarked his troops at Bermuda Hundred. He proceeded himself to City Point, and then for the first time Grant learned his intention to accompany the expedition. The general-in-chief had not designed nor desired to entrust the command of these forces to Butler; for, as repeatedly shown, although he was entirely satisfied with that officer's zeal and general ability, he was convinced that he lacked some quality essential in a commander in the field: whether the military coup d'oeil, or the judgment of a general, or the faculty of handling troops in the presence of the enemy, Grant did not pronounce; but he felt certain that the peculiar talent of a successful soldier was not possessed by the commander of the army of the James.

He therefore had directed him to place Weitzel in command of the expedition; and had in fact committed to Butler movements in support of those of Meade, which he intended should detain him at Bermuda Hundred. Nevertheless, he did not now forbid Butler to accompany Weitzel. It was difficult thus to affront a commander of so high rank, unless it was intended to relieve him entirely from command; and this Grant was not prepared to do, without consulting the government, which he knew would dislike, and perhaps forbid, the step. He fancied, besides, that Butler's object might be to witness the explosion of the powder-boat, in which he took great interest, rather than to direct the expedition itself; thus no disapproval of his purpose was indicated. It is certain, however, that it would have been better if Grant had frankly and peremptorily ordered Butler back to the army of the [237] James, to superintend the movements there. His dislike to wound the feelings of another should doubtless, at this crisis, have been sacrificed. Those who have never been placed in situations of great delicacy and responsibility, or who cannot realize the various considerations, military, political, and personal, which affect the decisions of men in power —will doubtless here find cause to censure Grant.

This day the general-in-chief sent further and more definite orders to Sherman, to guide him on his arrival at the coast. ‘Establish a base on the sea-coast. Fortify, and leave all your artillery and cavalry, and enough infantry to protect them, and at the same time so threaten the interior that the militia of the South will have to be left at home. With the balance of your command come here by water, with all dispatch. Select yourself the officer to leave in command; but you, I want, in person. Unless you see objections to this plan which I cannot see, use every vessel going to you, for purposes of transportation.’ In the same letter, he informed Sherman: ‘Hood has Thomas close in Nashville. I have said all I could to force him to attack, without giving the positive order, until to-day. To-day, however, I could stand it no longer, and gave the order, without any reserve. I think the battle will take place to-morrow.’

On this day Grant's hands and time were full indeed. He sent orders to Thomas to attack Hood, ‘without any reserve’; he gave directions to Sherman to move his army by sea to Richmond; he wrote detailed instructions to Butler for Weitzel's expedition, and minute orders to Meade for the movement southward against the Weldon road. [238]

On the 7th, he telegraphed to Butler, now at Fort Monroe: ‘Let General Weitzel get off as soon as possible. We don't want the navy to wait an hour.’ At ten P. M., he reported to the government: ‘General Warren, with a force of twelve thousand infantry, six batteries, and four thousand cavalry, started this morning, with the view of cutting the Weldon railroad as far south as Hicksford. Butler, at the same time, is holding a threatening attitude north of the James, to keep the enemy from detaching there. To-night he has moved six thousand five hundred infantry and two batteries across James river, to be embarked at Bermuda Hundred, to cooperate with the navy in the capture of the mouth of Cape Fear river. Palmer has also moved, or is supposed to have moved, up the Roanoke, to surprise Rainbow, a place the enemy are fortifying, and to strike the Weldon road south of Weldon.’

It was not a single hammer, however ponderous, that was at work; but a great and complicated mechanism, with springs, and levers, and pulleys, and wheels; and the simultaneous blows that fell at numerous and distant points were all directed and controlled by the mind of the master-workman.

On the same day, taking every contingency into consideration, Grant said to Meade: ‘If the enemy send off two divisions after Warren, what is there to prevent completing the investment of Petersburg with your reserve?’

The country meanwhile had become uneasy, and the government was even more anxious than Grant, in regard to Thomas. On the 7th of December, at 10.20 A. M., Stanton telegraphed: ‘Thomas seems unwilling to attack because it is hazardous, [239] as if all war was anything but hazardous. If he waits for Wilson to get ready, Gabriel will be blowing his last horn.’ Grant replied at 1.30 P. M.: ‘You probably saw my order to Thomas to attack. If he does not do so promptly, I would recommend suspending him by Schofield, leaving Thomas subordinate.’ Only those who were with him at the time, and in his confidence, could know the pain it gave to Grant to write these words. He was fond of Thomas, personally. He remembered his worth, his services, his patriotism, as well as the devotion of the Western army to its chief. He knew also the extreme risk in changing commanders at such a crisis. As Lincoln said, with homely force, on another occasion, it was like ‘swopping horses while crossing a stream.’ But he felt that unless an advance was promptly made in Tennessee, the peril to the entire West was instant and inevitable; and if Thomas refused any longer to obey, there was no option but to put a general in his place who would carry out his orders; and painful though the necessity was, Grant gave the word.

Nothing, however, was done by the government, and nothing was heard from Thomas till nine o'clock on the night of the 7th, when he telegraphed to Halleck: ‘Captain Fitch, United States navy, started down the river yesterday with a convoy of transports, but was unable to get them down; the enemy having planted three batteries on a bend of the river, between this and Clarksville. Captain Fitch was unable to silence all three of the batteries yesterday, and will return again to-morrow morning, with the assistance of the [gunboat] Cincinnati, now at Clarksville; and [240] I am in hopes he will be able to clear them out.’ Thus another avenue of communication with Thomas was cut off. The Cumberland river was closed.

Rosecrans, who had commanded in Missouri, was at this juncture relieved by Dodge, at Grant's request, and on the 8th, the general-in-chief telegraphed to Halleck: ‘Please direct General Dodge to send all the troops he can spare, to General Thomas. With such order, he can be relied on to send all that can properly go. They had probably better be sent to Louisville, for I fear either Hood or Breckenridge will go to the Ohio river. I will submit whether it is not advisable to call on Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, for sixty thousand men for thirty days. If Thomas has not struck yet, he ought to be ordered to hand over his command to Schofield.’ Yet even now, he had a good word to say for his inert subordinate. ‘There is no better man to repel an attack than Thomas, but I fear he is too cautious to take the initiative.’ Halleck replied to this at nine P. M. ‘If you wish General Thomas relieved, give the order. No one here will, I think, interfere. The responsibility, however, will be yours, as no one here, so far as I am informed, wishes General Thomas removed.’ To this Grant answered at ten o'clock: ‘Your despatch of nine P. M. just received. I want General Thomas reminded of the importance of immediate action. I sent him a despatch this evening, which will probably urge him on. I would not say relieve him, until I hear farther from him.’

The despatch Grant had sent to Thomas was in these words: ‘8.30 P. M. It looks to me evident the enemy are trying to cross the Cumberland, and are [241] scattered. Why not attack at once? By all means avoid the contingency of a foot race, to see which, you or Hood, can beat to the Ohio. If you think necessary, call on governors of states to send a force into Louisville, to meet the enemy, if he should cross the river. You clearly never should cross, except in rear of the enemy. Now is one of the finest opportunities ever presented of destroying one of the three armies of the enemy. If destroyed, he never can replace it. Use the means at your command, and you can do this, and cause a rejoicing from one end of the land to the other.’ He left nothing undone to stimulate, and encourage, and rouse, the powerful but dogged nature, which needed sometimes a goad, but when once incited into action, was as irresistible as it before had been immovable.

On the 9th, at 10.30 A. M., in obedience to Grant's orders, Halleck telegraphed to Thomas: ‘Lieutenant-General Grant expresses much dissatisfaction at your delay in attacking the enemy. If you wait till General Wilson mounts all his cavalry, you will wait till doom's day, for the waste equals the supply. Moreover, you will be in the same condition that Rosecrans was last year—with so many animals that you cannot feed them. Reports already come in of a scarcity of forage.’ Thomas replied, at two P. M.: ‘Your despatch, of 10.30 A. M. this date, is received. I regret that General Grant should feel dissatisfaction at my delay in attacking the enemy. I feel conscious that I have done everything in my power to prepare, and that the troops could not have been gotten ready before this. And if he should order me to be relieved, I will submit without a murmur. [242] A terrible storm of freezing rain has come on since daylight, which will render an attack impossible, till it breaks.’

