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Chapter 9:
Plan of peace.
1779.
for the northern campaign of 1779 two objects
presented themselves to America: the capture of
Fort Niagara, to be followed by that of
Detroit; and the recovery of New York city.
But either of these schemes would have required an army of thirty thousand men; while the fall of the currency, party divisions, and the want of a central power paralyzed every effort at a harmonious organization of the strength of all the states.
Washington remained more than a month at
Philadelphia in consultation with congress, and all agreed that the country must confine itself to a defensive campaign.
1
Measures for the relief of the national treasury were postponed by congress from day to day, apparently from thoughtlessness, but really from conscious inability to devise a remedy; while it wasted time upon personal and party interests.
Gates was more
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busy than ever in whispers against
Washington.
Most men thought the war near its end; the skilfully speculative grew rich by the fluctuations in prices; and shocked a laborious and frugal people by their extravagant style of living.
The use of irredeemable paper poisoned the relations of life, and affected contracts and debts, trusts and inheritances.
Added to this, the
British had succeeded in circulating counterfeit money so widely, that congress in January was compelled to recall two separate emis-
sions, each of five millions.
Even a defensive campaign was attended with difficulties.
To leave the officers, by the depreciation of the currency, without subsistence, augured the reduction of the army to a shadow.
2 Few of them were willing to remain on the existing establishment, and congress was averse to granting pensions to them or to their widows.
The rank and file were constantly decreasing in number, and not from the casualties of the service alone.
Many would have the right to their discharge in the coming summer; more at the end of the year.
To each of them who would agree to serve during the war, a bounty of two hundred dollars, besides land and clothing, was promised; while those who had in former years enlisted for the war received a gratuity of one hundred dollars. Yet all would have been in vain but for the character of the people.
Among the emigrants, some mere needy adventurers joined the
English standard; others of serious convictions, as well as the descendants of the early settlers of the country, formed the self-reliant,
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invincible resource of the
Americans.
If
Washington could not drive the
British from New York, neither could
England recover jurisdiction over a foot of land beyond the lines of her army.
Tardily in March, congress voted that the infantry
should consist of eighty battalions, of which eleven were assigned to
Pennsylvania, as many to
Virginia, and fifteen to
Massachusetts.
3 Not one state furnished its whole quota; the last-named more nearly than any other.
In addition to the congressional bounty,
New Jersey paid two hundred and fifty dollars to each of her recruits.
Often in
Massachusetts, sometimes in
Virginia, levies were raised by draft.
4
Four years of hard service and of reflection had ripened in
Washington the conviction of the need of a national government.
To other states than his native commonwealth he made appeals for the subordination of every selfish interest to the public good; so that, in the want of a central government, each of them might do its utmost for what he called ‘our common country, America,’ ‘our noble cause, the cause of mankind.’
5 But to the men of
Virginia he unbosomed himself more freely.
His was the eloquence of a sincere, single-minded, and earnest man, whose words went to the heart from his love of truth and the intensity of his convictions.
To one
Virginia statesman he wrote: ‘Our affairs are now come to a crisis.
Unanimity, disinterestedness, and perseverance in our national duty are the only means to avoid misfortunes.’
In a ‘letter sent by a private
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hand,’ he drew the earnest thoughts of George
Mason to the ruin that was coming upon the country from personal selfishness and provincial separatism in these words:
I view things very differently from what the people in general do, who seem to think the contest is at an end, and to make money and get places the only things now remaining to do. I have seen without despondency, even for a moment, the hours which America has styled her gloomy ones; but I have beheld no day, since the commencement of hostilities, that I have thought her liberties in such eminent danger as at present.
Friends and foes seem now to combine to pull down the goodly fabric we have been raising at the expense of so much time, blood, and treasure; and unless the bodies politic will exert themselves to bring things back to first principles, correct abuses, and punish our internal foes, inevitable ruin must follow.
Indeed, we seem to be verging so fast to destruction, that I am filled with sensations to which I have been a stranger till within these three months. Our enemies behold with exultation and joy how effectually we labor for their benefit; and from being in a state of absolute despair, and on the point of evacuating America, are now on tiptoe.
Nothing, therefore, in my judgment can save us but a total reformation in our own conduct, or some decisive turn to affairs in Europe.
The former, alas!
to our shame be it spoken, is less likely to happen than the latter.
Were I to indulge my present feelings, and give a loose to that freedom of expression which my unreserved friendship for you would prompt me to, I should say a great deal on this subject.
