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to hasten up with all the troops within reach.
He brought up
Hampton's and
Hatton's brigades in a few minutes.
The strength of the enemy's position, however, enabled him to hold it until dark.
About sunset, being struck from my horse severely wounded by a fragment of shell, I was carried off the field and
Major-General G. W. Smith succeeded to the command.
He was prevented from resuming his attack on the enemy's position next morning by the discovery of strong entrenchments, not seen on the previous evening.
His division bivouacked on the night of the 31st within musket-shot of the entrenchments which they were attacking, when darkness stayed the conflict.
Major-General Smith directed the attack, and would have secured success if it could have been made an hour earlier.
On the morning of the 1st of June the enemy attacked the brigade of
General Pickett, which was supported by that of
General Pryor.
The attack was vigorously repelled by these two brigades, the brunt of the action falling on
General Pickett.
This was the last demonstration made by the enemy.
Our troops employed the residue of the day in securing and bearing off the captured artillery, small arms, and other property, and in the evening quietly returned to their own camps.
We took ten pieces of artillery, six thousand muskets, one garrison flag, and four regimental colors, besides a quantity of tents and camp equipage.
That of the enemy is stated in their own newspapers to have exceeded ten thousand--an estimate which is, no doubt, short of the truth.
Had
Major-General Huger's division been in position and ready for action when those of
Smith,
Longstreet, and
Hill moved, I am satisfied that
Keyes's corps would have been destroyed instead of being merely defeated.
Had it gone into action even at 4 o'clock the victory would have been much more complete.
Major-Generals Smith and
Longstreet speak in high terms of the conduct of their superior and staff officers.