Meanwhile, at eight P. M. of the 8th, Van Duzer, the telegraph operator at Nashville,¹¹ reported: ‘No change in position since last report. Enemy still in force in front, as was found out by reconnoissance, and large artillery force on south bank of the Cumberland, between here and shoals. One of our gunboats came to grief in the exchange of iron at Bell's Ferry. Rebel General Ewell holds same bank, below Harpeth's to Fort Donelson, but don't fight gunboats.’ At 9.30 P. M. the same night, Thomas himself reported: ‘With every exertion on the part of General Wilson, he will not be able to get his force of cavalry in condition to move before Sunday [December 11th].’

But Grant had directed Thomas to move without regard to Wilson, and on the receipt of these despatches, he telegraphed, on the 9th, to Halleck: ‘Despatch of eight P. M. last evening, from Nashville, shows the enemy scattered for more than seventy miles down the river, and no attack yet made by Thomas. Please telegraph orders relieving him at once, and placing Schofield in command. Thomas should be ordered to turn over all orders and despatches received since the battle of Franklin, to Schofield.’

Before, however, this direction could be obeyed, [243] Thomas himself telegraphed to Grant, in reply to the despatch of the general-in-chief of the night before: ‘December 9, one P. M. Your despatch of 8.30 P. M. of the 8th is just received. I had nearly completed my preparations to attack the enemy to-morrow morning, but a terrible storm of freezing rain has come on to-day, which will make it impossible for our men to fight at any advantage. I am therefore compelled to wait for the storm to break, and make the attack immediately after. Admiral Lee is patrolling the river above and below the city, and I believe will be able to prevent the enemy from crossing. There is no doubt but that Hood's forces are considerably scattered along the river with the view of attempting to cross, but it has been impossible for me to organize and equip troops for an attack at an earlier moment. General Halleck informs me you are much dissatisfied with my delay in attacking. I can only say I have done all in my power to prepare, and if you shall deem it necessary to relieve me, I shall submit without a murmur.’ It is impossible not to admire the spirit that prompted these words, however much one may regret the peculiarities that made them necessary. Thomas was aware that his delay was greatly in opposition to the views of his chief and to the wishes of the government; he was aware that to neither did the delay seem necessary: he was conscious that it was a positive disobedience of orders, and might be visited, according to military rule, with that severest of punishments to a soldier, removal from command in the presence of the enemy. Yet he could not bring himself to act contrary to his own judgment and instincts, and [244] deliberately suggested to his superiors the fate, which he declares he should submit to without a murmur. There is a determination and unselfishness combined in all this amounting to magnanimity.

But the high-mindedness was not all on one side. Halleck read the message as it passed through Washington, and telegraphed to Grant at four P. M., on the 9th: ‘Orders relieving General Thomas had been made out, when his telegram of this P. M. was received. If you still wish these orders telegraphed to Nashville, they will be forwarded.’ Grant replied at 5.30 P. M. ‘General Thomas has been urged in every possible way to attack the enemy, even to giving the positive order. He did say he thought he should be able to attack on the 7th, but he did not do so, nor has he given a reason for not doing it. I am very unwilling to do injustice to an officer who has done as much good service as General Thomas, however, and will therefore suspend the order until it is seen whether he will do anything.’ To Thomas himself, at 7.30 P. M.., he said: ‘Your despatch of one P. M. received. I have as much confidence in your conducting a battle rightly as I have in any other officer. But it has seemed to me that you have been slow, and I have had no explanation of affairs to convince me otherwise. Receiving your despatch of two P. M. from General Halleck before I did the one to me, I telegraphed to suspend the order relieving you until we should hear further. I hope most sincerely that there will be no necessity of repeating the order, and that the facts will show that you have been right all the time.’ It would be difficult for a superior to show greater consideration for a subordinate, [245] when they differed in judgment at a momentous crisis, than to hope, and to state the hope, that the man who persisted in disobeying might prove to have been right all the time.

Thomas replied at 11.30 P. M.,¹² the same night: ‘Your despatch of 7.30 P. M.. is just received. I can only say in further extenuation why I have not attacked Hood, that I could not concentrate my troops and get their transportation in order in shorter time than it has been done; and am satisfied I have made every effort that was possible to complete the task.’ Still he did not attack.

At 9.30 P. Mr. he telegraphed to Halleck: ‘There is no perceptible change in the appearance of the enemy's line to-day. Have heard from Cumberland, between Harpeth and Clarksville. There are no indications of any preparation on the part of the enemy to cross. The storm continues.’

On the 10th, no despatches passed between Thomas and either Grant or the government; but on that day the general-in-chief directed Halleck: ‘I think it probably will be better to bring Winslow's cavalry to Thomas, until Hood is driven out. So much seems to be awaiting the raising of a cavalry force, that everything should be done to supply this want.’ Hearing nothing whatever from Thomas, at four P. M., on the 11th, Grant telegraphed him once more: ‘If you delay attacking longer, the mortifying spectacle will be witnessed of a rebel army moving for the Ohio river, and you will be forced to act, accepting such weather as you find. Let there be no further [246] delay. Hood cannot even stand a drawn battle, so far from his supplies of ordnance stores. If he retreats and you follow, he must lose the material, and much of his army. I am in hopes of receiving a despatch from you to-day, announcing that you have moved. Delay no longer, for weather, or reinforcements.’

Butler had not yet started for the Cape Fear river; and to him also on this day Grant was obliged to say: ‘Richmond papers of the 10th show that on the 7th, Sherman was east of the Ogeechee, and within twenty-five miles of Savannah, having marched eighteen miles the day before. If you do not get off immediately, you will lose the chance of surprise and weak garrison.’

Good news, however, came in from Warren. He had completely destroyed the railroad, from the Nottoway river to Hicksford, meeting with only trifling opposition The weather had been bad, and marching and working were difficult; but he was now on his return to Meade. Upon the receipt of this news, Grant telegraphed to Sheridan: ‘The inhabitants of Richmond are supplied exclusively over the roads north of James river. If it is possible to destroy the Virginia Central road, it will go far towards starving out the garrison of Richmond. The Weldon road has been largely used until now, notwithstanding it has been cut to Stony creek. It is now gone to Hicksford, and I think can be of no further use. If the enemy are known to have retired to Staunton, you will either be able to make a dash on his communications, north of the James, or spare a part of your force.’ [247]

On the 11th, at 9.30 P. M., Thomas telegraphed to Halleck: ‘The position of the enemy appears the same to-day as yesterday. Weather continues very cold, and the hills are covered with ice. As soon as we have a thaw, I will attack Hood.’ In the same despatch he reported that a force of between two and three thousand rebels had crossed the Cumberland river, and were supposed to be moving northward, towards Bowling Green. Thomas had sent two brigades of cavalry after them. A rebel attack had also been made on Murfreesboroa, but repelled. Thus Hood had become bold enough to throw large detachments of infantry and cavalry both to the north and south of Nashville, and in spite of the storms and ice that held Thomas fast, the rebel troops were in constant motion.

At 10.30 P. M. this night, Thomas replied to Grant's order for an immediate attack: ‘Your despatch of four P. M.. this day is just received. Will obey the order as promptly as possible, however much I may regret it, as the attack will have to be made under every disadvantage. The whole country is covered with a perfect sheet of ice and sleet, and it is with difficulty the troops are able to move about on level ground. It was my intention to attack Hood as soon as the ice melted, and would have done so yesterday, had it not been for the storm.’ He nevertheless did not obey, but on the 12th, at 10.30 P. M., he still continued: ‘I have the troops ready to make an attack on the enemy, as soon as the sleet which now covers the ground has melted sufficiently to enable men to march; as the whole country is [248] now covered with a sheet of ice so hard and slippery, it is utterly impossible for troops to ascend steeps, or even move over level ground in anything like order. It has taken the entire day to place my cavalry in position, and it has only finally been accomplished, with imminent risk and many serious accidents, resulting from the number of horses falling with their riders on the roads. Under these circumstances, I believe an attack at this time would only result in an useless sacrifice of life.’ On the 13th, again: ‘There is no change in the weather, and as soon as there is, I shall move against the enemy, as everything is ready and prepared to assume the offensive.’