I cannot
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refrain lamenting, however, in the most poignant terms, the fatal policy too prevalent in most of the states, of employing their ablest men at home in posts of honor and profit, till the great national interest is fixed upon a solid basis.
To me it appears no unjust simile, to compare the affairs of this great continent to the mechanism of a clock, each state representing some one or other of the smaller parts of it, which they are endeavoring to put in fine order, without considering how useless and unavailing their labor is, unless the great wheel or spring which is to set the whole in motion is also well attended to and kept in good order.
As it is a fact too notorious to be concealed, that congress is rent by party, no man who wishes well to the liberties of his country and desires to see its rights established can avoid crying out, Where are our men of abilities?
Why do they not come forth to save their country?
Let this voice, my dear sir, call upon you, Jefferson, and others.
Do not, from a mistaken opinion, let our hitherto noble struggle end in ignominy.
Believe me, when I tell you, there is danger of it. I shall be much mistaken if administration do not now, from the present state of our currency, dissensions, and other circumstances, push matters to the utmost extremity.
Nothing will prevent it but the interposition of Spain, and their disappointed hope from Russia.
On the eighteenth of May he wrote to another
friend: ‘I never was, and much less reason have I now to be, afraid of the enemy's arms; but I have
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no scruples in declaring to you, that I have never yet
seen the time in which our affairs, in my opinion, were at as low an ebb as at the present; and, without a speedy and capital change, we shall not be able to call out the resources of the country.’
6
While
Washington reasoned that the
British ministers plainly intended to prosecute the war on American soil, and to make a permanent conquest of the south, congress avoided or delayed the expense of proper re-enforcements of its army,
7 and lulled itself into the belief that hostilities were near their end. In this quiet it was confirmed by a proceeding of the
French minister, who had been specially commanded to ascertain its ultimate demands, and to mould them into a form acceptable to
Spain.
Its answer to the
British commissioners in 1778 implied a willingness to treat with
Great Britain on her recognition of American independence.
‘It has but one course to take,’ wrote
Vergennes before his treaty with
Spain, ‘and that is to declare distinctly and roundly, that it will listen to no proposition, unless it has for its basis peace with
France as well as with
America.’
On the report of an able committee on which are found the names of
Samuel Adams and
Jay, congress, on the fourteenth of January, 1779, resolved
unanimously, ‘that as neither
France nor these
United States may of right, so they will not conclude either truce or peace with the common enemy, without the formal consent of their ally first obtained.’
The conditions on which it was most difficult for
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the
Americans to preserve moderation related to
boundaries and to the fisheries.
They were to take their place in the political world as an unknown power, of whose future influence both
France and
Spain had misgivings.
The latter longed to recover the
Floridas: the
United States had no traditional wish for their acquisition; and, from the military point of view,
Washington preferred that
Spain should possess the
Floridas rather than
Great Britain.
Here no serious difference could arise.
Spain wished to extend on the north to the
Ohio, on the east to
the Alleghanies; but the backwoodsmen were already in possession of the territory and it would have been easier to extirpate the game in the forests than to drive them from their homes.
Spain made the exclusive right to the navigation of the
Mississippi the condition of her endurance of the
United States; and it remained to be seen, whether they could be brought by their necessities to acquiesce in the demand.
It was the wish of both
France and
Spain that the country north-west of the
Ohio river should be guaranteed to
Great Britain; but such a proposition could never gain a hearing in congress.
France, renouncing for herself all pretensions to her old provinces,
Canada and
Nova Scotia, joined
Spain in opposing every wish of the
Americans to acquire them.
In this congress acquiesced, though two states persisted in demanding their annexation.
With regard to the fisheries, of which the interruption formed one of the elements of the war, public law had not yet been settled.
By the treaty of
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Utrecht,
8 France agreed not to fish within thirty
leagues of the coast of
Nova Scotia; and by that of
Paris, not to fish within fifteen leagues of Cape Breton.
9 Moreover,
New England at the beginning of the war had by act of parliament been debarred from fishing on the banks of
Newfoundland.
What right of legislation respecting them would remain at the peace to the parliament of England?
Were they free to the mariners of all nations?
and what limit was set to the coast fisheries by the law of nature and of nations?
‘The fishery on the high seas,’ so
Vergennes expounded the law of nations, ‘is as free as the sea itself, and it is superfluous to discuss the right of the
Americans to it. But the coast fisheries belong of right to the proprietary of the coast.
