Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America. Vol. 3.
Henry Coppee , LL.D., Ed.

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[594] receive him, to present the various plans he can adopt, and examine the motives which determine his choice. We have shown that before continuing his march northward he had been obliged to measure strength with the Federal army. In order to preserve his communications, to receive ammunition, to send back his booty and sick, and to transform his movement into a positive invasion, it was necessary as soon as practicable to render it impossible for this army to attack him. He has drawn it into a pursuit, and then has suddenly turned against it, while the simultaneous arrival of Hill and Ewell before Gettysburg has enabled him to crush two Federal corps. Lee, however, was not able to gather the fruits of his victory that same evening, and on the morning of the 2d of July he found the greater portion of the Union army in front of him. He has four alternatives to select from: he has the choice to retire into the gaps of the South Mountain in order to compel Meade to come after him; or to wait steadily in his present positions for the attack of the Federals; or, again, to manoeuvre in order to dislodge them from those they occupy by menacing their communications by the right or the left; or, finally, to storm these positions in front, in the hope of carrying them by main force. The best plan would undoubtedly have been the first, because by preserving the strategic offensive Lee would thus secure all the advantages of the tactical defensive. Once master of the mountain-passes, he may cover his retreat upon Hagerstown or Hancock on the one side, while still menacing the very heart of Pennsylvania on the other. Meade, being hard pressed by public opinion, will be compelled to attack him in as formidable positions as those of Crampton's and Turner's Gaps, where the preceding year a handful of men so long resisted McClellan's assaults. Lee, by way of excuse for not having adopted this plan, has alleged the impossibility of bringing to the rear in time the supply-trains which were crowding on the road from Chambersburg to Gettysburg: this excuse does not seem to us to be admissible, for the same trains were able to retrograde, without obstruction, during the night of the 4th and 5th, and such a movement would have been less dangerous after the victory of the 1st than after the defeat of the 3d. The truth is, that the ardor and assurance of the Confederate army, the mutual confidence