On the 14th, at 12.30 P. M., Halleck telegraphed, without Grant's knowledge, but doubtless by the order of the President or the Secretary of War: ‘It has been seriously apprehended that while Hood, with a part of his forces, held you in check near Nashville, he would have time to co-operate against other important points left only partially protected. Hence, Lieutenant-General Grant was anxious that you should attack the rebel forces in your front, and expresses great dissatisfaction that his order had not been carried out. Moreover, so long as Hood occupies a threatening position in Tennessee, General Canby is obliged to keep large forces on the Mississippi river, to protect its navigation, and to hold Memphis, Vicksburg, etc., although General Grant had directed a part of these forces to co-operate with Sherman. Every day's delay on your part, therefore, seriously interferes with General Grant's plans.’ To this Thomas replied at eight P. M.: ‘Your telegram of 12.30 P. M. to-day [249] received. The ice having melted away to-day, the enemy will be attacked to-morrow morning. Much as I regret the apparent delay in attacking the enemy, it could not have been done before with any reasonable prospect of success.’

But before these two despatches were exchanged, Grant had given up all hope of inducing Thomas to move. Major-General Logan was at this time visiting the Headquarters of the army, and as Grant knew him to be a good fighter, an order was made out for him to proceed to Nashville. He was informed that he was to take command of the army of the Cumberland, provided that on his arrival, Thomas had still made no advance; but Grant intended to proceed himself to the West, and assume control in person of all the operations there. He started from City Point, for this purpose, on the night of the 14th of December; but on arriving at Washington, on the 15th, was met by the news that Thomas had attacked Hood and driven him on the Franklin road, a distance of nearly eight miles.

Nashville lies in one of the numerous bends of the Cumberland river, surrounded by steep and rugged hills, eminently suited for the operations of a siege. Thomas's entrenchments were on the southern side, extending across the bend, and along the crest of one of these ridges. Hood's lines were immediately opposite, on another range, somewhat lower than the national position, but otherwise equally well-situated. A combination of roads from the south centres within the town, converging, like the sticks of an open fan. The principal ones, beginning on the national right, are the Charlotte, [250] Hardin, Hillsboroa, Granny White, Franklin, Nolensville, and Murfreesboroa roads. Besides these, the three railroads to Johnsonville, Decatur, and Chattanooga, all meet at Nashville, but all were controlled by the rebels. The Cumberland river was also closed above and below the town, and Thomas's only avenue of communication was towards the north.

To the south, the hills are higher and steeper, as you advance, and at Brentwood, ten miles from Nashville, they become precipitous, and are only penetrated by narrow gaps, through which the Franklin and Granny White roads are carried. In case of a rebel disaster, these two roads would become of immense importance, for they would constitute Hood's only possible line of retreat; and even they soon unite, the Granny White entering the Franklin road, south of the Brentwood Hills. Hood drew abundance of food and forage from the country, but all of his ordnance came by the Decatur railroad, which was open from the rebel rear to Pulaski; at the latter point there was an interval unrepaired, but from Cherokee the road was unbroken, to the interior of Mississippi and Alabama.

On the 14th of December, Forrest was still in the neighborhood of Murfreesboroa, with two divisions of cavalry, and two brigades of infantry. The remainder of Hood's command lay in front of Nashville, the right wing under Cheatham, the left under Stewart, while S. D. Lee had the centre, across the Franklin road; the flanks extended to the river on either side, and a little west of the centre a salient projected to a point within six [251] hundred yards of the national line: this work was admirably situated on a prominence known as Montgomery Hill, commanding the Granny White road. On the national side, Thomas had placed Steedman on the extreme left; Wood, with the Fourth corps, was at the centre, in front of Montgomery Hill; and A. J. Smith had the right. Schofield was held in reserve, ready to support the left of Wood, and the cavalry, which had hitherto guarded the flanks, was now massed on the right of Smith. The interior works were manned by quartermasters' employes, so that all the enlisted troops of the command could be put into action. Thomas's infantry was now fifty-five thousand strong; Hood's, about twenty-two thousand. The national cavalry in front of Nashville numbered twelve thousand men; the rebel, seventeen hundred.¹³ [252] There is hardly another instance in war of a general with a force so large as Thomas commanded, allowing himself to be beleaguered so long by an army of less than half his numbers.

Hood seems to have had no designs, after once reaching Nashville. His despatches and reports give no inkling of any settled purpose, except that he hoped to recruit his army by conscriptions in Kentucky and Tennessee, ‘in time for a spring campaign.’ He suggested also that the Trans-Mississippi troops should be sent to him, but he gave no order to Forrest to cross the Cumberland river, and he made no preparation himself for such a move. The boldness that inspired the conception of his campaign entirely disappeared in the execution. It is possible that the failures at Spring Hill and Franklin had convinced the rebel commander that his army was unfit or unprepared for aggressive operations; and he was perhaps deceived by Thomas's inertness, and fancied that he should be allowed to remain before Nashville until reinforcements could be found and forwarded to him. He certainly flattered himself that he could resist assault. On the 11th of December, he wrote to his superiors: ‘I think the position of this army is now such as to force the enemy to take the initiative.’ In this, at least, he was not deceived.

On the afternoon of the 14th of December, Thomas called a meeting of his corps commanders, and discussed with them his plan of battle. Steedman, on the left, was ordered to make a demonstration east of the Nolensville road, while to Smith, on the right, was entrusted a vigorous assault against the enemy's left, from the direction of the Hardin [253] road. Wood, at the centre, was to support Smith's left, on the Hillsboroa road, and operate against the rebel advanced position on Montgomery Hill. Wilson was ordered to send one division of cavalry by the Charlotte road, to protect the right rear of the army, and with the remainder of his force, support the movement of Smith, while Schofield was still held somewhat in reserve, but instructed to cooperate with Wood, at the centre of the line. The plan was simple, but well designed; a heavy demonstration on the left, and under cover of this, a grand turning movement and assault from the right, supported by the centre and reserve. As in all of Thomas's operations, every commander had his work laid out, and every contingency was cared for in advance. He left nothing to chance. In the event of bad weather, the attack was to be still longer deferred.

On the morning of the 15th, however, the weather was favorable, and the troops were in motion at an early hour. The formations were partially concealed from the enemy by the broken nature of the ground, as well as by a dense fog, which hung close to the earth till noon. Under this double cover, Smith and Wilson advanced along the Charlotte and Hardin roads, Smith moving in echelon, so as to facilitate the turning movement, and Wilson on his right. As soon as these troops had taken position, Steedman was ordered to make his demonstration on the extreme left. He succeeded, with some difficulty and loss, in drawing the enemy's attention to that portion of the field; and when this was apparent, Smith and Wilson began the grand movement of the day, [254] wheeling to the right, sweeping around the left flank of Hood's position, and crossing the Hardin and Hillsboroa roads. The cavalry was dismounted, and first struck the enemy, driving him rapidly back, and capturing a redoubt with four guns, which were quickly turned upon the rebel line. McArthur's division, of Smith's command, participated in this assault, vying with the cavalry. A second redoubt, stronger than the first, was next assailed, and carried; four more guns and three hundred prisoners were captured, the cavalry and infantry reaching the position simultaneously, and both laying claim to the artillery and the prisoners.

Smith, however, had not taken ground as far to the right as had been expected, and Thomas now ordered Schofield to move from his position, in reserve, to the right of Smith, and thus enable the cavalry to operate more freely towards the enemy's rear. The movement was rapidly accomplished, and Schofield's troops participated in all the subsequent operations on this flank.

Meanwhile, as soon as Smith had struck the rebel left, Wood, at the centre, assaulted Montgomery Hill, and carried the entire rebel line in his front, capturing several pieces of artillery, and five hundred prisoners. The enemy was thus driven completely out of his original line of works, and forced back to a second range of hills, still holding, however, his line of retreat by the Franklin and Granny White roads.

At nightfall, Thomas readjusted his line, which now ran parallel to and east of the Hillsboroa road; Schofield was on the national right, Smith at the centre, and Wood on the left; while the cavalry remained [255] on the right of Schofield, and Steedman a little in advance of the position he held in the morning. The total result of the day's operations was the capture of sixteen guns and twelve hundred prisoners, and the forcing back of the enemy's line. The casualties on both sides were extremely light. Thomas's entire command bivouacked in line of battle, on the ground occupied at dark, and prepared to renew the attack in the morning. During the night the enemy's line was shortened, and his left thrown back. As the principal national attack was evidently directed against Hood's left, Cheatham's corps was passed from the right to the left of the rebel army, leaving Lee on the new right, who had previously held the centre; while Stewart, who had before been on Hood's left, now became the centre of the line.

