Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 3

[538] city crowded with a servile race who looked to the approach of the besiegers to set them free—and this place was left by the authorities and the army to await the entrance of its conqueror—without one soldier to keep order, or restrain pillage, or claim protection, or exchange military formalities with the captors. The so-called government fled in dismay and disgrace, and the conduct of the army was little better towards its capital in this emergency. Lee was as derelict as Davis, and equally with him deserved the execrations which the other received.¹ For Lee was general-in-chief, and knew of the flight of his superiors; he knew the destitution and desperation of the inhabitants; he was a soldier, and knew what horrors often come upon besieged cities when at last they fall. Yet he left not a company, not a squad, behind. He made no pretence of surrendering the forts or their armament, and therefore ran the risk of exasperating the victors; thus saving his military pride at the expense of his military honor. He did not attempt to protect the miserable wretches whom he abandoned, a prey to all the anguish of expectation and despair. His generals followed his example and his orders;² they withdrew after dark, and set fire to the warehouses in the most crowded part of the city as they fled; and