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march directly to
Camden, confident of its easy capt-
ure and the consequent recovery of the country.
To
Kalb he wrote: ‘Enough has already been lost in a vain defence of
Charleston; if more is sacrificed, the southern states are undone; and this may go nearly to undo the rest.’
Arriving in the
camp of Kalb, he was confirmed in his purpose by
Thomas Pinckney, who was his aid, and by
Marion.
It was the opinion of
Kalb, that the enemy would not make a stand at
Camden.
1 His first words ordered the troops to be prepared to march at a moment's warning.
The safest route, recommended by a memorial of the principal officers, was by way of
Salisbury and
Charlotte, through a most fertile, salubrious, and well-cultivated country, inhabited by presbyterians who were heartily attached to the cause of independence, and among whom a post for defence might have been established in case of disaster.
But
Gates was impatient; and having detached
Marion towards the interior of
South Carolina to watch the motions of the enemy and furnish intelligence, he, on the morning of the twenty-seventh
of July, put what he called the ‘grand army’ on its march by the shortest route to
Camden through a barren country which could offer no food but lean cattle, fruit, and unripe maize.
On the third of August, the army crossed the
Pedee river, making a junction on its southern bank with
Lieutenant-Colonel Porterfield of
Virginia, an excellent officer, who had been sent to the relief of
Charleston, and had kept his small command on the frontier of
South Carolina, having found means to subsist