At six o'clock on the morning of the 16th, Wood pressed back the rebel skirmishers across the Franklin road; and swinging lightly to the right, advanced due south from Nashville, driving the enemy before him, till he came to a new work constructed during the night. This was about five miles south of the city, on Overton Hill, east of the Franklin road. Steedman at the same time moved out by the Nolensville road, securing Wood's left flank, while Smith established connection on the right of the Fourth corps, and completed the new line of battle. Schofield remained in the position taken the day before, facing east, and looking to the enemy's left flank; while Wilson's dismounted cavalry was again formed on the right of Schofield's command. By noon, the cavalry had succeeded in gaining the enemy's rear, and stretched across the [256] Granny White road, one of Hood's two outlets to Franklin.

As soon as these dispositions were complete, and Thomas had visited in person the different commands, he directed the movement against the rebel left to be continued. The entire national line now approached within six hundred yards of the enemy at all points. The rebel centre was weak, but Hood was strong both on the right at Overton Hill, and at the left on the heights bordering the Granny White road. Still, Thomas had hopes of gaining Hood's rear, and cutting off his retreat to Franklin. At about three P. M., two brigades of Wood's command, and one of colored troops from Steedman's force, were ordered to assault the position at Overton Hill. The ground on which the columns were formed was open, and exposed to the view of the enemy, and the assault was met by a tremendous fire of canister and musketry. The men, nevertheless, moved steadily up the hill till near the crest, when the rebel reserves arose, and poured into the advancing column a withering fire. The troops first wavered, then halted, and at last fell back, leaving their dead and wounded in the abatis, black and white indiscriminately mingled. Wood, however, re-formed his troops in the position they had occupied before the assault.

About this time, McArthur, in command of one of Smith's divisions, sent word that he could carry the hill on his right, by assault. Thomas was with Smith when the message arrived, and it was referred to him for decision. He, with his usual caution, directed Smith to delay the movement till Schofield could be heard from, on the right. McArthur, however, receiving no reply, and fearing if he longer [257] delayed, that the enemy would strengthen his works —advanced without orders.¹⁴ The troops pressed on with splendid ardor, sweeping up the hill, through mud and thickets, and over stone walls and earthworks. ‘Powder and lead,’ said the rebels, ‘could not resist such a charge.’ Prisoners were taken by the regiment, and artillery, by batteries.

Immediately, Smith and Schofield moved their entire commands, and carried everything before them. A panic seized the rebel left; the line was broken irreparably in a dozen places; literally, all the artillery and thousands of prisoners were captured. Wilson's cavalry, still dismounted, had advanced simultaneously with Schofield and Smith; and striking the rebels in rear, they now gained firm possession of the Granny White road, and completely cut off that line of retreat from the enemy. At the same time Wood and Steedman's troops, hearing the shouts of victory from the right, rushed impetuously forward, renewed the assault on Overton Hill, and though meeting still a heavy fire, their onset was irresistible. The rebel troops, hopelessly broken, fled in confusion on the Franklin road, and all efforts to re-form them were fruitless. The Fourth corps followed in close pursuit for several miles, till darkness intervened to save the fugitives. [258]

Meanwhile, Wilson had hastily mounted two divisions of his command, and directed them to move along the Granny White road, so as to reach Franklin in advance of the flying enemy. But the troops had pushed on so far, dismounted, that time was necessarily lost before the horses could be brought up. The column then pushed on, but had not proceeded more than a mile when the advance came upon the rebel cavalry posted across the road, behind barricades. The command was again dismounted, and a battle ensued after dark. The rebels were scattered in all directions, but the delay was of inestimable value to the routed army. It saved Hood from annihilation, for Wilson proceeded no further, but went into bivouac, while the rebels continued their flight on the Franklin road. A victorious army seldom equals a routed one, in speed.

At Brentwood, about four miles from his line of battle on the morning of the 16th, Hood was first able to collect some of his scattered troops, and S. D. Lee took command of the rear-guard, camping for the night in the neighborhood of the Brentwood Hills, which were filled with fugitives, unable to escape by the roads. The enemy had abandoned all his dead and wounded on the field. Four thousand four hundred and sixty-two prisoners were taken during the two days battle, and fifty-three pieces of cannon. When the rebel guns were placed in position on the night of the 15th, the horses had been sent to the rear, and the giving way of the lines was so sudden that it was impossible to remove the artillery. The killed and wounded were not numerous on either side; for after the first break in front of Smith, [259] there was no severe fighting. It was no longer a battle, but a rout.

At daylight on the 17th, the pursuit was resumed. The Fourth corps pushed on by the direct Franklin road, and the cavalry moved by the Granny White, to its intersection with the Franklin turnpike, and then took the advance. Wilson now sent one division, under Johnson, to the right, on the Hillsboroa road, with directions to cross the Harpeth river and move rapidly to Franklin, in advance of the enemy. In the meantime, the main column came up with Hood's rear-guard, four miles north of Franklin, and pressed with great boldness and activity, repeatedly charging the infantry with the sabre, and several times quite penetrating the lines. The rebels now fell back across the Harpeth, and Johnson's division coming up on the southern side, compelled them to retire altogether from the river banks; the cavalry then took possession of Franklin, capturing two thousand wounded. On the night of the 17th, the rebels encamped at Spring Hill, and on the 18th, Hood continued his retreat across the Duck river, to Columbia.

On leaving the field on the 16th, the rebel general had dispatched an officer to notify Forrest of the disaster, and directed him to rejoin the army with as little delay as possible, and protect the rear; but Forrest was detained by swollen streams, and unable to overtake the infantry until the night of the 18th, at Columbia. Even after his defeat, Hood at first had hoped to remain in Tennessee, on the line of the Duck river, but at Columbia he became convinced that the condition of his army made it [260] necessary to re-cross the Tennessee river without delay.¹⁵

But just here the pursuit was interrupted for three days. On the 18th, the national cavalry arrived at Rutherford's creek, three miles north of Columbia; but the rains were falling heavily, and the stream was swollen; the bridges were destroyed, and the pontoons had been sent by mistake on the Murfreesboroa road. The whole country was inundated, and the roads were almost impassable; nevertheless, the army crossed the Harpeth, and Wood's corps closed up with the cavalry. It was not, however, till the 20th, that a floating bridge could be constructed out of the wreck of the old railroad bridge. Hatch's division of cavalry at once crossed Rutherford creek, but found on reaching Duck river that the enemy had already passed all his infantry, and removed his pontoon train. Duck river was a torrent, and another bridge must be laid. The pontoons had now arrived, but the weather had changed from dismal rain to bitter cold, and the colored troops employed in laying the bridges were half frozen as they worked in the stream. This occasioned further delay.

It was not till the 22nd that Wilson and Wood were ordered forward, the infantry moving by the main road, and the cavalry on either flank, in the fields. Smith and Schofield marched more leisurely behind. Forrest was now in command of the rebel rear-guard, composed of what was left of his cavalry, and five brigades of infantry, altogether about five thousand men. The inclemency of the weather was at this time the cause of great suffering in both [261] armies. In both armies also there was lack of food, for the supply trains were impeded by the wretched condition of the roads. The horses had to be pushed up to their knees and often to their bellies through slush and mud; while the men marched slowly, with sleet and snow beating on their heads and shoulders, and sometimes waded waist-deep in the ice-cold streams. The flying troops, besides, were often shoeless. The rebel army of Tennessee had become a disheartened and disorganized rabble of halfarmed and half-clad men; the principal part of Hood's ordnance had already been abandoned, and at Pulaski, where the roads became altogether impracticable for wheels, a further quantity of ammunition was destroyed. The country was strewn with abandoned wagons, limbers, blankets, and smallarms, from Nashville to the Tennessee river. Nevertheless, the rebel rear-guard was undaunted and firm, and did its work to the last. It frequently delayed the advance of the national cavalry, and never allowed Wilson again to strike the main command. Twice, in narrow gorges, Forrest made a stand, where a few hundred men were able to obstruct a division, and under cover of this resistance, the fugitive army moved off. He was once even able to capture a gun from his pursuers, which was not regained.

