Adam Badeau, Grant in peace: from Appomattox to Mount McGregor, a personal memoir

Chapter 6:

Johnson's manoeuvres

Grant at once protested verbally but earnestly against sending troops to Baltimore. But the President persisted in his suggestion. He did not give the order, for he frequently used all the weight of his position to induce Grant to act as he desired, yet failed to assume the responsibility of issuing a positive command. Grant therefore wrote an [50] official letter to the Secretary of War, declaring that ‘no reason existed for giving or promising military aid to support the laws of Maryland.’ ‘The tendency,’ he said, ‘of giving such aid would be to produce the very result that was intended to be averted.’ The President referred this letter to his Attorney-General, who was compelled to concur with Grant; and Johnson, unable to induce Grant to send the troops without a positive order, took very good care not to give one. Grant sent both staff and general officers to Baltimore, and went thither twice in person during the emergency. He saw both parties to the dispute, persuaded them to leave the decision to the courts, and averted the danger—as signal a service as he had often rendered the country in the field.

This entire proceeding caused him as much solicitude as any Presidential action of the period. Occurring immediately before the elections which were to pronounce upon Johnson's policy, it had peculiar significance. For a while the President almost insisted on sending troops into a region that had been disaffected, and where the very authorities that he wished to support by arms had been of doubtful loyalty during the war. He suggested to Grant in writing that there was ‘a turbulent disposition which might assume insurrectionary proportions,’ and that it was ‘the duty of the Government to be prepared to act with force and decision.’ But he meant to act ‘with force’ against men who had fought for the Union and in support of those who had fought against it. Grant believed that Johnson would be glad to put those who opposed his policy into the position of rebels, while the Southerners who supported it would seem to be loyal to the Government. The crafty scheme was never developed, but the watchful, skillful, anxious care of Grant may have had more to do with its prevention than any lack of will on the part of the President.

General Grant never said in my hearing that he knew the [51] intentions of Johnson to be seditious at this time, but much of his course throughout the entire crisis was taken because he feared they were. He was as anxious to frustrate Johnson's manoeuvres as he had ever been to thwart those of Lee. In each instance he was uncertain of the strategy of the enemy, but he fought what he believed to be the enemy's plan. He never changed his opinion afterward, but remained convinced that had opportunity offered Johnson would have attempted some disloyal artifice. Of this he repeatedly assured me.

The following letter to General Sheridan shows Grant's apprehensions at this time. It was written while Sheridan was in command at New Orleans:

[Confidential.]

headquarters armies of the United States, Washington, D. C., Oct. 12, 1866.

dear General,—I regret to say that since the unfortunate differences between the President and Congress the former becomes more violent with the opposition he meets with, until now but few people who were loyal to the Government during the Rebellion seem to have any influence with him. None have unless they join in a crusade against Congress, and declare their acts, the principal ones, illegal, and indeed I much fear that we are fast approaching the time when he will want to declare the body itself illegal, unconstitutional, and revolutionary. Commanders in Southern States will have to take great care to see, if a crisis does come, that no armed headway can be made against the Union. For this reason it will be very desirable that Texas should have no reasonable excuse for calling out the militia authorized by their Legislature. Indeed it should be prevented. I write this in strict confidence, but to let you know how matters stand in my opinion, so that you may square your official action accordingly.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. Grant. To Major-General P. H. Sheridan.

P. S.—I gave orders quietly two or three weeks since for the [52] removal of all arms in store in the Southern States to Northern arsenals. I wish you would see that those from Baton Rouge and other places within your command are being moved rapidly by the ordnance officers having the matter in charge.

U. S. G.

Grant's course in the Maryland matter and his outspoken advice to the Arkansas delegation had convinced the Administration that he could be induced to take no step at all beyond the strictest line of the law; and when it was seen to be impossible to use him, a scheme was concocted to send him out of the country. The Government did not indeed dare remove the victorious head of the army, but they determined to suspend him from his functions for a while, and to put Sherman, who it was hoped would prove more supple, in his place. Sherman had said and written things which the President construed into an approval of his policy. So Grant was directed to order Sherman to Washington, but was not informed of the reason for the order.

Grant had long exhibited a peculiar interest in the expulsion of the French from Mexico and the overthrow of the empire of Maximilian. He regarded the intrusion of foreign armies and institutions on this continent not only as a direct menace to all republican interests, but as an act of hostility towards the United States that would never have been attempted except when we were at war. His opinions were well known to the country and had been repeatedly and earnestly pressed upon the Government; and the device of the Administration now was to make use of these sentiments as an excuse to send him on a mission to the neighboring republic and thus get rid of his presence which had become such an obstruction to many of their designs.

