Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 3

[77] most vulnerable. At 9.40 P. M. on the 30th, Meade was instructed: ‘You need not advance to-morrow, unless in your judgment an advantage can be gained, but hold on to what you have, and be ready to advance. We must be greatly superior to the enemy in numbers on one flank or the other, and by working around at each end, we will find where the enemy's weak point is.’ To Butler Grant described the operations on the left, and said: ‘This would look as if no heavy force had been sent north of the James. I think it will be advisable for you to reconnoitre up the Darbytown road, and if there appears to be any chance for an advance, make it.’ No further movement of importance, however, occurred on either front. The enemy modified his defensive line north of the James, and Grant strengthened Fort Harrison and turned its guns against those who had constructed it, while Butler pushed out his cavalry as far as the fortifications on the Charles City road; but neither army attempted another assault. On the 1st of October, Warren and Gregg were each attacked on the extreme left, but each repulsed the enemy; on the 2nd, Meade advanced his whole force and discovered the rebels, withdrawn to their main line, and refusing battle outside of fortifications. The necessary works were then laid out, and the national line was extended from the Weldon road to the position gained at Peeble's farm. This was a little more than a mile from the Boydtown road, and not more than two miles from the Southside railroad.

In these operations there were about sixty-six thousand men engaged on a side. Butler lost on the