Adam Badeau, Grant in peace: from Appomattox to Mount McGregor, a personal memoir

The whole force of the Reconstruction measure lay in the power of the District Commanders to remove civil officers who opposed or obstructed the new law. Mr. Johnson at once took the ground, as I have shown, that no such power existed in those commanders. Grant knew personally and positively that Congress had intended to confer this power, for he had been constantly consulted during the preparation of the bill. Indeed, it had been proposed not only to bestow the power on District Commanders, but on himself, as their superior. This, however, he disadvised. He was still unwilling to be placed in open antagonism to the President, and, besides, thought it wise not to provoke him by public humiliations or unnecessary restrictions of his authority. He had therefore urged that the appointment of District Commanders should be left with the President, and that the supervisory authority also should be committed to the Executive rather than to the head of the Army; for he believed that Congress could maintain a sufficient check upon any hostile action of the President.

Johnson, however, at once made it certain that his claws had not been so closely pared but that he could still do serious mischief. Nevertheless, Grant remained averse to taking or advising any step which might aggravate the difficulties of the situation. His policy at this crisis is shown in the following letter of April 21, 1867, to Sheridan:

[Private.]

my dear General,—As yet no decision has been given by the Attorney-General on the subject of the right of District Commanders to remove civil officers and appoint their successors. It is likely, however, that he will give attention to that subject and all other questions submitted to him arising under the Reconstruction act, as soon as he is through with the Mississippi motion to file a bill