Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America. Vol. 1.
Henry Coppee , LL.D., Ed.

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[611] Virginia would have been the theatre. He had already issued orders, directing the greatest portion of his army to proceed towards Harper's Ferry, when one of those incidents which make so hazardous a game of war compelled him, in spite of himself, to adopt once more the project which had so long had his preference. The bridge of boats thrown, on the 26th, over a river so wide and so subject to sudden risings as the Potomac could not suffice for the communications of a large army. Accordingly, in order to establish a more solid crossing, a large number of barges, which were to debouch into the river through a lock situated in front of Harper's Ferry, were assembled in the Ohio Canal. But when everything was ready, and an attempt made to bring down these barges into the waters of the Potomac, above the rapids which obstruct its course, it was found that they were too broad for the lock, the latter being especially intended to allow the entrance into the canal of the small boats which ply on the Shenandoah. It would have required several days to widen the passage; the army would have lost all the advantages that a rapid movement might have secured, and would have found itself in a perilous position. General McClellan gave up the plan he had just formed, but did not return to Washington until he had secured the restoration of the railway, which Mr. Lincoln considered so important.

The latter at last decided to furnish the commander of the army of the Potomac the means for undertaking his maritime expedition. On the 27th of February the first orders for chartering numerous vessels to transport the army were received at the War Department. The government, notwithstanding its impatience to act, had thus wasted six weeks, during which all the necessary preparations might easily have been completed. In the mean while, before taking the field, General McClellan was obliged, in compliance with the orders of the President, to raise the Potomac blockade. Any attempt at disembarkation or movement of his army on that side might have brought on a general engagement under the most unfavorable circumstances. The naval force, being otherwise engaged, had not the means to attempt such a difficult enterprise. It could only promise him for the 10th or 12th of March, an auxiliary which might prove useful, but upon which