From Pulaski, Hood moved by the most direct roads to Bainbridge, on the Tennessee river. Wood's corps kept well closed up with the cavalry, but Smith followed no further than Pulaski, and Schofield remained at Columbia. On the 27th of December, the whole rebel army, including the rearguard, crossed the Tennessee river, and on the 28th, Thomas directed further pursuit to cease. On that [262] day, the advanced guard of the cavalry reached the Tennessee, just in time to see the rebel pontoons swing to the other side.¹⁶

The news of the first day's battle at Nashville reached Grant as he stepped from the steamer at Washington, and he telegraphed at once to Thomas: ‘11.30 P. M.: I was just on my way to Nashville, but receiving a despatch from Van Duzer, detailing your splendid success of to-day, I shall go no further. Push the enemy now, and give him no rest till he is entirely destroyed. Your army will cheerfully suffer many privations to break up Hood's army and render it unfit for future operations. Do not stop for trains or supplies, but take them from the country, as the enemy has done. Much is now expected.’ Half an hour later, Thomas himself reported: ‘Attacked enemy's left this morning. Drove it from the river very nearly to Franklin Pike. Distance, about eight miles.’ To this Grant replied at midnight: ‘Your despatch of this evening just received. I congratulate you and the army under your command for to-day's operations, and feel a conviction that to-morrow will add more fruits to your victory.’ Lincoln and Stanton also sent messages of congratulation and encouragement. The President declared: ‘You have made a magnificent beginning. A grand consummation is within your reach.’ He added: ‘Do not let it slip.’

No further news from Tennessee arrived till the 17th, when a long despatch from Thomas was [263] received, dated: ‘Six miles from Nashville,’ and giving full details of the victory. This day the good news came in fast, for despatches were also brought from Sherman. He had reached the coast, carried Fort McAllister, opened Ossabaw Sound, communicated with the fleet, and invested Savannah. On the 18th, Grant congratulated both his generals.

To Sherman he wrote: ‘I have just received.. and read, I need not tell you with how much gratification, your letter to General Halleck. I congratulate you and the brave officers and men under your command, on the successful termination of your most brilliant campaign. I never had a doubt of the result. When apprehensions for your safety were expressed by the President, I assured him that with the army you had, and you in command of it, there was no danger but that you would strike bottom, on salt water, some place; that I would not feel the same confidence and security—in fact, would not have entrusted the expedition to any other living commander.’ Then reverting to the Tennessee campaign, he continued: ‘It has been hard work to get Thomas to attack Hood. I gave him the most peremptory order, and had started to go there myself before he got off. He has done magnificently, however, since he started.’

The same day came a second despatch from Sherman, dated December 12, in which he said: ‘I am. . somewhat astonished at the attitude of things in Tennessee. I purposely delayed at Kingston, until General Thomas assured me he was all ready; and my last despatch from him of the 12th November was full of confidence; in this he promised me that he would “ruin Hood,” if he dared to advance from Florence urging me to go [264] ahead and give myself no concern about Hood's army in Tennessee. Why he did not turn on Hood at Franklin, after checking him and discomfiting him, surpasses my understanding. Indeed, I do not approve of his evacuating Decatur, but think he should have assumed the offensive against Hood from Pulaski, in the direction of Waynesboroa. I know full well that General Thomas is slow in mind and in action, but he is judicious and brave, and the troops have great confidence in him. I still hope that he may out manoeuvre Hood.’

Meanwhile, Logan had arrived at Louisville, on his way to Nashville, and receiving the news of the victory, he telegraphed at once to Grant: ‘Just arrived. . . People here jubilant over Thomas's success. Confidence seems to be restored. I will remain here to hear from you. All things going right, it would seem best that I return soon to join my command with Sherman.’ Grant replied: ‘The news from Thomas is in the highest sense gratifying. You need not go further.’

On the 18th, the general-in-chief said to Thomas: ‘The armies operating against Richmond have fired two hundred guns in honor of your great victory. . . In all your operations we hear nothing of Forrest. Great precautions should be taken to prevent him crossing the Cumberland or Tennessee rivers below Eastport. After Hood is driven as far as possible to follow him, you want to reoccupy Decatur and all other abandoned points.’ Thomas replied the same day: ‘I have already given orders to have Decatur occupied, and also to throw a strong column on south side of Tennessee river, for the purpose of capturing Hood's depot there, if possible, and gaining [265] possession of his pontoon bridge.’ This column was Steedman's, which was sent on the 18th, by way of Murfreesboroa, and thence by rail to the Tennessee. Thomas had also requested Admiral Lee, in command of the gunboat fleet at the West, to proceed up the Tennessee to Florence and Eastport, and prevent the laying of pontoons there, or destroy the bridge, if one should have been already laid. At the same time he reported the attack on Murfreesboro, which had been made before the battle of Nashville, and in which Forrest had been repelled.

On the 19th, the Secretary of War proposed to confer on Thomas the vacant major-generalcy in the regular army, and the general-in-chief replied: ‘I think Thomas has won the major-generalcy, but I would wait a few days before giving it, to see the extent of damage done.’ This day Thomas declared ‘If the expedition against Florence be successful, I am confident we shall be able to capture the greater part of Hood's army.’ ‘I feel the utmost confidence we shall be able to overtake him, before he can reach and cross the Tennessee.’

But on the 21st, came news of the delay in crossing Duck river, and Halleck now sent a despatch to Thomas without instructions from Grant, but doubtless by order of either the President or the Secretary of War, urging the importance of hot pursuit of Hood's army. ‘Every possible sacrifice should be made, and your men for a few days will submit to any hardships and privations to accomplish the great result. . . A most vigorous pursuit on your part is, therefore, of vital importance. . . No [266] sacrifice must be spared to obtain so important a result.’

Thomas was evidently hurt by the persistent goading, and replied to Halleck at length, and with spirit: ‘Your despatch of 12 A. M. this day is received. General Hood is being pursued as rapidly and as vigorously as it is possible for one army to pursue another. We cannot control the elements, and you must remember that, to resist Hood's advance into Tennessee, I had to reorganize and almost thoroughly equip the force under my command. I fought the battles of the 15th and 16th insts with the troops but partially equipped, and, notwithstanding the inclemency of the weather and the partial equipment, have been enabled to drive the enemy beyond Duck river, crossing two streams with my troops, and driving the enemy from position to position, without the aid of pontoons, and with but little transportation to bring up supplies of provisions and ammunition. I am doing all in my power to crush Hood's army, and if it be possible, will destroy it. But pursuing an enemy through an exhausted country, over mud roads completely sogged with heavy rains, is no child's play, and cannot be accomplished as quickly as thought of. I hope, in urging me to push the enemy, the Department remembers that General Sherman took with him the complete organization of the Military Division of the Mississippi, well supplied in every respect, as regards ammunition, supplies, and transportation, leaving me only two corps, partially stripped of their transportation, to accommodate the force taken with him, to oppose the advance into Tennessee of that army which had resisted the advance of the army of the [267] Military Division of the Mississippi on Atlanta, from the commencement of the campaign till its close, and which is now in addition aided by Forrest's cavalry. Although my progress may appear slow, I feel assured Hood's army can be driven from Tennessee, and eventually driven to the wall by the force under my command. But too much must not be expected of troops which have to be reorganized, especially when they have the task of destroying a force, in a winter's campaign, which was able to make an obstinate resistance to twice its numbers, in spring and summer. In conclusion, I can safely state that this army is willing to submit to any sacrifice to oust Hood's army, or to strike any other blow which may contribute to the destruction of the rebellion.’

The defence was eloquent, but on one or two points hardly fair. Sherman left Thomas much more than two corps, as has been repeatedly shown; and Thomas had been, since the 3rd of October, in command of all the district north of the Tennessee. His Headquarters were established at the greatest depot west of the Alleghanies, where thousands of quartermasters' employes were at his disposal to provide transportation, and every facility was afforded for supplying and equipping his troops. Few armies during the war were better furnished than that which fought so successfully at Nashville. It was to ensure this readiness that Thomas had so persistently retreated and delayed; and during the few days before the battle, he had himself repeatedly assured the general-in-chief that he was entirely ready for offensive operations, and waited only for favorable weather. The completeness of his success demonstrates [268] that he was ready. As to the willingness of both Thomas and his army to make every sacrifice and every effort, that had been displayed on many fields, but never more conspicuously than in this campaign. Nothing was at fault but the disposition for elaborate preparation which, at all times, and under all circumstances, was so marked a feature of Thomas's character.

