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Chapter 10:
when
Johnson discovered that in spite of all his opposition Reconstruction under
Grant was becoming a reality, he remembered that he had still another weapon in his armory.
It was in his power to remove the
District Commanders and the
Secretary of War—who were now all diligently engaged in the execution of the law.
A wide difference of opinion had early become apparent in
Johnson's Cabinet, the members of which were originally appointed by
Lincoln, but had been retained by his successor.
As soon as the new
President betrayed his antagonism to those who had elected him, four out of his seven Ministers refused to second what they considered his apostacy.
In July, 1866, the
Postmaster-General and the
Secretary of the Interior resigned, and in September they were followed by the
Attorney-General, who was a Southern man, but unable to approve the
President's policy.
Three of those who remained supported
Johnson and became abettors of all his devices and designs.
Seward, the original Republican leader, fell away completely from his old associates;
Welles, a bitter Democrat before the war, returned to his early allies; and
McCulloch, who had never been prominent in politics or public life, decided to retain the place to which he had been elevated on the resignation of a superior.
But
Stanton, the
Secretary of War, the
Minister who had been most important of all, both to
Lincoln and the country, who by his position and ability and energy and
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fidelity had done more than any other civilian except
Lincoln to serve the
State; without whose efforts indeed the
State could hardly have been saved—this man remained in the
Cabinet to oppose what he deemed the dangerous and treasonable projects of the
President.
The relations of
Grant and
Stanton had been peculiar.
They had never met until after the battle of
Chicamauga, when at
Stanton's earnest desire
Grant was placed in command of the
Western armies.
Then an interview of a day occurred when they traveled together from
Indianapolis to
Louisville and discussed the military situation.
After
Grant became
General-in-Chief their intercourse was necessarily constant and confidential, though even then hardly intimate.
In Washington Grant saw more of
Lincoln than of the
Secretary, and his official correspondence with the
Government was always addressed to
Halleck, the
Chief-of-Staff of the army.
They had no personal correspondence, and I doubt if they exchanged a dozen letters in their lives.
Lincoln gave
Grant full liberty in all matters of strategy, and
Stanton never interfered.
When
Grant started on the
Wilderness campaign both of these official superiors assured him that they had no wish to become acquainted with his plans.
But
Stanton, as well as the
President, promised
Grant an absolute support; and he kept his word.
He left nothing undone to uphold the hands of the
General-in-Chief.
He never indeed expressed great admiration for
Grant nor pretended to any especial affection for him, but he was a stanch ally.
The most, and so far as I can recollect, the last he ever said in praise of
Grant was in his comments, published at the time, on the victory at
Donelson.
In his report of the final operations of the war there is not one word commending
Grant.
But he sent him all the men and arms and supplies he required; he made all the assignments of troops and commanders that
Grant requested; he never thwarted one of his plans or interrupted one of his movements.
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There were times when he probably did not concur with
Grant, but he deliberately subordinated his own opinions to those of the soldier on all military points.
Sometimes when
Grant was too far away to be easily reached,
Stanton, probably by
Halleck's advice, made dispositions or appointments that
Grant did not approve, but if subsequently
Grant wished these steps reversed,
Stanton never objected.
During
Early's invasion of
Maryland telegraphic communication between
Washington and
City Point was interrupted for a while, and great confusion and alarm prevailed at the capital.
Several movements were ordered without
Grant's knowledge, all of which proved abortive.
In this emergency
Stanton finally appealed to
Grant.
He directed
Charles A. Dana, then
Assistant Secretary of War, to say to
Grant that unless he gave positive directions and enforced them the result would be ‘deplorable and fatal.’
When
Grant placed
Sheridan in command in the
Valley he did it knowing that his own confidence in that officer's capacity was not shared by the
Government, but neither
Lincoln nor
Stanton interfered, and all this, though
Stanton was an imperious man, fond of power, used to authority, and never doubting his own judgment in civil affairs.
But he had made up his mind to intrust plenary authority to
Grant, and he carried out his intention heartily and absolutely.
Grant fully appreciated this course.
They had one little difference at
Chattanooga when
Stanton insisted on controlling the cipher operator at
Grant's headquarters, but this was soon forgotten; and
Stanton always directed
Grant's telegraphic orders to subordinate commanders to be taken off the wires as they passed through
Washington, so that he might inspect them.
Grant sometimes would have preferred to withhold the information these dispatches contained, lest it should be made public too soon; but
Stanton was within his rights, and the subject was never broached in their correspondence or conversation.
At every serious point their harmony was undisturbed.
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This is the statement
General Grant always made to me. Until the last year of his life he expected and intended my history of his campaigns to be the final authorized expression of his views, and whatever I wrote for that history was submitted to his inspection.
In the winter of 1879 I sent him my account of his relations with
Stanton which is similar to that now given; he found nothing to correct, but replied from
Naples, December 18th: ‘Your chapter on
Stanton is the best pen picture of a historical character I ever read.
I venture to predict that it will be so considered by others when it comes before the public.’
