Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America. Vol. 4.
Henry Coppee , LL.D., Ed.

Book II:—the siege of Chattanooga.

Chapter 1: Wauhatchie.

We left this army, in Volume III., about the middle of July. The Mississippi is open, Johnston has been forced into the interior, while Pemberton's troops, prisoners on parole, have followed his track in sadness. The victory of the Federals is so complete that they no longer have an adversary confronting them. The troops collected from all parts to ensure this victory are available. As early as the 18th of July, Grant proposes to the general-in-chief of the army to transport these troops by sea to Mobile, to take possession of that city, and thence to enter upon a campaign which, in ascending the Alabama River, would lead him to the heart of the Confederacy. But this plan, the very probable success of which would have speedily put an end to the war, is not approved by Halleck, who is always ready to favor operations of a secondary importance at the sacrifice of measures which might prove of a decisive character. The forces collected before Vicksburg are scattered. As we have stated, the Ninth corps embarked at the beginning of August to rejoin Burnside. Halleck, while he sends the latter into East Tennessee, wishes also to finish the conquest of Louisiana. The Thirteenth corps is transported from Vicksburg to Natchez, to co-operate with Banks in the campaign of which we shall hereafter relate the disastrous issue. Hurlbut, [194] with the Sixteenth corps, is recalled to Memphis: one of his divisions is sent to General Schofield in Missouri. Only two corps remain with Grant near Vicksburg: these are the Fifteenth and the Seventeenth, commanded by his two favorite lieutenants, Sherman and McPherson. The former while returning from Jackson halted on the banks of the Big Black River. The latter encamps within the works which Pemberton had so long defended.

In this army, thus divided, every one thinks only of resting, for all have very quickly understood that great operations are suspended. The men would have gallantly made another effort if it had been demanded of them forthwith to strike the enemy yet stunned by defeat. But once that moment of enthusiasm is passed, fatigue overcomes the strongest constitutions. The warm and damp climate completes the enervation of troops which are no longer stimulated by the excitement incident to the struggle. More men are disabled by typhoid and marsh fevers than by the fire of the enemy. Requests for furloughs, at first readily granted, multiply at a fearful rate. It appears to be the belief that the army has accomplished its task. Besides, Halleck continues to parcel it out, for at the beginning of September he asks Grant for a division to reinforce Steele in Arkansas. Finally, the army beholds its chief himself reduced for a time to inactivity. The Federal Government wished to re-establish its authority in Texas and occupy the frontier formed by the Rio Grande River. The creation of the ephemeral empire of Mexico, together with the difficulties which it had raised between Paris and Washington, caused the latter to fear lest a foreign army, crossing the Rio Grande, might come and join with the Confederates. But Grant was still thinking of the expedition to Mobile. Whether the troops landed at the mouth of the Alabama or of the Rio Grande, they had to embark at New Orleans. Toward the latter part of August he went to that city in order to confer about his project with Banks. But shortly after his arrival he had so serious a fall from his horse that when brought back to Vicksburg he was for three weeks obliged to remain in bed, and for two months could not walk without crutches.

It is in the midst of this season of rest that Halleck's pressing appeal in favor of Rosecrans is received at Vicksburg. It has [195] already been noticed that the general-in-chief of the army addressed a first despatch to Grant on the 13th of September, directing him to send all his available forces to Memphis, and to move them thence eastward by way of Corinth and Tuscumbia. Forty-eight hours thereafter the same orders were repeated in a second despatch, containing more detail. However, the days succeed one another and the news of the battle of Chickamauga comes, without any response returning either from Memphis or Vicksburg: the telegraph-wire does not extend beyond Cairo, and official messages are forwarded by water. But important orders might easily be carried within fifteen hours by a special boat as far as Memphis, the distance being only about one hundred and fifty-five miles. A like service, organized by Grant, maintains communications between Memphis and Vicksburg, which are separated by a distance of nearly two hundred and twenty-four miles. Carelessness on the part of some employes is the only cause of this strange silence. The urgency of Halleck's despatches has doubtless not been made known at Cairo, nor understood by those who have received them. Whether they were mislaid or have been entrusted to boats which have stopped on the way, these despatches reach Memphis only after incredible delays. The despatch of the 15th arrives first, on the 21st; Hurlbut sends it immediately to Grant, who receives it on the 22d. That of the 13th is handed to him only on the 25th: it took ten days to carry this despatch from Cairo to Memphis. This neglect may compromise the safety of a large army, and it is incredible that Halleck should not have made a searching inquiry into this matter. Grant, although still confined to bed, loses not a moment to repair the neglect. All his orders are issued within a few hours. A boat despatched after J. E. Smith carries to him the order not to land at Helena, and to proceed by water as far as Memphis, whence Hurlbut shall direct him by land on Corinth, with two divisions of the latter's own corps. The expedition into Arkansas being accomplished, the troops which would return thence to Memphis would be sent in the same direction. Osterhaus' division of Sherman's corps is recalled in great haste from the banks of the Big Black River, and as early as the 24th it is ascending the river. [196]

However, Grant has readily understood that in thus detaching four divisions from his army he has done either too much or too little. It is best to renounce the campaign of which New Orleans might be the base, by leaving on the river only indispensable garrisons, and to send the bulk of the army to the eastward in search of new battlefields near the blood-stained banks of the Chickamauga. Therefore, on the 25th,