Grant had not stinted his acknowledgments of the brilliant success which had already been attained, but he was most anxious to secure the greatest possible result, and when this dispatch was received, he telegraphed at once to Thomas: ‘You have the congratulations of the public for the energy with which you are pushing Hood. I hope you will succeed in reaching his pontoon bridge at Tuscumbia, before he gets there. Should you do so, it looks to me that Hood is cut off. If you succeed in destroying Hood's army, there will be but one army left to the so-called Confederacy, capable of doing us any harm. I will take care of this, and try to draw the sting from it, so that in the spring we shall have easy sailing. You have now a big opportunity, which I know you are availing yourself of. Let us push and do all we can, before the enemy can derive benefit, either from the raising of negro troops on the plantations, or the concentration of white troops now in the field.’

On the 23rd, he said to Stanton: ‘I think it would be appropriate now to confer on General Thomas the vacant major-generalcy in the regular army. He seems to be pushing Hood with energy, and I doubt not he will completely destroy that army.’ The appointment was made the next day. [269]

On the 24th, Thomas replied to Grant: ‘Your telegram of 22nd is just received. I am now, and shall continue to push Hood as rapidly as the state of the weather and roads will permit. I am really very hopeful that either General Steedman or Admiral Lee will reach the Tennessee in time to destroy Hood's pontoon bridge, in which event I shall certainly be able to capture or destroy almost the entire army now with Hood.’

Steedman, however, had not proceeded further than Decatur, when he learned that the rebels had re-crossed the Tennessee. Admiral Lee also reached and held Florence, but owing to the falling of the water, his gunboats could ascend no higher; and Hood made his crossing at Bainbridge, eight miles above Florence, with Lee and the national fleet on the right, Steedman on the left, and Wilson and Wood in his rear. So liable are the best combinations in war to be intercepted and marred. As if to complete the mockery of events, the rebel pontoon train was captured, after the enemy had crossed. A cavalry force of six hundred men, from Steedman's command, overtook and destroyed it, on the 31st of December, at a distance of two hundred miles from Nashville. This was the last blow of the campaign.

Thomas now directed A. J. Smith to take position at Eastport; Wood was to concentrate his troops at Huntsville and Athens, in Alabama; Schofield was ordered back to Dalton, on the Chattanooga railroad, and Wilson to send one division of cavalry to Eastport, and concentrate the remainder at Huntsville. The different commands were to go into winter quarters, and ‘recuperate, for [270] the spring campaign.’ These dispositions, however, were not approved by the general-in-chief, and Thomas was promptly notified that it was not intended his army should go into winter quarters.

Hood had moved from the Tennessee on the 21st of November, at the head of a compact and veteran army, reinforced by the finest body of cavalry in the rebel service; boasting that he was about to redeem Kentucky and Tennessee, and threatening to carry the war into the North. When he re-crossed the same river thirty-six days later, half of his force had been absolutely destroyed; and the remainder, defeated, disorganized, shattered beyond recovery, was flying in dismay before its conquerors. Thomas had captured, in the same period, thirteen thousand one hundred and eighty-nine prisoners, and seventy-two pieces of serviceable artillery; two thousand deserters had also given themselves up, and taken the oath of allegiance to the government; and when Hood reached Northern Mississippi, a large proportion of his troops were furloughed, and went to their homes. In January he was superseded by General Richard Taylor, and what was left of the rebel army of Tennessee was shortly afterwards transferred to the Atlantic coast, to oppose the advance of Sherman. In all the region between the Mississippi river and Virginia, there was then no formidable organized force to oppose the national armies. Thomas's entire loss, during the campaign, did not exceed ten thousand men, in killed, wounded, and missing; and half of the wounded were speedily able to return to the ranks.

The expedition into Tennessee was conceived by [271] Hood, but approved by Jefferson Davis and Beauregard. The design avowedly was, either to force Sherman to fall back from Atlanta to Chattanooga, or, failing in this, to crush the force that was left behind, and at least secure Nashville and large reinforcements and supplies. Even more than this, however, was generally expected, and the invasion of Kentucky and of the country beyond the Ohio was confidently anticipated by the greater part of the rebel army.

Hood's first blunder undoubtedly consisted in remaining three weeks on the Tennessee, and allowing Thomas time to collect his scattered commands. After this, he was six days marching to Columbia, and at Spring Hill his campaign really failed; for here he had the opportunity he sought, of striking Schofield, in motion and in flank, and greatly his inferior in numbers. But from whatever cause, Hood was unable to inflict the blow; and Schofield marched by unhurt, within gun-shot of the rebel army, which bivouacked when it could, and should, have destroyed him. The battle of Franklin, however, was splendidly fought by the rebels; they seemed determined to atone for the fault of the day and the night before. But Schofield was able to hold his own. His position was admirable, his men behaved like heroes; and though the rebels were equally gallant, they were repelled. Hood lost six thousand men in a few hours. This was the deathblow of his army. His men never fought so well again.

Beauregard censured Hood for his course at the beginning of the campaign, and still more severely for his conduct after the repulse at Franklin. ‘It [272] is clear to my mind,’ he said, ‘that after the great loss of life at Franklin, the army was no longer in a condition to make a successful attack on Nashville, a strongly fortified city, defended by an army nearly as strong as our own, and which was being reinforced constantly by river and railroad.’¹⁷ This, it has been seen, was the opinion of both Grant and Sherman; and Schofield wrote, on the 27th of December: ‘By uniting my troops to Stanley's, we were able to hold Hood in check at Columbia . . and Franklin, until General Thomas could concentrate at Nashville, and also to give Hood his death-blow at Franklin. Subsequent operations have shown how little fight was then left in his army, and have taken that little out of it.’

After this, Hood seemed to lose all his skill, and even the boldness, which had previously characterized him, disappeared. He acted as if he had a premonition that his troops would fail him. Doubtless their lack of spirit was apparent to him, and affected him without his knowledge; for commanders receive the impulses of their troops at least as often as they impart their own. At Nashville, the rebels certainly felt that they were outnumbered, and that their chance was gone; and on the night of the 15th of December, Hood made his preparations for retreat, although the issue was yet undecided.¹⁸ The behavior of the troops on the next day is described in caustic terms, not only by Hood himself, but by his corps commanders, in their official reports. After the first break in the line, a panic ensued, and it was [273] impossible to rally the army. These panics, which seized upon veteran troops in the Valley of the Shenandoah and in Tennessee, almost at the same epoch of the war, were doubtless the result of the conviction, gradually pressing itself home to soldiers and civilians at the South, that their cause was hopeless. The all-embracing strategy of Grant, his remorseless energy, his ceaseless attacks, dispirited and unmanned the bravest of his foes. The rank and file of Hood's command had heard that Sherman was penetrating Georgia, while Lee was held at Richmond; they knew of Early's disasters, and felt that even their own success could only delay the inevitable end. When troops are imbued with feelings like these, a slight reverse is easily converted into irremediable ruin.

The condition of the rebel army, however, detracts in no degree from the skill of Thomas or the gallantry of his soldiers at Nashville. After that sturdy commander finally made up his mind to fight, his dispositions were admirable, and he was ably seconded by his generals. Every movement originally planned was carried out, and the battle proceeded by regular steps to its intended consummation. The only material change in the plan consisted in the removal of Schofield from his place in reserve and in rear of Wood, to the point, on the right of Smith, where his presence was more important: and this use of the reserve, though not absolutely designed in advance, was all the more creditable to Thomas, for it showed him able to develop his schemes and adapt them to new and unforeseen emergencies. But though there was development, there was no interruption of his plan. Even the resistance at [274] Overton Hill was anticipated and overcome; it postponed, but did not avert the end, nor did it occasion the slightest change in the instructions to any commander.