Therefore the fisheries on the coasts of
Newfoundland, of
Nova Scotia, of
Canada, belong exclusively to the
English; and the
Americans have no pretension whatever to share in them.’
10
But they had hitherto almost alone engaged in the fisheries on the coast of
Nova Scotia and in the
gulf of St. Lawrence; deeming themselves to have gained a right to them by exclusive and immemorial usage.
Further, the
New England men had planned and had alone furnished land forces for the first reduction of Cape Breton, and had assisted in the acquisition of
Nova Scotia and
Canada.
The fisheries on their coasts seemed to them, therefore, a perpetual joint property.
Against this
Vergennes argued that the conquest had been made for the crown of Great
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Britain; and that the
New England men, on ceasing
to be the subjects of that crown, lost all right in the coast fisheries.
The necessity of appeals to
France for aid promoted obsequiousness to its wishes.
He that accepts subsidies binds his own hands, and consents to play a secondary part.
A needy government, reduced to expedients for getting money, loses some degree of its consideration.
To persuade congress to propitiate
Spain by conceding all her demands, the
French minister at
Philadelphia sought interviews with its separate members and with its newly appointed committee on foreign affairs, which was composed of one from each state; and insisted with them on the relinquishment of the fisheries, and of the valley and navigation of the
Mississippi.
It was answered, that that valley was already colonized by men who would soon be received into the union as a state.
He rejoined that personal considerations must give way to the general interests of the republic; that the king of
Spain, if he engaged in the war, would have equal rights with the
United States to acquire territories of the king of
England; that the persistence in asserting a right to establishments on the
Ohio and the
Illinois, and at
Natchez, would exhibit an unjust desire of conquest; that such an acquisition was absolutely foreign to the principles of the
American alliance with
France, and of the system of union between
France and
Spain, as well as inconsistent with the interests of the latter power; and he formally declared, ‘that his king would not prolong the war one single day to secure
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to the
United States the possessions which they
coveted.’
11
‘Besides; the extent of their territory rendered already a good administration difficult: so enormous an increase would cause their immense empire to crumble under its own weight.’
12 Gerard terminated his very long conversation by declaring the strongest desire, ‘that the
United States might never be more than thirteen, unless
Canada should one day be received as the fourteenth.’
The president of congress, still confiding in the triple alliance, avowed himself content with the boundary of the colonies at the breaking out of the revolution,
13 and the
French minister did not doubt of success in extorting the concessions required by
Spain.
On the fifteenth of February,
Gerard in a private
audience represented to congress that the price which
Spain put upon her friendship was
Pensacola and the exclusive navigation of the
Mississippi;
14 if her wishes were not complied with,
Spain and
England might make common cause against
America.
15
Two days after this private interview, congress re-
ferred the subject of the terms of peace to a special committee of five, composed of
Gouverneur Morris, of New York;
Burke, of
North Carolina;
Witherspoon, of
New Jersey;
Samuel Adams, of
Massachusetts; and
Smith, of
Virginia.
Of these,
Samuel Adams demanded the most territory; while
Morris would rather have had no increase than more lands at the south.
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On the twenty-third the committee reported their
Chap. IX.} 1779. Feb. 23. |
opinion, that the king of
Spain was disposed to enter into an alliance with the
United States, and that consequently independence must be finally acknowledged by
Great Britain.
This being effected, they proposed as their ultimatum that their territory should extend from the
Atlantic to the
Mississippi, from the
Floridas to
Canada and
Nova Scotia; that the right of fishing and curing fish on the banks and coasts of
Newfoundland should belong equally to the
United States,
France, and
Great Britain; and that the navigation of the
Mississippi should be free to the
United States down to their southern boundary, with the benefit of a free port below in the
Spanish dominions.
Congress, in committee of the whole, on the nine-
teenth of March, agreed substantially to the report on boundaries, yet with an option to adopt westward from
Lake Ontario the parallel of the forty-fifth degree of latitude.
The right to the fisheries was long under discussion, which ended with the vote that the common right of the
United States to fish on the
coasts, bays, and banks of
Nova Scotia, the banks of
Newfoundland and
gulf of St. Lawrence, the straits of
Labrador and
Belle Isle, should in no case be given up.
16 On the twenty-fourth, ten states against
Penn-
sylvania alone,
New Hampshire and
Connecticut being divided, refused to insert the right to navigate the
Mississippi.