The French Emperor, it was true, was tardily preparing to remove his army, and there was neither object nor necessity for Grant's presence or intervention. Nevertheless, in November, 1866, immediately after the failure of the Baltimore scheme, the President informed Grant that he meant to [53] send him to Mexico. A Minister had already been appointed to that republic, and Grant was to be given neither ‘powers’ nor authority. No special purpose for the mission was announced; he was simply ‘to give the Minister the benefit of his advice in carrying out the instructions of the Secretary of State.’ It was doubtless supposed that Grant with his profound anxiety for Mexican independence would bite at the bait. But the device was too transparent; and Grant, if ordinarily unadroit, was yet far-seeing. He usually went to the core of a thing, when immediate judgment was required. He promptly declined the mission. This was in conversation with the President.

A day or two afterward Johnson returned to the subject and announced that he had sent for Sherman to take Grant's place in his absence. Congress was about to assemble, a Congress hostile to Johnson, and the air was full of rumors that the President would refuse to recognize the Legislature, and might even attempt to disperse it by arms. Mr. Johnson had recently seemed to have designs to use the military force in Maryland illegally, or at least improperly. Grant remembered this, and again declined to leave the country; this time in writing. Nevertheless, in a day or two he was summoned to a full Cabinet meeting, when his detailed instructions were read to him by the Secretary of State, exactly as if objections and refusal had not been offered. But Grant was now aroused; and before the whole Cabinet he declared his unwillingness to accept the mission. The President also became angered. Turning to the Attorney-General he inquired: ‘Mr. Attorney-General, is there any reason why General Grant should not obey my orders? Is he in any way ineligible to this position?’ Grant started to his feet at once, and exclaimed: ‘I can answer that question, Mr. President, without referring to the Attorney-General. I am an American citizen, and eligible to any office to which any American is eligible. I am an officer of the army, and [54] bound to obey your military orders. But this is a civil office, a purely diplomatic duty that you offer me, and I cannot be compelled to undertake it. Any legal military order you give me I will obey; but this is civil and not military; and I decline the duty. No power on earth can compel me to it.’ He said not another word. No one replied; and he left the Cabinet chamber. He returned immediately to his headquarters, and recited all that had occurred. I took down his words at the time, and read him afterward this account, which he approved.

Even after this scene a copy of his instructions was sent to him through the Secretary of War, who was directed to request him to proceed to Mexico. But he wrote a second letter declining positively the duty assigned him. Meanwhile Sherman had arrived. Grant had written to him to come directly to his house, and there explained the situation; he told his great subordinate of the plot to get rid of himself, and declared that he was determined to disobey the order and stand the consequences. Sherman then paid his visit to the President. He was informed that Grant was to be sent to Mexico, and that he was to command the army in the absence of the General-in-chief. But Sherman assured the President that Grant would not go, and said very flatly that Johnson could not afford to quarrel with Grant at that time. He declared he could himself be easier spared than Grant.

The country was full of rumors of the object of Sherman's visit; if the real purpose was abandoned it was necessary to contrive some excuse for sending for him. This Sherman's own suggestion afforded. In a day or two Grant was directed to turn over his instructions to Sherman, who was sent to Mexico in his stead, on the United States ship Susquehanna, Captain Alden commanding. As the vessel left New York harbor, Sherman turned to Alden and said: ‘My mission is already ended. By substituting myself I [55] have prevented a serious quarrel between the Administration and Grant.’

More than once the soldier friend thus came to the rescue when crafty politicians sought to entangle Grant. I shall have other stories like this to tell. At these crises Sherman returned with interest all the constancy and loyalty that Grant had so often displayed toward him during the war. He now cruised along the coast of Mexico, visited one or two points, performed no duty of the slightest importance, and in a month or two returned. For all that had been accomplished he might as well have remained at St. Louis. He declares in his memoirs: ‘I am sure this whole movement was got up for the purpose of getting General Grant away from Washington.’ Grant always attributed the conception of the scheme to Seward.

About this time Grant received the following letter, which I opened and handed to him. After reading it he threw it into the fire, but I snatched it from the flames and thus preserved it:

October, 1866.

General,—I feel it to be my duty to warn you to be on your guard against assassination, also to be very careful of what you eat, and where you eat, for the next sixty days. I believe that the Knights have spotted you, Sheridan, and Sherman. I have written them to be careful. My warning may not reach them. If you can warn them do so.

As ever, yours,

Tewandah, the Scout.

Nothing more was ever heard on the subject, but the letter is curious, as showing the fears that some entertained at this time. [56]

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