The national troops, throughout both days, behaved with splendid steadiness. The rebel works were built on difficult heights, covered with timber, hard to climb, and bristling with artillery; and, notwithstanding Thomas's preponderance in numbers, had the defenders fought with their usual spirit, they must have inflicted terrible loss. But Hood, as well as his men, was cowed. He attempted no counter-move in any direction, and Thomas worked out his schemes as completely and as successfully as if the enemy, too, had been under his orders. It was like one of those lessons in chess, where all is laid down in advance, and each player knows exactly what his antagonist will do. On the night of the 15th, the rebels perceived their situation perfectly; they knew that they were enveloped; that they had but one line of retreat, which Thomas was reaching out to grasp. Yet they were unable to extricate themselves from the web which the national commander was weaving.¹⁹ They were forced to do exactly what Thomas expected and designed.

The victory was as complete as in any battle of the war, and was followed by pursuit, which, for twenty-four hours, was as vigorous as could be desired. Afterwards, the obstacles were provoking, and, for a time, insurmountable. They, indeed, prevented any further important result being reaped from the victory. Hood was driven [275] from Tennessee; but he made up his mind to this at Columbia, where he arrived on the 18th, and after that day, no important captures of guns or prisoners occurred, and no fighting on a scale worthy of record. All the harm was done on the battle-field, or before the rebels reached Columbia. Afterwards, though the national cavalry followed hard, they were never able to recover what was lost, or to bring Hood's main army again to a stand. The elements,—the rain, the snow, the icy streams—did more injury to the enemy than Wilson's pursuing column.

Thomas's strategy in the earlier part of the campaign has already been fully described. It was simply to fall back until he could concentrate his forces, and consider himself strong enough to attack or resist the enemy. It has also been shown that this was contrary to the expectations or wishes of either Grant or Sherman, neither of whom considered the falling back necessary. At any time after the 12th of November, Thomas could have called in his detachments from Chattanooga, Murfreesboroa, and Decatur, leaving the guards at his railroad block-houses, and thus have made up an army of veterans sufficient to have defeated Hood at Pulaski, at Columbia, or Franklin. He, however, preferred to wait at Nashville. This was with no farseeing intention of decoying Hood, of which there is not an intimation in his dispatches, nor a suggestion in his report; but solely from his inveterate disposition to cover every line and hold every point. In consequence, he had not the army in front of Hood which Grant expected and Sherman had arranged. [276]

‘I did not turn my back on Thomas,’ wrote General Sherman, ‘until he himself assured me that he had in hand troops enough to prevent Hood from endangering the national interests in my rear.’²⁰ ‘I have no fear,’ said Thomas to Sherman, on the 12th of November, ‘that Beauregard can do us any harm now, and if he attempts to follow you, I will follow him as far as possible.’ In fact, when Sherman and Thomas first discussed the campaign, and calculated the relative forces, Thomas asked for the Fourth corps only, and Sherman added the Twenty-fourth, to make assurance doubly sure;²¹ and when Sherman started for the coast, Thomas had in hand a force superior by ten thousand to Hood's army. Steedman, and Granger, and Rousseau were all nearer to him than to the enemy—the very men who afterwards overwhelmed, by numbers, the rebel command entrenched before Nashville. There was thus no necessity for the falling back, except what Thomas imposed on himself, by not concentrating earlier.

Still, with this strategy, although it would never have been his own, Grant found no positive fault; for it was possible that the delay made Hood weaker and Thomas stronger, and thus increased the preponderance which rendered victory secure. It was when the troops had been concentrated, and the enemy had been beaten, and Thomas still remained in his fortifications in front of a manifestly inferior army, while the country was anxious and operations elsewhere were dependent on those in Tennessee— [277] it was then that Grant became, first, disturbed, and finally, peremptory.

The event showed how true his instincts and perceptions were. The very completeness of the victory was the best proof that he had been right all the time. The national army which so easily conquered its foe, could have accomplished the same result, had it gone into action immediately after Smith and Steedman arrived. Thomas's success was not at all because of the delay, but in spite of it. All that he gained could have been gained two weeks before, for all that delay secured was a somewhat more efficient cavalry; and Wilson's cavalry was not engaged on either day of the battle, as cavalry. It fought as well as any part of the army, and distinguished itself as greatly; but it fought dismounted, and the horses were, in reality, a weakness, for one man out of four was detained at the rear to hold them. It was of great use as cavalry on the 17th, undoubtedly; acting with boldness and inflicting serious injury; and it certainly hastened the flight of the rebel army: but this, too, could have been accomplished a fortnight earlier; for on the 17th, Forrest had not arrived from Murfreesboroa, and there was only Chalmer's cavalry to oppose, not two thousand strong. Three days were lost at Duck river, and that time was never made up again. There was nothing in what occurred to justify either the long delay, or the anxiety which the delay lad caused. The victory would have been as splendid, and the rout as desperate, had Thomas moved on the day when he was first ordered to advance.

On the other hand, if Hood had displayed the [278] daring which distinguished him in front of Atlanta, or which apparently inspired the conception of this very campaign; if he had realized the expectations of the South, or the fears of the North; if he had acted as half a score of generals, on either side, had acted on half a score of occasions during the war—Grant's apprehensions might have been terribly justified. Had the rebel commander moved to the Ohio, and compelled Thomas to follow, that officer would never have been forgiven. As it was, the rebels lived upon the country for a fortnight;²² they fortified strongly in front of Nashville, and doubled the loss of life that Thomas incurred to oust them; they gave extreme uneasiness to the country and the government, and for a while endangered the success of Grant's plans elsewhere—and all of this might have been saved: the proof of which is that Hood, instead of striking Thomas, remained to receive the blow. The blow, it is true, when it came, was well considered, admirably aimed, perfectly executed, and the result all that had been hoped or desired; but if Grant's other subordinates had taken it upon themselves at critical moments to defy his judgments and disregard his orders, the strategy which gave Thomas the opportunity to strike that blow would have come to naught. No general can count on success when those to whom he entrusts the execution of his plans take it upon themselves to determine that he is wrong. If Thomas's own lieutenants had acted towards him as he did to [279] Grant, the battle of Nashville would have been a rebel triumph.

Grant, however, was the last man to quarrel with victory. He was too much in earnest to care whether it was won in accordance with his own views, or in opposition to them. He sent congratulation after congratulation to Thomas and his soldiers. He recommended him for a major-generalcy in the regular army. He refrained from all censure or reference to his previous course; and there never was a particle of coolness in their relations afterwards.

Grant, indeed, did not regard the inaction of Thomas as defiant or disrespectful. He attributed it to temperament rather than to judgment. For Thomas was always heavy and slow, though powerful. He would never have acted contrary to orders, in a positive matter. He would not have fought against orders, although he delayed in spite of them. He was nicknamed ‘Slow Trot’ at West Point, and his mates in the army used to say: ‘Thomas is too slow to move, but too brave to run away.’ Caution is not always wisdom in war, but his caution and phlegm were combined with vigor, when once aroused. If he had the quality of inertia, he possessed momentum as well. He was like an elephant crossing a bridge, and feeling his way with ponderous feet before every step, but woe to the enemy he met on the opposite side.

Grant knew all this well. The same traits which were exhibited in the Nashville campaign, he had seen evinced at Chattanooga a year before; the same provoking, obstinate delay before the battle, the same splendid, victorious, irresistible energy after [280] wards. He believed, indeed, in Thomas more than Thomas did in himself. The subordinate always shrank from responsibility.²³ He appeared relieved, when Sherman was appointed above him in May, 1864; and he was unwilling at first to be left behind in the very command where he was destined to reap such a harvest of fame. But Grant's confidence in his ability was one reason why he wanted Thomas to fight. He was sure he would win, if once he became engaged.

When the war was over, and the generalin-chief made his formal report of the operations of the year, he at first wrote out an elaborate criticism of Thomas's course; but afterwards determined to refrain from even the appearance of censure of one who had done so well for his country; and instead of dispraise, he declared in so many words, that though his own opinions were unchanged, Thomas's ‘final defeat of Hood was so complete that it would be accepted as a vindication of that distinguished officer's judgment.’

And, indeed, when criticism is spent, the fact remains that Thomas at Nashville did as much to end the rebellion as any one general in any one battle of the war. And in military matters nothing which is successful, is wrong.

After the victory, the revulsion in feeling at the North was marked. The country passed in two days from extreme uneasiness and anxiety to exultation and confidence. The event of the 15th of December dispelled at once all fear of disaster at Nashville, or of the invasion of Kentucky; while that of the 16th [281] announced the overthrow of the rebellion itself at the West, and foreshadowed its speedy and utter annihilation all over the land. Thomas naturally, and appropriately, became one of the heroes of his time, and took his place among the great captains whom the war rendered historical.