17 On that subject the instructions were properly silent; for it was a question with
Spain alone;
Great Britain, according to the
American
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view, was to possess no territory on the
Mississippi,
from its source to its mouth.
On the same day,
Gerry obtained a reconsideration of the article on the fisheries.
The treaty of
Utrecht divided those of
Newfoundland between
Great Britain and
France, on the principle that each should have a monopoly of its own share.
Richard Henry Lee brought up the subject anew, and, avoiding a collision with the monopoly of
France, he proposed that the right of fishing on the coasts and banks of
North America should be reserved to the
United States as fully as they enjoyed the same when subject to
Great Britain.
This substitute was carried by the vote of
Pennsylvania and
Delaware, with the four
New England states.
But the
state of New York, guided by
Jay and
Gouverneur Morris, altogether refused to insist on a right by treaty to fisheries; and
Gouverneur Morris, on the eighth of May, calling to mind ‘the exhausted
situation of the
United States, the derangement of their finances, and the defect of their resources,’
18 moved that the acknowledgment of independence should be the sole condition of peace.
The motion was declared to be out of order by the votes of the four
New England states,
New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania, against the unanimous vote of New York,
Maryland, and
North Carolina; while
Delaware,
Virginia, and
South Carolina were equally divided.
The French minister now intervened, and on the twenty-seventh of May congress went back
o its resolve, ‘that in no case, by any treaty of
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peace, should the common right of fishing be given
up.’
19
On the third of June,
Gerry, who was from
Marblehead, again appeared as the champion of the
American right to the fisheries on banks or coasts, as exercised during their political connection with
Great Britain.
He was in part supported by
Sherman;
20 but
New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, and
Rhode Island alone sustained a right to the fisheries on the coasts of British provinces; and, though
Pennsylvania came to their aid, the ‘Gallican party,’ by a vote of seven states against the four, set aside the main question; so that congress refused even to stipulate for the ‘free and peaceable use and exercise of the common right of fishing on the banks of
Newfoundland.’
In the preceding December the queen of
France, after many years of an unfruitful marriage, gave birth to a daughter.
On the fifteenth of June, con-
gress, congratulating the king of
France on the birth of a princess, asked for ‘the portraits of himself and his royal consort, to be placed in their council chamber, that the representatives of these states might daily have before their eyes the first royal friends and patrons of their cause.’
This was not merely the language of adulation.
The
Americans felt the sincerest interest in the happiness of Louis the Sixteenth.
An honest impulse of gratitude gave his name to the city which overlooks the falls of the
Ohio; and, when in 1781 a son was born to him,
Pennsylvania commemorated the event in the name of one of its counties.
In later years, could the
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voice of the
United States have been heard, he and
his wife and children would have been saved, and welcomed to their country as an asylum.
On the same day, congress solicited supplies from
France to the value of nearly three millions of dollars, to be paid for, with interest, after the peace.
On the seventeenth, performing a great day's work,
it went through the remainder of the report of its committee.
The independence or cession of
Nova Scotia was waived; nor was the acquisition of the Bermudas to be mooted.
A proposal to yield the right to trade with the
East Indies was promptly thrown out. A clause stipulating not to engage in the slave-trade was rejected by a unanimous vote of twelve states,
Georgia being absent;
Gerry and
Jay alone dissenting.
The committee proposed to bind the
United States never to extend their dominion beyond the limits that might be fixed by the treaty of peace; but the article was set aside.
Before the close of the day every question on the conditions of peace was decided; the ‘Gallicans’ congratulated themselves that the long struggle was ended in their favor; and
Dickinson of
Delaware,
Gouverneur Morris of New York, and
Marchant of
Rhode Island, two of whom were of that party, were appointed to prepare the commission for the
American minister who should be selected to negotiate a peace.
Suddenly, on the nineteenth of June, the content-
ment of the
French minister and his friends was disturbed.
Elbridge Gerry, of
Massachusetts, evading a breach of the rules of congress by a change in form, moved resolutions, that the
United States have a common
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right with the
English to the fisheries on the
banks of
Newfoundland, and the other fishing-banks and seas of
North America.
The demand was for no more than
Vergennes confessed to belong to them by the law of nations; and
Gerry insisted that unless the right received the guarantee of
France, or the consent of
Great Britain, the
American minister should not sign any treaty of peace without first consulting congress.
A most stormy and acrimonious debate ensued.
The friends of
France resisted the resolutions with energy and bitterness, as absurd and dangerous, sure to alienate
Spain, and contrary to the general longing for peace.