In November, 1864, I accompanied
Grant to
Washington from
City Point.
It was at a time when
Stanton's enemies and rivals were making every effort to procure his removal.
Grant had a long interview with
Lincoln in which they discussed the subject, and the same day he told me what had occurred.
Lincoln, he said, introduced the subject, and promised that if a change took place he would consult
Grant before appointing a new War Minister.
But
Grant at once advised the
President to make no removal.
He declared that no one could be found better fitted for the position; that the ability, energy, and patriotism of
Stanton were undoubted, and as for himself he certainly desired no other superior.
There can be no doubt that the urgency of
Grant on this occasion strengthened
Stanton's hold on the
President.
In March, 1865,
Grant felt a little sore at a sharp message he received through
Stanton, forbidding him to hold any conference with
Lee except on purely military matters, and there were those about him who attributed what they thought an implied rebuke to
Stanton's influence.
But they were wrong; for
Lincoln wrote with his own hand and without suggestion the dispatch that
Stanton forwarded.
But even this produced no ill-feeling between the great patriots who felt that each in his sphere was doing indispensable service to the cause in which they were alike so interested.
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After the war, however,
Stanton assumed all the authority of his office.
When every one else was paying court to
Grant he showed that he thought the
Secretary of War the superior of the
General of the Army.
He gave
Grant orders, as he had a right to do, and always sent for him when he wished to see him officially.
This may have nettled
Grant a little, as it certainly did some of his personal friends; but it never annoyed him as much as it did others.
There was once, indeed, a question almost of authority.
Stanton insisted that all orders by the
General-in-Chief should be submitted to him before they were issued by the
Adjutant-General of the Army.
Sometimes he delayed giving the necessary authorization, but when
Grant protested in writing the difficulty was obviated.
It was an old question, and had arisen in the days of
General Scott; it came up again, or something like it, after
Grant had ceased to be
General of the Army.
Grant once had a letter written to the
President appealing to him from
Stanton's action in the matter, but he tore it up, and there was no rupture or open disagreement.
There was always, however, a sort of personal barrier between them.
Grant respected profoundly the services
Stanton had rendered the country, and I doubt not the sentiment was reciprocated.
But
Stanton was harsh and austere in manner, and apparently cared little for the feelings of others.
He doubtless had his affections and his intimacies, but
Grant was included in neither; and at times the harshness was extended even to him, probably without intent, perhaps unconsciously.
But
Grant was in reality one of the most sensitive of men. He regarded the feelings of others carefully, and it was always painful to him to inflict pain.
Although few supposed so, he felt acutely all the censures and attacks and even the slights of which he was the object.
He said nothing, perhaps, when he received them, but there was abundant evidence, which those who were with him closely could detect, that
Grant was a thinskinned
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man. Therefore these asperities of
Stanton wounded him. He was in no way elated at his own success and his honors, but he was nevertheless conscious that he had done good service to the country; he knew that he occupied a dignified position before the world; and the attention and consideration he received were far from disagreeable to him. When in the midst of all this, one man roughly asserted or implied a superiority, sent for
Grant as he would for a lieutenant, or allowed his orders as
General-in-Chief to remain for days unapproved,
Grant was touched, as any other human being would have been under the circumstances.
He did not, indeed, resent what he disliked, for
Stanton never transcended his technical rights—though he sometimes approached the verge—but the recollection remained and produced a permanent impression.
Thus without any absolute variance ever occurring, and while on all important matters the two were in complete harmony, their personal intercourse was never familiar, and hardly agreeable.
I do not believe either ever enjoyed the other's society.
But they were true patriots and earnest men. The moment a question of duty to the country or to each other was involved, all this petty unrevealed sentiment was ignored or trampled on. To my mind their behavior to each other was finer than if they had been warmly and personally attached.
I must add one remark.
As I look back upon these matters now, with all my partiality for my personal chief, I am convinced that while
Stanton was undoubtedly lacking in delicacy and perhaps withheld some of the consideration to which
Grant was entitled, he doubtless believed that he was asserting an important principle—the superiority of the civil over the military arm, the doctrine that even a victorious
General-in-Chief is, under our institutions, the subordinate of the executive branch of the
Government.
But these were absolutely the only points on which the soldier and the
Secretary had ever differed.
They would be
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insignificant if their effect and importance had not been unduly magnified.
They are to be mentioned only to be disposed of, brought forward only to be brushed away.
Grant had a higher respect for the character and services of none of his compatriots than for
Stanton.
He had been a cordial co-worker with him in the
War, and he was now as cordially working with him in a crisis which both considered was as important as any through which they had already passed.
Stanton's accord with
Grant at this crisis is indicated in the following informal note written in pencil, which I preserved:
General,—I have received the copy of
General Sheridan's telegram.
I do not remember when he proposed to close the registration, but think it was the 10th or 15th of June.
There appears to be no necessity for any action until we can confer together, and in the meantime
General Sheridan can let his orders, if he has made any, stand until he gets instructions from you.
Yours truly,