1 ‘The plan of campaign into Middle Tennessee was correct, as originally designed by General Hood.’—Beauregard's Endorsement on Hood's Report, January 9, 1865.

2 ‘. . General Stanley's corps being only 12,000 effective, and General Schofield's 10,000 effective. As yet General Wilson can raise only about 3,000 effective cavalry. Grierson's division [of cavalry] is still in Missouri, and the balance of the cavalry belonging to the army of the Cumberland, not having yet received their horses and equipments, at Louisville. I have a force of about 4,000 men at Decatur and on the Memphis and Charleston railroad, which might be made available, if Decatur and that road were abandoned, but as General Sherman is very anxious to have Decatur held if possible, I have kept the force there up to this time. I will, however, if you approve, withdraw and add it to my main force at Columbia, and shall then be, on the arrival of General A. J. Smith with his force, as strong in infantry as the enemy; but his cavalry will greatly outnumber mine, until I can get General Wilson's force back from Louisville.’—Thomas to Halleck, November 21.

Yours of 4 P. M. yesterday just received. Hood's entire army is in front of Columbia, and so greatly outnumbers mine that I am compelled to act on the defensive. None of General Smith's corps have arrived yet, although embarked on Tuesday last. The transportation of Hatch and Grierson's cavalry was ordered by Washburne, I am told, to be turned in at Memphis, which has crippled the only cavalry I have at this time. All of my cavalry were dismounted to furnish horses to Kilpatrick's division, which went with General Sherman. My dismounted cavalry is now detained in Louisville, awaiting arms and horses. Horses arrive slowly; arms have been detained somewhere en route for more than a month. General Grierson has been delayed by conflicting orders in Kansas, and from Memphis. It is impossible to say when he will reach here.
Since being placed in charge of affairs on Tennessee, I have lost nearly 15,000 men, discharged by expiration of service, and permitted to go North: my gain probably 12,000 perfectly raw troops; therefore as the enemy so greatly outnumbers me in both infantry and cavalry, I am compelled for the present to act on the defensive. The moment I can get my cavalry, I will march against Hood. If Forrest can be found, he will be punished.
Thomas to Grant, November 25.

When Thomas says in this despatch ‘all my cavalry was dismounted,’ etc., he must be understood as meaning all the cavalry of the original army of the Cumberland, for on this date he had a cavalry force equipped for duty, of 5,500 men. See his return of November 20.

Wilson distinctly states in his report: ‘All the serviceable horses of McCook's and Garrard's divisions and Colonel Garrard's brigade were turned over to the Third [Kilpatrick's] division, and every effort was made to put it upon a thoroughly efficient footing; while the dismounted men of the First and Second divisions were ordered by rail to Louisville, Kentucky, for removal and equipment.’ These were the only troops dismounted for Sherman.

4 Hood attributed his lack of success entirely to Cheatham's remissness. ‘Major-General Cheatham was ordered at once to attack the enemy vigorously and get possession of this pike [the Franklin road]; yet although these orders were frequently and earnestly repeated, he made but a partial and feeble attack, failing to reach the point indicated. Darkness soon came on, and to our mortification the enemy continued moving along this road, almost in ear-shot, in hurry and confusion nearly the entire night. Thus was lost the opportunity for striking the enemy for which we labored so long, the best which the campaign has offered, and one of the best afforded us during the war. Major-General Cheatham has frankly confessed the error of which he was guilty, and attaches much blame to himself.’—Hood to Beauregard, December 11.

No reason, however, is given by Hood for the failure to attack the column of Schofield after dark.

5 ‘This P. M. I gave the orders to General Steedman, who was at Gowan with 6,000 men [between Chattanooga and Tullahoma], to embark on the railroad cars and come to Nashville immediately, and I presume he will be here by to-morrow morning.’—Thomas to Halleck, November 30.

In his official report, dated January 20, 1865, Thomas puts this force at 5,000; perhaps the colored brigade made up the 6,000.

6 ‘The Fifth division contained at this time but 2,500 men, Croxton's brigade about 1,000, and Capron's 800—in all, about 4,300 men.’—Wilson's Report.

7 ‘At the time of the battle the enemy's loss was known to be severe, and was estimated at 5,000; the exact figures were only obtained, however, on the reoccupation of Franklin by our forces, after the battles of December 15 and 16, at Brentwood Hills, near Nashville, and are given as follows: Buried upon the field, 1,750; disabled and placed in hospital at Franklin, 3,800; which, with the 702 prisoners already reported, make an aggregate loss in Hood's army, of 6,252.’—Thomas's Official Report.

The later rebel estimates do not place their loss at less than 5,000 or 6,000.

8 Thomas had ordered Schofield to fall back, to Nashville, before the battle of Franklin was fought. ‘General Wilson has telegraphed me very fully the movements of the enemy yesterday and this morning. He believes Forrest is aiming to strike this place, while the infantry will move against you, and attempt to get in on your flank. If you discover such to be his intention, you had better cross the Harpeth at Franklin, and then retire along the Franklin pike to this place.’—Thomas to Schofield, Nashville, Nov. 29, 11 P. M.

9 The field returns of Thomas's command for November 30, 1864, show present for duty, equipped:--

Infantry.

	Officers.	Enlisted Men.
Fourth corps	724	15,378
Twenty-third corps	494	10,033
Smith	483	8,284
Steedman	199	6,757
	——	——
	1,900	40,452

Hood's return for December 10 was—Effective total, 23,053.

There is nothing to show that any force was included in Hood's army, outside of this return, except Forrest's cavalry.

10 ‘The enemy still holding Murfreesboroa with some 6,000 troops, Major-General Forrest, with the larger portion of the cavalry and Bates's division of infantry, was sent there to see if it was practicable to take the place.’—Hood to Beauregard, January 9, 1865.

‘On the morning of the 4th I received orders to move with Buford's and Jackson's divisions to Murfreesboro’—Forrest's Report, January 24, 1865.

11 The operators at the different Headquarters were in the habit of sending telegrams to each other, which sometimes conveyed important information, in addition to that communicated by the commanding officers.

12 This despatch has sometimes been published with the date of December 7th, but that given in the text is evidently correct.

13 On the 10th of December Thomas returned present equipped for duty:—

Infantry.

	Officers.	Enlisted Men.
Fourth corps	646	13,526
Twenty-third corps	488	9,719
A. J. Smith	561	9,990
District of Tennessee	637	15,884
District of Etowa	209	7,541
In his entire command		70,272

Hood's effective present, as already shown, was 23,053, including the infantry force at Murfreesboroa.

Wilson states in his official report, that after the battle of Franklin he spent ten days remounting and equipping, and then he had, exclusive of two brigades of the First division, sent towards Bowling Green, nearly 9,000 mounted men; besides these, there were two brigades of 1,500 dismounted men each.

There is no return of Forrest's force other than that already given; but whatever its strength, it was all at Murfreesboroa, with the exception of Chalmer's command.

14 ‘About 3 o'clock P. M. General McArthur sent word that he could carry the hill on his right by assault. Major-General Thomas being present, the matter was referred to him, and I was requested to delay the movement until he could hear from General Schofield, to whom he had sent. General McArthur not receiving any reply, and fearing if the attack should be longer delayed, the enemy would use the night to strengthen his works, directed the first brigade to storm the hill.’—A. J. Smith's Report, January 10, 1865.

15 Hood's Report.

16 My authorities for this account of the battle of Nashville, are almost exclusively the reports of Thomas and Hood, and those of their subordinate commanders. There are no important discrepancies between the statements of rebel and national officers.

17 Beauregard's Endorsement on Hood's Report, January 9, 1865.

18 Reports of Hood's corps commanders.

19 Reports of Hood's corps commanders.

20 General Sherman to Author, February, 1880.

21 Ibid.

22 On the 12th, Forrest destroyed the railroad from Lavergne to Murfreesboroa, and on the 13th, captured a train of 17 cars loaded with 60,000 rations sent from Stevenson, and 200 prisoners.

23 ‘Thomas always shrank from supreme command and consequent responsibility.’—General Sherman to Author, April, 1879.

New York Appleton 1885.

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Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 2

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Chapter 29:

Infantry.

Infantry.