Four states declared peremptorily that, should such a system be adopted, they would secede from the confederation;
21 and they read the sketch of their protest on the subject.
Congress gave way in part, but by the votes of the four
New England states and
Pennsylvania against New York,
Maryland,
Virginia, and
North Carolina, with
New Jersey,
Delaware, and
South Carolina divided, they affirmed the common right of the
Americans to fish on the grand banks; and they asked for that right the guarantee of
France in the form of an explanatory article of existing treaties.
22
The French minister took the alarm, and sought an interview with the president of congress and two other members
23 equally well disposed to his policy.
Finding them inclined to yield to
New England, he interposed that disunion from the side of
New England was not to be feared, for its people carried their
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love of independence even to delirium.
He added:
‘There would seem to be a wish to break the connection of
France with
Spain; but I think I can say that, if the
Americans should have the audacity to force the king of
France to choose between the two alliances, his decision would not be in favor of the
United States; he will certainly not expose himself to consume the remaining resources of the kingdom for many years, only to secure an increase of fortune to a few shipmasters of
New England.
I shall greatly regret on account of the
Americans, should
Spain enter into war without a convention with them.’
24
The interview lasted from eight o'clock in the evening till an hour after midnight; but the hearers of
Gerard would not undertake to change the opinion of congress: and the result was, therefore, a new interview on the twelfth of July between him and
that body in committee of the whole.
Of the committee on foreign affairs, eight accepted the
French policy.
Jay, with other members, gained over votes from the ‘Anti-Gallican’ side; and, after long debates and many divisions, the question of the fisheries was reserved to find its place in a future treaty of commerce with
Great Britain.
The proposition to stipulate a right to them in the treaty of peace was indefinitely postponed by the votes of eight states against
New Hampshire,
Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, and
Pennsylvania;
Georgia alone being absent.
The French minister desired to persuade congress to be willing to end the war by a truce, after the precedents of the Swiss cantons and the
United
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Netherlands.
Burke, of
North Carolina, seconded
by
Duane, of New York, wished no more than that independence should be tacitly acknowledged; but congress required that, previous to any treaty of peace, the independence of the
United States should, on the part of
Great Britain, be ‘assured.’
Further;
Gerard wished America to bring about the accession of
Spain to the alliance by trusting implicitly to the magnanimity of the
Spanish king; otherwise, he said, ‘you will prevent his Catholic majesty from joining in our common cause, and from completing the intended triumvirate.’
But congress was not ready to give up the navigation and left bank of the
Mississippi.
It therefore escaped from an immediate decision by resolving to send a plenipotentiary of its own to
Spain.
The minister to be chosen to negotiate a peace was, by a unanimous vote, directed to require ‘
Great Britain to treat with the
United States as sovereign, free, and independent,’
25 and the independence was to be effectually confirmed by the treaty of peace.
Nova Scotia was desired; but the minister might leave the north-eastern boundary ‘to be adjusted by commissioners after the peace.’
The guarantee of an equal common right to the fisheries was declared to be of the utmost importance, but was not made an ultimatum, except in the instructions for the treaty of commerce with
England.
At the same time the
American minister at the court of France was instructed to concert with that powder a mutual guarantee of their rights in the fisheries as enjoyed before the war.
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The plan for a treaty with
Spain lingered a month
Chap. IX.} 1779. Sept. 17. |
longer.
On the seventeenth of September, congress offered to guarantee to his Catholic majesty the
Floridas, if they should fall into his power, ‘provided always that the
United States shall enjoy the free navigation of the
Mississippi, into and from the sea.’
26 The great financial distress of the states was also to be made known to his Catholic majesty, in the hope of a subsidy or a guarantee of a loan to the amount of five millions of dollars.
27
On the twenty-sixth of September, congress pro-
ceeded to ballot for a minister to negotiate peace;
John Adams being nominated by
Laurens, of
South Carolina, while
Smith, of
Virginia, proposed
Jay, who was the candidate favored by the
French minister.
On two ballots no election was made.
A compromise reconciled the rivalry;
Jay, on the twenty-seventh,
was elected envoy to
Spain.
The civil letter in which
Vergennes bade farewell to
John Adams on his retiring from
Paris was read in congress in proof that he would be most acceptable to the
French ministry; and, directly contrary to its wishes, he was chosen to negotiate the treaty of peace as well as an eventual treaty of commerce with
Great Britain.
